Chapter III: Case Study – Indo Pacific
The Quadrilateral Indo-Pacific Strategy
Ever since Donald Trump’s talks on the 2017 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the term, “Indo-Pacific,” has received considerable attention in international
politics.25 Despite several other countries’ supports for a similar strategy before, the injection of the US aspiration made possible the term becoming a name of a new region. Nebulous and void as the term appeared and being criticized, the Indo-Pacific can actually be viewed as a representation and reformation of security and defense security networks. Furthermore, the emergence of the concept is the very outcome of the structural and geopolitical fluctuation which imports considerable momentum into security and defense cooperation.
This section will be organized as follows. First, I offer an overview of the regional power structure as well as the geopolitical landscape and supplement them with the institutional
25 The term, “Indo-Pacific,” is not coined only around this decade. In fact, in the early 20th century, the German general and historian, Karl Haushofer, has already referred to the “Indo-Pacific” space. The space was then most colonized territories situated. Seeing the longing desire for self-determination, Haushofer called for cooperation between the oppressed Germany and their Indo-Pacific counterparts. The similar geopolitics sphere has also been identified by the other geopolitical theorist. Earlier in the late 19th century, Sir Halford Mackinder has already called the place as the Monsoon of Asia, which is the key to balance against the power from the heartland. Interestingly, together with the other edge of Eurasia, namely the Western Europe, Spykman and Nicholl (1944) renamed the space as “the Rimland,” one of the geopolitical foundation of the US containment policy during the Cold War. Currently, Indo-Pacific has been generally understood as the combination of Pacific and Indian Oceans, without referring to the continent. Ever since its formation, besides wider geographical range, it has been endowed with heavy concerns of security nature, which makes the nature of Indo-Pacific slightly different from Asia-Pacific. It also contains several of the busiest sea lane of communication (SLOC) and territories with strategic importance, for instance: the Korean Peninsula, the South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait. For more debate, see He (2018); Beeson (2018); Wilson (2018).
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architecture within. In this case, I concentrate on the regional security under the US hub-and-spoke alliance system, which was formed by the US predominance in the region but challenged in the face of a growing China. Against this backdrop, I further elaborate on individual states’
responses to the uncertainty generated by the change of regional geopolitics as well as institutional unreliability.
To trace increasing defense cooperation within the Indo-Pacific, I focus on the response
and interaction by the following four countries: the US, Japan, Australia, and India. These four countries, namely the Quad, the shorthand for “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,” despite
divergence on issue priority, have actually pursued closer cooperation in the defense area.26 Except for considering the role of China’s rise, I further examine the US’s undetermined commitment and regional powers’ search for strategic autonomy.
Unsettling the Hub
The security architecture in Asia-Pacific is largely in debt to the San Francisco System (also known the “hub-and-spoke system).27 The system, as the name suggests, was centered
26 The exact meaning of the Quad focused on the Quadrilateral consultation mechanism, which has been mostly dormant rather than active. However, the status of the consultation group is not the main focus in this section.
The main theme of interests here is the defense cooperation between the members of the Quad rather than the defense cooperation conducted under the framework of the Quad. The basic unit of analysis, therefore, is country instead of a single grouping. In the following sections, the Quad is mainly used to refer four countries participating in the dialogue rather than the grouping per se.
27 The so-called hub-and-spokes, in general, can be referred as a wider concept that describe a form of network made up by a center, the hub, and multiple linkage with the center but not each other. The San Francisco System was dubbed as so because of Asia-Pacific’s dominant bilateralism centered on the US. John Foster Dulles, the former Secretary of States, was considered as the architect of the system. For more, see Calder (2004); Cha (2011).
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on a pivotal power: the US. After the end of WWII, given the fear of communist aggression, the US signed multiple treaties to signal its commitment to the region. Despite most treaties includes the clause of mutual defense obligation, the truth is that treaty allies relied heavily on the US. The US' ability to provide security and commitment is, hence, the bedrock of the Asia-Pacific security architecture.28
Furthermore, the system is characterized by its preference for bilateral cooperation.
Though the US attempted to create the “Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO),” the
effort was in vain. Disdain for formality and the lack of collective awareness apparently
abhorred the prospect for multilateral cooperation. As for Northeast Asia, the historical and territorial disputes hindered potential collaboration. Accordingly, an Asian “NATO” became
an unlikely future. Until today, security and defense cooperation remains to be the mainstream despite regular multilateral forum such as East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the West Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM), and ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting – Plus (ADMM+). Though these fora successfully convene political leaders from the region, they rarely if any introduce meaningful outcomes.
28 The US ability to make commitments play not only an enabling but also an restricting role. Given the
historical complex underlying the East Asia politics, East Asia states are mostly hostile to each other. The WWII and the emerge of a Communist China further aggravated the tendency. Hence, to prevent the adventurism of the East Asian states, the US have to make commitment to ensure its allies security to prevent any actions of seeking security on their own; a fear of another great war became a main driver behind the establishment of the hub-and-spoke system. For more, see Bush (2005); Cha (2009).
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However, hub-and-spoke is not unchallenged. In fact, the regional power structure changed considerably in the way that the US, the fundamental force maintaining the system, became less dominant. In turn, we are witnessing a stronger yet even tougher China. A few numbers can tell the story. Using the data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), it is immediately clear that the US still entertain significant military
predominance in contrast to the other powers in the Quad and China. Despite the preeminence, China’s rapid growth military power dwarfs its counterparts in the same region (Figure III.1).
Take a different view, the growth rate over the past few years delivers a rather different image. Early on, nearly all states decreased their military expenditure, a reaction probably resulted from the financial crisis. However, the development that follows diverges considerably.
While the US growth rate went negative, the other countries military expense remains relatively stable. Among them, China’s military growth has obviously overtaken the others by keeping roughly 10% increase every year, despite Australia’s brief progress. Overall, the regional
power structure has gradually if not totally been driven away from the US preponderance in
terms of military capability.29
29 The balance of power in East Asia is actually predicated on a delicate equilibrium between multiple factors.
The power structure is largely mediated by the geographical obstacles. Currently, China’ navy is overwhelming given its tremendous tonnage. Also, its shore is filled by multiple submarine bases and land-based missiles.
Altogether, China’s predominance is truly intimidating. Based on the existing data, China has at least 360,000 deployable personnel in the Eastern and Southern Theaters. In the same theaters, PLAN possess more than 50 destroyers and frigate. The military balance tilts largely toward China if we consider the other forces such as the Rocket Force and Strategic Support Force (United States Department of Defense 2018). Nonetheless, China faces the exact same challenge as the US, Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD). The strategy, however, is carried out by its regional counterparts, all of which are capable of weakening China’s projecting power by carrying out asymmetric warfare in both East China Sea and South China Sea. For instance, Japan has far less military power than China. However, Japan’s integrated network with the US and its readiness for high operational tempo could significantly contain China’s ambition of power projection beyond the first island chain. Overall, China has not
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Figure III.1: Power Distribution and Growth in the Indo-Pacific, 2007-2018
become a regional hegemon. Instead, the balance of power characterizes East Asia. For more, see Medeiros et al. (2008), Beckley (2017).
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The international structure is not the only change occurred in the past few years. China
has become more and more assertive and aggressive. One of the most telling examples is China’s declaration of its air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea. By this
new regulation, China required all aircraft to report identification and to follow instructions.
Otherwise, emergency measures could be taken. The act received wide protests and critics from neighbor countries and stakeholders. What makes the measure even more contentious is its coverage over disputed areas such as Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and Ieodo/Suyan Rock. For another instance, in 2016 China not only refused to abide by the rule made by the Permanent
Court of Arbitration and further militarized the isle in the South China Sea afterward. On the other hand, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) patrolled more frequently than ever.
Occasionally, the patrols went beyond the first island chain. Along with growing frequency of
approaching disputed areas such as Senkaku/Diaoyu Isle, China raised the level of assertiveness significantly. Overall, China’s tendency toward further geopolitical outreach is
arguably getting stronger.
Heightened tension is not the only trend characterizing the past few years. Another feature is the uncertainty brought by the US. Soon after awakening from the global financial crisis, the Obama administration shifted the strategic focus from the Middle East to Asia-Pacific. She enhanced its participation in Asia-Pacific, an effort marked by the strategy, “Rebalance to Asia.”
On the address to the Australian Parliament in 2011, the former President Barack Obama
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declared, “In the Asia Pacific in the 21st century, the United States of America is all in” (White
House 2011).
Later in 2012, the Strategic Guidance released by the Pentagon further made it clear that they will “of necessity rebalances toward the Asia-Pacific region.” Such a necessity was
entailed by the economic growth of the emerging economies, particularly China and India. Yet the opportunities also required DOD to mitigate the risk in “the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia” (United States Department
of Defense 2012). The US Rebalance to Asia delivered a wonderful picture to East Asia by not only strategic engagement but also deeper and comprehensive economic integration, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).
Nevertheless, the optimism was suspended in the winter of 2016. Donald Trump’s victory
in 2016 brought significant tumult in both American domestic and international politics. Since Trump’s inauguration, his transactional style, perfectly conveyed through the slogan, “Make America Great Again (MAGA),” casts wide doubts on the US commitment in East Asia (Stokes
2018). “…our allies are not paying their fair share, and I’ve been talking about this recently a lot. Our allies must contribute toward their financial, political, and human costs, have to do it, of our tremendous security burden. But many of them are simply not doing so,” said Trump in
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his foreign policy speech (Trump 2016). The US has since then delivered a gloomy image to the strategic landscape by requiring renegotiation on alliance arrangement.30
Diverging from this despairing image, the Trump administration instead introduced a new concept, “Indo-Pacific.” The terminology catalyzed wide debates regarding the US grand
strategy. Despite the vibrant discussion of a new geospatial imagination, the renewed strategy vision injected a strand of mixed message that, in fact, results in even greater uncertainty (Pan 2014). In the face of a rising China, the Trump administration has indeed multiple signals
expressing the resolve to stand firm against the revisionist challenges. Clear examples include but not limited to the Vice President’s remark in the Heritage Foundation and Wilson Center
as well as various legislation aiming to facilitate interaction between the US and its allies.31 On the other hand, the so-called “Freed and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” is hardly convincing.
The practical content of the strategy failed to convince the regional power about its sustainability and orientation.32 Such concerns are underwritten by Trump’s frequently
30 Trump expressed his insatisfication to the current division of defense cost sharing with the US treaty allies.
One instant case would be the negotiation on the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) between the US and Korea. Ever since Trump’s presidential campaign, he has been demanding allies to pick up more burdens.
Despite the nearly equal division of approximately $866.6 million paid by both side (United States Forces Korea 2014), Trump instead require South Korea to pay 400% additional costs for hosting troops, costing around $5 billion . At the time of writing this thesis, the negotiation to raise the payment is suspended (Lee, Cha, and Shin 2019; Gaouette 2019). For more information, see Manyin et al. (2017).
31 These actions and information provides strong signals to the international society with resolute tones to stand against China’s revisionist aggression in the South China Sea and beyond as well as North Korea’s disruption in the Northeast Asia. Practically, the US Congress authorized appropriation to the executive branch to strengthen both strategic and economic connections in Indo-Pacific. See White House (2018a; 2018b; 2019), US Congress (2018).
32 Without doubts, there are multiple initiatives announced to address some of the key issues in Indo-Pacific.
For instance, Pence presented to the 2018 APEC CEO Summit “the Indo-Pacific Transparency Initiatives.” The initiative covers a wide array of issues area, all pertaining to good governance (United States Department of States 2019). Nevertheless, the US commitment to the region remains largely doubted given the administrations.
The skepticism was mainly fostered by Trump’s inconsistency with his national security team (Huxley and Schreer 2017).
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altering foreign policies. In addition, the administration’s hardline approach toward China does
not necessarily please the regional power. Instead, the stance to some extent instills hardships by requiring states choosing sides (Palit and Sano 2018; Shambaugh 2018; Storey and Cook 2018).
From the observations above, it could be immediately seen that, despite inertia, the so-called Indo-Pacific region has been undergoing considerable uncertainty. First and foremost, in the past few years, China became stronger and more assertive. The brief statistic reflects that, in terms of military power, China possesses the largest regional military capabilities. Moreover, the recent events demonstrated that China has changed tremendously as a geopolitical actor.
As the 2017 US National Security Strategy indicates, China is now a revisionist power willing and aiming to challenge the status quo. The second source of uncertainty, ranging from the strategic end to the economic end, came from the US. Strategically, we see a rather progressive foreign policy orientation yet accompanied by doubtful commitments. Economically, the major economic integration lost the major pillar, the US.
To some extent, the aforementioned development marked a wide recognition that
transformed a geopolitical construct to a geopolitical fact; competing strategic visions were gradually accumulating to an underlying context upon which regional powers acts. China’s
hardening posture and the US undetermined but hawkish standings characterized the so-called Indo-Pacific with uncertainty and confrontation. Unmatching with the precarious standoff was
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a loosely organized regional security institution that amplifies realpolitik in the region (Medcalf 2013; H. Lee 2017; Lee-Brown 2018; K. He 2018).
In this sense, we are seeing an increasingly rigid power structure in the region. Meanwhile, the institutional structure remains relatively flexible and loose for their bilateral and forum fashion. Based on my analysis framework, this combination of structural constraints and institutional pathways breeds a precarious rivalry. Given that the US is the foundation of the hub-and-spokes system, its unsettled determination casts another shadow over the structural balance. How can the alliance system be sustained in the face of doubly challenging uncertainty?
Before addressing this issue, it is imperative to understand regional powers’ preferences and options in such an environment.
Uncertainty within Strategic Interests and Options
a. United States of America
The US strategic interests in East Asia have been consistent at least in the past ten years despite different forms. Ever since the Obama administration, the US has been pursuing a
stronger but flexible presence in East Asia. As Obama addressed in his early speech in 2008,
“[n]ow is the time for a new era of international cooperation. It's time for America and Europe
to renew our common commitment to face down the threats of the 21st century just as we did the challenges of the 20th. It's time to strengthen our partnerships with Japan, South Korea,
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Australia, and the world's largest democracy—India—to create a stable and prosperous Asia.
It's time to engage China on common interests like climate change, even as we continue to
encourage their shift to a more open and market-based society. It's time to strengthen NATO by asking more of our allies, while always approaching them with the respect owed a partner…”
(Obama 2008). In terms of strategic interests, the US under Obama was clearly pursuing coherent international cooperation with powers in different regions. Furthermore, the administration was also attempting to reduce the burden of sustaining alliance on its shoulders
by fostering closer engagement in the multilateral institutions (Tan 2015, 118–20). Through such an approach, the Obama administration’s foreign policy was predicated on multilateralism
in which regular consultation instead of unilateral imposition plays the main role.
Hub-and-spoke system, to some extent, evolves upon the new era. With such a rationale in mind, it would not be hard to understand Obama’s approach to carry out the “Rebalance to Asia.” Supplementing the administration’s focus on revitalizing the US economic and
withdrawing military from Iraq, then-Secretary of States, Hillary Clinton, in the article published on Foreign Policy declared that Asia’s strategic and economic is the key to the US prosperity in the next decades. Hence, it is in the US interests to commit to building a robust network across Asia-Pacific as the one in Atlantic Ocean (Clinton 2011). In the grand strategy as such, the US would not be a guarantor on its own. Rather, the US was attempting to broaden and deepen its reach in Asia-Pacific through renewing its commitment as well as encouraging
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inter-spokes cooperation in the alliance system. Even in the face of China’s rise, the US has
inter-spokes cooperation in the alliance system. Even in the face of China’s rise, the US has