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Chapter V: Conclusion
The Origins of DCA: Structure or Institution?
As the title of the section questioned, what motivates the formation of DCAs? How can we properly explain the trend? The theoretical framework in Chapter 2 suggested that two factors could be responsible for the impetus of bargaining a new DCA: one structural and the other institutional. Can each of them alone account for the formation of DCA? Given this question, we can derive two tentative proposition. First, DCAs are created when there are structural changes and geopolitical risks. Second, DCAs are created when existing institutions are questioned or challenged. I examined these two arguments in the following paragraphs.
Can structural pressure explain the formation of DCA? The two cases above offered diverging answers. In the case of the Indo-Pacific region, increasing structural pressure against the members of the Quad indeed motivated them to strengthen defense cooperation. For example, we might not see a closer US-Japan or Japan-Australia defense cooperation if there were no challenges from China. However, the implication from CSDP yielded a quite different image. Indeed, the US indeterminacy and the Brexit posed great challenges to the power structure of Europe. The balance of power continued to be in favor of the EU even in the face of Russia, which was experiencing declining military expenditure. Nevertheless, CSDP still
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kept up its pace to bolster current security architecture. The structural factors alone seemed incapable of explaining the whole picture of increasing DCAs.
On the other hand, does the institutional pathway predicted flourishing DCAs? Within the Quad, there are indeed growing trends of security and defense coordination. However, they do not necessarily amount to signing DCAs. More often, military-to-military cooperation remains informal. In terms of either bilateralism or minilateralism, it was actually the formalization of defense cooperation between the Quad members turns out to be abnormal. In such cases, the institutional explanations do not turn out to be a well-fitted predictor for the formation of DCAs.
On the other hand, CSDP is highly institutionalized and rigidly delimited by multiple previous documents. It is almost unavoidable to see an even more institutionalized CSDP to clarify the boundary between NATO and itself. Given such a competition between institutions, the formation of DCAs appears to be necessary given their limited ability to tie hands and prospects to improve odds over enemy in the future. However, the signing of DCAs remains a great instrument to provide signals and commitments to bolster current institutions.
Thus far, we can observe that neither international structure nor institutional pathway along can suffice to explain the formation of DCA.58 However, each of them delivers a unique
portion of the whole picture. On one hand, the international structure generates a momentum
58 Some readers might argue that institutional explanations are inherently stronger for the EU-related institutions as the structural explanations might perform for the Indo-Pacific alliances. I do not reject such a claim. However, I aim for more generalizability within theories. Furthermore, my claim is solely about structural explanations or institutional explanations. Instead, as the second chapter of this thesis implied, my claim is rather one of rationalism. By so doing, structural and institutional factors inform states’ preference in favor of certain options and outcome.
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within itself and international institutions so that states are forced to adjust their own policy.
On the other hand, each state’s own policy change contributes to the change of the regional structure and architecture. In terms of DCAs, its formation could be hardly explained by either structural or institutional factors alone. Rather, their interaction motivates the formation of DCAs. DCAs, furthermore, are not the end of the story. Their formation further strengthens existing security and defense architecture. That is, they are regenerating.
However, we should further ask, why do states opt for DCAs rather than alliances as a path for regeneration? This question can be answered by the institutional concerns. As observed in both cases, the US remains a strong hub despite waning credibility. One of the least preferable options for it is the creation of new alliances. Interestingly, such a point of view was concurred by its regional partners. For instance, the 3Ds cautioned by Madeline Albright suggested a strong predisposition against the making of new alliances. Also, regional powers in the Indo-Pacific also chose cooperative declaration than alliances to elevate their security relationship. Obviously, the institutional bargaining plays a critical role in the making of DCA.
To put this observation in the language of process tracing, neither structural pressure such as distribution of power or geopolitical pressure, nor institutional pathway such as the existence of previous institutions or dependence on institutions are sufficient conditions to predict the formation of DCAs, not to mention the even harder threshold of necessity. Still, these competing explanations do not undermine each other. They are rather mutually complementary
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than undermining. In both cases, we can see that states used DCA as a way to harden the regional architecture against uncertainty. In such a scenario, both structural pressure and institutional pressure play important roles; they are congruent pieces of evidence.
Another aspect of DCAs is the cost required to sign them. DCAs distinguished from the other international agreements in the way that they entailed considerable costs, in form of both
tying hands and sinking costs. In general, a more colloquial way to understand the making of DCAs is to see them as “investing.” Recall the definition of tying hands. Actors’ hands are tied
because they are likely to be punished if deviating from the current pathway. Sinking costs, on the other hand, represent the costs sunk that are unable to improve the future payoff. In a strict sense, DCAs can hardly be categorized into either category.
This aspect of DCAs, however, does not contradict to the joint explanations provided by international structure and institutions. Put it shortly, states are structurally deterred from leaving current institutional paths. Partly, states’ propensity to use DCAs to reduce uncertainty demonstrated the fact that they perceived the external constraints and accordingly form distinguished preferences. Such evidence accordingly turns the credible commitment explanations of DCAs into congruent support to the other explanations. The exact reason why the explanations converge, as I contend, is state's source of preferences. States' preferences do not appear ex nihilo. Assuming them with arbitrary presumptions tells far less than by considering the broader context. Examining the layered context of the international relations
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accordingly provides greater explanatory power in the origins of DCAs. While the international
structure largely dictates and initiates states decision-making process, we cannot easily dismiss the impacts of institutions and competitors’ calculation. The causal sequence can be
summarized in Figure V.1.
In sum, this thesis has examined states’ structurally informed and institutionally mapped
decisions amidst strategic interactions. Beyond the explanations above, this thesis sheds further light on strands of international relations studies. In the next section, I indulge myself with some space to discuss the implication of this thesis.
Discussion and Implications
The defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region and the EU shares common patterns.
First, they are becoming less dependent on a single guarantor such as the US. Instead, they opt to pursue a network woven by closer defense cooperation. On the other hand, despite the importance of vocal commitments from the political arena, states are actually devoting more to the functional aspects in terms of security and defense cooperation. In particular, the Figure V.1: Causal Sequence of DCA Creation
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“defense” part of the cooperation is gaining more weight than ever (Simón, Lanoszka, and
Meijer 2019).
Global and Regional Politics
This thesis is largely predicated on the awareness of global influence on regional politics.
As I contended in the previous chapters, seldom do countries have the ability to exert meaningful influence beyond the region in which they dwell. Furthermore, states are inherently
bounded by the locations and geography. Such limitations could be conditioned by states’
propensity to utilize or make up for their “hard-wired” material nature.
In this point of view, the regional security complex theory lends considerable leverage to my research. The theory’s focus on regional interaction and security externalities provide keen insights into the formation of one region but not the other. By theorizing the formation of DCAs, I demonstrated that geopolitical pressure is not entirely materialistic nor deterministic. States do have the ability to challenge and alter the geographic landscape by their collective vision to forge a new discourse (Buzan and Wæ ver 2003, 65–73). The formation of the Indo-Pacific is presented here exactly like a perfect example of the regional security complex, in which competing strategic interests brawl with each other to attain favorable arrangements. This thesis extends the argument further by providing two additional insights. The first is the transition
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from one region to another region, e.g.: the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific. The second is the consolidation of a region, e.g.: the growth of CSDP.
On the other hand, the evidence from the Indo-Pacific and European regional politics yields yet another implication. That is, anarchy and hierarchy coexist in regional politics.
Moreover, they compete with each other. While most of the international relation theories assumed international hierarchy, the assumption by itself does not exclude the possibility of hierarchy. Relational power as such often exerts a certain level of influence on somewhat subordinate states (Lake 2009). For instance, among the Quad members, the US influence over the Indo-Pacific regions is still predominant given the foundation of the hub-and-spoke system.
Though the Quad members have sought alteration of the alliance system to spread the risk of being abandoned, they follow the baseline order underlying the system (Bisley 2019). To some extent, it is exactly the efforts to challenge that exhibit the legitimacy of the existing order. The same situation works in the EU. In the EU, despite competing view over the orientation of the European defense and security, NATO still occupies the heartland of the debated. The existence of the Atlantic mindset largely swayed the pathway of the debate. In either case, the US apparently maintains its authority over the regional power. Hierarchy accordingly became a wedge within the regional anarchy.
However, what does the regional security complex tell in terms of DCAs? Or the other way around, what do DCAs mean for the regional politics under the global influence? DCAs
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are perfect tools to confer further legitimacy toward wider regional architecture. If we take a deeper look at the relations between DCAs and alliances, we can readily observe that DCAs are mostly hinged on blocs formed by alliances. In this sense, DCAs indeed represent an effort
to enhance the capabilities of relationships such as alliances or strategic partnerships. Equally important, however, is states’ recognition toward their DCA partners.
Convergence and Diffusion
It is widely contended that international institutions will bring states’ foreign policy closer.
Alternatively, they are more likely to cluster given their converging social network. In either way, information and options filtered by institutions play an important role during bargaining international institutions, in an environment of uncertainties. 59
Nevertheless, contrary to conventional wisdom, institutionalization does not necessarily lead to policy convergence. This phenomenon is corroborated in the two case studies above.
Despite their close positions within the social network—in this case, the EU and NATO, Germany and France have only limited overlapping vision toward the future of the European
59 Existing literature of policy convergence inspected the mechanism through which emulation and learning take place. Social network analysis, for example, considers states’ position within social network and argues that states with closer position are more likely to adopt similar policy. Accordingly, policy convergence occur because of peer pressure and socialization. Both of which provides states impetus and information regarding certain sorts of policies. On the other hand, other scholars has studied how international organizations facilitate policy diffusion and convergence. The inter-organizational communication, in such cases, provides international organizations a means to improve their rules and procedures. In this point of view, states still matter in the way that they provide international organizations information required for moderating designs of international organizations. Still other take a more sociological perspective by which states are either induced or coerced so that in the long run they legitimate specific policies. For more, see Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990); Acharya (2004); Cao (2012); Sommerer and Tallberg (2019).
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defense. For example, France and Germany, despite increasing cooperation facilitated by CSDP and EDA, continue to diverge in the way they devise their national security and defense strategy (Pannier and Schmitt 2014). In such a case, to fully develop the potential of CSDP, Germany, and France would need a stronger and converging consensus in terms of their vision toward the strategic autonomy of the EU. Without proper political and strategic coordination, only limited progress will be achieved, especially in face of uncertainty brought by the Brexit (Kempin et al. 2017).
On the other hand, the evidence derived from the Quad in the Indo-Pacific yielded a rather
different implication. In that case, it appeared that structural pressure delivered mainly by China’s increasing military presence and the US uncertain leadership played a decisive role to
urge regional powers to adopt vigilant foreign policies. Essentially, the phenomenon demonstrated the selection effects generated by the international structure (Waltz 1979, 35:91–
93).
However, it does not imply that international institutions do not matter at all. Rather, as Chapter 2 suggested. International institutions actually filter the options and information available to the Quad members. Without regional security architecture such as alliances and multilateral arrangements, it is more likely that confrontations such as the standoff between China and the Philippines will take place more often, which was apparently not the case for the Quad members. States immersed and committed themselves to the existing international
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institutions. Meanwhile, the pathway taken locked the Quad into a loose but regular consultation with each other.
DCAs, in such a vantage point, could be deemed as converging efforts to bolster the security institutions under similar international pressure. Furthermore, it is exactly the existing architecture that guides them toward the signing of DCAs.
Costs and Commitment
This thesis also argues that states' efforts to consolidate existing institutions entail some costs for states. Without endowing enough resources into institutions being maintained, states' commitment to security architecture can be hardly credible. Furthermore, despite no formal
inference, this thesis also demonstrated how DCA prevents states from reneging or abandoning.
To see this, we can see DCA as instruments of revealing states’ commitment to the current
institutions. DCAs assert its influence by the following mechanism. First, it revealed the information about each actor. For example, the defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific tends to include information sharing or regular consultation. This practice is likely to reduce states' preference for reneging on commitments it made because they might put themselves at risk after revealing private information capability or resolve to other parties (Powell 2006). On the other way around, states might be benefitted from sharing information to prevent unwanted risks. In other words, the opportunity costs of reneging are too large to shoulder. Secondly,
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signing DCAs can express states’ commitment through the costs they have endowed. In the
case of CSDP, Germany’s relatively stable military expenditure could hardly tell something if observed alone. However, by connecting the spending with broader context—CSDP and PESCO, the spending showed not only signal its preference for collective security but also its commitment to institutions to be strengthened. Such an action was made even more credible after formalizing and legalizing defense cooperation, e.g.: PESCO and EDF (Morrow 2000).
What can we ask if we extend the implication above? An interesting question to be asked
should be: does informality abhor commitments? Not necessarily. The existence of overlapping institutions, be they formal or informal, has revealed information regarding states’ capability
and type in various ways. As we can see in previous chapters, defense cooperation does not always have to be formalized. More often, they started with informal coordination and collaboration. Defense cooperation agreements, in other words, only account for limited parts of defense and security cooperation between states. In either the Quad or CSDP, regular
military exercises have been conducted to enhance defense cooperation and taken as a signal to honor the commitment to certain defense cooperation. Kevin Rudd’s withdraw from the Malabar Exercise and India’s distrust over Australia can be viewed a case that shows the costs
of reneging.
More importantly, when bargaining defense cooperation or DCAs, states are certainly bargaining over bargaining power in the future. Bear this in mind: DCAs are not simply
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lumping states’ capability; DCAs aim at increasing state’ capability. Given this function, it
would unrealistic to regard DCAs as a static instrument. Instead, they entail dynamic commitment problems given the possible transition of capability (Debs and Monteiro 2014).
Some readers might start to doubt the potential commitment problems incurred accordingly.
However, it should be noticed that, as I repeatedly indicated, DCAs do not appear ex nihilo.
Lower or higher, narrower or broader, DCAs tend to emerge from a preexisting framework.
Hence, commitments were actually made to rather a larger scheme rather DCAs per se.
Research and Policy Prospects
This thesis mainly focuses on the internal dynamics of defense cooperation. Future research should further include how challengers could be integrated into the network established among alliances. More intricate inquiries should accordingly state the balance by which the networks centered on different major powers coexist with one another.
In this study, the role of challengers in each case is passive, more like background information. Permissive or prohibiting conditions as they are, they do not possess agency in the international structure or institution building. This self-constraint is adopted because of my focus on the cooperation within and commitment to existing institutions. Without a doubt, the limitation overlooks considerable information in international politics. As a matter of fact, there are numerable dyads of cooperation between countries that are hostile to each other. DCAs as
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a source of behavioral context, then, should have additional effects on challengers (Goddard 2018; Buzan 2019; Dian and Meijer 2019).
Including them will shed further light on the role of DCAs. Whether DCAs could be deemed as a source of deterrence or signaling to challengers could further extend existing literature on alliance politics. On the other hand, this study focuses only on security institutions.
Nonetheless, a wider array of issue-linkages should be considered. In this thesis, I only consider
Nonetheless, a wider array of issue-linkages should be considered. In this thesis, I only consider