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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
In this thesis I have attempted to demonstrate the similarities in the Skeptic and Zen approaches to attaining tranquility. For the Skeptic, I have argued that tranquility is found in not rashly asserting judgments about the nature of things non-evident and for the Zennist it is learning how to engage in thought without clinging to what is thought.
The Zennist dwells in momentary awareness as does the Skeptic who only reports on what she has investigated on up to the present moment. Thus, in my view, the Greek and Chinese minds find a very common ground in this regard. Furthermore, the use of oppositions is paramount: the Skeptic is unable to rest on a judgment because of the equipollence of the two sides of the arguments she examines. The Zennist, in a slightly different manner, does not rest on judgments because she lives in awareness of the interdependence of opposites. Thus, whereas the Skeptic does not attach to, for example, sagliness because, among other things, she demonstrates that rationally speaking it is impossible to become a sage at all,242 the Zennist does not attach because she is fully aware that sagliness is only possible in contrast to ordinariness.
The emphases are different, but the psychological result I believe is essentially the same. And though there are some differences regarding metaphysical and ethical statements, the non-dogmatic nature of these stances on either along with their common underlying therapeutic aims in the final analysis make the differences appear largely inconsequential.
Thus, to return to Garner’s central question concerning the Skeptic’s quietude that we highlighted in the introduction: “what his [the Skeptic’s] quietude amounts to, how it
242 PH III, 273-279.
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is attained, how it is maintained, and, further and most importantly, how it is supposed to lead to a lack of perturbation?”,243 my answer is that the Skeptic’s simply quietude amounts to a disposition, as Sextus says, of not affirming anything which lies beyond appearances. To appreciate this simple point, we need only reflect on the fact that when Skeptic likes or dislikes some particular thing, she will be immediately aware that her preferences are not rational. And when a situation arises, she realizes that no response is any more or less justified than any other. Thus, after judgment has been suspended on the nature of right and wrong, there is no dread or anxiety about making the “wrong” decision. The Skeptic simply proceeds undogmatically, and out of necessity (since remaining inactive would essentially be a choice to commit suicide!), in the way that is most agreeable to her own intuitions. And this inclination may be the result of cultural influences or owe its existence to some other non-rational basis.
The Skeptic’s more intuitive mode of being does not bring with it the disturbing
“intensity” of either positive or negative emotion. Thus, she lives without disturbance in matters that pertain to belief even though she feels compelled to take action. The Skeptic still is, however, and as Sextus points out, subject to the ordinary discomforts of life. The Skeptic’s one saving grace here is simply that she does not also dogmatically assert anything about the nature of those discomforts so as to not cause herself discomfort of the psychological variety as well.244
With that said, I therefore see my contribution in writing this thesis as one of not only bringing to the forefront overlooked similarities in the Skeptical and Zen approaches to tranquility, but also one of elucidating somewhat the nature of tranquility itself through examining how places arguments and concepts in opposition to one another
243 Garner, “Skepticism, ordinary language and Zen Buddhism,” 168.
244 PH I, 29-30.
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assist in bringing it about. The key to tranquility, as I have argued throughout, lies in the practice of placing dichotomies in opposition as opposed to attaching to the
“good” side while suppressing the “bad” one. Once the two are placed in opposition, the intellect comes to a standstill and one proceeds intuitively, without dogmatizing.
Philosophically of course, talk of “intuition” is always suspect. What legitimizes it here, however, is that there is no claim being made that the intuition acts a guarantor of extra-intellectual truths. It is simply the case that reason is unable to provide a guide for practical conduct, and thus the Skeptic and the Zennist, having no other option, live intuitively without dogmatizing about how the “intuitive life” is preferable to one lived according to (one-sided) philosophical principles (as that itself too would appear to be a one-sided argument!). Sextus at many times, however, does argue that the person who doesn’t believe things are good or bad by nature is better of than the person who does or that the “wise man” of the Stoics is worse off than the ordinary person.245 But such arguments are generally not conclusive, but Sextus does not in any case need them to be true in order to retain his tranquility since it may have only appeared to Sextus that the Dogmatist could not achieve any sort of permanent happiness in regards to her beliefs Thus, not only do these arguments not succeed, but they also diverge from Sextus’ own stated Skeptical practice. Then again, Sextus doesn’t claim that any of his arguments are absolutely correct, so the Skeptical position he presents itself seems to be able to provide a path to tranquility so long as the Skeptic admits that she may not be any more or worse off than the Dogmatists.
And likewise, Huineng criticizes other schools even though he says that in practice we should not see the faults of others. However, as long as he is not “stained” by his criticisms of the “bad” schools (which must necessarily contrast with the teachings of
245 See PS I, 27-28, III, 276-277, M VI, 110-140.
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his “good” school), he seems able to retain his tranquility as well. Thus, in practice, Huineng, like everyone else, must reject some things. But unlike the average person, he rejects them without “rejecting” them, so to speak. Or in the language of the Skeptics, he does not dogmatize his rejections, and thus the psychological impact of his preferring some things to others remains minimal and mental disturbances are thus prevented from arising.
Lastly, before offering my thoughts on directions for future research, I would like to highlight what I consider the downside of my approach of concentrating on the thought of Huineng in this thesis. The Sixth Patriarch hardly mentions doubt in the Platform Sutra, and in his cultural context, it is completely understandable why he does not. In the Japanese tradition, however, there is much said on the relationship between doubt and enlightenment and thus I felt compelled, for example, to include Hakuin’s historically importantly thoughts on the subject of doubt into the discussion in Chapter 3 because of their obvious relevance. And I think there still remains much more to be said on the connection between doubt and tranquility in the Zen context.
Hopefully, this area of research will pique the interest of future scholars. And this brings me to the subject of future research. I believe be a comparison between the Daodejing’s theory of “non-action” (wu wei 無為) and the Skeptic’s practice of “not resisting” appearances but instead following them undogmatically “without much proclivity or strong pro feeling, as the child is said to be persuaded by or obedient to his teacher” would be of immense value.246 I find A.C. Graham’s description of the Daoist who instead of “pondering choices lets his problems solve themselves as inclination spontaneously finds its own direction, which is the Way” very reminiscent
246 PH I, 230.
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of the Way (agoge) of the Skeptics just referred to.247 One might in fact interpret the Skeptic’s “four-fold regimen” of life as being something of a consistent statement of Daoism’s paradoxical theory of non-action. Moreover, I for one am curious about the philosophical implications of following inclinations. One does it imply about autonomy if the individual ceases to act deliberately and becomes content with being
“guided” by conditioned responses and natural urges? Or perhaps a paradox will emerge that suggests that to be free is precisely to be guided (in a subtle way) by these very forces! One could also compare the different ways the Skeptics and Daoist eschew decision-making based on dogmatic standards of good and bad (e.g., the Skeptics arrive at it through dialectic and the Daoists might arrive at it through the contemplation of dichotomies, just as Huineng does). Secondly, as Kjellberg points out in his comparative essay on Sextus and Zhuangzi, Zhuangzi is interested in the
“skillful living” that leads to more effective decisions (according presumably to the person’s own criteria of “effectiveness”) when one does not cling dogmatically to preconceptions about the way things should be.248 I therefore see Zhuangzi’s contribution in terms demonstrating how creativity may be unleashed through the unhinging of dogmatic concepts as when he, for example, explains to Huishi how the gourds he labeled useless could have been used for other purposes besides only what he originally had in mind.249 Sextus, on the other hand, does not mention the benefits of non-dogmatic thinking other than the tranquility it is said to bring. Thus, further explorations into this aspect of the non-dogmatic disposition will I think provide a fuller interpretation of what it means to live according to this “Way” of the Skeptics and Daoists, as opposed as to the traditional habit of attempting to rely on unfounded
247 A.C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao. (Illinois: Open Court, 1989), 234.
248 Paul Kjellberg and Phillip J. Ivanhoe, Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi.
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 11-13.
249 Kjellberg and Ivanhoe, Essays, 11.
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rational principles for guidance. It is important to note, however, that this non-dogmatic mode of living only comes after one has inquired into the subject matter in question. Thus, it is not a disavowal of reason, and nor is it to say that reason cannot discover truth (interpretations which Zhuangzi sometimes leaves himself open to). It simply means that life requires action and if reason cannot serve as an adequate guide, then it seems obvious that something else must. And that something turns out to be undogmatic reliance on our original preconditioned ways of thinking. In Zen terms, this means that one comes back to the very society and culture that one initially attempted to transcend, but this time without clinging to it or rejecting out of mind other traditions. Thus, I think conducting research on how different philosophical systems throughout history and around the world have arrived at the same or similar conclusions as the ones presented here will contribute immensely to not only comparative philosophy, but also to our understanding of that
“great matter” of the mind.
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APPENDIX: A SKEPTIC AND ZENNIST IN DIALOGUE
Skeptic: How is that you teach the doctrine of a non-evident Buddha-nature? Why should anyone believe such a thing exists?
Zennist: We teach it in order to save sentient beings.
Skeptic: But if you have no proof that this non-evident entity exists, why lead people to hold this view?
Zennist: Because it is a view that can lead them to hold no views.
Skeptic: Hmmm….That sounds a bit mysterious to me; wouldn’t it just be better to get them to suspend their judgment?
Zennist: Is suspending judgment good?
Skeptic: I don’t know; I’ve suspended judgment on that.
Zennist: So why are recommending it to me?
Skeptic: Well, to me it seems better to provide them with arguments which expose the rashness of their judgments. Surely this is better than having them believe things which purportedly lie beyond appearances, isn’t it?
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Zennist: But the very arguments you use to expose rashness you yourself confess are many times weak in persuasiveness. Thus, the function of your arguments is therapeutic, just as is our teaching of the Buddha-nature.
Skeptic: Well, since you put it that way, I do sort of agree that my weak arguments may play the same role, but at least even our most far out arguments are nonetheless theoretically possible.
Zennist: And isn’t the existence of the Buddha nature also theoretically possible?
Skeptic: Yes, but strongly affirming its existence would indicate that you are attached to it, would it not?
Zennist: Precisely, that is why we at times affirm it and other times deny it; it all depends on context I’d say.
Skeptic: Well, as a skeptic I only go on what seems to be the case to me. And to me there seems to be no such thing as a Buddha-nature. However, I don’t deny that there is one; I just do see how it is warranted to affirm that there is one.
Zennist: I see, so you mean that my affirmation of the Buddha-nature is “bad?”
Skeptic: Not in itself, but it appears so to me. But I’ll be the first to admit that my basis for believing this has no rational support.
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Zennists: In that case, your claim that it is bad is no more credible that the opposite claim that isn’t!
Skeptic: Hey are you trying to use my method against me?! I’m just saying that unwarranted assertions seem to lead to dogmatism and a lack of respect for truth.
Zennist: But since we do not cling to these assertions, so how can dogmatism arise?
Moreover, we in fact oppose these assertions one against the other. Thus, sometimes we will emphasis darkness over light or the mundane over the sacred, or even the not-Buddha mind or the Buddha mind if we detect in our students attachment to the opposite side of the dichotomy in question.
Skeptic: Yes, that is exactly what the Skeptic does as she investigates truth, except that the Skeptic deals more with arguments as opposed to simple dichotomies. In any case, we place arguments in opposition and rely undogmatically on traditional norms.
And in this way, we experience peace.
Zennist: That is itself exactly what the Zennist calls seeing the Buddha-nature; for us, such a state of mind is truth!
Skeptic: So if you’ve already found truth, then won’t that make you dogmatic?
Zennist: Haha, perhaps it would if weren’t for the fact that finding “truth” for us is uncovering all that we do not wish to see, in ourselves. We don’t suppress any inconvenient facts about ourselves or the world; we in fact may need them to
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counterbalance the “convenient” ones we do tend to cling to!
Skeptic: Perhaps we might agree then since that sort of describes our activity as well.
But one important difference is that we Skeptics don’t see a mental attitude as being
“truth.” We conceive of truth as existing external to us, something to be found “out there,” beyond the world of appearances.
Zennist: Well, wouldn’t you have to first have reason to believe that a world was out there in order search for truth? It seems that you can only search for truth externally only by assuming that externally reality already exists. But whether it does is in fact
“the very thing in question,” as you often like to put it.
Skeptic: You’ve got a point there I suppose, but since our motivation all along was to find peace of mind, we’re not really bothered about whether truth can be found. We arrive at tranquility by simply coming to doubt the once-held uncritical belief that tranquility was only possible once truth was found.
Zennist: So it seems you don’t have much of reason to search for truth then...
Skeptic: We are indeed very interested in investigating the claims of those who claim to have found truth. After all, they might be correct! And we also constantly examine the veracity of our own beliefs. So I would say we are very interested in truth even if what constitutes the term remains vague.
Zennist: The Skeptic is interested in truth?…People normally think you are interested
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in only attacking all claims to truth! Anyway, our “truth,” which is essentially found in leaving behind what we already believe to be false, but often slow to admit, as being the same in essence as your activity of openly and honestly searching for
“truth” and questioning the veracity of even one’s own beliefs. So do you think I right about the equivalence of two doctrines on this point? (Smiling)
Skeptic: You know what, I think I’ll suspend judgment on that one question and try some of that tea you’ve got there. (Smiles back)
(The Zennist unceremoniously passes the Skeptic a new tea bag.)
Skeptic: So, ma’am, what about our notion of ataraxia. I’m curious as to how it compares to your doctrine of “no-thought” exactly?
Zennist: When we become aware of attachment, we don’t react emotionally to that, since to do so would only represent an attachment to “non-attachment.” Thus, we acknowledge our attachments while neither striving to reject or cling further to them.
Thus, we say that we are unattached in the midst of attachment, or to put it the standard way, to not think while even in the midst of thought.
Skeptic: Hmmm….In a similar way I suppose, we acknowledge that the basis of our beliefs about the “non-evident” are non-rational. Thus, we don’t dogmatize about such things. And we have found that by not dogmatizing about that which we cannot prove, we experience peace. We affirm only those things we can’t be wrong about, such as having a headache or being cold.
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Zennist: In that case, wouldn’t you worry about being wrong or sometimes accidentally overstating your case?
Skeptic: We’re not perfect I guess, so sometimes we bring disturbance upon ourselves by assuming that dogmatism is really bad and do be avoided at all costs. But since we do not say that suspending and ataraxia are “good” in themselves, we hardly need fear becoming dogmatic. It might actually itself be good for all we know!
Zennist: Hmmm…, nice reply. So the only other real difference between our positions seems to be that you embrace doubt while we attempt to overcome it. These views seem to be polar opposites, or am I missing something?
Skeptic: Well, for starters, to question the truth of a dogmatic belief is already to detach from it. Thus, our doubt can be equated with our non-attachment to views?
Zennist: That’s right. If we’ve attached to the idea that we must eradicate doubt in order to be enlightened, then we will actually always remain in doubt! Thus, we eliminate doubt by not attaching to the idea that we must get rid of it to begin with!
Skeptic: Exactly, and not getting rid of doubt is somewhat similar to our finding
Skeptic: Exactly, and not getting rid of doubt is somewhat similar to our finding