CHAPTER 4 THE USE OF OPPOSITIONS
4.2 The Zen Use of Opposition Pairs
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立 政 治 大 學
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N a tio na
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4.2. The Zen Use of Opposition Pairs
As I have been arguing, for both Skeptics and Zennists, opposition plays a primary role in the attainment of tranquility. For Huineng in particular, one section of the text of the Platform Sūtra is devoted to an exposition of the “36 polarities (pairs of opposites).”188 Mentioned there are the 5 polarities of inanimate objects, the 12 polarities of the dharmas and marks in language, and the 19 polarities among
“functions which arise from the self nature.”189 The study of the polarities are said to be of such central importance that, according to Huineng, they “can be used to understand and explain all the scriptures.”190 One key passage is the following:
Darkness is not darkness by itself; it is because of light that there is darkness.
Light is not light by itself; it is because of darkness that there is light. Darkness is distinguished in contrast to light, and light appears because of darkness. Their existences are mutually dependent. It is the same with all thirty-six pairs of opposites.191
As the last sentence of the passage suggests, the substitution of any other set of polarities in place of light/darkness opposition pair would yield the same analysis.
Take the dichotomy of beauty and ugliness for example. If beauty is to be appreciated as beauty, then there of course needs to be ugliness. Thus, to be happy that one is
188 There text actually lists 37 polarities. Perhaps an additional one was added as a result of scribal error at some point during the transmission of the text.
189 PS 46, 對。外境無情對有五…法與相對有十二對…自性居起用對有十九對。
190 Ibid., 此三十六對法，能用通一切經。
191 Ibid., 暗不自暗，以明故暗。暗不自暗，以明變暗。以暗顯明，來去相因。三十六對，亦復
如是。
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beautiful is in effect to be happy that there are ugly people; if there were not people so judged, one necessarily could not appreciate one’s own beauty. And if everyone were judged as beautiful, then there would of course be no meaningful concept of
“beautiful” people to begin with. The same also of course applies to the polarities of
“sage” and “ordinary person.” We normally prefer the sage over the ordinary person, just as we normally prefer beauty over ugliness. The irony, however, is that the “sage”
is actually one who knows that the idea of a “sage” is mutually dependent upon the idea of the “ordinary person.” Therefore, the sage can take no satisfaction in his status as a “sage.” This is not because our sage feels as if she has reached some high level of attainment, but simply because feeling a sense of accomplishment from becoming a sage necessarily requires that there be ordinary (deluded) people who can serve as a contrast. But since any “sage” worthy of the name would hardly desire that there be deluded people, she therefore feels no satisfaction in contrasting herself with them. In fact, the true sage necessarily welcomes the prospect of everyone becoming a sage (after all, that is the purpose of her teaching), and when this happens our sage’s own “sagliness” would of course cease to have any significance altogether!192 And as in the case of beauty, sagliness cannot be appreciated as such without ordinariness.
Therefore, the sage has no real motivation to attach special significance to either
“sagliness” or “ordinariness” or any set of polarities.193 Furthermore, Huineng says that “When you are enlightened, you will see that originally there are no distinctions.”194 By this statement, he is not literally suggesting that no distinctions exist as this would imply that there was no difference at all between, say, a Chinese
192 In other words, the sage is trying to work herself out of a job.
193 Compare this to the Daoist sage who also casts off “sagliness”: “Abandon sagliness and discard wisdom.” (絕聖棄智) Daodejing., Ch. 19. Chan, Wing-tsit. A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).
194 PS 16. 悟即元無差別。This was spoken in the context of the sudden/gradual debate. But it seems that they can be applied to all distinctions generally.
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Zennist and an Arabian stallion. Instead, this I think should be taken to mean that in understanding how all distinctions are mutually related to their opposites, our minds should lose the motivation to cling to dichotomous distinctions. As the Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi says, “That which makes my life good makes my death good also.”195 Thus, one cannot appreciate one half of the dichotomy without also appreciating the other. But, then again, to appreciate both is essentially to cling to neither. It is important to note that one need not see them as equally preferable in all situations (which in any case appears practically impossible), but rather one simply that the disliked one is necessary for the other be preferable in the first place.
As Zen Buddhism is a philosophy of the Middle Path, it necessarily seeks to avoid the extremes inherent in dualistic thinking: “Is the world eternal or not eternal?” “Is there or is there not perception in the enlightened state?” And even aside from the philosophical, in everyday life, we seem to unfailingly find ourselves struggling between two extremes: “Should I or should I step in to resolve this dispute?” “Should I or should I not take this job?” However, according to the Zen School, the good news is that at this very point of standing between two opposing choices that we find ourselves in the best position to experience the state of non-dwelling. In fact, through the joining together of mutually contradictory positions A and not-A the ego is without a firm dwelling point.196 As Huineng once instructed his disciples “If someone asks you about any dharma (thing), your answer should always be given in dichotomies drawing on the pairs of opposites,”197 meaning that when my mind gives
195 Zhuangzi Ch. 2. 故善吾生者，乃所以善吾死也。
196 The Diamond Sūtra makes constant use of not {A, ¬ A} but rather {A , ¬A, A}. That is, it affirms a proposition, then denies it, and then reaffirms it. I interpret this to be a clever method of forestalling attempts by the mind to dwell on what is first affirmed. The second affirmation following the denial seems to be asserted less dogmatically than in the first instance.
197 PS 45.
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rise to one option, I should actively counter it with the thought of its opposite. And once I have juxtaposed both extreme possibilities, the two conditioned polarities will
“have no place to go.”198 Thus, in telling myself that I have to both do and not do X, I have in effect given myself a kōan (Chin: gong an 公案, lit. “public case”). A kōan is in most cases an inconsistent statement or question whereby one is instructed to find an “answer.” The purpose of the kōan is able to produce the sensation of “great doubt”
we spoke of in Chapter 3, and in doing so brings the ego to an impasse. Thus, for example, one of the most famous kōans attributed to Huineng, which is found in the Wumenguan (無門關, Case #23), reads “When you are without the thought of good or evil, that is your original face.”199 It is just as impossible to know that you are not thinking of good and evil (since to be aware of it is already to open it to judgment) as it is to both do and not do X. Consider also De-Shan’s (德山) famous “Thirty blows if you can speak, thirty blows if you cannot.”200 In this case, neither speaking nor not speaking is adequate to stave off the thirty blows. The upshot, however, is that by putting the two extremes together (both/and—the third level of the tetralemma) we are able to eventually arrive at an “answer” that recognizes that both extremes are equally problematic (neither/nor—the fourth level of the tetralemma).201 Thus, when the ego-mind attempts to contemplate two mutually contradictory dharmas, it finds no escape, and when it acknowledges its entrapment it by this very means attains escape, but this time through the door of humility. Contradiction thus plays a prominent role in Zen I think not because Zen is “beyond the ken of ordinary reason” as Suzuki held
198 Ibid.
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不思善、不思惡、正與麼時、那箇是明上座本來面目。＂Literally, the text says, “At precisely the time when there is no thought of good or evil, that is the Abbot Ming’s original face.” (Huineng is addressing the listener in the dialogue by name.)200 Compendium of Five Lamps (wu deng hui yuan 五燈會元; Jap: Goto Egen), Bk II.
201 The tetralemma (Sanskrit: catuskoti), the “four cornered” logic affirms of proposition, then denies the proposition, then affirms the proposition’s joints affirmation and denial, and finally rejects the proposition’s joint affirmation and denial.
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(for how could it be known if it were?),202 but because the ego typically must force itself into contradiction when it strives to articulate ultimate truth. When this happens, humility sets in and one recognizes that one possesses no “ultimate understanding” of enlightenment or spiritually by means of which one may boast. And even if one were theoretically to become “freed” from egotism, one could not possibly become aware of such a fact. If one did, then that “freedom” would necessarily have to coexist with the knowledge of one’s own “entrapment” by the idea of freedom itself! This is perhaps why it is sometimes said in Zen that there is nothing to gain (one necessarily could not be aware of gaining “it” even if one did).203 Thus, Huineng emphasizes humility since attaching to either X or not-X will lead to egotism; and we have no other choice but choose one of them (or perhaps some other equally problematic alternative) if we are to remain active in the world. Therefore, “to think without thinking” means in a sense to think humbly, not because it’s good to do so, but simply because one finds no other or tranquility-inducing alternative. And in Chapter 1 we saw that the Skeptic does not take self-devouring slogans as holding absolutely, but uses them to express her lack of assent in regards to claims concerning the non-evident. The Skeptic may regard certain behaviors as right or wrong, but like the Zennist, she cannot but assert them with humility (or “non-confidently” to use Sextus’s wording) since it is goes against common standards of rationality to strongly assert some non-evident truth that one cannot possibly prove. Moreover, we should also I think not read the Zennist not as expressing any mysterious universal truths
202 Suzuki, An Introduction to Zen, 58. Though perhaps Suzuki simply means that some “truths”
simply cannot be stated in non-contradictory language. This would make such pronouncements in Zen
“dialetheisms” or true contradictions. However, there is nothing in Huineng’s sermons that suggests to me that he meant his contradictory or paradoxical statements to be taken as literal truth, though neither would he I think say that they definitely shouldn’t be taken as such!
203 Such as in PS 43: 但離法相，作無所得，是最上乘。Compare this to Ch. 31 of Daodejing which states “Supreme virtue is without ‘virtue,’ therefore it possesses virtue. Lower virtue never loses sight of its ‘virtuousness,’ therefore it possess no virtue.” (上德無德，是以有德，下德不失德，是以無德。)＂
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through her self-contradictory utterances, but also as expressing her non-attachment to or rejection of either half of the dichotomy in question. Suzuki argues that the
“ordinary process of reason is powerless to give final satisfaction to our deepest spiritual needs.”204 If that’s true, then neither could we expect non-ordinary reasoning to bring any similar satisfaction owing to the fact that ordinary/non-ordinary reasoning is itself a dualism. Thus, I would say the way to satisfy our spiritual would be realize both the necessity and futility of both types of reasoning!
204 Suzuki, An Introduction to Zen, 59.