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Facing Political System Dilemma
As it was discussed earlier, Thai democracy development has been going on since 1932 with military and coup intervention all along. Thai monarchy is also seen as the key characteristics in Thai politics. However, the network of the monarchy seems to be in a crisis as the King charisma is in decline resulted from his fragile health condition. This problem creates serious impact to the Thai monarchy institution and Thai political system.
The Thai monarchy network has been gradually embedded in Thai political system. A McCargo points out, Thai politics are often framed in terms of democratic change and political transition (ChaiAnan, 1990). Following a 1991 military coup that invalidated simplistic assumptions about Thai democratization, many studies emphasize the changing political economy and the rise of civil society, accompanied by more limited projects of political reform (Connors 1999; McCargo 2002). However, he argues that Thailand’s political order is characterized by network-based politics. From 1973 to 2001, Thailand’s leading political network was that of the reigning monarch, King Bhumibol (McCargo, 2005:500). This network works perfectly and suits with Thai political system according to the Thai political revolution in 1932. The elite group, indeed, compromised with the King RAMA VII and agreed to form Constitution Monarchy with this system. This gave the monarchy the channel to balance its power with the parliament.
As McCargo puts it in his article, network monarchy is inherently illiberal because it advocates reliance on “good men” and the marginalization of formal political institutions or procedures. Low priority is given to democratic principles such as the rule of law and popular sovereignty, but King Bhumipol’s core achievement lay in securing a high degree of relative autonomy for the monarchy within Thailand’s increasingly pluralist order. This contrasts with the tight controls placed on constitutional monarchies as conventionally understood. The Thai monarchy may be best seen, in RobertDahl’s terms, as an organization or a
“subsystem” (Dahl 1982: 27–8), rather than an institution (McCargo: 2005, 501). Of course, the “subsystem is not an institution. However, it is one of the core units which
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are powerful in Thai political system. As to build leverage in Thai political system, there are three core power units which are; (1) monarchy, (2) government, and (3) people.
Although some scholars think the military, in the past, was one of the core powers, it can be argued that the military did not have the legitimacy to rule the country. Apart from the recent coup which the picture of military is quite different, military power has been growing weak and s always seen as the bad guy since 1932.
One more thing that since the coup in 1991-1992, the coup had to make a king pardon to overthrow the government. Therefore, it is clear that military power or coup is under monarchy control. The monarchy network has been adjusting from time to time especially when the globalization was introduced to Thai society, according to McCargo. After May 1992, a new system of monarchical governance was refined, one much less reliant on direct action. Royalists such as Mr. Anand and Mr. Prawase worked hard to reinvent network monarchy as a more liberal construct, not being paralyzed by anachronistic military and bureaucratic preferences for stability and order. Mr. Anand and Mr. Prawase were liberals when compare too many of the King’s closest confidantes, yet objectively speaking, they were also deeply conservative. For the next nine years, the King and his allies will refine a new model
that reduce his direct involvement, as he has been working with Mr. Prem, Mr. Chuan and others to shape the direction of the country (McCargo:2005, 508).
Therefore, Thai monarchy has been undoubtedly playing the main role in Thai political system and functionally working with Thai society. Despite the fact that Thai monarchy is not an institution, it represents the King’s personality and the King’s charisma. His importance in Thai political system and Thai society is best demonstrated by the celebration of 60 years of his throne where Thai people wore
“yellow shirt” representing his color symbol and hung his picture on the wall of their houses. Clearly, the Thai monarchy network successfully dominates Thai society. As Mr. Prem said in Hewison to emphasize his call for “Thai-style democracy”, “my country is about 800 years old, and we run the country as a kingdom. We will never be a republic or be without the King. So, that is the trick – the only thing that induces the people together. So, as long as we have the King, the monarchy – this very, very good king we have right now, we will go ahead – either slowly or rapidly – but we
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will be united. So, if you have a united country and the people united you have few problems to undo” (Hewison, 2007: 939).
In contrast, the monarchy network has been in crisis since Mr.
Shinawtara won the election in 2001 and became the prime minister of Thailand. Mr.
Shinawatra tried to install his own network and replace the monarchy by policy which seems to be appealing to the rural people. Thus, to understand why the Thaksin network has been working well since he became the prime minister of Thailand, the so-called Thaksinomics” should be examined.
Thaksinomics preaches two principal economic policies, people-centered politics (populist policies) and the Dual-Track Economic Development Strategy. Within Thaksinomics, the Dual-Track Development Strategy can be further divided into two main categories, outward orientation and grassroots development.
The outward orientation is aimed at creating stability in banking by having a Thai Asset Management Corporation (TAMC) manages the assets (bad loans from state owned banks or private asset management companies). This component of the Dual Track Development Strategy is intended to win over the rich because it would help them with risk management, import and export. The grassroots development focuses on rural people by implementing policies, such as the agrarian debt moratorium, the Village Fund program, the People’s Bank, SMEs, OTOP, and the 30-Baht Health Care scheme. Thaksinomics also works to stimulate the economy by changing the ratio of spending (marginal propensity to consume), given that the poor’s spending is higher than the rich. By stimulating spending on a grassroots level, the government was able to create multiplier effects for GNP (Tangpianpant, 2010:27-28). As Ungpakorn emphasizes, Mr. Thaksin also saw the poor as stakeholders in society and partners in development, while the conservatives saw the poor as either people to be exploited or as a burden on society. Mr. Thaksin is neither a socialist nor a principled democrat or advocate of human rights. His vision is to build a modernized society where the state and big business could incorporate the majority of the population in development. He looks to countries like Singapore for inspiration. The Thaksin’s model is incompatible with being a royalist and maintaining the monarchy. It just means that the monarchy would be used to protect and legitimize a modern, class divided status quo (Ungpakorn, 2010:12).
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The Thaksin network has put the monarchy network into a crisis (Sulak Sivarak 2003). A respected conservative intellectual with close NGO ties, asserted that the TRT was not only harmful to the people but a threat to the monarchy and its interests, suggesting that Thaksin’s “moneyism” negatively affected the King’s Crown Property Bureau (Kitirianglar and Hewison, 2009:466).
Thus, it creates a conflict between monarchy network which represent conservative democracy and liberal democracy. Moreover, it has created the controversy between the majority groups which are the yellow-shirts and the red shirts. Both factions have their own democracy perceptions which are heavily debated both in the public and in parliament. Therefore, with this new network, Mr.
Shinawatra won an election and almost successfully replaced the monarchy network.
Moreover, the incumbent government led by Mr. Thaksin’s sister, Ms. Yingluck Shinawatra, the “Thaksinomics policy” was used to run the country once again. After the new constitution, the 2007 constitution which was written by a junta-appointed group of drafters was approved by a public referendum. A referendum was held and 59.3% of the voters voted in favor of the constitution.
As Jensen points out, besides the ideological dimension of the conflict and the conflicting interpretations of democracy, the present political crisis is also a conflict between two power centers in Thai politics, the “old elite” representing pro-royalist elite groups in the civilian and military bureaucracy, rich business families, and the royal family. The other centre, the “new elite”, constitutes Mr. Thaksin and his network in the police force, military, and business elite (Asia Portal, 2011).
Moreover, Albritton and Bureekul’s study shows that Thailand is a tale of two democracies - that of sophisticated urban elites (with origins or current status in Bangkok) and that of a rural, often isolated, parochial interest that views political activity, especially elections, as opportunities for personal or community benefit. This perspective is important because it has been historically the position taken by Bangkok elites that has determined the fate of democratic government in Thailand (Albritton and Bureeku, 2004:22).
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Later on, after the general election in July 2011, the Pheu Thai party won a landslide victory. Ms. Yingluck Shinawatra, younger sister of Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra, became a prime minister. The government introduced a rice subsidy scheme with the aim of ensuring farmers - who form the main part of Pheu Thai’s social base in the rural north of Thailand - to receive a guaranteed price for their rice crop. The scheme caused government debt to soar, and the increasing price of Thai rice resulted in the country losing its rank as the world's number one rice exporter. In the beginning, the bright hope of the poor, especially the farmers, seems to come true, and the proposed rice subsidy scheme policy won their heart.
However, after this policy has been run for two years, the government’s budget experienced problems. Moreover, after Ms. Yingluck Shinawatra took government office, her cabinet proposed amnesty bill which one of the campaign for social reconciliation especially for the PAD (the yellow shirts) and the UDD (the red shirts). However, this amnesty bill allowed the ousted former prime minister, Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra, to freely return home without any charges. The bill caused aggravation among the Thais, and they consequently began to protest on the street and social media.
According to Agence France Presse (2013), anti-government protesters returned to the streets of Bangkok on Thursday as members of the parliament were debating the amnesty bill. The opponents believed that it would “whitewash” past abuses and allow ousted prime minister to return. Critics of the controversial legislation said it could unleash a fresh bout of political turmoil in a country rocked by a series of rival demonstrations since royalist generals toppled Thaksin in 2006.
The opposition, the Democrat Party, called for a mass rally against the planned amnesty outside a railway station in Bangkok on Thursday evening, and thousands were predicted to attend.
By late afternoon, hundreds of people had already gathered at the site.
Some were wearing bandanas reading “fight” and waving clappers with the slogan
“stop the amnesty for corrupt people.” The ruling Puea Thai Party of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra ordered all its lawmakers to support the bill which would cover crimes related to political unrest since 2004. While a vote was expected to take place in the next few days, the demonstration was still in unrest.
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The anti-government protesters led by Mr. Suthep resulted in the closure of several government offices without police intervention as the government feared that this could result in a repeat 2006 military coup. It was a first day of the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) to be formed and demonstrated peacefully. Thirat News (2014), however, reported that within three months of demonstration of the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), there has been more than 50 times of violence between the government and the PDRC. There were approximately 628 people injured and 11people killed since November 30, 2013 to February 12, 2014.
Later on in November, the anti-government protesters began marching to several government offices forcing their way inside the Ministry of Finance, the Budget Bureau, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Public Relations Department and urged for their closure. The Prime Minister, Ms.Yingluck Shinawatra, invoked the Internal Security Act (ISA) in all districts of Bangkok, Nonthaburi Province, Bang Phli and Lat Lum Kaeo Districts of Samut Prakan Province and Pathum Thani Province to handle the crowd.
The protesters continued their activities by rallying to another ten ministry offices, cutting the electricity supply, forcing the evacuation of the people who worked at Department of Special Investigation's headquarters and staging a sit-in at the Chaeng Watthana Government Complex. Protesters also rallied to twenty-four provincial halls which were mainly in the South, a traditional Democrat Party base of support.
Later on, the Internet services had been disrupted for several hours in the evening and in the morning of the next day. Violence erupted between anti-government protesters and the red shirts near Rajamangala Stadium. With gunshots fired, the clash resulted in 4 people died and 57 people wounded. The UDD leaders subsequently ended their rally in the following morning.
The fact that the Internet service was disrupted can be implied to the role of social media which are important for PDRC and Thai society. The PDRC’s movement is the best example for social media movements which turn individual action into collective action. Their demonstration on the streets and occupying the government building were successful.
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Meanwhile, media censorship law is one of the most useful tools for in power government. It always uses for control and order society opinion and hearing.
There is a long history of censorship in Thailand. Harassment, manipulation and strict control of political news were common under the Thaksin government (2001–2006), and restrictions and media harassment have worsened after a military junta overthrew the Thaksin government in a 2006 coup until present. Thailand ranked 59th out of 167 countries in 2004 and then fell to 107th out of 167 countries in 2005 in the worldwide Press Freedom Index and Reporters Without Borders. Thailand’s ranking fell to 153rd out of 178 in 2010 and rose to 137th out of 179 in 2011-2012 (Wikipedia, 2012).
Furthermore, most Internet censorship in Thailand prior to the September 2006 military coup d’état was focused on blocking pornographic websites. The following years have seen a constant stream of sometimes violent protests, regional unrest, emergency decrees, a new cybercrimes law, and an updated Internal Security Act. Year by year, Internet censorship has grown, with its focus shifting to lèse majesté, national security, and political issues. Estimates put the number of websites blocked at over 110,000, and the number was growing in 2010.
Internet filtering in Thailand was classified as selective in the social, political and Internet tools areas, and no evidence of filtering was found in the conflict and security area by the OpenNet Initiative in November 2011. Thailand is on Reporters Without Borders list of countries under surveillance in 201, and Thailand’s Internet Freedom status is rated “Not Free” in the Freedom on the Net 2011report by Freedom House, which cites substantial political censorship and the arrests of bloggers and other online users.
Therefore, the consequence of Thailand’s Computer Crime Act of 2007 has been criticized for being overbroad and for granting authorities too much discretion in prosecuting Thai citizens and online service providers. However, the Computer Crime Act (CCA) suffers from many defects such as vague, overbroad, and overly punitive provisions.Moreover, it could inhibits Thai service providers from offering Web 2.0 services and harm Thailand’s global economic competitiveness and downgrade of good governance in the Information Age.
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On the other hand, computer Crime Act of 2007 is a piece of legislation that has had a significant and negative impact on freedom of Expression on the Internet since it came into force in July 2007. Thus, with this law and policy, Thai government (Yingluck government; the present government) is facing a serious challenge in good governance for manages and develops country. On the other hand, cybercrime, cyber terrorism, and tradition terrorism are using a new way to damage and destroy infrastructure also trade and investment. The terrorism has been moved downward from Middle East to Southeast Asian especially in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Southern of Thailand. Moreover, Thailand social media and Internet censorship is being implemented using two methods. One, the Thai police has placed an online roadblock to about 32,500 websites which permanently prevents such sites from being viewed by Net users in the country and two, the Communications Authority of Thailand has additionally filtered an undisclosed number of websites right at the country’s Internet gateway. To censor a website, the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology sends a request to each of the 50 or so non-profit and commercial ISPs in the country.
Any Internet service provider that fails to blacklist a requested website will be reprimanded by the government via cancellation of licenses or restriction on bandwidth capacity. For fear of sanctions, local ISPs strictly abide by Thailand Internet censorship. Just three years ago, the country’s Communications Ministry requested for approximately 2,500 websites to be blocked. A year after that, the number of blocked websites increased to more than 13,000 which represents over 500% rise in blacklisted sites. Today, the number of websites censored by the ministry through local ISPs is largely unknown (Wikipedia, 2012).
The reason for blocking websites is for national security which disclosed to the public. Many Internet users feel that the rules regarding Thailand Internet censorship are mainly based on the government’s security and stability. Thai government has also spent millions of dollars for an Internet gateway system that will block any harsh comments on the country’s supreme ruler. The same system can also be used to blacklist sites owned by terrorists and those that deal in pornography. It must be emphasized, though, that all the steps taken by Thai government to censor inappropriate websites are all within the bounds of the local laws. As a matter of fact,
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blocking certain websites is aimed at safeguarding the privacy of millions of Internet users in the country. Moreover, social media has been restricted and censored ever more severely since Thailand faced unrest resulting from political conflict between many different groups. During this political crisis, the correct role of the Thai state is to protect rights and liberties for people to access news and information and express opinions because it is a critical time when the public needs to receive information from a variety of sources in order to be able to assess the situation both in terms of the safety of themselves, their property, and society, and political matters.
Therefore, social media and political movement in Thailand is one of the most outstanding demonstrations of the transform of social movement. Social media are the new tools that allow people to express the feelings and opinions to public without hierarchy and allow them to quickly respond in real time. Moreover, social media can dominate people easier than main media because social media do not have any boundaries. Social media reflect the reality of the society. They spread and
Therefore, social media and political movement in Thailand is one of the most outstanding demonstrations of the transform of social movement. Social media are the new tools that allow people to express the feelings and opinions to public without hierarchy and allow them to quickly respond in real time. Moreover, social media can dominate people easier than main media because social media do not have any boundaries. Social media reflect the reality of the society. They spread and