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Intergovernmental Fiscal Systems and Local Government Behavior
— A Study of Duplicate Construction and Local Protectionism in Transitional China
Hai-tao Tsao
(Associate Professor, Department of International Business, Asia University)
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the duplicate investment and local protectionism in transitional China through the reform of intergovernmental fiscal relations. The changes in intergovernmental fiscal relations including revenue and expenditure, the tax system, and the budget institution give rise to the revenue-seeking incentives of local governments. Duplicate construction and local protectionism together constitute one of the principal forms of local government behavior. In order to maximize their revenues, local governments are enthusiastic about the high tax rate industries. Consequently, during the revenue-sharing system (RSS) (1978-1993), local governments invested heavily in processing and manufacturing industries in order to collect product tax. Local protectionism in this period mainly arose as local authorities protected local products from market competition by means of regulation and embargoes. By contrast, after the tax-sharing system (TSS) reform, local governments invested heavily in
local infrastructure so as to increase their revenues from business tax and income tax. While local protectionism has been largely alleviated since that period of time, it has not been eradicated due to the shortcomings of the TSS reform.
Keywords: Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations, Local Governments, Revenue-seeking Incentive, Duplicate Construction, Local Protectionism