研究限制與建議

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再行收購其研發成果及資產。而這些現象，也與 Phillips and Zhdanov （2012）

所建立的模型之預測相同。

第二節研究限制與建議

本文研究所使用之樣本資料為台灣上市（櫃）公司，然而針對小型公 司積極投入研發與創新活動之研究，若能納入未上市（櫃）公司之微型企 業將更為完整，然而此部分資料並非公開可取得。

而本研究最大之研究限制在於產業分類，公司財務資料主要由台灣經 濟新報資料庫（TEJ）取得，其分類方式採用台灣上市及上櫃公司之統一產 業分類碼（TSE 產業別）。然而在衡量產業需求變數時，主計處所採用的產 業分類方式為中華民國行業標準分類，與前者有所不同，也因此可能無法 精確反映需求變動，僅能作為代理變數參考。

此外，本研究之另一限制為國內購併樣本數太少，尚不如美國購併活 動盛行，已有上千筆的購併事件足以做深入的研究探討，若往後能累積更 多樣本數後，後續研究者則能夠依產業不同的屬性，做更深入之分析與研 究。以電子工業或高科技產業為例，因為近年來產品營業週期短，而大規 模公司因為在研發競賽中相較不利，故可能透過購併方式來取得新產品之 技術或專利權，此現象可供後續研究者或相關經營者思考與探討。

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