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Chapter II: A Contextual Approach of DCAs
Thus far, DCAs could be understood as a product of structural pressure, institutional dynamics, and strategic bargaining. It should be further noticed that, despite separate sections above, these theoretical explanations are not mutually exclusive. As some might notice, the
approach mentioned in the first chapter is all essentially rationalist. That is, they provide the theoretical of DCAs in that the formations of DCAs are reflections of states’ calculation to
respond the environment, either international structure, institutions, and strategic interaction.
Furthermore, the strategic choice approach has been founded on methodological bets of
“boxes-within-boxes” and “relationship-centric.” They are, in fact, a precise viewpoint to
leverage the potential benefits of the other approaches (Lake and Powell 1999a). For example, the foundational assumption such as the anarchic system, underlying the neorealism and
neoliberalism, can and do inform the preferences and options within a strategic interaction.
Strategic interactions, in this sense, “summarize” a broader context under which states interact
with their counterparts. These contexts, instead of being assumed, can be specified to derive a
deeper understanding of bargaining. In addition, with appropriate exogenous shocks, the environment can be changed that actors’ preferences and options could later contribute to the
evolution or modification of current institutions. This later phase is inherently an evolutionary
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approach to see how states and institutions adapt themselves to the international environment (Kahler 1999).
Given their commonality, I argue that these approaches are compatible and that a systemic and orderly conjoint of these theories could produce a more fruitful analysis framework. This framework contains several parts. First, it requires a specification of international structure and geopolitical assessment. Second, institutional background, globally and regionally, should be elaborated to see whether a counterforce against pure international structure exists. Finally, I start examining strategic bargaining which is informed by the aforementioned considerations.
This chapter is organized as follows. I start by describing my analyzing frameworks and then specifying each part of the framework. Then, I will make some propositions to elaborate my expectations as well as the limits of this approach.
Pathway of Bargaining: Structural and Institutional Context
To better capture the formation of DCAs, I consider wider information behind the strategic interaction to provide a more coherent explanation for actors’ preference and decision to opt
for DCAs instead of assuming rationality.
In a standardly structured game, environments of strategic interaction involve several factors: players, options, and payoffs. The settings, however, are absent of the texture of international politics in that they treat international structure and institutional constraints as exogenous variables. In this manner, the source of options and the content of payoffs are
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narrowly defined despite parsimonious theories and inference. Further, the analytical framework as such would depart considerably from the reality. Hence, it is imperative to include information that provides for inferences the source of preference, accordingly actions (Copelovitch and Putnam 2014). To start with, I categorize the external constraints into structural and institutional constraints. While the former represents the geopolitical landscape
and international power distribution, the latter reflects the existing norms and rules guiding the actor’s choice of actions.
Structural Constraints
In terms of structural constraints, extensive literature has been developed to elaborated how states will act optimally to ensure their own survival. States, under the structural characterized by international anarchy, should expect no one to come to their help. Instead, it is their own endeavor that could increase their odds of survival (Waltz 1979). Inherently, a
structure is defined by the distribution of power within. Together with the agnostic perspective on the others’ intention and relatively free use of force, it is exactly the distribution of power,
or more precisely capability, that foster the environment in which states act. States in this sense are the prisoners in the jail they build.
Given the consideration above, several variables are included to deduce the preliminary pool of optimal actions. First, the distribution of power must be specified. In the realist
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convention, it is probably most useful to consider both military and economic power since both are capability to exert power against others. For example, after the end of the Cold War, China’s
rise in both economic and military aspects have greatly altered the once predominance enjoyed by the US. However, as the previous chapter indicated. There are few states being able to extend their impacts throughout the globe at its own given their limited capability that constrains the sphere of influence. (Lemke & Werner, 1996). For this reason, I narrow down the base of balance of power to regions instead of the globe.14 Again, the relationship between the US and China properly shows the limitations. A few years ago, despite China’s spectacular
growth, she barely has the counterweight against the US in another region rather than East Asia.
This constraint from states’ capability, and accordingly, the international structure has limit
China’s ability to assert its influence (Ross 2010).
Second, states’ ability to engage realpolitik does not merely rely on their capability.
Rather, as scholars of geopolitics implied, they tend to be restrained by the geography.
Geography, to some extent, is the foundational structure of international politics. While some suffered from the revenge of geography, the rest could be blessed by it. In a similar sense, not all states have the same say on international politics. Some states benefit from their inherent advantages such as abundance of energy and strategic locations, others might simply have no
14 This process is, in fact, reflecting a consideration of regional systems that act with autonomy, if not independently, within the global system. Lemke (2002, 49–57) demonstrated that, despite conventional assumption of international anarchy, hierarchy operates in the meantime that minor states are restrained given the presence of great powers. Furthermore, the structure exists not only in the scope of entire globe but also in a regional fashion such that regions live with their own hierarchies and dynamics.
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such conditions.15 For example, states in the Middle East possess great potential to influence international politics through oil. States without such advantages might nevertheless subdue to such clouts. Based on this distinction, states that are able to weigh in the geopolitics could be roughly separated into two groups: geopolitical players and geopolitical pivot. While the former labels those willing to alter and challenge the structure beyond their own borders, the latter describes states possessing characteristics that can incur geopolitical volatility even against their own will (Brzezinski 1997, 37–41).
Some might argue the similarity of this geopolitical claim to the neorealist structural view.
Geopolitics is, however, much less rigid given the necessity to combine geographical facts with states’ predisposition to settle in the current geopolitical arrangements. Hence, regionally or globally, states are not facing their counterparts’ capability per se. Instead, what they encounter in their own perception of the others’ threats, which can be largely conditioned by the
geographical limits or odds. In terms of international security, the extent to which other states are able to cause harm against others could be states’ central concerns given their insecurity.
Multiple factors can explicate such insecurity. For instance, whether the capability advantages lean toward offense and defense will make a grave difference. On the other hand, whether a state occupied geographic predominance might also change the expected outcomes of conflict
15 Probing the role of issue linkage in improving alliance credibility, Poast (2013) discovered that the issue linkages do have the function of increasing successful deterrence. Furthermore, he revealed that buffer states with valuable resources actually are much less, not more, likely to be invaded. This result yield an interesting insights regarding the passive, instead of proactive, aspects of resource in swaying geopolitics.
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considerably (Jervis, 1978; Van Evera, 1998). Such concerns considerably inform states’
subjective evaluation of others’ geopolitical weight.
Institutional Pathway
The material structure as such, however, is not the only exogenous constraints that limit
the choice of states. International regimes, on the other hand, guide the formation of international institutions to coordinate states’ external actions. The structural restraints as an
underlying rationale upon which states act are rather a permissive environment for states to participate in international institutions (Stein 1982; Keohane 1982). Further, as the Folk Theorem entails, under repeated interactions, there could be multiple equilibria which produces less useful prediction if at all.16 Hence, to facilitate coordination between states, the creation of institutions is rather the demand of states rather than an automatic outcome of international structure. Additionally, institutions generate a force of path dependence by inducing states to sink costs if the former continue to produce profitable outcomes and reduce the costs (Keohane 1988). Given this situation, institutions could be viewed as being created to enhance coordination of interstate interaction.
This function, on the other hand, indicates that states can not make decisions entirely at their will. They are constrained by the norms, rules, and procedures of the existing institutions.
16 The same difficulties occur in the game of the sex, in which two equilibria are possible. This type of game implies the importance of institutional designs and the problem of coordination.
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Furthermore, the structural constraints, despite mitigation by institutions might prevent them from following institutional paths optimally. Factors such as inherent interest, previous distribution of power, or internal bargaining could altogether generate additional forces to change the institutions. Accordingly, asymmetry can exist within such institutional relationships (Young 1982). While one state might be a member or party of a given institution, the other nonetheless might not or have only a marginal say on the direction of the institution.
Furthermore, states might have different degrees of participation or commitments to institutions that states’ connection to existing regimes can vary. Bearing this situation in mind,
the first variable will be dichotomy. That is, whether states in a relationship are symmetric in certain institutions. Are states in the same institution equally in need of such arrangements?
In addition, as I mentioned in the previous chapter, institutions do not appear ex nihilo.
They are, instead, created within an existing institutional landscape. Even states taking part in the same institutions consider the possibility to create or modify the current arrangement in order to tackle the emerging problem. The existence of preceding institutions is, in fact,
necessary to enable the bargaining process. Mere changes of structural constraints along will only be “sufficient” to alter the institutional path. States’ intents and efforts to proceed the
bargaining, instead, will be necessary to introduce the pathway alteration.17 Given this concern,
17 Existing literature has addressed such issues from various aspects. Issue-linkage, for instance, has been one of the most important strand to discuss states’ endeavor to negotiate for better arrangements. In particular, states different perception or judgements on type of issue linkage could widely influence the bargaining outcomes.
Trade issues, in particular, have been studied in this fashion. For example, Japan’s concession for agricultural liberalization was actually a product of cross-sector issue linkage and domestic lobbying for pushing forward the negotiation. In such process, states’ basic preference and institutional contexts have played pivotal roles
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I consider the second variable of institutional path, the existence of preceding institutions. For instance, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation’s formation can be legitimately seen as a
product of institutional bargaining under the change of structure, and more importantly participants’ desire to incorporate existing institutions (Aggarwal 1998a).
Here, if we take the institutional symmetry into consideration, then we will immediately observe states might have different approaches to proceed institutional bargaining. In particular, given the previous concerns of states' different degrees of attachment to the institutions, it could be plausibly reasoned that states would derive different bargaining strategies accordingly.
So far, the structural and institutional factors are articulated to derive a comprehensive description of the environment in which states operated. Generally, they make up the first two determinants of state option in strategic interaction: structural pressure and institutional path.
Specifically, each of them is made up of two sub-variables. In terms of structural pressure, I consider the international structure, the distribution of power, and the underlying constraints, geopolitical predispositions.18 On the other hand, I deepened the inquiries by seeking how
states import such concerns into international institutions. In this case, I include states'
deciding states’ choice of path. While the previous section emphasized the importance of structural factors, this section in turn focus on the institutional contexts. On this point, see Carnegie (2013); Davis (2004); Haas (1980); Koremenos, Lipson, & Snidal (2003).
18 The concept of structural pressure could be understood in terms of loss-of-gradient (LSG) developed by Kenneth E. Boulding. In his papers, he laid out a theory of viability. That is, in a given space, a state’s survival depends on its viability. Specifically, states’ viability is determined by the number of other actors and the loss-of-gradient. For the number of other actors, the logic is similar to structural realist, who utilize the logic of market as an analogy. The more actors in a given space, the more competitive is the environment. On the other hand, loss-of-gradient also matters to determine the viability of a given state. Loss-of-gradient implies that states’ power has a negative relationship with distance. Simply put, the further the weaker. This concept sums up the dynamics of structural pressure. Both determinants together illuminated the structural pressure and geopolitical limitations in international politics. For more, see Boulding (1963; 2018); Webb (2007).
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participation in institutions, institutional symmetry, and the context of state interaction,
significance of existing institutions. Altogether, they form an informative background to infer
states’ preference and choice. Table II.1 summarizes these variables.
Table II.1: Determinants of External Constraints
Main Variables
Institutional Path:
Institutional Symmetry & Significance of existing Institutions
Rigid Loose
Structural Pressure:
Distribution of power
& Geopolitical predisposition
High International Stability Precarious Rivalry
Low Spiral Competition International Instability
Source: Made by author.
From the table above, we can readily observe four combinations. In the top-left cell, which is characterized by high structural pressure and rigid institutional path, we derive international stability. In this case, states are bounded by the status quo and the constant payoff by the international institutions. Hence, states are more likely to maintain the status quo instead of deviating from the original pathway. In the top-right cell, where the structural pressure is also high, but this time comes with the absence of strong international institutions. In such an arrangement, we should observe a rather international environment that encourages a sense of precarious balance. Under such a situation, states live in a typical setting of the realist balance of power. States strengthen the existing institutions to compensate for the lack of institutional focal point. In the bottom-left cell, states reside in a totally opposite environment against
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precarious balance. Given the low structural pressure and rigid institutional pathway, weaker states are more likely to engage in balancing behavior to increase their own security. In terms of DCA, states would step up in making new DCA enhance their defense capacities. Finally, in the bottom-right cell, states are encircled by high uncertainty given little structural pressures that can refrain their counterparts from taking risking behavior. Loose international institutions, on the other hand, become an enabling feature that is conducive to state aggression. A tentative generalization from the table, thus far, is the baseline of states’ propensity to reduce uncertainty.
In either one scenario, states are prone to foster stability by improving balancing and coordinating. How, then, do these scenarios fit into the analysis of the DCA formation?
The next step, accordingly, will be specifying the strategic interaction of how states decide to sign DCAs in addition to the current security arrangements, for instance, alliances and strategic partnerships. As I will show below, I argue the formation of DCAs as costly signals to deter the potential aggressors as well as the institutional evolution against changing the global structure.
Arming through Aligning: Specifying Strategic Bargaining
One last issue must be addressed to understand why states sign DCAs. While the explanations above account roughly for the formation of alliance and other institutions. They nonetheless fail to explain why states aimed at such a form of cooperation in the international arena. With this background information at hand, I subsequently specify the “game” being
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analyzed. The structural and institutional contexts that informed the position and policy taken by actors in this stage establish the causes that motivated actors' rationality. Accordingly, I import these ideas into a specific strategic relationship to make sense of certain institutional designs.19
However, it should be noted that actions taken in these specified interactions also contributed to the contexts under which interactions take place. These feedbacks, in turn, modify the current contexts and further import a certain degree of impacts into the next stage of strategic bargaining. In this perspective, the actions are means not only to maximized actors' utility but also to shape a more preferable environment in the future.
Using the insights from the structural and institutional accounts, I consider DCAs as an effort to counter the external uncertainty. Indeed, existing literature has discovered that states take advantage of escape clauses or withdrawal provisions to counter domestic or international shocks. Still others discussed the effect of renegotiation in adjusting existing institutions.
Though compatible, the formation of DCAs cannot be simply attributed to the strategies above.
Rather, DCAs are intended to bolster current institutions in the face of uncertainty by adding features to the security and defense architectures.
19 I discern my approach here from the so-called strategic culture approach. The strategic culture approach focuses on the symbolic, semantic, and ideal objects that might create a strong focal point, which accordingly generates a converging force to justify or alter the efficacy of certain choices. In contrast, my argument here is rather materialistic than idealistic. Concentrating on the material aspects enable me to develop a possibly parsimonious approach that takes advantage of strategic rationality. For strategic culture, see Johnston (1995).
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From Exogenous Shock to Institutional Evolution: Credibility through Consolidation
From the previous chapters and sections, one way the institutional path might change is the exogenous shock, an impetus triggering the underlying capability and preference of states.
In this sense, the rearrangements, either modification or replacement, are the exact bargaining problems. Bargaining problems within international cooperation can largely foreshadow future cooperation by projecting the enforcement and monitoring problem. External shocks matter in the way that they are able to generate unexpected leverages for participants in international institutions. Given these problems, states are actually distanced by the fear of being reneged amidst uncertainty. Hence, exogenous shocks do not directly lead to the change of international institutions per se. Shocks, instead, introduce new rounds of bargaining that eventually breed,
In this sense, the rearrangements, either modification or replacement, are the exact bargaining problems. Bargaining problems within international cooperation can largely foreshadow future cooperation by projecting the enforcement and monitoring problem. External shocks matter in the way that they are able to generate unexpected leverages for participants in international institutions. Given these problems, states are actually distanced by the fear of being reneged amidst uncertainty. Hence, exogenous shocks do not directly lead to the change of international institutions per se. Shocks, instead, introduce new rounds of bargaining that eventually breed,