國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
blocking certain websites is aimed at safeguarding the privacy of millions of Internet users in the country. Moreover, social media has been restricted and censored ever more severely since Thailand faced unrest resulting from political conflict between many different groups. During this political crisis, the correct role of the Thai state is to protect rights and liberties for people to access news and information and express opinions because it is a critical time when the public needs to receive information from a variety of sources in order to be able to assess the situation both in terms of the safety of themselves, their property, and society, and political matters.
Therefore, social media and political movement in Thailand is one of the most outstanding demonstrations of the transform of social movement. Social media are the new tools that allow people to express the feelings and opinions to public without hierarchy and allow them to quickly respond in real time. Moreover, social media can dominate people easier than main media because social media do not have any boundaries. Social media reflect the reality of the society. They spread and multiply faster than public main media such as radio, TV and newspaper. As we discuss earlier censorship act is the tools for government and military coup to control and monitor society. In fact, whenever political power is changed, the media censorship is always changed as well. In next section we will discuss a new era of social movements based on three political movements which focus on political participation and social media.
Political Participation and Political Movements in Social Media:
A Revolution of Social Movements
Social media is an important tool for distributing information, sharing opinions, creating collective groups and mobilizing people for demonstration in public space while the traditional media are limited by space and time. Also social media allow information to freely flow in online without boundary which is different from the traditional ones. Moreover, political participation in classic forms are limited and narrowed as it only focuses on institution, voting, donating, volunteering, election, contact politicians and free of speech. Social media are new tools that allow
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
people to engage with politics in both individually and collectively easier than the traditional ones. A new analysis and understanding of political participation and political movement is thus needed in a new framework.
Previously, civil engagement and political movement were limited by the reason of time and space. When Social media take place, people’s behaviors are changed, and their actions do not appear only in public space. They can go online, reflect their opinions on web pages and leave some massages and comments on Facebook wall. However, it does not mean people will not mobilize and demonstrate in public space such as streets, public buildings, public space and etc. Indeed, social media have linked the online and offline society allowing individuals to gather as collective group with bigger numbers.
Since the political turmoil has started in 2005, there have been three major political factions organizing political movements. Each faction, namely the PAD, the UDD and the PDRC, has different goals. Social media are utilized by each camp as a tool to generalize their aims and political ideologies and multiply members as well. Social media such as YouTube, Line, Facebook and other chat programs are likely to increase in numbers of users as it was discussed in Chapter Two. The number of each camp has been multiplied by number of webpages that were created for dominant and offensive political opponents with their different thinking in democracy and political system.
In the PAD camp, they have four main goals to achieve. Those goals include; to get rid of corruptions, to protect the monarchy, to establish real democracy for Thailand, and to get rid of Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra and his proxy politicians and punish them according to the laws. To expand and achieve these goals, the PAD needs people to support their activities and ideology. Social media were installed as a tool for their political movements. As far as we know, the PAD members are initially consisted of middle and upper-class residents of Bangkok and the Southerners. They are also supported by the conservative elites, factions of the Thai Army and state-enterprise labor unions. These include prominent socialites and some little-known minor members of the Thai royal family. The PAD’s support base has expanded to include civil servants, state enterprise labor unions, the urban middle class of other cities and conservative Buddhist groups. Supporting Buddhist groups include the
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Santi Asoke sect and their “Dharma Army”. Moreover, General Pathompong Kesornsuk, a close aid of Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda, was seen appearing in a full uniform at the PAD protests. He urged his fellow soldiers to follow suit (antithaksin.com, 2011).
Bouckaert (2011) mentioned in early 2006 that growing discontent among many social sectors including intellectuals, NGOs, business elites, the upper-middle class, civil servants, employees of state-owned enterprises and opposition political parties, particularly the Democrat Party which could not compete with Mr.
Shinawatra geographically nor financially, had coalesced into an organized protest movement.
Similary, Kitirianglarp and Hewison (2009) mentions that the PAD represents an alliance of two social forces and brings them together to oust Mr.
Shinawatra and to collapse the TRT. The first group includes royalists who are largely from the middle classes and the elite led by Mr. Limthongkul, and the second group is consisted of activists, NGO leaders and trade unionists.
The involvement of activists in 2005 was highly significant for the PAD, for it avoids being perceived as a movement of disgruntled members of the elite. The PAD drew much of its support from Bangkok’s middle classes rather than the poor or the political grassroots in the provinces. This was emblematic strategies of a political shift that was neither a political accident nor a well-considered political decision; rather, it resulted from the failure of these activists and the leadership of social movements to develop alternative political agendas that appealed to the grassroots. This shift, on the part of the leadership of social movements, was drawn to the PAD’s nationalism, communitarianism and “clean politics” agenda. Without its own mass base, the PAD needed the support of social movement leaders to overcome the potential negative perception associated with opportunistic leadership and crusty elite support. The PAD necessarily incorporated social movement discourses and initially included some of the demands made by social movements.
According to Lertchoosakul (2012), not only two major groups joined the PAD movements but also a large number of Octobrists supported the PAD. At the beginning of the movement in 2006, around 70%–80% of Octobrists were believed to support the movement. Many leading Octobrist figures either joined the PAD protest
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
or publicly announced their support of the PAD. Moreover, several Octobrists encouraged their heirs to organize student political groups in the name of the
“Democratic Student Group (Klum Nakrian Phuea Prachathipatai)” and “Thinking Force Democratic Seed (Klum Raeng Khit Ton Kla Prachathipatai)’ to support the PAD on its protest stage.
However, in reality, they did not have as much power as other conservative leaders, namely Mr. Sondhi Limthongkul and Major General Chamlong Srimuang. This was partly because of two major reasons. Firstly, Mr. Limthongkul had elite and middle class support, and secondly, Major General Chamlong Srimuang was backed by his Dharma army from the Santi Asok Buddhist sect.
On the other hand, there are a numbers of supporting groups from social network particularly from Facebook pages. Those groups include the PAD NewEngland.org, the PAD USA, PAD.VfLY.NET, PADNet.net and antithaksin.com.
There are also a number of anti-Thaksin and anti-Yingluck government groups such as Against.Pardon.Thaksin, antithaksinlanna, pakeerakchart (Love country alliances), kongtamparchachonKonthaksin (People army topple Thaksin), ThaksinHnaHee (anti-ThaksinorganizationofThailand), V.For.Thailand and Shphaph Hnakak KhawV for VendettaHaengPrathesthiyV (white mask of Thailand association).
The PAD websites are not only created in Thailand but also in other countries as well. This is the significant evidence indicating that social media go beyond the traditional ones. When, they want to take action, social media take the main role for mobilizing people. The PAD has allied webpages and Facebook pages which are used as a communicating tool to gather people. Paireepairit (2012) points out that when Manager Group started rallying against Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra, Manager.co.th became the best online source for political news, especially for the anti-Thaksin camp. When Muang Thai Rai Supdahwas dropped from TV, Mr. Sondhi continued his show at a public park in Bangkok and broadcasted livestream versions of the show through Manager.co.th. The program was later on broadcasted via satellite TV station, ASTV. Evidently, Manager Group utilized multi-medium media strategy effectively. Viewers who missed live events could watch archived clips online with full transcription within hours. Most articles on Manager.co.th were
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
opened for discussion via a commenting system which has created a vibrant community among online politics followers.
In contrast, the UDD camp is relatively different from the PAD. Their goals are; to attain true democracy, to ensure that sovereignty is truly in the hands of the people of Thailand with the King as the head of state, to unify grassroots masses as the main social and cultural force together with people from every sector who seek democracy and justice, to resist “aristocratic” forces that obstruct equitable and democratic national development, to promote non-violence as the modus operandi for all activities, to fight against poverty by tying economic policies on poverty reduction through political strategies which stress that economic policy must be directly formulated by an elected government, to reinstate the “Rule of Law” through ensuring equitable and transparent judicial process for all along with putting an end to the
“double standards” policies which are currently under control by aristocratic interests and elite networks, and to revoke the 2007 Constitution and its unjust laws that favor certain military and elite interest and to draw up a new democratic Constitution (Thairedshirts.org, 2011).
There are many people support the group. Social media has also been created to expand their goals by focusing on people who have a strong will to protect democracy and government from democracy. As Thabchumpon and Maccargo (2011) point out, the UDD has gathered people with a wide range of backgrounds, ranging from former communists to liberals and rightist hardliners. The lack of clear lines of command and accountability among the various core leaders of the UDD undermines the effectiveness of the movement. Overall, the red-shirt movement represents an extremely pragmatic alliance among groups ranging from idealistic post-leftists to others of a rather thuggish disposition, and the elements from the two sides that had fought one another in the 1970s were now collaborating.
Furthermore, Paireepairit (2012) gives some examples on red-shirt social media after the military coup which are collected from 19Sep.net, Saturdayvoice.com, Thai Free News and Thai E-news. Those are notable forums used by anti-coup and Thaksin Shinawatra supporters. The red-shirt website also provides links to their alliances, for example, 2 Bangkok.com, Asia Provocateur, BlogSpot, Chicago Red Shirts For Democracy (illinoisredshirts.blogspot.com), RED IN USA
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
(redusala.blogspot.com), Robert Amsterdam Thailand, UDD Red, and UDD TODAY.
The red camp also has alliance in the US as well as the PAD. It is premised that social media are the only tool that can expand their goals especially in spreading out an ideology beyond border while the mainstream media and political participation have a limited in time and space.
However, how the red camp mobilizes its people to join activities and demonstrations is quite different from the PAD. The red camp is more functional where people are mobilized via personal relationship, especially in local community.
According to Thabchumpon and Mccargo (2011), without denying the agency of the protesters themselves, it is also important to recognize that the red shirts are highly susceptible to politicization and mobilization by community leaders who are often linked to pro-Thaksin politicians. The red shirt movement is a loosely structured network organization rather than a hierarchical one. Members expand the network by reaching out to friends, relatives and people in their own villages and communities.
Red-shirt groups communicate through community radio stations, the distribution of CDs and hard-copy newsletters which are reproduced locally as color photocopies.
The networks are organized in the way that the demonstration outside a provincial hall could be held within half an hour notice.
In contrast, social media are very crucial for the PDRC movements, as the group heavily uses social media for distributing information, mobilizing people and demonstrating their political activities. This movement began with amnesty bill protest, and later on, it was turned to be against the government (Yingluck’s government). As Wikipedia (2014) puts it, controversial anti-government protests have been ongoing in Thailand since December 2013 aiming at removing the influence of the former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra from Thai politics. The protests were triggered by a proposed amnesty bill that would have pardoned Thai politicians who involved in various unrest incidents. The bill was proposed as to pardon Mr. Abhisit Vejjajiva and Mr. Suthep Thaugsuban over murder charges and dismiss Mr. Shinawatra’s corruption allegations.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
The bill could have made it possible for Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra, the brother of the current Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, to return to Thailand after a self-imposed exile without facing an existing conviction. Although oppositions, who derived from both the Democrat Party and the pro-government red shirts, have caused the bill to be rejected unanimously by the Senate of Thailand on November 11, 2013, protests led by former Democrat MP, Mr. Suthep Thaugsuban, has continued and turned towards an anti-government agenda. An independent poll reported that the majority of Thai people wanted all protests to end.
Protests in recent years are seen to take place as to achieve two main political goals. The first one is working toward the rejection of an amnesty bill.
According to the Guardian’s report (2013), Thailand’s Senate convened a highly charged session to determine the fate of an amnesty bill, which could pave the way for the return of the self-exiled former leader, Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra.Thousands of protesters rallied across Bangkok, raising concerns of renewed political violence after three years of relative calm. Nearly 7,000 police officers were deployed around the parliament, near the main protest site.
Consequently, Bangkok Post (2013) reported that senators have rejected the blanket amnesty bill in a bid to defuse political and social tensions. Anti-amnesty bill demonstrators march from Asok intersection to converge with another protestgroup from the Silom area at the Royal Thai Police Headquarters near Ratchaprasong and headed to Ratchadamnoen Avenue altogether. After 12 hours of debate, the senators shot down the controversial bill by 140 votes to 0.
After the rejection of an amnesty bill, the protest had shifted their aim and goal to Ms. Yingluck Shinawatra’s resignation and political reform. Burma News (2013) reported that the Thai people at the moment stood resolute in their goal of creating a better, brighter future for future generations. To attain these goals, reformation before the next bout of elections was necessary. Laws must be fair and just, corruption must be abolished and electoral fraud and vote buying leading to endless vicious cycles of graft must be uprooted. However, the illegitimate government under Yingluck Shinawatra which defiantly maintained its invalid claim to office was the main impediment to these reforms.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
The PDRC movement has many supporters which include not only Democrat party but also celebrity, big businessmen in Thai society. However, some denied to support the PDRC. According to Bangkok Post (2014), although the Centre for Maintaining Peace and Order (CMPO) had decided to postpone revealing the names of 136 firms and individuals said to be funding anti-government protests, a list of 32 alleged financial backers has been leaked to the media. The reports identified 19 companies and 13 individuals who were allegedly funding People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) protests.
Post Today newspaper (2013) named the 19 companies as Saha Pathanapibul Plc, Gaysorn Plaza, Siam Paragon Department Store, King Power Group, Dusit Thani Hotel, Siam Intercontinental Hotel, Riverside Hotel, Mitr Phol Group, Wangkanai Group, Boon Rawd Brewery Co, Thai Beverage Plc, Yakult (Thailand) Co, Neptune Co, Thai Namthip Co, Muang Thai Life Assurance Co, Hello Bangkok Co and Metro Machinery Group. The 13 individuals were identified as Chumpol Suksai, Chalerm Yoovidhya, Pramon Suthiwong, Khunying Kallaya, Nuanphan Lamsam, Wimolphan Pitathawatcha, Dr Pichet Wiriyachitra, TayaTeepsuwan, Sakchai Guy, Krisana Mutitanant, Police General Kitti Rattanachaya, Chitpas Kridakorn and Issara Vongkusolkit.
However, the PDRC secretary general, Mr. Suthep Thaugsuban, told supporters that none of the people on the list, except Sakchai Guy, had provided financial support to his political movement. Mr. Taugsuban said Mr. Guy’s donation to PDRC was from T-shirts selling. Similarly, many companies and individuals who were named to support PDRC denied that they did not support PDRC. For example, Saha Pathanapibul chief executive officer, Boonchai Chokwatana, denied that he helped funding the anti-government movement, and Mr. Pramon, chairman of Toyota (Thailand), also denied any financial involvement with the PDCR. Moreover, Bangkok Post (2013) reported that former leader of the People’s Alliance for Democracy, Mr. Sondhi Limthongkul, was to join the rallies for the first time by starting a march from Ban Phra Arthit. Therefore, the yellow shirt group was to join the PDRC to the massive rally against Yingluck Shinawtara’s government.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Social media are the most popular and important channel for mobile phone users to communicate with the public. According to Jakarta Post’s (2014) analysis, the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) has been extensively using social media to inform, invite and connect with supporters and the public. They are active in posting information, news and updates many times a day. They do this via facebook.com/PDRCThailand and Twitter at @CMDThai. The PRDC’s Facebook page had 27,040 people talking about it and nearly 19,000 “friends” who liked it.
Furthermore, Asia Foundation survey (2013) reports profile of the protestors. In regard with a survey of pro and anti-government demonstrators in Bangkok on November 30, 2013, the PDRC respondents make significantly greater use of smart phones 42% for organizing rally participation, and the PDRC respondents use the Internet, smart phones or social media to learn about events in Thailand.
Therefore, it seems like the PDRC and the PAD have similar goals which contrast to the UDD’s. People who join the PAD have the tendency to join the PDRC and then possibly return to the PAD. Based on Asia foundation survey in 2013 report, it is premised that the new forms of political movement are replacing the traditional ones. Social media are the important tools for political participation and political movements in Thailand. They act as a connecter and amplifier between
Therefore, it seems like the PDRC and the PAD have similar goals which contrast to the UDD’s. People who join the PAD have the tendency to join the PDRC and then possibly return to the PAD. Based on Asia foundation survey in 2013 report, it is premised that the new forms of political movement are replacing the traditional ones. Social media are the important tools for political participation and political movements in Thailand. They act as a connecter and amplifier between