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However, his network gradually created the conflict of political and society. The accusation of corruption and dethronement of royal institution eventually urged the Thai military who called themselves as “king army” to take action. They claimed to protect the royal institution and to interfere the conflict of people factions.
The “yellow shirts” and “red shirts” were the groups that had different ideology on democracy. Thai political system was facing the time of transition, but this time Thai people had an opportunity and access to the power more than in the beginning.
Politics in Thai Democracy and Political System
Thai democracy is unique and special to understand. Some scholars said it is a “Thai democracy”. Also many political scientists are still debating the meaning of democracy, Western discourses on democracy Che (2002), and endorsing a normative notion of liberal democracy have influenced the Indonesian, Thai and the Philippines governments. However, many non-governmental organizations have resisted such homogenization by constructing a variety of democratic definitions, which account for cultural specificities. It is clear that the formation of discourses on democracy for regional and local NGOs entails more than top-down adoption of external views.
In response to the suggestion that a globalization of liberal definitions has taken place as identified by Huntington (1991) and Diamond (1996), this study has shown that this is not the case in reality in the Southeast Asian realm (Albritton B.
Robert and Bureekul Thawilwadee 2004). Some people think that some words for democracy (prachathipatai) refer to the King. The ideologies of democracy created in 1932 and have lasted throughout democratic, despotic, and authoritarian governments are sometimes considered to ascribe ambiguous meanings to the concept of democracy. Wyatt (1984) suggests that, during the early days of constitutional governance, enthusiasm for democracy was not dampened by the fact that people had no clear idea of the meaning of constitution and democracy.
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In a more modern context, the debate over “Asian values” suggests that there are significant semantic differentials in understandings of democracy, between those who hold essentially procedural views of democracy and those who hold more substantive ones. What does democracy mean, given these different perceptions and orientations? One possibility is that the distinction between subjective and objective indicators of democracy affects measures of democratic support.
Therefore, to understand and to accurately analyze “Thai democracy”, the origin of democracy in Thailand on how it was started, and how much it has been developed so far should be examined.
In the beginning (Klein, 1998: King Chulalongkorn (r. 1868-1910), democracy was credited with the establishment of a modern Thai bureaucracy and military force at the end of the nineteenth century which consolidated the power of the throne, centralized administration and revenues, and defended Thailand against European colonization. The 1932 Revolution, which established a constitutional monarchy, did little to change the political and administrative systems created by King Chulalongkorn other than to transfer state power and patronage from the crown to shifting cliques of senior bureaucrats and military officers. The absolute rule of the monarchy was simply transformed into the absolute rule of elite. The people’s part as a government was exercised by elites in a one-party state (the People’s Party), and full electoral democracy was not even contemplated until half the population had completed primary education or ten years had passed, whichever came first (Albritton and Bureekul, 2004:5). It is clear that democracy in Thailand was created by the elites and not genuinely from the Thai society. Therefore, it yielded the power to the military to occupy and rule the country. Until the present day, Thai democracy is always facing with coup and constitutions which were torn and rewritten again and again (17 constitutions).
During the post-WWII era, the ideology of democracy was persisted, reinforced, in part, through growing consciousness among rural people who were oppressed by the military, the police and the bureaucracy. This disaffection toward the authoritarian regimes served to support an equally anti-authoritarian sentiment among the educated middle-classes. By 1973, a coalition of workers, farmers, students and
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others in the middle class clashed with police. In order to prevent mass bloodshed, the King intervened to end the authoritarian regime (Albritton and Bureekul, 2004:6).
The return of civilian rule in 1988 under the Chatichai Choonhavan’s administration demonstrated the worst flaw in the political system that had evolved out of the 1932 Change of Government. When the military overthrew the Chatichai government in 1991, Thai citizens were disturbed by the thought of another coup.
They were not upset, however, the corrupt government had been removed.
Interestingly, neither the Thai public nor the media were willing to be cowed into another era of benevolent military rule. The age of fax, mobile phone, Internet, CNN and BBC, and the free flow of information had arrived. The military could no longer control discussion and demands for political reform (Klein, 1998:11). Therefore, the drafting of the 1997 constitution was initiated. With a long process after the national assembly, the constitution reform was assigned in Mr. Chun Leekpai government in 1992.
The Democrat Party was able to initiate the process of political reform with Dr. Prawase’s Committee. It took three years to achieve promulgation of a new constitution to implement these reforms. The force behind this change included a highly educated middle class and a network of committed civic sector organizations.
This commitment was expressed through continued pressure for reforms after the Democrats were forced from office. Both Mr. Banharn and the Mr. Chavalit’s administrations had much to lose when political reforms were implemented. Although they allowed the process to move forward, they did so reluctantly. Shortly after the constitution was promulgated, the Chavalit government fell. On November 9, 1997, Chuan Leekpai and his Democrat Party, once again, formed a coalition government with a narrow majority. It was incumbent on the Democrats to continue the process they set in motion by faithfully executing the 1997 constitution and the party’s future (Klein, 1998:14).
Moreover, Hewison article gives accurate analysis that the 1997 constitution was a huge document. Even though many conservatives were not satisfied, the elite nature of the charter was clear. For example, workers and poor farmers were prevented from running for parliament by the requirement that members of parliament had to hold a university degree. While this provision was vehemently
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opposed by labor groups, it remained in place. Many of the other issues which the labor activists considered to be important had been set aside (Hewison, 2007:934).
In addition, the 1997 constitution brought about reform in many institutions in Thai political system. One of them was the constitutional court. Until now, this institution remains so powerful in controlling the political parties.
According to the existence of the conflict in Thai politics namely, people factions, the verdict on the constitution court has worsen the conflict.
Although economic situation in 1997 and in the mid-1980s were different, they were both triggered by the depreciation of the baht. While the devalued baht in the mid-1980s boosted the export sector, the collapse of the financial system and a regional meltdown in 1997 compromised the sectors ability to benefit from a falling baht. While rapid growth during the 1980s was contributed by an investment of private sector under sound policies and economic conditions, the financial collapse in 1997 was largely caused by private sector failure in managing loans and operations under weak macroeconomic policies and financial management, a lack of investment confidence and political instability, and worsening external conditions.
Under such conditions, capital inflows which were mostly invested in short term unproductive sectors turned overnight into capital flight. Domestic operations incurred high debt burdens and credit risks. The banking sector was besieged with the problems of NPLs and a lack of liquidity, and the whole economy faced a severe credit crunch. Hence, the financial and economic crisis affected people and their families and consequently led to social problems. The initial capital flight triggered currency depreciation, domestic credit shortages, widespread corporate financial difficulties and severe contractions in demand and output. The second round of contagion effects led to falling export demand (through a fall in other currencies), which further dragged down income and output levels. This led to more drops in employment and wages. Lower output led to lower government revenues, which in turn negatively affected government budgets, including social sector programs.
Unemployment, reduced wages and price rises had already placed a strain on vulnerable groups and their family members. Insufficient social safety nets to offset these effects further added to the tension and even led, in some cases, to family breakdown and created social problems.
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By 2001, Thai democracy movements started again after economic crisis to rebound the economy and reshaped political system. The fact that Mr.
Thaksin Shinawatra was the first premier elected under the provisions of the 1997 constitutions was risky. Thaksin rose to power on the backwash of the 1997 financial crisis. The severity of the economic shock transformed Thailand’s politics. Old ruling elite of technocrats and political bosses were discredited for allowing the country to sleepwalk towards disaster. Farmers learnt that they were more vulnerable to global forces than the fickleness of the monsoon. Businessmen agitated for stronger and more pro-business government. A broad coalition that ran from old leftists through liberal reformers to the heads of the surviving business conglomerates invested in Mr.
Shinawatra with their hopes, sweeping him to power at elections in 2001(Phongpaichit and Baker, 2008:1).
Mr. Shinawatra had quickly recognized that the 1997 constitution demanded a different kind of politics. Previously, political parties relied on vote-buying and influential local figures to deliver power. The TRT hit on a different strategy, one that neither critics nor the conservative elite had recognized in the 1997 charter. While Mr. Shinawatra and the TRT did not entirely reject the previously successful electoral tactics, TRT decided that if it was to rescue domestic capital from the jaws of the ongoing economic crisis, then it had to get votes from the masses.
Using surveying and focus groups and being supported by a coterie of capable advisers, the TRT developed a platform that appealed to the poor especially to rural voters (Hewison, 2007:935).
Moreover, Ungpakorn emphasizes the populist policy or Thaksinomics appealed to Thai society especially, people in the rural areas. “They argued that the poor should be “stake-holders” rather than surfs. These “populist” policies were developed after the 1997 Asian economic crisis and were a result of widespread consultations in society. This was no socialist party, but a party of big business committed to free-market policies at a Macro and Global level, and Keynesian policies at village or grass-roots level9. This was called the “dual track” economic policy. It was not some wild invention of a power-crazed leader, as claimed by those who refer to these economic policies as “Taksinomics” (Ungpakorn, 2010:15).
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Thai society and economy appeared to be rebooted and moved upward in international. However, the rapid growth led to an economic calamity. The conflict started when Mr. Shinawatra turned his business to politics as Phongpaichit and Baker emphasizes. In the early 1990s, he rose within four years from deep debt to a net worth of US$2 billion on the hugely abnormal profits of a government-bestowed near-monopoly in mobile phones. He initially became involved in politics extended the monopoly system. During 2001- 2005, his government changed laws and rules to favor his family business empire and boosted its market value by three times in four years. Businessmen outside a crony inner circle peeled away. When the family company was sold to Singapore government’s Temasek Holdings in early 2006 for US$1.7 billion without incurring any tax liability, criticism of his greed and corruption spread widely within middle-class officials, professionals and small businesspeople (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2008:1).
According to Nelson,the underlying problem in Thai politics is it was Mr. Shinawatra himselfwho fatally turned the situation around to his own disadvantage byselling his Shin Corporation to Temasek, the Singaporean government’s investment company. The sale was announced onJanuary 6 and almost immediately inflamed the publicbecause the sale had been executed in such a way that theShinawatra family did not have to pay a single baht of tax onproceeds totaling 73 billion baht (Nelson, 2006:2).Moreover, Mr.Shinawatra tried to put his own network and replace monarchy network. Therefore, the outcomes turned to a bad situation for his position. Mr. Shinawatra’s action threatened the old networks of money politics, which had resulted in weak political parties, governing the country in corrupt and unstable coalition Governments (Ungpakorn, 2010:11).
Therefore, the anti-Thanksin group began to protest his adminitration.
In February 2006, thePeople’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) was formed. PAD demonstrations brought thousands onto the streets. These rallies were well organized and theatrical in their presentation. Mr. Sondhi launched a range of attacks on Mr.
Thaksin, many of them were accusing Thaksin of usurping the King’s role and being disrespectful of the throne. Many of the accusations could never be verified and some were fabrications. In a clear break from earlier pro-democracy movements, the PAD strongly asserted that the King was the moral and political centre of the country and
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repeatedly called for the monarch to throw Mr. Thaksin out and appoint his own prime minister (Hewison, 2007:936).
It has been almost ten years that the 1997 constitution was promulgated and called as “People Constitution”, but the coup has torn it down in September 19, 2006, and Thai democracy moved backward again. The anti-coup uprising and Thai people gathered as different political factions.
On the September 19, 2006, the Thai army staged a coup toppling the elected government of Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra. Soldiers sported yellow royal ribbons, and the military junta claimed that they were staging the coup to protect
“Democracy with the King as the Head of State”. They certainly were not protecting democracy, but most Thais believed that this was indeed a “royal coup”, even if the real power of the throne was in question (Ungpakorn, 2010:17).
The military coup replaced the 1997 constitution by the new 2007 constitution and also attempted to expose the wrongdoings of Mr. Shinawatra and his administration. Although election was held over a year after the coup, the pro-Thaksin party (the People’s Power Party) won the majority vote and returned to power. The PAD went back to the streets and occupied the international airport of Bangkok. In the midst of this turmoil, the Constitutional Court ordered the dissolution of the People’s Power Party. Though the party changed its name to the Pheu Thai Party in an attempt to retain the power, a faction of the Pheu Thai Party decided to join the opposition during the cabinet formation process, leading to the creation of the current Democrat Party’s administration. The army was believed to have helped prop up the creation of this new coalition. The transfer of power within the Thaksin faction was controlled by the might of the army, an intolerable course of action, which in turn brought the UDD out in protest (Shinichi:2010:2).
However, many scholars tried to defined Thai political conflict as a class war like: Hewison (2007), Ungpakorn (2010), Mccargo (2005), Bello (2010), and Shinichi (2010). However, I would like to argue that it is not class war as the democratic perception in Thai political is different. If we take a look carefully both of people factions have many classes to join their groups. In the red shirt side, it consists of many groups of people including communist people or left wings activists.
Surachai Sae Dan is the Internationaltimes reporter who included in the group. “Also
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known as Surachai Sae Dan, Danwattananusorn is involved with a faction called Red Siam, a breakaway group from the better known the red shirts factiont. He is a former communist activist who has been repeatedly jailed for his political views (Internationaltimes, 2012). There are also scholars and intellectuals who are university professors such as Sudsanguan Suthisorn, an associate professor of criminology at Thammasat University. He attends the rallies as the committed red shirts (The New York Times, 2010). Assistant Professor Suda Rangkupan, linguistics teacher at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, is also known as the red shirt supporter (The National, 2010). There are also people from the business group and politician publicly support the red shirts as well. According to The Nation, “this was why many of the
“Thai Rak Thai 111” politicians became red-shirt leaders after they were hit with a court-ordered five-year ban from politics” (The Nation, 2012). Mr.Thanksin supporters such as Chachavalpongpun said “leading members of network Thaksin include the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), informally referred to as the red shirts, middle-class Thais in provincial Thailand, some quarters of academia and activists, members of the old Thai Rak Thai network, and unions for the poor (Bangkok Post, 2009), and of course, labor and poor people are a majority to joined this political factions”.
As well as BBC News, “members are mainly rural workers from outside Bangkok, but the red-shirt ranks also include students, left-wing activists and some business people who see attempts by the urban and military elite to control Thai politics as a threat to democracy” (BBC NEWS, 2012). Also as Jensen said “the red shirts, however, support a political system based on the principles of ‘liberal democracy”. After the dissolution of the TRT and the PPP and the removal of elected politicians following the 2006 coup, the “democratic image” of both the Mr. Aphisit government and the regime was fading, and its commitment to democracy became questionable. The use of ‘democracy’ in the political discourse of the ‘red shirt’
leaders has therefore become an effective channel for contesting the legitimacy of both the government and the political regime. The government and its supporters, however, fear and claim that it is a political instrument used by the ‘red shirts’ to bring Mr. Shinawatra back to power. While he has been in an exile, he is assisting the
‘red shirts’ with moral and financial support. He is believed to fund the mass
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mobilization of ‘red shirts’ from the countryside to Bangkok during the March-May protests” (Asia Portal, 2011). In conclusion, all of this groups have different backgrounds, democracy perception and political ideology, but they gathered because they denied the coup and military to cancel the 1977 constitution and did not accept the puppet government (General Surayut Julanont’s government), which was formed without justification.
On the other hand, the yellow shirts are well-known as the middle class. However, it was not all middle class people who joined in this group. It consists of many groups of people who share the same democracy concept. According to BBC NEWS, the yellow shirts are “a loose grouping of royalists, ultra-nationalists and the urban middle class also known as the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), the yellow shirts utterly oppose Mr. Thaksin” (BBC NEWS, 2012). According to Wikipedia, the PAD supporters are media mogul, Mr. Sondhi Limthongkul, military officer, Major GeneralChamlong Srimuang, activist Phiphob Thongchai, state enterprise labor union leader, Mr. Somsak Kosaisuuk, university lecturer and social activist, Mr. Somkeit Pongpaibul, and also many middle and upper-class residents of
On the other hand, the yellow shirts are well-known as the middle class. However, it was not all middle class people who joined in this group. It consists of many groups of people who share the same democracy concept. According to BBC NEWS, the yellow shirts are “a loose grouping of royalists, ultra-nationalists and the urban middle class also known as the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), the yellow shirts utterly oppose Mr. Thaksin” (BBC NEWS, 2012). According to Wikipedia, the PAD supporters are media mogul, Mr. Sondhi Limthongkul, military officer, Major GeneralChamlong Srimuang, activist Phiphob Thongchai, state enterprise labor union leader, Mr. Somsak Kosaisuuk, university lecturer and social activist, Mr. Somkeit Pongpaibul, and also many middle and upper-class residents of