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Chapter IV: Case Study – EU CSDP
The EU Common Security and Defense Policy
The European Union (EU) has not only been known for its exemplary economic and political integration but also its recessive failure of security and defense integration. Although the EU has experienced outstanding era of political integration, its memory of security integration is bitter – until the past five years. In the past five years, despite heavy blows from the Brexit and 2014 Ukraine Crisis, the EU has, in turn, started to pursue a more proactive and comprehensive framework to enhance the capability of the EU as a whole. Some questions are worth proposed. First and foremost, why did it fail before rather than now? What leads to recent
success in contrast to past failure? What is the content of current policies that enables the member states to cooperate under the EU’s security and defense framework? The following
paragraphs will pick up these questions by order by delivering a brief historical review.
To answer these questions, it would be necessary to review the following developments.
First, the development of CSDP should be carefully examined. Except for the external shock, the role of NATO has to be clarified not least because of the general confusion of the institutional overlapping but because of the institutional bargaining between NATO and CSDP being decisive in determining the mandate of CSDP. Second, by narrowing down the scope from the institutions to states, I investigate how these external constraints and opportunities
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influence the calculations of the main actors in the making of CSDP. I will particularly focus on Germany and France because these two countries have been supporting different paths toward the European defense. Finally, based on the outcome of the bargaining, the initiatives
of CSDP in the past few years will be examined. As I will argue later, these initiatives are choices adopted to strengthen member states’ commitment to CSDP as well as assuring the US
its abandonment.
The Evolution of CSDP
Today, a large portion of European defense cooperation takes place within the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). CSDP is the main body in charge of the political aspects of the security and defense affairs within the EU. In practice, the European Defense Agency (EDA) plays a key role in coordinating the tasks bestowed by CDSP. Intuitively, the structure and mandate could seem redundant to international relations students studying NATO. After all, the EU has been benefitted from NATO’s deterrence and posture during the Cold War.
However, the gradually changing attitude of the US, as well as rapid evolution of the international environment, has in the meantime dampen the role of NATO; a trend thereby requires the EU to take on new initiatives in order to continue the supply of collective security.
This context provides an overarching way to comprehend the formation of CSDP as well as the defense cooperation occurring within. One of the earliest efforts to establish a European
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defense force was the Western European Union (WEU) in 1948, which was a de facto alliance aimed to prevent the return of a militarized Germany. The establishment of WEU materialized the earlier failure to construct the European Defense Community, which aims to build a security and defense pillar of Europe. In the decades afterward, WEU was mostly used as a forum to coordinate the defense policy on the European continent. Nevertheless, in the wake of 1980s debates on the missile deployments, WEU was reactivated to prompt the European Community (EC) extension to the security and defense area. It was since then that the security and defense
issues became to receive renewed attention.
Multiple severe challenges came right after EC’s determination to forge a common stance
on the security issues. The challenges set out with the fall of the Berlin Wall. This tremendous change of European politics required EC to come up with new political framework to deal with the challenge brought by the end of the Cold War. Thereafter, alongside the creation of the European Union (the EU) was the birth of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), authorized by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.40 Unfortunately, right before birth of this embryonic project, EC was hit with immediate setbacks posed by the Yugoslavia crisis. Another setback came from the 1991 Gulf War, in which the Europeans were again aware of their lack of
40 CFSP’s institutions was later strengthened by the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, by which the EU created the post of the High Representative for the CFSP. Again, the failure of CFSP was more than clear in the Bosnian Crisis. The EU was unable to deploy its force efficiently given the political hindrance. The solution or intervention did not take place until the US decided to step in. In such a case, the EU’s commitment seems nothing more than a blank check (Gonzalez and Hoffmann 1999).
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common security standings against pressing issues. To some extent, they were observers but not participants in issues they are stakeholders (Howorth 2014, 4–6).
The Europeans were not left in awe and without actions. Instead, they decided to develop the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within WEU in order to commit further to the European security and defense. The principle was: separable but not separate. The rationale behind this was to establish a corresponding framework to deal with contingency such as those occurring in Yugoslavia. However, what is the idea behind the aforementioned principle? Put it frankly, the EU demanded to borrow forces from NATO, which was known as the combined joint task force (CJTF). By employing such a framework, ESDI enabled the EU to conduct military operations without transgressing national command while at the same time duplicating
institutional structures such as NATO (Barry 1997). Nonetheless, this is not the end of the story.
the EU’s words were not matched by their deeds. Despite there earlier absorption of WEU’s
assets and mandates, ESDI remained a concept without clear goal.41 Pursuing strategic autonomy, thereby, turned out to be absent from the agenda of European security.
Yet, such indeterminacy is not always the case. Lightning of the blue was the Saint-Malo Declaration in 1998. Quite abruptly, then United Kingdom’s Prime Minister, Tony Blair and
France President Jacques Chirac jointly issued the declaration to voice their support for a
41 It is not to say that ESDI was practically out of usage. Instead, the invention of ESDI actually catalyzed further cooperation between WEU and NATO, including information sharing agreements and facilities sharing procedures. However, based on the Petersberg Declaration of 1992, WEU’s mission scope limits to only low-level operations such as evacuation and peace-making (Western European Union Council of Ministers 1992).
Together, the EU’s commitment to pick up security and defense issues seriously was widely doubted (Bailes 1999).
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stronger security and defense framework in the EU. The declaration called upon the EU to take further actions to strengthen her capability and resources to fully implement the provisions relevant to CFSP. In addition, the envisaged the incorporation of WEU into the EU to fully consolidate the EU security and defense while avoiding creating an alliance within another alliance, that is, NATO (France and the United Kingdom 1998). The declaration ignited a wide debate regarding the pathway by which the EU could progress toward greater security
autonomy. The concerns were addressed in the 1999 European Council meeting in Cologne.
Recognizing the necessity to “have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness…” (European Union 1999a,
Annex III).
The 1998 Declaration was literally a wake-up call. Soon after the Cologne Meeting, the 1999 Helsinki Meeting gave the formal birth of the common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).42 This time, the institutional structure is further enhanced by establishing political and military bodies such as the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee (MC), and the Military Staff (MS). All of these bodies were aiming to increase the readiness for the EU-led operations (European Union 1999b).
How, then, did ESDP become CSDP? The process was realized by the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon and going beyond rebranding. Instead, after the failure of sealing a European
42 Originally, the synonym for the common European Security and Defense Policy would be CESDP.
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constitution, the EU turned to a more extensive reform of itself by agreeing on the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007. The reform includes the establishment, or reformation from ESDP to CSDP, as well as additional posts to facilitate the operation of CFSP (European Union 2007). On the other hand, the Treaty of Lisbon was not the only document supporting the consolidation of EU security and defense. Two additional amendments in 2009 also made considerable contributions; they are the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). These three treaties together as the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union authorized the establishment of the permanent structured cooperation (PESCO). Under the Article 42(6) and Article 46 of TEU, member states with higher capabilities and commitment can voluntarily notify their intention to the EU in order to strengthen their defense capacities with one another on the multinational level. In particular, by joining PESCO, states could benefit from the harmonization between forces as well as interoperability (European Union 2012).
Nevertheless, the implementation of CSDP would be hardly conceivable without the European Defense Agency (EDA), which was created in 2004 to take charge of coordinating the EU defense cooperation. One of the main functions of EDA is to realize the policy put forward by CSDP. Practically, EDA connects member states by providing a shared platform for armament procurement, development cooperation, and personnel training. In other words, previous discussions regarding enhancing defense capacity could be largely attributed to EDA.
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By introducing intergovernmentalism through the adoption of a common code of conduct, EDA reduces the transactional costs of security and defense cooperation by convening government, military, and industry. Furthermore, its Steering Board also serves as a regular venue for defense ministers to hold a discussion of the harmonization between member states (Howorth 2014, 91–96).
The discussion above provides some background information to understand the internal issues of CSDP. Amidst the trace of the development, the pursuit of autonomy shines. The Saint-Malo Declaration illuminate a path toward greater European defense. However, like the other international institutions, CSDP can be widely challenged by the external environment, which is especially the case when issues at hand involve NATO. In addition, in the last decade, uncertainty has increased not only in the CSDP-NATO relations but also in the broader context such as Russian threats and the Brexit, both required the EU to step up improving the adaptability of CSDP. In the next section, I further discuss the structural and geopolitical challenges faced by CSDP.
Challenge and Threat to CSDP: Competing Interests and Options
There are several challenges prompting a stronger CSDP: 2008 Financial Crisis, the US shifting pivot, and the ongoing unrest after 2014. Each of them has, directly or indirectly,
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motivated the EU member states to contribute more to the defense area. However, the cleavages between members remain in spite of the benefit provided by CSDP.
a. Increasing Uncertainty in Europe
The geostrategic landscape altered considerably from 2008. The Global Financial Crisis delivered a strong blow to the global economy. The worldwide crisis gave birth to the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. In a series of defaults, the EU had no choice to force austerity in several of its members. The financial burden reduced the available resources for public sectors such as public health.43 The challenge was no less severe in the realm of security and defense.
One of the foremost impacts of the financial crisis on security and defense was the cut of military expenditure. According to NATO’s press release, the growth rate of aggregate defense
expenditure from 2009 to 2014 has remained under zero. Though the growth rate after 2014 began to turn positive, the growth was marginal (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2016a).
As a whole, the 2008 Financial Crisis weakened the financial boost for defense cooperation between the EU members. Individually, the effects, however, were diverging across member states. While larger states’ military expenditures were almost constant, medium and smaller states mostly decided to cut their spending in defense.
Arguably the situation would look just fine given the continuing support from major countries. Nonetheless, this would create additional pressure on defense cooperation within
43 For more on the 2008 Financial Crisis and the impacts afterward, see Lane (2012); Nelson and Katzenstein (2014).
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voluntary contribution.44 Given this situation, there were growing gaps between member states in terms of their commitment to smaller countries’ decisions to spend less on security and
defense. The impasse casted further doubts the capability and development, both of which require tremendous investment (Mölling and Brune 2011; Larivé 2014, 88–100).
However, there are indeed winners during and after the crisis. Oddly, it was the victim of the crisis who became the winner; EDA was benefitted from the crisis in the long run because the crisis actually lit the supranational activism toward greater integration. Member states need
more than strategic proposal—they need platforms to jointly materialize the focal points they envisage. Based on NATO’s most recent press release, most of the European states have
increased their military spending. Together, the aggregate growth rate amounted to 4.19% and 5.21% relatively in 2018 and 2019 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2019). How can one explain such a trend? Indeed, growing financial pressures forced the EU member states to shift
their pathway to defense cooperation. The transformation was engendered by a German-Swedish discussion paper, known as the “Ghent Initiative” (German-German-Swedish Food for
Thought: European Imperative Intensifying Military Cooperation in Europe). The main idea
derived from the discussion is spreading costs and sharing outcomes. Germany and Sweden
44 Based on Article 41 of the Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, the budget of EU bodies could be roughly separated into two major parts: operational and non-operational. If the spending belongs to the former, then the spending could be charged to the EU budget. Otherwise, the spending would have to be charged to member states by the scale of GDP. With such regulation, EDA has limited operational expenditure. That is, most of its financial resources would have to rely on member states. Given this drawback, EDA could be said to be influence largely by the financial crisis (Mölling and Brune 2011).
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recommended a bottom-up approach, with EDA’s coordination, to boost the defense cooperation between the EU members. By doing so, the member states would have the opportunities to cooperate and lower the cost in the meantime (The Federal Republic of
Germany and the Kingdom of Sweden 2010). This development enables PESCO to go forward under EDA’s facilitation.
Nevertheless, the progress was not without hindrance. Given the fact that the participation was still largely constrained by member states' political will, the fundamental problems remain intact. For example, as the Ghent Initiatives indicated, the member states have to conduct their own national analysis and accordingly determine the area and level of actions they aim to take.
Put in another way, the framework is essentially decentralized; multilateralism in security and defense cooperation thereby was of decreasing relevance. Against this backdrop, instead, bilateralism and minilateralism are taking place between member states to achieve different goals. For instance, there are several trilateral cooperation mechanisms such as the Benelux Group, the Weimer Triangle, and the Nordic group—each aims at dealing with their own priorities. In the foreseeable future, the problem would only be worse because of the
protectionist nature of the defense industry (Larivé 2014, 102–8; Müller 2016).
On the other hand, the deteriorating situation in East Europe revitalized European’s threat
perception (Jakobsen 2018). The balance of power among the major players on the European continent is rather stable without any power entertained preeminence. This can be corroborated
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by Figure IV.1. In the coordinated pie chart. We can readily observe that even Russia has been categorized as one of the greatest sources of threats. Its military power did not take over the other major power in Europe. Instead, Russia’s military expenditure considerably declined in
2017 and 2018. From this case, we can arguably exclude military power as the sole source of military threats. What, then, distinguish Russia’s aggression from the other sources of
instability?
Figure IV.1: Distribution of Power among Main EU Players, 2007-2018
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limited odds in prevailing in conventional warfare, Russia instead attempted to create a new form of conflict that blur the boundary between peace and war. One of the clearest concepts was provided by the so-called “Gerasimov Doctrine,” The concept was invented by the Russian General Staff Gen Valery Gerasimov.45 While the concept remains debated, the central concept of warfare is rather clear. It is an all-out approach to winning a conflict. Rather than seeing wars as an activity only involving engagement between military, Gerasimov took into different phases of initiating conflicts. Against this backdrop, what matters does not limit to those militarized conflicts but also includes the phases before conflicts. By undermining the internal cohesion of rivalries, non-military measures create considerable advantages (Bartles 2016).An example of the feasibility of such warfare was presented in the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis.
During the crisis, it can be observed that Russia employed a wide array of measures including economic sanctions and political blackmail. Furthermore, in 2015 the situation was worsened by the Crimean separatist movement. Despite a large proportion of Russian population in the
45 What I indicate here is the way European strategic community understood Russian’s military behavior instead of inferring the existence of such a concept within the Russian strategic community. In fact, there has been clarification pointing out that the so-called “Gerasinov Doctrine” has never been a doctrine. Instead, it is at most a construct of the Western military assessment. However, the concept stills possess considerable analytical value in that it takes the political warfare seriously as a phase of preparing for warfare. By doing so, the
boundary between war and peace is still clear. However, there is an imperatives to distinguish political entrepreneurs as a sort of military operations (Galeotti 2018).
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region, the autonomy of the Crimean government was significantly challenged. “Little Green Men”—dubbed by the Western media, controlled the Crimean Parliament.46 Soon after the
occupation, the parliament passed the decision to hold a referendum, even without required votes. Later that year, the conflicts in Eastern Ukraine projected extended chaos to entire East Europe. The conflicts caught additional attention in international society after the crash of the Malaysian Airlines Flight 17. Together, the turmoil in East Europe has created even greater uncertainty after 2014.
In the face of such a stark image, CSDP as an instrument for the European security remains largely dormant. Lacking appropriate leadership and abundant overlapping institutions together revealed the absence of a larger strategic framework that could guide the EU members to take
In the face of such a stark image, CSDP as an instrument for the European security remains largely dormant. Lacking appropriate leadership and abundant overlapping institutions together revealed the absence of a larger strategic framework that could guide the EU members to take