在本研究中，我們遭遇了一些問題，因為此篇研究乃一延伸研究，
首先是資料收集方面，在家族董事與外部董事上的資料收集有限，再加 上在經理人異動宣告方面，部份樣本並未透露異動原因，導致樣本數過 少，也許未來仍可以增長研究期間，藉以增加研究樣本。再者，在自願 性異動與非自願異動性異動的區分上，由於文獻對於自願與非自願的異 動，多屬主觀性分類，故本文以過去文獻做為標準，來做此一分類，然 而，仍不可避免，其中有部份樣本出現錯誤存在。
本研究未來尚可進一步做其他的延伸性研究，在家族企業方面，對 於繼任人選的探討，是否仍舊為家族血親關係人，由於台灣家族企業頗 多，過去對於台灣家族企業的研究，也與國外文獻大為不同，故若在繼 任經理人上再深入探討，應可再加強台灣家族企業為何異於他國家族企 業的實證。另外，在經理人異動方面，應可將經理人異動做一分類，如 內部升遷或聘用外部專業人才等做一研究，並將產業做一分類，如新任 的經理人是不是屬於同產業等，以此等想法再去做一些延伸性的變化研 究。
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附錄 問卷範例
親愛的女士、先生：
您好！ 感謝您在百忙之中撥空拆閱此信，我是朝陽科技大學企研所二年級的 學生，目前在黃旭輝老師的指導下，針對 92 學年度之國科會計畫案進行研究，
為使此國科會研究切合實際，具有參考價值，亟需您的協助。素仰 貴公司為業 界翹楚，爰特選為研究調查樣本之一，由於您最瞭解貴公司之情況，因此祈請您 能在百忙中撥空填答本問卷。您的協助對於本研究具有關鍵性的影響，謝謝您！
本問卷所得之所有資料僅供本研究整體分析之用，個別問卷之內容絕不披露 發表，敬請 安心填卷。
最後，僅對您熱中學術與協助，至上最高的敬意。
敬祝
業績大展 闔家安康
靜宜大學財務金融系助理教授 黃旭輝博士
朝陽科技大學企研所研究生 王育偉 敬上
1.請問下列董事會名單中，董事長和總經理是否具有親屬關係？
是 否
2.請問下列董事名單中，與董事長或總經理不具有親屬關係的董事共有幾位？
3. .請問下列董事名單中，是否具有外部董事？
是 否
4.請問下列董事名單中，共有幾位外部董事？
附註：
1.親屬關係定義：此處的親屬關包含直系血親、旁系血親和姻親的關係。
2.外部董事定義：此處的外部董事係指該董事及其親屬未在公司任職且亦非關係 企業的代表。
以下為第一店公司民國 85 年 5 月董事會名單：
法人或個人代表 姓名 身份
今武投資(股) 袁祖鈞 董事長
僑信投資(股) 梁慧賢 董事