Managing the relatio nship with the United States, the only superpower in the po st-Cold War World, is the most significant challenge for China to establish a positive security environment in its periphery. The U.S. is a forwardly deployed power in Asia-Pacific, maintains fo rmal security treaties with Japan and South Korea, and is the primary weapon supplier to Taiwan. Whether or not Beijing can successfully handle above-mentioned other challenges, to a large extent, depends on the nature and level of American inv olvement in Asia an d on the U.S. policy toward China. The U.S. has the ability to influence China’s periphery policy b y affecting the policies of some of China’s neighbors and the overall security environ ment in th e Asian-Pacific reg ion . However, China’s ability to influence U.S. policy is very limited because it does not have much leverage over the U.S. policy, which is largely a ho stage to its do mestic politics.
The Sino-U.S. relationship has been in a state of roller coasting Since Tiananmen. It deteriorated after 1989 and warmed up briefly during the perio d between President Jiang’s visit to Washington
in Octo ber-November, 1997 and President Clinton’s visit to Beijing in June-Ju ly, 1998. Howev er, Sino-U.S. relations have been under strain again since late 1998. The U.S. Co ngress was angry over charges of China’s nuclear spying and political payoffs, the Clinton administratio n’s careless handling of U.S. tech nolog y transfer to China, reports of China’s new suppression of p olitical d issidents, import obstacles as the Chinese economy slowed, and PLA missile buildu p along the Taiwan Strait. As the domestic criticism over Clinton administration’s engagement policy increases, the Sino-U.S. relationship was pushed onto a difficult path. Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji’s visit to Washington in April 1999 failed to halt this down -turn.
The NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy on May 7 , 1999 further drifted these two countries toward the edge of co nfrontation.
Althou gh the d ownward spiral was temporarily arrested, the relationship, as a Chinese scholar indicated, was “stabilized only at a low level” in the last mon ths of the Clinton administration.
49
When George W. Bush took the Wh ite House in January 20 01, Chinese leaders became especially co ncerned about the outlook for U.S.-China relations as Bush had termed Ch ina as a “strategic competitor” rather than a p artner that President Clinton termed earlier. This concern was proved real as a series of in cidents in the first four months after Bush took office seriously strained Sino-American ties. The most important one was the incidental
Jia Qin gguo , “Frust rat ions a nd Ho pes: C hi nese Perc ep tio ns of the Enga ge ment Po lic y de ba te i n the Unit ed St ate s,” J ournal of C onte mpo ra ry C hin a, Vol.10 , No.2 7, p.3 25.
mid-air collision between a U.S. Navy EP-13 spy plane and a Chinese fighter jet on the South China Sea on April 1, 20 01.
Although this incident was finally resolved without lasting impact, Sino-U.S. relatio nship was further strained. As a Washington Post article reported aftermath o f the crisis, “China’s lead ers are increasingly concerned that Washington and Beijing are headed for a confrontation as China emerges as an economic and military power in Asia.”50 A series of actions taken by the Bush administration in its first 100 days of tenure seemed confirm Beijing’s concerns.
Bush backed a natio nal missile defen se system, which China feared would negate its nuclear deterrent. Over Chinese objections, the U.S. g overn ment p ermitted Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian unprecedented access to the United States, allowing him to stop twice in America and meet lawmak ers in his tran sit visit to New York City an d Houston in June 2001. Bush also shelved the peace process of the Korean Pen insula and hosted the Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, at the White House. He approved a multibillion-dollar weapons package for Taiwan in May 20 01, including, for the first time, offensive weapons such as submarines.
A pro-China Hong Kong magazin e listed all these action s and believed that
“Although it is still hard to say that the United States is ready to invade China, all th is showed that the United States was in deed openly creating a tense military
Joh n Po mfret , “Chi na Gro wing Un ea sy a bo ut US R el at ion s,” Washi ngto n Post, Ju ne 23, 2001 , p.A1 .
confrontation atmosphere and raising the political pressure against Ch ina for the purpose of driving China into a war panic.”51
The deterioration of Sino-U.S. relations is certainly not conducive to China’s effort to secure its periph ery. China’s foreign policy estab lishment has been worried that the foundations are being set now for long-term aggressive competition with the United States.
This is not something that these Chinese leaders want to see.
However, to handle the relations with the U.S. has always been difficult for the Chin ese leaders since the end of the Cold War.
Many Chin ese leaders, particularly th ose in the PLA, have been deepl y suspiciou s ab out U.S. co ntainment poli cy dressed as engagement. They have pointed o ut that while preach ing strict Chinese compliance with international arms control agreements in the n ame of regional stability, the U.S. has increased its arms sales to Taiwan an d strengthened its defense links with Japan and South Korea. China has been particularly alarmed over the U.S. announcement to build the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system co vering the Asia-Pacific following a surprise North Korean rocket test in 19 98.
TMD may not only be used to protect Taiwan fro m Chinese missiles but also give Japan a more active role in regional security matters.
The U.S. military intervention in Yugoslavia has seriously fed China’s paranoia about Taiwan and Tibet. To add to this concern, China has seen the decision by the Philippin e Senate on May 28,
“U.S. Policy o f C ontain ing China : Re sul t o f B iased, Lo psi ded Information ,”
Gu angj iao jin g (Wide -An gle Mi rror), No.34 4, M ay 16, 2 001 , p.33 .
1999 to reopen its territory for joint exercises with U.S. forces as another link in an American chain of containment against Ch ina.
China has been particularly ap prehensive about the shift o f th e U.
S. military and strategic focus fro m the Atlantic to the Pacific, which would have serious consequence on China’s periphery policy.
An article in Beijing’s Liaowang Zhoukan (Outlook Weekly) speculated that in the Asian -Pacific Region, “follo wing the ‘new U.S.-Japanese defense guidelines,’ the United States will step up its deploymen t of Theater Missile Defense and strengthen its military alliance, and the po ssibility of the establish ment of an” eastern NATO “cannot be ruled out.” It further indicated that
“In line with the shift of the focus of U.S. military strategy from Europe to Asia, the U.S. military will redeploy its forces in the west Pacific, step up activities by military planes and ships, expand the scope and frequency of its aggressive reconnaissance ag ainst China, and step up activities for ad vance military probing.”5 2
Ch ina cannot change the U.S. forward dep loyment and the web of alliance in Asia at least in the foreseeable future. Therefore, working with the U.S. is no t a choice but a necessity. Beijing has to find ways to stabilize relatio ns with the U.S. in order to create a favorable regional environment for its perip hery policy.
Confrontation with the U.S. will not only complicate China’s
Sh an Mi n, “Wha t is t he Unt ie d St at es In te ndin g t o D o w ith it s Ch ina Se cu rity St rate gy,” Liao wa ng Zhou kan (Out look We e kly), No .18, Apri l 30 , 20 01, p .31.
periph ery policy but also rend er a high cost for its modernization efforts. As one Western rep orter p ointed out, “the direction of Beijing’s relations with the United States could exert a strong influence on China’s development plans, forcing funds to be funneled into defense spending instead of econo mic growth.”53
Conclusion
To establish and maintain a peaceful security environment in its periphery, China has tried to appear as a benign power that focused on economic development and has tried to improve relations with its Asian neighbors. However, it has been assertive and even belligerent when dealing with issues relating to what it considers as vital national interests, such as territorial disputes. These two pronged efforts have often transmitted conflicting signals to its neighbors and make it difficult for China to meet the challenges discussed above. The disparity between China’s belligerent behavior and “benign” face may bring uncertainties ahead in the Asia-Pacific, particularly considering the rapid growth of China’s economic and military power toward the 21st century. China could become more assertive in taking back Taiwan and resolving maritime disputes in its own terms. China’s regional rivals and weaker neighbors would have to be more concerned about China’s might and threats. China’s growing power could also rub against longstanding U.S. interests in Asia.
However, this situation has not seemed bothering Beijing’s
Joh n Po mfret , “Chi na Gro wing Un ea sy a bo ut US R el at ion s,” Washi ngto n Post, Ju ne 23, 2001 , p.A1 .
leaders very much. They have become more confident in dealing with its neigh bors because of the increase in China’s economic and military capacity. In his summary of the security environment for China’s rise in the Asia-Pacific, a Chinese scholar, Yan Xuetong, stated th at China and its neig hbors have shared the goal of their security strategy as all of th em have wanted to maintain region al peace and stability. It is n ot a surprise to any cou ntry that China as big power wants to be placed in an advantageou s position in the strateg ic balance. This is a normal interest and demand in intern ational politics and will not pose a th reat to the security of other states. “China h as shared certain common security interests with all peripheral cou ntries and has no co nflict in the overall in terest with an y cou ntries althoug h there are some contradiction s in national border and reu nification issues.”5 4 But it remains to be seen if this optimistic view can prevail.
※本文於第一屆兩岸遠景論壇《新世紀•新發展•新願景－－亞太情勢 與兩岸關係》學術研討會上發表。
（收件：2001 年 7 月 25 日，修正：2001 年 9 月 26 日，採用：2001 年 10 月 12 日）
Ya n Xue ton g, Zh ong guo de Jue qi, Gu oji Hu anj ing pi ngg u ( Th e Ri se of Ch ina : An Ev al uat ion of th e Inte rna tio na l Env iron me nt ) (Tian jin : Ti an jin Re nmin Ch uba n Sh e, 1 998 ), p.23 8.