CHAPTER 1 PYRRHONIAN SKEPTICISM
1.2 The Way of Pyrrhonian Skepticism
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1.2. The Way of Pyrrhonian Skepticism
The word “skeptic” comes from Greek noun “skepsis,” which means “to reflect” or
“consider carefully.” Sextus tells us also that the Skeptic Way is “zetetic” or investigative.57 The Skeptic originally assumes that ataraxia (mental imperturbability) can only be found by separating truth from falsity in the things disputed by philosophy. In the course of his investigations, however, the Skeptic discovers that finding ultimate answers is not necessarily itself a precondition for arriving at ataraxia as was previously assumed. However, the Skeptic does not conclude from this discovery that it follows that the search for truth should be abandoned. In fact, reason itself can give us no more reason to search than to not search. The Skeptic qua Skeptic continues to search nonetheless though it is not clear as to what his motivation might be in the absence of any intellectual disturbance whatsoever. In any case, the tranquil state of mind arises from suspending judgment on already-held dogmatic beliefs as opposed to the acquisition of new facts about the nature of reality.58
The System of Skepticism
Here we begin our survey of Skepticism with the words of Sextus Empiricus himself on what Skepticism is and is not. Sextus tells us very straightforwardly that:
If one defines a system as an attachment to a number of dogmas that agree with one another and with appearances, and defines a dogma as an assent to
57 PH I, 6.
58 Actually a more accurate rendering of the term skeptikoi would be inquirer, which reflects that the fact the Skeptic’s principle aim is not simply to doubt, but rather to inquire. However, it just so happens that inquiring into a matter naturally leads to doubts concerning the veracity of claims previously made.
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something non-evident, we shall say that the Skeptic does not have a system.59 [emphasis added]
“But,” he continues,
if one says that a system is a way of life that, in accordance with appearances, follows a certain rationale, where that rationale shows how it is possible to seem to live rightly (“rightly” being taken, not as referring only to virtue, but in a more ordinary sense) and tends to produce the disposition to suspend judgment, then we say that he does have a system.60
Skepticism, therefore, is first and foremost a way of life based on the suspension of judgment concerning things “non-evident” (adelos, lit. “hidden”). It is, as stated in the outset, an “ability” (not a philosophy in the formal sense) to place arguments in opposition for the sake of ceasing to dogmatize. According to Sextus, the skeptic starts out experiencing puzzlement (aphoria) concerning the nature of appearances and believes that by finding the “ultimate” answer peace of mind will follow, but then something else happens:
…the Skeptics were hoping to achieve ataraxia by resolving the anomaly of phenomena and noumena, and, being unable to do this, they suspended judgment.
But then, by chance as it were, when they were suspending judgment the ataraxia followed, as a shadow follows the body.61
59 PH I, 16.
60 PH I, 17.
61 PH I, 29.
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Thus, the Skeptic finds peace of mind accidentally by not resolving the question, but by suspending judgment on something that was previously rashly believed to be true.
And since the Skeptic has acquired the “disposition” (dunamis) to suspend judgment for any argument encountered, she will naturally apply the method of placing arguments in opposition:
The Skeptic Way is a disposition to oppose phenomena and noumena to one another in any way whatever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence among the things and statements thus opposed, we are brought first to epoché and then to ataraxia.62
Ataraxia, the Greek term meaning “imperturbability,” is the ultimate goal of the Skeptics and virtually all Hellenistic schools of thought. It is, says Sextus, that
“untroubled and tranquil condition of the soul.”63 Though, we elaborate more fully on the notion of ataraxia in Chapter 6, let us first note for the time being that the Skeptic has found that tranquility appears to be incompatible with dogmatic or precipitous assent to views, including I suppose this one too if one so happens to rashly assent to even it. Sextus himself even stops short of saying suspending judgment is a “good”
thing by nature as he claims Aenesidemus did.64 And although the Skeptic has discovered that peace is actually able to follow from suspending judgment on appearances, the Skeptic nonetheless continues investigations. In the opening paragraph of the Outlines Sextus writes,
62 PH I, 7-9.
63 PH I, 10.
64 PH II, 233.
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So also in the case of what is sought in philosophy, I think, some people have claimed to have found the truth, others have asserted that it cannot be apprehended, and others are still searching.65
The Skeptic of course places herself in the last group, and the description implies that Dogmatism of either the positive or negative variety (“truth has been found” and
“truth cannot be found” respectively) is what rules out the possibility of continued searching. And Sextus has also this reply to the charge that Skeptics aren’t interested in seeking truth:
For to continue the investigation or problems is not inconsistent in those who confess their ignorance of their [the problems] real nature, but only in those who believe they have an exact knowledge of them.”66
Investigating is thus a way of life for the skeptic and she does not say whether truth can or cannot be found, for that is itself something also non-evident at the moment.
And even for arguments the Skeptic currently finds convincing, she is able to oppose her present state of conviction to past instances of similar conviction. Thus, the Skeptic is able to reply:
Just as before the birth of the person who introduced the system which you follow, the argument supporting that system did not yet appear sound although it really was, so also it is possible that the opposite of the argument you now
65 PH I, 1-2.
66 PS II, 11.
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advance is really sound despite its not yet appearing so to us, and hence we should not yet assent to this argument that now seems so strong.67
The practice of “opposing present things to things past and future” is what Skepticism scholar R. J. Hankinson refers to as the Skeptic’s “McCawber policy.”68 However, Hankinson remarks that “far from being a desperate expedient to preserve an authentically skeptical stance in the face of overwhelming evidence (as some think), there is much to be said for it. After all, until 1543 (and in fact considerably thereafter) the vast preponderance of evidence suggested that the earth was stationary.”69 If this is true, then of course the modern Skeptic will not strongly assent now to the proposition that “The earth revolves around the sun” simply because it is currently the most convincing theory (and perhaps neither would modern scientists who typically prefer to speak in terms of “theories” as opposed to “truths” of science). Thus, the mere possibility that a future discovery could tip the tide of convincingness is enough prevent the Skeptic from assenting to anything which is not necessarily or incorrigibly true.70 From the foregoing, it might at first appear that the Skeptic might be disinclined to search in that she can always imagine any theory being falsified upon further research with the implication that finding “truth” is hopeless. And though many a commentator have accused Sextus of “bad faith” in regards to his claim to still be searching for truth,71 I think such claims are inconclusive. Again, it is only apparent to the Skeptic “right now” that any conceivable theory has the possibility of being overturned. This being the case, perhaps even that conclusion itself might one
67 PH I, 34.
68 The name is inspired by the Wilkin Micawber character in Charles Dicken’s David Copperfield who is constantly asserting his faith that “something will show up.”
69 Hankinson, The Skeptics, 30.
70 PH I, 193.
71 Hankinson, The Skeptics, 13.
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day be overturned as well! Thus, the Skeptic stands poised to continue the search now and has not made any precipitous judgments about what can or cannot be found. And this freedom from rash assumptions is what ushers in the Skeptic’s quietude. We will say more on the “present tenseness” of the Skeptic’s position in Chapter 3.
The Ten Modes and the Five Modes of Argument72
The Skeptic has observed that beliefs about appearances can be opposed to one another in such a way that doubt arises in regards to the trustworthiness of those beliefs. The “Ten Modes” were introduced by the earlier Skeptic Aenesidemus in order to show that there is no way to properly ground our beliefs about appearances.
Appearances can be opposed to other appearances (just judgments about appearances can be opposed to appearances themselves) such that we may be led to suspend judgment on the nature of the “underlying thing” (hypokeimenon, see Ch. 3.1) in question. Thus, by way of example, Sextus writes, “we oppose phenomena to phenomena when we say that the same tower appears round from a distance but square from close up.”73 Therefore, if someone were to claims that X is Y because it has the appearance of Z, then if the Skeptic can show that X also under certain circumstances has the appearance of not-Z, then X can no longer be affirmed to be Y by nature. This is essentially the reasoning behind the Ten Modes which we now briefly list. Impressions and appearances are opposed to one another in the following
72 For considerations of space, “Two Modes” and the “Modes for Causal Explanations” will not be elaborated on. But to briefly quote Sextus on the former entails: “For since everything that is apprehended is either apprehended through itself or through something else, by pointing out that what is apprehended is apprehended neither through itself nor through anything else they produce aporiai, as they [the Skeptics who propound the Two Modes] suppose, about everything.” (PH I, 178-179). The eight modes for refuting causal explanation were believed by Aenesidemus, who devised them, to be able to “refute and expose as unsound every dogmatic causal explanation.” (PH I, 180-186)
73 PH I, 33
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ways:
1) Impressions differ due to differences in the physical constitution of species (e.g., bats and humans perceive the world differently)
2) Impressions differ due to the difference of individuals of the same species (e.g., two different people may perceive the world differently)
3) Impressions differ due to the fact that different sense organs detect different sensations (e.g., the eyes and the nose perceive things differently)
4) Impressions differ due to the present circumstances of the perceiver (e.g., an intoxicated or sick person perceives the world differently than a person in their natural condition)
5) Impressions differ depending on one’s spatial position in relation to the object (e.g., a coin looks round from the top, but flat from the side)
6) Impressions differ due to objects being mixed with other objects (e.g., a body in water appears different than one seen through the medium of air)
7) Impressions differ due to quantities of a thing (e.g., food may not be appealing to a person that is full)
8) Impressions differ due to the relativity of things (e.g., a tall person may be considered short in comparison to a skyscraper).
9) Impressions differ due to constancy or rarity (e.g., the rare comet seems more awe-inspiring than the sun which is seen everyday)
10) Impressions differ due to customs and laws (e.g., people of different cultures approve and disapprove of different practices).74
74 PH 36-163.
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These modes are meant to inducing suspension of judgment concerning the way things really are behind appearances, and not to prove that things are not as the Dogmatists claim them to be. Sextus openly admits that “they may well be unsound, and there may be more than the ones I shall mention.”75 Furthermore, Sextus says that these ten modes can all be subsumed under the mode of relativity, 76 which itself listed as the third of the Five Modes attributed to Agrippa (Sextus does not refer to him by name, but just attributes them generally to the “Later Skeptics,” i.e., those following after Aenesidemus).77 These are as follows:
1) The mode of “disagreement” or “discrepancy” (diaphonia) whereby the Skeptic is led to suspend judgment owing to the fact of disagreement among philosophers on the matters in question.
2) The mode of “infinite regress” (ienai eis apeiron) whereby true of a statement requires a proof to make it credible, but that proof will in term will require yet another proof and so ad infinitum.
3) The mode of “relativity” (pros ti) as just discussed.
4) The mode of “hypothesis” or “assumption” (hypothetikon) or the non-allowance of unproved premises in a debate.
5) The mode of “circularity” (diallelon) whereby an argument assumes the truth of what is already in question.78
Sextus goes on to show that all matters of inquiry can be brought under these five
75 PH I, 35.
76 PH I, 38.
77 DL IX, 88.
78 PH I, 164-169.
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modes (or perhaps more properly, that all have been thus far brought under them),79 and among these he makes the most extensive use of the second, fourth, and fifth modes in his arguments against his opponents. It should be noted also that Modes 2, 4, 5 are also referred to as the “Münchhausen-Trilemma” or also “Agrippa's Trilemma.”
A few of these modes we will employ in Chapters 4 and 5 to provide a demonstration as to how they are able to bring about epoché and ataraxia.
79 PH I, 170.