The first challenge is to settle border disputes in the following three categories.32 The first categ ory is over land boundaries.
Jia ng Zemin ’s rep ort to the 15 th Part y Na ti ona l C ong ress o f th e C CP, B ei jing Xinh ua, O ct obe r 16 , 199 7.
Before th e arrival of Western imp erialist powers, territorial boundaries along Chin a’s frontiers had little significance under the tributary system. After the decline of the Chinese Empire in the 1 9th century, Western powers not o nly took over many of China’s tributaries but also pushed the frontiers forward into areas that China would have preferred to control itself. These new frontiers were often institutionalized in what China called “u nequal treaties.” As a result, after the founding of the PRC, communist leaders in Beijing found themselves in a series of territorial disputes with its neighbors. The second category is over so-called
“lost” territories: Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan . The third category is over maritime boundaries involv ing both bilateral and multilateral relations. Bilaterally, China is in dispute with Vietnam over th e demarcation of the Tonkin Gulf and with Japan over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyutai in Chinese), a g roup of rocky islets lying on the edge of the continental shelf about 1 00 miles northeast of Taiwan. Japan considers these islets as part of the Ryukyu s whereas China claims them as p art of the Taiwan province and therefore part of Chin a. The major multilateral dispute is over the Spratly/Nansha islands in the South China Sea where is believed to be a potentially resource-rich region possessing oil deposits. Beijing draws a maritime boundary running from Taiwan
Ha rol d C . H into n c ha rac te riz ed th em int o fo ur c at eg orie s a nd I re grou p th em in to thre e . Ha rol d C. Hin ton, “Chi na a s a n Asia n Powe r,” i n Thoma s W. Rob inson a nd Dav id Sha mba ugh , e ds., Ch ine se Fore ig n Poli cy : Th eory an d Pract ic e (Oxford , U.K.: Cl are ndo n Pre ss, 199 5), pp .352 -357.
southwestward virtually along the coasts of the Philippines and East Malaysia and Brunei an d then northward mo re or less along the coast of Vietnam. The Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam have disp uted this claim.
Bo rder issue is related to sovereignty, which is Beijing’s most important concern in its foreign relations. Beijing has been firm in negotiatio ns over all three catego ries of territorial disputes.
The progress towards th e settlemen t of these disputes has been made, albeit very limited. The most important progress is over land dispute with Russia, which shares a total of 4,3 00-odd-kilometer borders: about 4,245 00-odd-kilometers on the Manchurian sections and 55 kilometers between Kazakstan and Mongolia. China made p rogress in this settlement primarily because most of the areas in question do not in general contain Chinese populations.
China signed the first border agreement in May 1991 with the U.S.S.R. on the Manchurian sectio ns of the common border. In September 1994, the second agreement was reach ed on the delimitation of the Sino-Russian border in th e Altai regio n, between Mongolia and Kazak hstan. Ratified in 1996, it led to th e concrete demarcation in 1997. Sino-Russian Joint Statement in November 1997 promises that the two sid es “will complete demarcation of the Western section of the Sino-Russian border within the agreed perio d of time.”3 3 The Chinese-Russian Border Demarcation Commission was disbanded upon its work drawing to an end in April 1999 when more than 2,084 border signs and markers along
“Sino -Russia n Join t St at eme nt on R el ati ons,” C hin a D ail y, Nov embe r 12 , 19 97, p .4.
their borders were set up and 2,444 islan ds on the border rivers were divided. About 1,163 of these islands go to Russia and the others go to China. The only unsettled territories are three large islands: two on the Ussuri Riv er and one on the Argun River, all of which are currently controlled by Russia.
The Chinese government has been extremely firm on the second category of territory disputes because it believes that people in these territories are ethn ically and historically Chinese. Taking back these territories involves not only the vital security interest of China but also the legitimacy of the regime. Beijing recovered Hong Kong in 1997 and Macao in 19 99. Taiwan is now the focu s of disp ute in this category. Beijing has tried to use the same way to recov er Taiwan as it did with Hon g Kong and Macao by economic inducement and proposing a “o ne country, two systems”
formula since the early 1980s. But this peaceful offense has not achieved its objectives. While total trad e across the Strait rose from $5 billion in 1990 to $ 25 billion in 1997 and to $32.386 billion in 2000, making Taiwan the second (after Jap an) larg est supplier to the main land and China the third largest market of Taiwanese goods, political relationship between the two governments remains officially nonexistent and hostile. In frustration and to show its determination, Beijing launched a series of military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in 1995-96.3 4 However, military coercion has not stopped Taiwan’s political centrifu gal tendency
Fo r a st udy o f t his cri si s, se e Sui sh eng Zha o, e d., Ac ross the Ta iwa n St rait : Ma inl and Chi na, Ta iwa n, an d t he 1995 -199 6 C ri si s (Ne w York : R out led ge , 199 9).
either. President Lee Teng-hui proposed a “special Sate-to - state relationship” in July 1999 in spite of Beijing’s military threat.
Chen Shui-ban, th e candidate o f pro-independent party, DPP, was even elected as Taiwan’s 10th president in the fiercely contested 2000 election. Altho ugh Beijing has made it clear that it is willing to figh t a war if necessary to recover Taiwan it still has to concern abo ut the reactions of the Un ited States and other Asian-Pacific countries as well as the resultant rupture of China’s economic development. Beijing’s leaders have been left very little room to maneuver in this effort of national reunification.3 5
The progress in the third category dispu te is extremely limited.
In the cases of dispute ov er Tonkin Gulf and Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands, no agreement or compromise has been reached with Vietnam and Japan. In the South China Sea, while Beijing has showed certain degree of flexibility by suggesting “shelving the dispu tes and working for jo in t d evelop ment” (gezhi zhengyi, gongtong kaifa ), China’s maritime neighbors h ave been very assertive in contesting Beijing’s sovereignty claims. As one study indicated, “although China has offered join development to other claimants, its concept of joint develo pment seems to involve join development of th e producing oil and gas fields on oth er claimants’
continental shelves—and then only after China’s sovereignty has been recognized.” In addition, as the same study po inted out, Beijing has continued to “insist on bilateral so lutions and its
Su ishe ng Zha o, “D ea dlo ck: Be iji ng’s Na ti ona l Re un ific at ion Strat eg y Aft er Lee Te ng-h ui,” Proble ms of Post-C ommu nism, Vo l.48 , No .2, M arc h-Ap ril, 2001 , pp.4 2-51 .
interest and sincerity in participating in a mu ltilateral cooperative solution remains in doubt.”36 China’s position has been criticized and even rid iculed by other claimants in the South China Sea.
Although Beijing and Hano i reached an agreement in defining their disputed 1,300-kilometer land border after Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji wrapped up his visit to Vietnam in December 19 99, no resolution was found over the two large islands groups-the Paracels (or Xisha and Zhongshao), which Chin a has occupied since 1974 and had a military clash with Vietnam in 1988. Vietnam still occupies most of the Spratlys that China claims sovereignty.
The Philippines has stepped up its claims over the Spratlys in recent years. Protesting on Chinese construction activity on Filip ino-claimed Mischief Reef in 1998, the Philippin es military set up patrols in the disputed archipelago and announced that the Ph ilippine navy will fire warning shots if Chinese vessels get closer than five miles to challenge its patrols.37 Beijing has not given up its claims of sovereignty ov er these islands because they are extremely important for Chin a’s security and energy supply. Sovereignty over these islands keeps all o f China’s op tions open reg arding resources, should any be discovered. However, Beijing’s sovereignty claim may eventually bring Chin a to the fore with all cou ntries in South east Asia. Were that happen ed, “China’s ability to use force is constrained by the possibility reactions of the United States,
M ark J. Va le nc ia, Hon M . Va n D yke , a nd No el A. Lu dwi g, S harin g th e Resou rce s o f the S out h C hi na Se a ( Hono lul u, H .I.: Univ ersit y of Ha wa ii Press, 19 97), pp.77 & pp .99.
UPI ne ws, Nov embe r 1 2, 19 98.
Japan, and ASEAN, which would p robab ly view such action as an attempt by Beijing to dominate the South China Sea.”3 8 Although sovereignty claim is crucially important for Beijing’s leaders, it is certainly an extremely difficult decision for them to squander China’s military resources and their political capital to seize these barren flysp ecks.