皮羅懷疑主義與禪宗的哲學對話 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學哲學系碩士班碩士論文指導教授：林鎮國. 教授. TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHY OF 治政大 TRANQUILITY 立. ‧ 國. 學. Pyrrhonian Skepticism and Zen Buddhism in Dialogue. ‧. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 皮羅懷疑主義與禪宗的哲學對話 Ch. engchi. i Un. v. 研究生：莊子義中華民國九十八年七月.

(2) Towards a Philosophy of Tranquility: Pyrrhonian Skepticism and Zen Buddhism in Dialogue Under the Direction of Dr. Chen-kuo Lin ABSTRACT This thesis is a comparative study of the Pyrrhonian Skepticism and Zen Buddhist approaches to “tranquility.” I will argue that the state of ataraxia (“unperturbedness”) as interpreted by the Skeptics is essentially identical to the Zen state of “non-dwelling” as articulated by the Sixth Patriarch Huineng. In doing so, I will attempt to show how the philosophical methodologies of both Sextus and Huineng succeed in bringing the individual to a state of tranquility through the skillful use of opposition pairs, be they in the form of opposed arguments (for the Skeptics) or traditional dichotomies (for the Zennists). I will argue also that simple non-dogmatic reliance on non-rational guides to life (e.g. culture, custom, etc.) as advocated by the Skeptics is equivalent to the Zen idea of returning to life in the ordinary world absent attachment to either the ordinary or the transcendent.. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. ‧. TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHY OF TRANQUILITY:. by. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. PYRRHONIAN SKEPTICISM AND ZEN BUDDHISM IN DIALOGUE. Ch. i Un. CARLO JAMELLE HARRIS. engchi. v. A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy in the College of Liberal Arts at National Chengchi University, Taiwan 2009 Committee Chair: Chen-kuo Lin Committee: Su-Ching Ho Yao-ming Tsai.

(3) ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. I first want to thank Prof. Chen-kuo Lin for his unending support and guidance throughout the writing and development of this thesis. His valuable insights provided in the form of personal consultations and many insightful lectures on Buddhist epistemology and philology were profoundly instrumental to the development of this thesis. I am also greatly indebted to him for the training I received in textual criticism and research methods.. I would also like to thank my committee members Su-Ching and Yao-ming Tsai for their enthusiastic participation as well as their willingness to join the thesis committee on short notice. Their probing questions and insightful recommendations were of incalculable value to the final form of this thesis, and all oversights and errors are strictly my own.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Finally, I would like to thank the Philosophy Department Chair Prof. Wen-sheng Wang and all the staff in the NCCU Philosophy Department for their steadfast support throughout the course of my graduate studies.. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v.

(4) TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………….. 1 CHAPTER 1 PYRRHONIAN SKEPTICISM…………………………………. 13. 1.1. The Philosophical Milieu of Sextus Empiricus…………………. 13. 1.2. The Way of Pyrrhonian Skepticism……………………………... 20. 1.3. The Text of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism……………………….... 29. CHAPTER 2 ZEN BUDDHISM……………….……………………………… 31. 2.2. 政治大 The Fundamentals of Huineng’s Southern School of Zen.……... 立 The Text of the Platform Sūtra………………………………….. 學. 2.3. Huineng and His Zen Inheritance……………………………….. ‧ 國. 2.1. 31 36 45. CHAPTER 3 SKEPTIC AND ZENNIST TERMINOLOGY…………………. 48. ‧. A Comparison of Key Terms. 3.2. Ataraxia and Wuzhu (無住)……………………………………... 48. n. al. 57. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 3.1. v. CHAPTER 4 THE USE OF OPPOSITIONS……………………...………....... 68. Ch. engchi. i Un. 4.1. The Skeptical Modes of Argument…………………………….... 68. 4.2. The Zen Use of Opposition Pairs………………………………... 73. CHAPTER 5 MORALITY AND METAPHYSICS..………………………….. 79. 5.1. On Good and Evil……………………………………………….. 79. 5.2. On the Positing of Metaphysical Objects……………………….. 91. CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION……..…………………………………………... APPENDIX:. 94. A SKEPTIC AND A ZENNST IN DIALOGUE……………….. 100 BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………….. 107.

(5) LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Acad.. Cicero, Academica. DL. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers. M. Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians. PH. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Prep. Ev.. Eusebius of Caesarea, Praeparatio Evangelica. PS. Huineng, Platform Sūtra of the Sixth Patriarch. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v.

(6) The Skeptic Way is a disposition to oppose phenomena and noumena to one another in any way whatever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence among the things and statements thus opposed, we are brought first to epoché and then to ataraxia. (Outlines of Pyrrhonism, BK I, 8). If someone asks you about the Dharma, answer in dichotomous fashion making constant use of opposition pairs to demonstrate their mutual dependency. Do this and eliminate dualistic dharmas once and for all, leaving them with no place at all to go. (Platform Sūtra of the Sixth Patriarch, Ch. 45). 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v.

(7) INTRODUCTION. This thesis is a comparative analysis of Pyrrhonian Skepticism as interpreted by Sextus Empiricus and the Southern School of Zen Buddhism as represented by Huineng, the historically-recognized Sixth Patriarch (Liuzu 六祖) of the Zen tradition.1 Through the comparison of these two schools, I aim to isolate the principle behind the attainment of “tranquility” which is loosely defined as “mental quietude” and the “absence of vexations” in the Skeptic and Zen schools respectively. Sextus is the. 政治大. obvious choice for representative of Pyrrhonian Skepticism because he, quite literally,. 立. wrote the book on it. His Outlines of Pyrrhonism serves as by the most complete and. ‧ 國. 學. comprehensive guide to ancient Skeptical thought The Platform Sūtra of the Sixth Patriarch (Liuzu Tanjing 六祖壇經), on the other hand, purported to be a sermon given. ‧. by Huineng, is the only Zen Buddhist text (or Chinese Buddhist text for that matter) to. Nat. sit. y. be recognized as “canon” (jing 經), meaning that it is considered by Buddhists to be. n. al. er. io. equivalent to words the historical Buddha himself. And as the monk Deyi (德異, fl.. i Un. v. 1290) famously stated in the preface of his version of the sūtra, “The teachings of the. Ch. engchi. Five Houses [of Zen] all without exception originate from the Platform Sūtra.”2 But why compare these two particular schools one might ask? Why not compare, say, Nagarjuna or Zhuangzi with Sextus? I chose Huineng because I think the Platform Sūtra gives the most precise formulation on the role that oppositions or opposition pairs play in eliminating vexations from the mind. Thus, in this thesis I will attempt to provide support for the hypothesis, held by Skeptics and Zennists alike, that the. 1. In this thesis I use the Japanese word “Zen” and not “Chan” (禪)as it coheres better with my frequent use of “Zennist” and also because it the term most frequently used in the works cited in this thesis. 2 T48n2008_p0345c25(01), 原其五家綱要，盡出《壇經》。.

(8) 2. practice of opposing of arguments, judgments, and concepts one against the other in various ways leads precisely to such a state of mind. The ancient Greek Skeptic Sextus Empiricus (fl. 200 CE) describes Skepticism, not as a philosophy, but rather as an “ability” (dunamis) to “oppose phenomena and noumena to one another in any way whatever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence among the things and statements thus opposed, we are brought first to suspension of judgment and then to unperturbedness.”3 Equipollence, a key term that we will elaborate on in Chapter 3, is the mental balance created when two equally convincing arguments are placed in opposition. It occurs when the intellect, being unable to prefer one opposing argument. 治政 over another, comes to a standstill thus allowing the 大 individual respond to situations 立 undogmatically. The Skeptics thus find peace, not by establishing the truth of one ‧ 國. 學. proposition concerning external reality over its opposite, but rather through not. ‧. confidently asserting the truth of any claim whenever it appears contrastable with an. sit. y. Nat. equally credible counterargument. The Skeptic then proceeds to live in accordance. io. er. with the “ordinary rules of life” (which we shall elaborate on later also) as the conflicting philosophical theories she has examined are unable to provide guidance.4. al. n. iv n C Huineng for his part directly states h that understandingU e n g c h i how dichotomies function is the sole key to understanding the entirety of scripture.5 The Zennist reaches a state of. equilibrium upon realizing not only the interdependence of opposites, but also through the active process of pitting judgments and concepts against one another. In Huineng's discussion of the 36 pairs of opposites, he, for example, equates “vexations” with “enlightenment” to show I think that we should not attempt to cling to either one as their existences are mutual. Thus, it seems clear that the Skeptics discovered just as. 3 4 5. PH I, 7-9. PH 23-24. PS 46, 此三十六對法，解用通一切經。.

(9) 3. Huineng did the pivotal role the skillful use of oppositions play in removing mental vexations. And in this thesis I shall attempt also to demonstrate how the practice of opposing concepts against one another prepares the way for calm awareness at each passing moment of experience.. One of the most obvious similarities which also provided the primary impetus for this study was the fact that the Skeptics and Zennists both find that achieving the goal of mental quietude, which in both schools is defined negatively—“freedom from disturbances” for the Skeptics and “freedom from thought” for Zennists—involves. 治政 giving up the struggle to achieve it while realizing that大 the struggle is at the same part 立 of the process of achieving it. One happens upon skepticism, after first inquiring into ‧ 國. 學. the nature of things under the belief that only through uncovering the truth of the. ‧. matters disputed in philosophy would peace of mind be attainable. And the Zennist, or. sit. y. Nat. her part, assumes in the beginning that with attaining a certain insight into the nature. io. er. of reality one can be freed from vexations. In the end, however, the Skeptic suspends judgment and the Zennist in a similar manner finds no special insight to rest upon. It. al. n. iv n C is rather the active and ongoing process judgments and concepts against h e nofgopposing chi U one another that leads followers of both traditions to their unexpected “tranquility.” Another interesting feature that the two systems have in common I think is that neither attempts to do away with words, thoughts, or appearances (the latter are. referred to as “marks” in Buddhism), but rather develops a disposition such that language and judgments are rendered incapable of causing mental disturbance. The Skeptic often uses qualifiers such as “I think,” “it appears,” “maybe,” etc., to reflect her non-dogmatic mode of life in the realm of appearances. And Huineng speaks of.

(10) 4. “transcending marks (appearances) even while in the midst of them,”6 which I take to mean simply that one should be observant of appearances, while neither clinging to nor seeking escape from them.. Additionally, Skepticism, also like Zen is a way of life, not a systematic philosophy in the strict sense. According to Sextus, the Skeptic follows a four-fold regimen of life in which she “lives without beliefs.”7 That is to say, the Skeptic doesn’t confidently or self-assuredly affirm what is or isn’t the case about external reality. Likewise, the Zennist never lets her mind “dwell” on the thought-objects that appear in the. 治政 consciousness. Moreover, the aim of the Skeptics’ arguments, 大 like the utterances of 立 the Zen teachers, is primarily intended as therapy. The Skeptic’s arguments are like ‧ 國. 學. medicine designed to induce the state of tranquility by way of suspending judgment. ‧. (epoché) through opposing arguments one against the other.8 Though initially this. sit. y. Nat. may seem a very counter-intuitive means of reaching tranquility, on closer inspection,. io. er. we may find that much mental unrest, especially in the case of philosophy, seems to arise from dogmatically affirming a position while knowingly suppressing the. al. n. iv n C existence of facts or arguments anathema own position. Huineng in fact says h e n tog one’s chi U that there can only be “truth” when the mind is no longer “false” (jia 假), that is, as I. interpret it, when the mind ceases to knowingly suppress the unwelcome facts it already believes to be true.9 Moreover, mental liberation in Zen is interpreted not in terms of a “suspended” intellect, but quite conversely in terms of an uninterrupted. 6. PS 17, 於相而離相。 PH I, 3. R.G. Bury renders adoxastos (“without belief”) as “undogmatic/ally” in his translations. Adoxastos in Sextus’ usage refers specifically to dogmatic beliefs regarding the nature of external reality, not everyday non-critical beliefs. 8 PH III, 280. 9 PS 48, 若能自有真，離假即心真。 “If are able to possess the truth within yourself, [you will know that] being free of falsity itself leaves the mind true.” 7.

(11) 5. “flow” (tong liu 通流)10 of thoughts, an idea which is encapsulated in the doctrine of “non-dwelling” introduced earlier. As the Zen and Daoist scholar John C.H. Wu states, “The insight that the mind must flow on and never stop is the key to the whole philosophy of Hui-neng.” 11 I mostly agree with this though I also see the “suspension” (stopping) of the Skeptics and the “flow” (going) of Zennists as two outwardly opposite, but nonetheless equally compatible ways of conceptualizing the same fundamental experience of tranquility. And lastly, for neither school is this lack of mental disturbance a cause for withdrawal from activity in the world. Zen, especially the Zen teachings of the Huineng the Sixth Patriarch, insists that stillness is. 治政 indeed found in activity. The Skeptics likewise engage 大in their various arts (techné) 立 and continue living in accordance with local laws and customs undogmatically. The 12. 13. ‧ 國. 學. Zennist also returns to the same world she previously sought escape from, but now. ‧. she transcends it, so to speak, by becoming completely engaged in it. Or in the. sit. y. Nat. language of the Skeptics, the Zennist no longer dogmatizes the teachings of her. io. er. tradition or the accidental characteristics of her culture. And we might observe also that just as the Buddhists preach compassion, the Skeptics (or at least they are. al. n. iv n C according to Sextus Empiricus) areh driven by their professed e n g c h i U feelings of philanthropos. (“love of mankind”) to cure people of their dogmatic beliefs,14 or in the language of Zen, to they wish to compassionately free people of the views which have ensnared them. 10. PS 14. 道須通流，何以卻滯？ Wu John C.H., The Golden Age of Zen: Zen Masters of the Tang Dynasty (Taipei: National War College, 1967), 80. As Wu also points out, Huineng was inspired by the following passage from the Diamond Sūtra: “Let your mind flow freely without abiding anywhere or in anything.” (應無所住，而生其心). Similarly, Charlotte Stough comments that the Skeptic’s experience is one of “simple sequential flow of sense impressions and all impressions are intrinsically of equal authority.” See Stough’s Greek Skepticism: A Study in Epistemology (Berkeley: UC Press, 1969), 80. 12 PS 48, 若見真不動，動上有不動。 13 PH III, 245-246. 14 PH, III, 280. However, I’m not quite sure how literally we should take Sextus’ “philanthropic” motivations. 11.

(12) 6. Lastly, let us examine Garner’s observation that, as compared to the Skeptic’s method, “the Zen approach is strikingly direct. When the Zen Master is confronted with philosophical speculation or with harmful conceptualization he appeals to no set trope or syllogism, but reacts spontaneously.”15 On the face of it, the Zennist would seem to have an advantage over the Skeptic in that he can also appeal to the spontaneity that comes from moment-to-moment awareness. However, since what the Skeptic is dealing with philosophical opponents and not disciples, obviously she is more limited in her range of tactics. However, since the Skeptic acknowledges that she can use. 治政 arguments weak in persuasiveness at times, it still seems 大 that he can spontaneously 立 devise arguments (though Sextus does not say this explicitly) as situations demand 16. ‧ 國. 學. them, and of course hitting, yelling, or replying with verbal nonsense to her opponents. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Literature Review. ‧. is not likely to get her opponents to believe that she is the more rational one!. n. iv n C Now while the resemblances between and Zen have not gone unnoticed by h eSkepticism ngchi U. many scholars of comparative philosophy, to my knowledge only Dick Garner’s article “Skepticism, ordinary language and Zen Buddhism” makes an attempt at a sustained comparison of the two schools. In his study, Garner does an excellent job I think of highlighting the differences in style and method between the Skeptics and the Zennists. Some of the questions he raises are quite fundamental regarding Skepticism: “what his [the Skeptic’s] quietude amounts to, how it is attained, how it is maintained, and, further and most importantly, how it is supposed to lead to a lack of 15 16. Garner, “Skepticism, ordinary language and Zen Buddhism,” 177. PH III, 280-281..

(13) 7. perturbation.”17 Thus, in this thesis will I will attempt to show, as precisely as possible, how the Skeptic’s quietude is acquired and maintained. One of the ways highlighted will be to emphasize the “moment-to-momentness” of the Skeptic’s approach. That is to say the Skeptic reports what appears true to her at the moment, resisting the tendency to universalize her conclusions, not because it is “wrong” to do so, but simply because she cannot legitimately do so without sufficient proof.18 The Skeptic thus holds non-rational beliefs (i.e., not based on philosophical demonstration) concerning how things appear to her at each particular moment. Thus, she can easily entertain counter arguments because of her light psychological investment in her own. 治政 preconceptions about the way things “really” are. This 大frame of mind I thus equate 立 with the “non-dwelling” mind of Zen in which judgments also flow through the mind ‧ 國. 學. without creating any marked disturbance as they enter and exit.19. ‧. sit. y. Nat. Another important reference for this thesis is Thomas McEvilley’s chapter entitled. io. er. “Pyrrhonism and Madhyamika” in his magnus opus The Shape of Ancient Thought. In that chapter McEvilley brings Zen into the discussion with the observation that the. al. n. iv n C were h essentially basedUon the engchi. Zen masters’ “attitudes. 17. Prajnaparamita and. Dick Garner, “Skepticism, ordinary language and Zen Buddhism,” Philosophy East and West. 27 no.. 2 (1978): 168. As ironic as it may sound, I think that every Skeptic must desire to be dogmatic in order to be truly Skeptical. After all, the only reason that one chooses Skepticism in the first place is due to the fact that the evidence examined does itself not allow anyone any room to dogmatize. But if one desires to remain Skeptical at all costs, then the fear of becoming dogmatic will I think continually disturb one. Thus, the Skeptic must eagerly desire I think to hear out the claims of the dogmatists, not with an eye to deconstructing them, but with a hope that truth can be found within them! And as Sextus points out, the suspension of judgment is only applicable to cases presented “up to now.” Each new investigation brings with it the possibility of finding final truth. If the Skeptic doesn’t possess such an attitude, I don’t see it as possible that she can remain free from disturbance. It’s questionable whether Sextus himself had such an attitude consistently, but ataraxia in any case certainly seems possible granted one’s mind does not grow biased toward Skepticism. Sextus does not, to his credit, affirm that the Skeptic’s practice of suspending judgment is necessarily a “good” thing (PH I, 233-234) and leaves open too the possibility that something is apprehensible (PH I, 226). 19 PS 17. 18.

(14) 8. Madhyamika texts.”20 This is true for the most part I think, but Huineng does not go as far to say that all things are “empty” (as in without self-nature) as he, along with many of other Zen teachers, posits the existence of the Buddha-nature (which seems indeed antithetical to the Madhyamika tradition in many respects). Huineng’s emptiness is literal emptiness; the Buddha-nature is not empty because it “dependently arises,” but rather because its nature is to all possess things, just like empty space.. 21. It remains true, however, that the Diamond Sūtra (Skrt:. Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā Sūtra Ch: Jin gang jing 金剛經), perhaps the most famous of the prajñāpāramitā texts aside from the Heart of Perfection Wisdom Sutra. 治政 (Skrt: Prajñāpāramitā Hṛdaya Ch: Bo re bo luo mi duo 大xin jing 般若波羅蜜多心經) 立 or Heart Sutra, to be sure holds decisive influence on the thought of Huineng. Its ‧ 國. 學. influence is explicit in the Platform Sūtra itself and is no doubt the source of. ‧. Huineng’s pivotal doctrine of “non-dwelling” (Skrt: apratisthita Ch: wuzhu 無住).22. sit. y. Nat. McEvilley’s survey moreover contains copious quotes from Buddhists and Skeptics. io. er. which stress many similarities in attitude and orientation, none of which seem to come to the surface in Garner’s treatment of the subject. As it happens, however, neither of. al. n. iv n C these studies quotes from the Platform Sūtra. Thus, U for this thesis I have focused on hen gchi the text of the Platform Sūtra to further elucidate Zen thought and practice as conceived in this foundational text.. One other notable study is Jay Garfield’s Epoche and Sunyata: Skepticism East and West, in which he argues, among other things, for the complementariness of Sextus’. 20. Thomas McEvilley, The Shape of Ancient Thought: Comparative Studies in Greek and Indian. Philosophies (New York: Allworth Press, 2002), 476. PS 25. 22 PS 2, 7, 9, 28. 21.

(15) 9. Wittgenstein’s, and Madhyamika’s approach to finding the middle way between reification and nihilism. 23 And although it provides a thorough analysis of the Skeptical method, the article itself makes no mention of Zen and has very little to say on the subject of the Skeptic’s state of tranquility, which is of course one of the overriding concerns of this thesis. Two other articles published in the University of Hawaii’s East West journal touch directly upon the subject of Greek and Indian philosophy, the latter of course being the ultimate root of Zen. There is “Skepticism and Indian philosophy” by Dipankar Chatterjee, which is mostly an epistemological comparison of the two said philosophical systems, although Zen is not discussed.. 治政 There is also “The Ontology of the Prajnaparamita,” 大 in which Edward Conze notes, 立 “At every point, a comparison with European philosophers suggests itself Parmenides, ‧ 國. 學. Pyrrho, Proclus, Sextus Empiricus, Berkeley, Hegel, etc that must be left to other. ‧. occasions.” 24 And although Conze does not engage in comparative analysis, he. er. io. sit. y. Nat. nevertheless observes that. one may say that the attitude of the perfected sage is one of non-assertion. His. al. n. iv n C individual self is extinct, and so he will not assert himself in any way. And, since he ngchi U. he has no belief in separate things, he will not affirm anything about any of them.”25. I find this to be, however, a very extreme interpretation of non-assertion (aphasia) in comparison to what Sextus actually has to say on the topic. And though Sextus does. 23. Jay Garfield, “Epoche and `Suunyataa: Skepticism East and West,” Philosophy East and West 40, no. 3 (1990): 290. 24 Edward Conze, “The Ontology of Prajnaparamita,” Philosophy East and West 3 (1953): 117. 25 Edward Conze, “The Ontology of Prajnaparamita,” 126..

(16) 10. use the phrase “we do not affirm or deny anything,”26 he nevertheless adds an important qualifier, so that he may still assert himself in a conventional way: “It is dogmatic statements about the non-evident [truths alleged to lie beyond appearances] that we say we neither affirm nor deny; we grant the things that stir our feelings and drive us by force to assent. [emphasis added]”27. In light of the similarities highlighted earlier, we might be also led to ask as to how to best account for these similarities? Did the Greeks import these ideas wholesale from the Indians? Was their mutual influence or did the two systems develop independently. 治政 of one another? “Hinduism and Buddhism in Greek 大 Philosophy” by A. N. Marlow 立 makes no mention of either Pyrrho (ca. 360 - ca. 270 BCE) or Skepticism, but gives a ‧ 國. 學. good overview of the influence of Indian thinking on the Greeks, which no doubt. ‧. accounts for some of the overall affinities in thought between the two civilizations.. sit. y. Nat. Everard Flintoff’s “Pyrrho and India” is also notable for its explorations of the Indian. io. er. influence in Pyrrho’s thought, though its findings appear in my opinion mostly speculative. And Adrian Kuzminski, in his Pyrrhonism: How the Ancient Greeks. al. n. iv n C Reinvented Buddhism, follows up h on the work of Flintoff e n g c h i U though without coming to. any firm conclusions while making the case, unsuccessfully I think, of an unbroken line of thought from Pyrrho to Sextus Empiricus. In any case, the Skeptics never affirm any Buddhist- or Indian-sounding concepts such as reincarnation, other worlds, karma, or even meditation (the absence of meditation in the Greek Skeptical tradition appears to weaken the case for Indian influence, as Kizminksi notes albeit somewhat indirectly 26. 28. ). Pyrrhonian Skepticism seems thus rooted more or less in. PH I, 192-193. PH I, 193. 28 Adrian Kuzminski, Pyrrhonism: How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented Buddhism (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008), 48. Kizminski says, after first noting Flintoff’s silence on the issue of meditation, that 27.

(17) 11. epistemological concerns important to the Greeks and it never engages in any soteriological discourse (in any other-worldly sense) and seeks no form of escape from the body or world, but from disturbance-causing beliefs, a trait that is also characteristic of the advanced stages of Zen Buddhist practice.29 Thus, according to my research, the overall historical evidence mainly suggests that Greek skepticism developed independently of Indian philosophy, an opinion also shared by comparative philosophy scholar Ben-Ami Sharfstein who opines that “None of the interesting parallels between Sextus’s text and Indian philosophy give decisive proof of Indian influence.” 30 I find it true, however, that Pyrrho’s emphasis on ataraxia and. 治政 suspending judgment on all beliefs cannot be attributed 大 to the influence of his 立 immediate Greek predecessors, as Kuzminski points out. But for Sextus Empiricus, 31. ‧ 國. 學. whose works are the focus of this study, the main target of his attacks is Stoicism and. ‧. other native Greek schools of thought, as well as various other Greek philosophers. sit. y. Nat. whom he refers to as “Dogmatists” (those who believe they have found truth) or. io. positions concerning the nature of the “non-evident.”. n. al. Methodology and Structure. Ch. engchi. er. “Academic Skeptics” (those who believe truth cannot be found) in regards to their. i Un. v. “its [meditation] apparent absence in the West in ancient times should seem surprising if we are to take Indian influences seriously.” 29 Huineng for example taught that the “Western Paradise” could be experienced immediately in this life; one did not have to wait to be reborn there. PS 35, 心地但無不淨，西方去此不遠。心起不淨之心，念佛往生難到。除惡即行十萬，無八邪即過八千。但行真心，到如禪指。 30 Ben-Ami Sharfstein, A Comparative History of World Philosophy: From the Upanishads to Kant (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998), 235. 31 Adrian Kuzminski, Pyrrhonism, 42-43. Kuzminski points out that the goal of ataraxia or liberation from belief makes its appearance in Greek philosophy with Pyrrho. However, we know that ataraxia was also the primary concern for Epicurus, Pyrrho’s contemporary. Thus, it’s not clear who established the teaching first. In any case, the suspension of judgment does come from Pyrrho, though as Kuzminski points out, was an established practice in Indian philosophy (Kuzminksi, Pyrrhonism, 44.)..

(18) 12. The methodology used in this thesis is comparative. I will analyze the doctrines of both schools of thought by first contextualizing them historically and then proceeding to explore similarities in terminology, ends, means, as well as ethical and metaphysical implications of their doctrines. The first two chapters provide basic biographical and historical data concerning the main proponents of Pyrrhonian Skepticism and Zen, Sextus Empiricus and Huineng respectively, to highlight the differences and similarities in culture and philosophical influence.32 There follows a general synopsis of the main ideas of each school, and finally a brief overview of the primary texts associated with both thinkers. Details concerning the basic texts are also. 治政 given in the finals sections of Chapters 1 and 2 respectively. 大 The indirect comparisons 立 in these two parts prepares the way for direct comparison in Chapter 3 where I ‧ 國. 學. compare side-by-side the themes found in the earlier chapters by exploring. ‧. similarities and highlighting points of contrast especially as it pertains to the. sit. y. Nat. attainment of tranquility in both schools. The two chapters that follow will deal with. io. er. metaphysical and ethical questions. In the concluding chapter, I will give a brief overall assessment of the major findings of this thesis and suggestions for future. al. n. iv n C research. In the appendix that follows an imagined dialogue between a h e nI gpresent chi U. Skeptic and a Zen master. Lastly, the bibliography contains more notes on the primary sources of this study, be Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism and the Platform Sūtra of the Sixth Patriarch.. 32. The order of the presentation of the schools in this thesis chronologically-based..

(19) 13. CHAPTER 1. PYRRHONIAN SKEPTICISM 1.1. The Philosophical Milieu of Sextus Empiricus. We know next to nothing about the life of Sextus Empiricus. In none of his writings does he provide much in the way personal background information or historical settings. He mentions cities such as Athens and Alexandria in passing though without suggesting any connection to the cities, though a Rome residence still remains a possibility. Diogenes Laertius mentions that Sextus was a student of Herodotus of. 政治大. Tarsus and had a pupil by the name of Saturninus, both of whom however are. 立. historically obscure.33 And as far as his dates are concerned, most scholars locate him. ‧ 國. 學. around the late second or early third century CE. Several pages of Sextus work were copied by Hippolytus (without citation) in his Refutations of All Heresies written. ‧. sometime before 235 CE, which means Sextus must have at least written before that. y. Nat. sit. date.34 And also we know that must have lived during or after the reign of Tiberius (d.. n. al. er. io. 37 CE), whom he mentions in passing.35 The appellation “Empiricus” would seem. i Un. v. also to imply that he was a member of Empirical Medical School, but as Sextus. Ch. engchi. himself states, the rival “Methodic” school was actually the most compatible with Skepticism.36 In any case, Sextus never claims any originality for arguments he presents, and almost always speaks in third person plural when referring to the Skeptics’ positions. Furthermore, virtually all of his arguments are ad hominem, that is, directed against the arguments and assumptions held by Dogmatists themselves 33 34. DL IX, 12, 116. Julian Annas and Jonathan Barnes, eds., trans. Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), xi. PH I, 84. 36 PH I, 236-237. 35.

(20) 14. (not against reason or rationality generally).37. Now in examining the background to Sextus’ thought, the most natural question to ask is when and through whom did the Skeptic movement first originate? Diogenes Laertius, whose Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosopher provides (oftentimes unreliable) biographical accounts of Greek philosophers from Thales down to the generation of Pyrrho’s successor, Timon of Phlius (d. 230 BCE), relates that skepticism was believed by some to date back as early as Homer:. 治政 Some say that Homer was the original founder of大 this school [skepticism]; since 立 he at different times gives different accounts of the same circumstance, as much ‧ 國. 學. as any one else ever did; and since he never dogmatizes definitively respecting. ‧. affirmation.38. Nat. sit. y. Diogenes then goes on to list other philosophers (and poets) whose writings have also. n. al. er. io. been regarded as skeptical for various reasons, including Zeno of Elea, Democritus,. i Un. v. and Heraclitus. Moreover, in ancient Greece, there were two main kinds of. Ch. engchi. skepticisms, Academic and Pyrrhonian. According the Roman philosopher Cicero (106-43 BCE), Academic skepticism actually began with Plato, the founder of the Academy (named after the ancient Greek hero Academus). And although Plato never refers to himself or Socrates as Skeptics, there are clearly skeptical trends in his philosophy, a fact which brings Cicero to firmly conclude that “Plato is a skeptic because he is always arguing pro and contra, states nothing positively, inquires into. 37. Stoicism was still a formidable school up until the 3rd century AD. It remains an open as to whether Sextus helped hasten their demise. 38 DL IX, 71..

(21) 15. everything, and makes no certain statements.”39 Indeed, it would take less than a century for the skeptical turn to begin in earnest under the scholarchship of Arcesilaus (316/5-241/0 BCE), which initiated the phase that became known as the Middle or Second Academy. Arcesilaus left behind no writings and according the historical sources, his main preoccupation was dialectical argument, which he used in his relentless attacks against Stoic epistemology and ethics. The next major figure was Carneades (214/3-129/8 BCE), who came fourth in succession after Arcesilaus and reinvigorated the Academy. He, like Arcesilaus, wrote. 政治大. nothing, but is said to have argued that there was no criterion by which truth could be. 立. found. But because people had to live and act, Carneades posited that there could be. ‧ 國. 學. degrees of truth and argued for what he called the “persuasive” (to pithanon) which was translated into Latin as probabilis, and is thus often misleadingly rendered into. ‧. English as the “probable.”40 Carneades distinguishes classes of the “persuasive”: only. Nat. sit. y. persuasive, persuasive and tested, and the persuasive, tested, and “thoroughly. n. al. er. io. explored” (diexodeumene).41 Sextus nonetheless, however, classifies Carneades as a. i Un. v. “dogmatic skeptic” since the latter positively claimed that truth could not be known,. Ch. engchi. which the Pyrrhonians do not do.42 This point is a contentious one, but Sextus in any case does not follow Carneades’ perceived claim the things are in themselves persuasive or probable (as such is necessarily non-evident).43 And after another brief interlude, Skepticism recommenced with Anesidemus in the first century BC, though this time not fully in coordination with the Academy, which had by that time had. 39 40 41 42 43. Acad. 1.46. R.J. Hankinson, The Skeptics (New York: Routledge, 1995), 111. PH I, 227. PH I, 3. PH I, 227..

(22) 16. adopted tenets of Stoic epistemology. 44 Aenesidemus, though his Pyrrhonian Discourses is no longer extant, is credited with formulating the Ten Modes or “Tropes” (from the Greek tropos)45 of argument and also reviving the principle of epoché (suspended judgment) originally proposed, it is said, by Pyrrho and Timon. Thus, the teachings of Aenesidemus hark back to the enigmatic Pyrrho, whom we shall now briefly discuss.. Pyrrho was the student of Anaxarchus, whom the young Pyrrho accompanied on Alexander’s military expeditions into India. There Pyrrho encountered the. 治政 gymnosophists (“naked philosophers”), and was, 大 according 立 influenced by them to the following effect:. to Laertius, was. ‧ 國. 學 ‧. He [Pyrrho] would withdraw from the world and live in solitude, rarely showing. sit. y. Nat. himself to his relatives; this is because he had heard an Indian reproach. io. er. Anaxarchus, telling him that he would never be able to teach others what is good while he himself danced attendance on kings in their court. He would maintain. n. al. ni C h 46 the same composure at all times. U engchi. v. After his return to Greece, Pyrrho became a skeptic and attracted to himself a group of devoted followers. And according to Laertius, Pyrrho’s teaching was as follows:. For he [Pyrrho] used to say that nothing was honourable, or disgraceful, or just,. 44. A.A. Long and D. N. Sedley. The Hellenistic Philosophers. 2 Vols. (New York: Cambridge. University Press, 1988), 456. R.J. Hankinson, The Skeptics (New York: Routledge, 1995), 55. 46 DL IX, 63. 45.

(23) 17. or unjust. And on the same principle he asserted that there was no such thing as downright truth; but that men did everything in consequence of custom and law. For that nothing was any more this than that.47. Pyrrho is said to have lived his life in accordance with this principle to the extent that,. …he never shunned anything, and never guarded against anything; encountering everything, even waggons [sic] for instance, and precipices, and dogs, and everything of that sort; committing nothing whatever to his senses. So that he. 治政 used to be saved…by his friends who accompanied 大him. 立. 48. ‧ 國. 學. This account, possibly from an unsympathetic source, however, contradicts. ‧. Anesidemus’ testimony, also given by Laertius, that although Pyrrho suspended. sit. y. Nat. judgment on all matters, he did nothing “without due consideration.”49 Another piece. io. writings of the Peripatetic philosopher Aristocles:. n. al. Ch. engchi. er. of evidence concerning the teachings of Pyrrho's is preserved in a fragment from the. i Un. v. He [Pyrrho] himself has left nothing in writing, but this pupil Timon says that whoever wants to be happy must consider these three questions: first, how are things by nature? Secondly, what attitude should we adopt towards them? Thirdly, what will be the outcome for those who have such an attitude?. 47. 50. DL IX, 63. DL IX, 63. 49 DL IX, 62. This not only contradicts the earlier claim by others that Pyrrho “never guarded against anything,” but suggests too that Pyrrho never ceased to inquire. 50 Prep. Ev. 14.18. 48.

(24) 18. At this juncture we would be led to think that the skeptic Pyrrho would answer the first question with an “I do not know.” But this is not the answer that is given:. According to Timon, Pyrrho declared that things are equally indifferent, unmeasurable and inarbitrable.51. In the literature, there is much debate on the proper interpretation of this passage. As the Skeptic scholar Richard Bett asks,. 治政 Is Pyrrho speaking of a property possessed by ‘things’ 大 intrinsically—their lack of 立 differentiating features—or is he speaking of our inability, for whatever reasons, ‧ 國. 學. to make differentiations among things?52 [emphasis original]. ‧. In other words, should Pyrrho’s pronouncement be read metaphysically or. Nat. sit. y. epistemologically? It would seem that the straightforward metaphysical reading is the. n. al. er. io. most reasonable. And indeed the first question is undeniably metaphysical as it. i Un. v. pertains to the “nature of things,” not the limitations of human knowledge. Thus, in. Ch. engchi. Bett’s words, if the metaphysical interpretation is correct, “it is a historical irony that Pyrrho became the most famous spokesperson for a later skepticism which rejects all claims about the true nature of the world.”53 And Aristocles also points out “for if it is our nature to know nothing there is no further need to inquire about other things.”54 Thus, this raises crucial questions concerning the implications Skeptic teaching holds 51. Prep. Ev. 14.18. Richard Bett, Pyrrho, His Antecedents and His Legacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 19. 53 In his Pyrrho, his Antecedents and his Legacy, Richard Bett argues for just this conclusion. Interestingly enough, Sextus refers to his system as Pyrrhonian not because of Pyrrho’s idea, but rather because of due to the latter’s conviction (PH I, 7). Kuzminksi argues against Bett on this point, but does not in my opinion make a convincing case. 54 Prep. Ev. 14.18. 52.

(25) 19. for the possibility of continued investigations, a question to be explored in the following chapter. But to continue for now with Aristocles’ lengthy quote on Pyrrho’s philosophy: For this reason [i.e., the indeterminability of things] neither our sensations nor our opinions tell us truths or falsehoods. Therefore, for this reason we should not put our trust in them one bit, but we should be unopinionated, uncommitted and unwavering, saying concerning each individual thing that it no more is than is not, or it both is and is not, or it neither is nor is not. The outcome for those who. 政治大. actually adopt this attitude, says Timon, will be first speechlessness and then. 立. freedom from disturbance...55. ‧ 國. 學. Also in this passage, aside from Pyrrho’s apparent adoption of the Indian catsukoti. ‧. “four-horned dilemma,” employed most strenuously by Sextus’ likely Indian. Nat. sit. y. contemporary Nāgārjuna, we can also observe Pyrrho’s apparently self-refuting call. n. al. er. io. for us to become “unopinionated,” a point whose irony was not lost on Aristocles, who goes on to conclude:. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. In admonishing us to have no opinion, they [the skeptics] at the same time bid us to form an opinion, and in saying that men ought to make no statement they make a statement themselves: and though they require you to agree with no one, they command you to believe themselves…”56 Sextus apparently took such criticisms to heart as his criticism and calibrated his skepticism in an attempt to avoid this form of dogmatizing in his own writings.. 55 56. Prep. Ev. 14.18. Ibid..

(26) 20. 1.2. The Way of Pyrrhonian Skepticism. The word “skeptic” comes from Greek noun “skepsis,” which means “to reflect” or “consider carefully.” Sextus tells us also that the Skeptic Way is “zetetic” or investigative.57 The Skeptic originally assumes that ataraxia (mental imperturbability) can only be found by separating truth from falsity in the things disputed by philosophy. In the course of his investigations, however, the Skeptic discovers that finding ultimate answers is not necessarily itself a precondition for arriving at. 政治大 this discovery that it follows that the search for truth should be abandoned. In fact, 立. ataraxia as was previously assumed. However, the Skeptic does not conclude from. ‧ 國. 學. reason itself can give us no more reason to search than to not search. The Skeptic qua Skeptic continues to search nonetheless though it is not clear as to what his motivation. ‧. might be in the absence of any intellectual disturbance whatsoever. In any case, the. sit. y. Nat. tranquil state of mind arises from suspending judgment on already-held dogmatic. n. al. er. io. beliefs as opposed to the acquisition of new facts about the nature of reality.58. The System of Skepticism. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. Here we begin our survey of Skepticism with the words of Sextus Empiricus himself on what Skepticism is and is not. Sextus tells us very straightforwardly that:. If one defines a system as an attachment to a number of dogmas that agree with one another and with appearances, and defines a dogma as an assent to 57. PH I, 6. Actually a more accurate rendering of the term skeptikoi would be inquirer, which reflects that the fact the Skeptic’s principle aim is not simply to doubt, but rather to inquire. However, it just so happens that inquiring into a matter naturally leads to doubts concerning the veracity of claims previously made.. 58.

(27) 21. something non-evident, we shall say that the Skeptic does not have a system.59 [emphasis added]. “But,” he continues,. if one says that a system is a way of life that, in accordance with appearances, follows a certain rationale, where that rationale shows how it is possible to seem to live rightly (“rightly” being taken, not as referring only to virtue, but in a more ordinary sense) and tends to produce the disposition to suspend judgment, then. 治政 we say that he does have a system. 大立 60. ‧ 國. 學. Skepticism, therefore, is first and foremost a way of life based on the suspension of. ‧. judgment concerning things “non-evident” (adelos, lit. “hidden”). It is, as stated in the. sit. y. Nat. outset, an “ability” (not a philosophy in the formal sense) to place arguments in. io. er. opposition for the sake of ceasing to dogmatize. According to Sextus, the skeptic starts out experiencing puzzlement (aphoria) concerning the nature of appearances. al. n. iv n C and believes that by finding the “ultimate” peace of mind will follow, but then h e n ganswer chi U something else happens:. …the Skeptics were hoping to achieve ataraxia by resolving the anomaly of phenomena and noumena, and, being unable to do this, they suspended judgment. But then, by chance as it were, when they were suspending judgment the ataraxia followed, as a shadow follows the body.61. 59 60 61. PH I, 16. PH I, 17. PH I, 29..

(28) 22. Thus, the Skeptic finds peace of mind accidentally by not resolving the question, but by suspending judgment on something that was previously rashly believed to be true. And since the Skeptic has acquired the “disposition” (dunamis) to suspend judgment for any argument encountered, she will naturally apply the method of placing arguments in opposition:. The Skeptic Way is a disposition to oppose phenomena and noumena to one another in any way whatever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence. 治政 among the things and statements thus opposed, 大 we are brought first to epoché 立 and then to ataraxia. 62. ‧ 國. 學 ‧. Ataraxia, the Greek term meaning “imperturbability,” is the ultimate goal of the. y. Nat. Skeptics and virtually all Hellenistic schools of thought. It is, says Sextus, that. er. io. sit. “untroubled and tranquil condition of the soul.”63 Though, we elaborate more fully on the notion of ataraxia in Chapter 6, let us first note for the time being that the Skeptic. al. n. iv n C has found that tranquility appearshto be incompatible e n g c h i U with dogmatic or precipitous. assent to views, including I suppose this one too if one so happens to rashly assent to even it. Sextus himself even stops short of saying suspending judgment is a “good” thing by nature as he claims Aenesidemus did.64 And although the Skeptic has. discovered that peace is actually able to follow from suspending judgment on appearances, the Skeptic nonetheless continues investigations. In the opening paragraph of the Outlines Sextus writes,. 62 63 64. PH I, 7-9. PH I, 10. PH II, 233..

(29) 23. So also in the case of what is sought in philosophy, I think, some people have claimed to have found the truth, others have asserted that it cannot be apprehended, and others are still searching.65. The Skeptic of course places herself in the last group, and the description implies that Dogmatism of either the positive or negative variety (“truth has been found” and “truth cannot be found” respectively) is what rules out the possibility of continued searching. And Sextus has also this reply to the charge that Skeptics aren’t interested in seeking truth:. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. For to continue the investigation or problems is not inconsistent in those who. er. io. sit. y. Nat. believe they have an exact knowledge of them.”66. ‧. confess their ignorance of their [the problems] real nature, but only in those who. Investigating is thus a way of life for the skeptic and she does not say whether truth. al. n. iv n C can or cannot be found, for that ishitself something also e n g c h i U non-evident at the moment. And even for arguments the Skeptic currently finds convincing, she is able to oppose. her present state of conviction to past instances of similar conviction. Thus, the Skeptic is able to reply:. Just as before the birth of the person who introduced the system which you follow, the argument supporting that system did not yet appear sound although it really was, so also it is possible that the opposite of the argument you now 65 66. PH I, 1-2. PS II, 11..

(30) 24. advance is really sound despite its not yet appearing so to us, and hence we should not yet assent to this argument that now seems so strong.67. The practice of “opposing present things to things past and future” is what Skepticism scholar R. J. Hankinson refers to as the Skeptic’s “McCawber policy.”68 However, Hankinson remarks that “far from being a desperate expedient to preserve an authentically skeptical stance in the face of overwhelming evidence (as some think), there is much to be said for it. After all, until 1543 (and in fact considerably thereafter) the vast preponderance of evidence suggested that the earth was stationary.”69 If this. 治政 is true, then of course the modern Skeptic will not 大strongly assent now to the 立 proposition that “The earth revolves around the sun” simply because it is currently the ‧ 國. 學. most convincing theory (and perhaps neither would modern scientists who typically. ‧. prefer to speak in terms of “theories” as opposed to “truths” of science). Thus, the. sit. y. Nat. mere possibility that a future discovery could tip the tide of convincingness is enough. io. er. prevent the Skeptic from assenting to anything which is not necessarily or incorrigibly true. 70 From the foregoing, it might at first appear that the Skeptic might be. al. n. iv n C disinclined to search in that she can imagine any theory being falsified upon h ealways ngchi U. further research with the implication that finding “truth” is hopeless. And though many a commentator have accused Sextus of “bad faith” in regards to his claim to still be searching for truth,71 I think such claims are inconclusive. Again, it is only apparent to the Skeptic “right now” that any conceivable theory has the possibility of being overturned. This being the case, perhaps even that conclusion itself might one 67 68. PH I, 34. The name is inspired by the Wilkin Micawber character in Charles Dicken’s David Copperfield who. is constantly asserting his faith that “something will show up.” 69 Hankinson, The Skeptics, 30. 70 PH I, 193. 71 Hankinson, The Skeptics, 13..

(31) 25. day be overturned as well! Thus, the Skeptic stands poised to continue the search now and has not made any precipitous judgments about what can or cannot be found. And this freedom from rash assumptions is what ushers in the Skeptic’s quietude. We will say more on the “present tenseness” of the Skeptic’s position in Chapter 3.. The Ten Modes and the Five Modes of Argument72. The Skeptic has observed that beliefs about appearances can be opposed to one another in such a way that doubt arises in regards to the trustworthiness of those. 治政 beliefs. The “Ten Modes” were introduced by the earlier 大 Skeptic Aenesidemus in 立 order to show that there is no way to properly ground our beliefs about appearances. ‧ 國. 學. Appearances can be opposed to other appearances (just judgments about appearances. ‧. can be opposed to appearances themselves) such that we may be led to suspend. sit. y. Nat. judgment on the nature of the “underlying thing” (hypokeimenon, see Ch. 3.1) in. io. er. question. Thus, by way of example, Sextus writes, “we oppose phenomena to phenomena when we say that the same tower appears round from a distance but. al. iv n C Therefore, were to claims that X is Y because it hifesomeone ngchi U. n. 73. square from close up.”. has the appearance of Z, then if the Skeptic can show that X also under certain circumstances has the appearance of not-Z, then X can no longer be affirmed to be Y by nature. This is essentially the reasoning behind the Ten Modes which we now briefly list. Impressions and appearances are opposed to one another in the following. 72. For considerations of space, “Two Modes” and the “Modes for Causal Explanations” will not be elaborated on. But to briefly quote Sextus on the former entails: “For since everything that is apprehended is either apprehended through itself or through something else, by pointing out that what is apprehended is apprehended neither through itself nor through anything else they produce aporiai, as they [the Skeptics who propound the Two Modes] suppose, about everything.” (PH I, 178-179). The eight modes for refuting causal explanation were believed by Aenesidemus, who devised them, to be able to “refute and expose as unsound every dogmatic causal explanation.” (PH I, 180-186) 73 PH I, 33.

(32) 26. ways:. 1) Impressions differ due to differences in the physical constitution of species (e.g., bats and humans perceive the world differently) 2) Impressions differ due to the difference of individuals of the same species (e.g., two different people may perceive the world differently) 3) Impressions differ due to the fact that different sense organs detect different sensations (e.g., the eyes and the nose perceive things differently) 4) Impressions differ due to the present circumstances of the perceiver (e.g., an. 治政 intoxicated or sick person perceives the world 大differently than a person in 立 their natural condition) ‧ 國. 學. 5) Impressions differ depending on one’s spatial position in relation to the. ‧. object (e.g., a coin looks round from the top, but flat from the side). sit. y. Nat. 6) Impressions differ due to objects being mixed with other objects (e.g., a body. io. er. in water appears different than one seen through the medium of air) 7) Impressions differ due to quantities of a thing (e.g., food may not be. n. al. ni C his full) appealing to a person that U engchi. v. 8) Impressions differ due to the relativity of things (e.g., a tall person may be considered short in comparison to a skyscraper). 9) Impressions differ due to constancy or rarity (e.g., the rare comet seems more awe-inspiring than the sun which is seen everyday) 10) Impressions differ due to customs and laws (e.g., people of different cultures approve and disapprove of different practices).74. 74. PH 36-163..

(33) 27. These modes are meant to inducing suspension of judgment concerning the way things really are behind appearances, and not to prove that things are not as the Dogmatists claim them to be. Sextus openly admits that “they may well be unsound, and there may be more than the ones I shall mention.”75 Furthermore, Sextus says that these ten modes can all be subsumed under the mode of relativity,. 76. which itself. listed as the third of the Five Modes attributed to Agrippa (Sextus does not refer to him by name, but just attributes them generally to the “Later Skeptics,” i.e., those following after Aenesidemus).77 These are as follows:. 治政 1) The mode of “disagreement” or “discrepancy” (diaphonia) 大 whereby the Skeptic is 立 led to suspend judgment owing to the fact of disagreement among philosophers on ‧ 國. 學. the matters in question.. ‧. 2) The mode of “infinite regress” (ienai eis apeiron) whereby true of a statement. io. 3) The mode of “relativity” (pros ti) as just discussed.. al. er. another proof and so ad infinitum.. sit. y. Nat. requires a proof to make it credible, but that proof will in term will require yet. n. iv n C 4) The mode of “hypothesis” or “assumption” or the non-allowance of h e n g c(hypothetikon) hi U unproved premises in a debate.. 5) The mode of “circularity” (diallelon) whereby an argument assumes the truth of what is already in question.78. Sextus goes on to show that all matters of inquiry can be brought under these five. 75 76 77 78. PH I, 35. PH I, 38. DL IX, 88. PH I, 164-169..

(34) 28. modes (or perhaps more properly, that all have been thus far brought under them),79 and among these he makes the most extensive use of the second, fourth, and fifth modes in his arguments against his opponents. It should be noted also that Modes 2, 4, 5 are also referred to as the “Münchhausen-Trilemma” or also “Agrippa's Trilemma.”. A few of these modes we will employ in Chapters 4 and 5 to provide a demonstration as to how they are able to bring about epoché and ataraxia.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 79. PH I, 170.. Ch. engchi. i Un. v.

(35) 29. 1.3. The Text of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism. The Outlines of Pyrrhonism (Pyrrhōneioi Hypotypōseis, thus commonly abbreviated PH) is Sextus’ most well-known work, though it is still debated whether it is Sextus’ first or final work.80 The Outlines of Pyrrhonism, which consists of three books, deals with the nature of Skepticism and also stockpiles a litany of arguments against the claims of the ancient logicians, physicists, ethicists, and sophists as well. The Outlines is a lengthy text and out of Sextus’s voluminous works, due its tighter structure and. 政治大. clear presentation of ideas as well as the lack of negative dogmatism, I consider it to. 立. best the representative text of Sextus’ thought. To cite one example one example of. ‧ 國. 學. Sextus’s own seeming transition from negative skepticism, Bett demonstrates how Sextus’ use of anairein “to do away with” goes from being an expression which. ‧. describes what the Skeptic does to the Dogmatists’ arguments in Against the. y. Nat. sit. Logicians to precisely the type of thing the Skeptic customarily does not do in the. n. al. er. io. Outlines.81 Thus, instead of asserting that the Dogmatist’s assertions are false, Sextus. i Un. v. simply shows that it is impossible under the present circumstances to either affirm or. Ch. engchi. deny the claims of the Dogmatists. And when Sextus does refute the Dogmatist’s argument, he typically does so ad hominem, such that he overturns their arguments by 80. Sextus’ other two extant works, which are both traditionally grouped the title Against the Mathematicians (Adversus Mathematicos, commonly abbreviated M), is composed of 11 books. Books I-VI are titled as follows: Against the Grammarians (Book I), Against the Rhetoricians (Book II), Against the Geometricians (Book III), Against the Arithmeticians (Book IV), Against the Astrologers (Book V), and Against the Musicians (Book VI). The other subset of books, referred to collectively as Against the Dogmatists, make up books VII-XI. This arrangement is somewhat misleading in that Against the Dogmatists was also thought to be part of another larger work entitled Skeptical Treatises (Skeptika Hupomnēmata), of which up to five books are thought to be missing. In any case, books VII-XI are as named as follows: Against the Logicians and Against the Physicists (two books each), and Against Ethicists (one book). It should be noted, however, that except for the Outlines of Pyrhhonism and Against the Mathematicians, the names of the eleven books listed above are not found in the manuscripts tradition. Sextus also refers in passing to two works no longer extant, Notes on Medicine and On the Soul. 81 Bett Richard, Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), xxiv..

(36) 30. making use only of the assumptions of his opponents.. As stated above, the text of the Outlines is divided into three books. The 34 sections of the first book provides a overview of Skepticism which includes an explication of the skeptical “modes” of argument, including the Ten Modes, the Five Modes, the Two Modes, the modes for causal arguments, a detailed explanation of the Skeptical slogans, and an explanation of how Skepticism differs from the other competing philosophies and skepticisms. The 22 sections of Book II deal mainly with the criteria of truth, proofs, and signs, the syllogism, inductive reference, definitions, mereology,. 治政 other logical problems. Finally, Book III contains 32 大sections which expound on 立 theories of the natural sciences including causality, time, motion, change, ‧ 國. 學. apprehension, God, as well as several concluding sections on ethics. This thesis will. ‧. draw mainly from Books I and III as these contain the most relevant material on the. sit. y. Nat. attainment of ataraxia and the ethical part of Skeptical philosophy. Lastly I might add. io. er. that Sextus points out that the contents of his book should be taken absolutely binding, for he says in the introduction that:. n. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. as regards none of the things that we are about to say do we firmly maintain that matters are absolutely as stated, but in each instance we are simply reporting, like a chronicler, what now appears to us to be the case.82. Sextus even admits in the very last section of the Outlines that many of the arguments contained therein may be weak in persuasiveness, but he recommends them nonetheless for their perceived efficacy in healing dogmatic rashness.83 82 83. PH I, 4. PH III, 279-281..

(37) 31. CHAPTER 2: ZEN BUDDISM 2.1. Huineng and His Zen Inheritance. Huineng (638-713 AD) came to be regarded nearly a century after his death as the Sixth Patriarch (Liuzu 六祖) of Zen Buddhism The biographical data concerning his life in the Platform Sūtra of the Sixth Patriarch (Liuzu tanjing 六祖壇經) is mostly regarded as fiction by contemporary scholars, though the earliest version which has Huineng doing a very un-Confucian thing in suddenly leaving behind his poor,. 政治大. widowed mother to study under the Fifth Patriarch Hongren (弘忍).84 The fact that. 立. the other versions attempt to tidy this story might suggest that it actually occurred. In. ‧ 國. 學. any case, Huineng is listed as one of Fifth Patriarch Hongren ten disciples in a historical work entitled Record of the Laṅkāvatāra Masters (Lengqiejing ziji ) 楞伽. ‧. 師資記. Huineng appears seventh on the list, along with the location at which he. y. Nat. sit. taught (which seems to indicate that he was a teacher of only regional significance. n. al. er. io. during his own lifetime). The Platform Sūtra states that Huineng was born in Fanyang. i Un. v. (范陽) and spent his childhood in Xinzhou (新州, modern-day Xinxing, Guangdong Province).85. Ch. engchi. According to the Platform Sūtra, Huineng (age unspecified) went to pay obeisance to the Fifth Patriarch Hongren after hearing a verse from the Diamond Sūtra recited, and stayed there for just over eight months.86 Near the end of his stint at the monastery,. 84. PS 2. Other versions of the story have the customer providing money for the care of Huineng’s mother. In Vol. II of the Patriarch’s Hall Anthology (Zutang ji 祖堂集), the customer, who also has a name, gives Huineng’s mother 100 taels of silver. In other versions of the Platform Sūtra, the nameless customer only gives 10 taels. 85 PS 2. 86 PS 3..

(38) 32. Huineng unexpectedly won a verse-writing contest against the monastery’s Head Abbot Shenxiu (神秀), who was also coincidentally claimed at one time to be the Sixth Patriarch by a rival tradition known somewhat anachronistically as the “Northern School.” And as a result of winning the verse contest, Huineng was secretly passed the robe of the Patriarchate. This became the official story, and through the vigorous efforts of one his most famous disciples, Shenhui (神會), by the end of the eighth century Huineng was recognized as the undisputed Sixth Patriarch of Chinese Zen. At present it is impossible to say how much of the Platform Sūtra originates from Huineng himself. Fortunately, however, for our purposes, the. 治政 historicity of the text is of little concern as we will concentrate 大 on the thought of the 立 text, using Huineng’s name a symbol for the teachings found in the Platform Sūtra. In ‧ 國. 學. the section that follows I give a fuller account of the specific teachings of Huineng,. ‧. but here it will be helpful I think to highlight a few of main features of the Zen. y. sit. io. al. er. later discussion.. Nat. teachings that Huineng inherited from his predecessors in order to better inform out. n. iv n C As is well-known, Buddhism originated with the teachings of a prince named h e ningIndia chi U Gautama. Gautama renounced his comfortable lifestyle in order to find the way to. escape the cycle of birth, old age, sickness, and death. Therefore, early Buddhism might be said to have adopted a pessimistic view of human existence which it saw as nothing but suffering, and looked for a means of escape from the dusty world. The Buddha’s followers withdrew from their homes and society to devote themselves to teaching of the Buddha (“Awakened One”) and practiced meditation in the hope of attaining freedom from suffering. The formula for salvation developed by the Buddha was the Four Noble Truths. These are (1) suffering, which essentially includes all.

(39) 33. human feeling and sensation, (2) the origin of suffering as craving, (3) the cessation of suffering, and (4) the path to ending suffering, which is called the Eight-fold Path. And although the Buddha made counter-arguments against the dominant view at the time of the existence of atman, or eternal Self, he was also careful not to fully endorse the view of no-Self either (anatman) either. He referred to his teaching like a “raft,” that was to be used for “crossing over and not for taking hold of.”87. Through the course of its development, Buddhism would, as it happened, make a metaphysical turn leading to the creation of the self-titled Mahāyāna (“Higher. 治政 Vehicle”) system of thought. Two Mahāyāna大sūtras in particular, the 立 Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra (Niepanjing 涅槃經) or Nirvana Sūtra for short, and the ‧ 國. 學. Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (Lengqiejing 楞伽經) teach, respectively, the existence of a. ‧. “Buddha-nature” (fo xing 佛性) and “self-nature” (zi xing 自性) inherent in all. er. io. sit. y. Nat. humans. Thus, according to one recent Zen anthology of Zen literature,. In substance Zen Buddhism advocates that the nature of the self is the. al. n. iv n C nature of the Buddha, and that of the self is the heart of the h ethen gheart chi U. Buddha, that Buddha nature is there in everyone, and everyone can attain Buddhahood.88. Thus, it turns out that the eternal atman, the very concept which much of early Buddhism so vehemently rejected, made a comeback in Mahāyāna Buddhism in the form of an unchanging Buddha-nature. Moreover, the fifth-century monk Daosheng 87. Rahula, Walpola. What the Buddha Taught. (New York: Grove Press, 1974), 11.. 88. Jiang Lansheng., ed., 100 Excerpts from Zen Buddhist Texts.(Taipei: Taiwan, 2001), vii..

(40) 34. (道生) was the first to synthesize the teachings of the Buddha nature and sudden enlightenment, and is a figure to whom Huineng’s thought appears much indebted. Huineng makes such extensive use of the doctrine of the Buddha-nature in the Platform Sūtra that it becomes one the central pillars of his teaching. In addition, the First Patriarch of Chinese Zen, the Bodhidharma (Puti Damo 菩提達摩), according to tradition, used the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra as his primary text.89 The text, developed by the Consciousness-Only School (Weishi zong 唯識i宗), teaches that there exists a substratum of consciousness, a “storehouse consciousness” (Skrt: alaya-vijnana, Ch: a lai ye shi 阿賴耶識) along with seven types of self-natures. 90 Huineng also. 治政 combines the Buddha/self-nature teaching, alternately大 known as the tathāgatagarbha, 立 with the prajñāpāramitā (“Perfection of Wisdom”) teaching of “emptiness” (Skrt: ‧ 國. 學. śūnyatā, Ch: kong 空) to produce a very unique system of thought and practice.91. ‧. One other important development of note within Mahāyāna Buddhism was its. y. Nat. non-separation of religious practice and everyday life. This line of thought is. er. io. sit. developed most fully in the Vimalakīrti Sūtra (Weimojiejing 維摩維詰經, a text which Huineng also mines heavily throughout the Platform Sūtra. 92 In the. al. n. iv n C h e n ong cthehfirst There is little reliable historical information i Uthree patriarchs of Chinese Zen, the Bodhidharma, Huike (慧可), and Sengcan (僧璨) respectively. The link between the Fourth Patriarch 89. Daoxin (道信) and the Fifth Patriarch (弘忍), however, is well-attested for in the literature. Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra V: “Again, Mahamati, there are seven kinds of self-nature [自性]: collection (samudaya), being (bhava), characteristic marks (lakshana), elements (mahabhuta), causality (hetu), conditionality (pratyaya), and perfection (nishpatti)” (Suzuki’s translation). The ambiguity of the self-nature is highlighted by D.T. Suzuki in a footnote in reference to the above verse: “What is exactly meant by these concepts regarded as self-nature (svabhava) is difficult to define as far as the Laṅkāvatāra is concerned.” Thus, it seems that Huineng may simply have equated the Buddha-nature with the self-nature. He uses the terms interchangeably in his sermons and discussions. See PS 3, 8, 12, 34, 38. 91 See PS 24-25. In contrast, Sheng-yen says, “In point of fact, Platform suutra uses wisdom as the method and regards tathaagatagarbha as its goal. It employs the perfection of wisdom's view of emptiness to destroy the attachments caused by passions in order to achieve the goal of "realizing one's clear mind and seeing one's true nature" (ming-hsin chien-hsing).” Though this is a fairly common interpretation of Huineng’s thought, but Huineng rarely if ever uses the teaching of “emptiness” in this sense. 92 Whereas many hold Chinese Zen is a Sinofication of Indian Buddhism, I see it more as an application of the practical spiritual life as already envisioned by the Vimalakīrti Sūtra. One telling point I find is Huineng’s rejection of traditional Confucian mourning rituals (PS 53). 90.

(41) 35. Vimalakīrti Sūtra the lines between monastic and lay life are blurred and it is affirmed that even lay practitioners may achieve awakening.93 This represents perhaps one of the most important transitions from early Buddhism. We now turn to teachings attributed to Huineng in the Platform Sūtra.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 93. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. Vimalakīrti himself was said to a highly attained lay disciple and revered as one of the greatest disciples of the Buddha (Vimalakīrti Sūtra Ch. 2)..