The second major ch allenge to China’s peripheral security is how to work with o ther reg ional powers, namely, Japan and In dia, to secure p eace and stability to gether in the Asian-Pacific region.
For obv ious historical and geo political reaso ns, China’s relationship with Jap an has always b een difficult. Japan was Ch ina’s most cruel an d destructiv e enemy for a half century between 18 95 to 19 45. Japan also allied with the U.S. to con tain Ch ina before these two cou ntries estab lished diplomatic relation s in 1 972. Alth ough a Sino-Japan peace treaty was signed in 1978 , this formally friendly relationship has been larg ely superficial.
Wh ile Ch in a has regarded Japan as a successful model o f econo mic modernizatio n and tried to lu re Japanese trade and investments, Japan has b een unwilling to build u p a potential rival unnecessarily.
Japan ese loans and inv estment h ave come to China on a very lavish scale for years. According to one stud y, in the p eriod between 19 80 and 199 6, the total amount of Japanese investment in Chin a was $14 .6 billion in comparison to $34 .6 billion from
M ark J. Va le nc ia , Hon M. Van Dyk e, a nd N oe l A. Lud wig, 1 997 , p.
88 .
fo ur small East Asian Tigers of Hong Kong , South Korea, Singap ore, and Taiwan.3 9
Disappointed Beijing’s leaders hav e thus blamed Japan for its arrogant and unfair trading practice. In particular, they have been extremely alerted against any signs of Japan ’s remilitarization.
Beijing has played the “guilt card” as a weapon. During Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in November 1998, the first visit by a PRC president, Jiang reminded Japanese leaders at almost every public occasion that the past is far from forgiven or forgotten.
Beijing has done everything to discourage Japan from aspiring to leadership o f the region or taking on a greater global or regional political role. At a seminar on Northeast Asian Security held in Shanghai, Chinese strategists asserted that “Northeast Asia is the only region where China has a strategic advantage. One of China’
s strategic goals should be to delay Jap an’s advancement toward becoming a major military po wer.”4 0 However, China’s strategy has not been very effective. When President Jiang visited Japan expecting to dominate the scene, the Japanese refused a formal written apology over the war atrocities even thoug h South Korea received this apology earlier, refused to exclude the Taiwan Strait from its security agreement with the U.S.. Japan also refused to
Xi ao min Ron g, “Ex pla ini ng the Pa tte rns o f Jap an ese Fore ign Dire c t Inv estme nt i n C hin a,” J ou rn al of C onte mpo rary Ch ina, Vol.8, No.2 0, M arc h 1 999, p.132 .
R en Xia o, “Ton gbe iyi a a nqu an x ingsh i de xia nz hua ng yu wei la i,” (The C urren t an d Futu re Se curi ty Sit uat ion in Nort he ast Asia ), Guoj i Zhan wan g (In tern at ion al Out look ), No.7 , 199 6, p .11 .
utter the “three no’s” (no support to Taiwan independence, no support to one China, one Taiwan, an d no support to Taiwan’s bid to join the United Nations) on the Taiwan issue although President Clinton made the pledge in his visit to Beijing earlier.
In the meantime, no matter what China thinks, Japan has taken a more and more critical position on China’s military modernization efforts. As June Teufel Dry er indicated, “China’s economic growth was accompanied by increase in the defense budget that av eraged 12-13 % each year. Given the absence of any external invasion threat and the presence of many domestic problems, this worried the PRC neighbors. Japan began to complain about the lack of transparency in Beijing’s defen se decision-making.”4 1 In response, Japan has made China the major target of its national defense strategy. It is hard, in this case, to be optimistic about the future relationship between these two important countries in the Asia-Pacific region. This rival relationship is certainly a major ch allenge to the success of China’s p eriphery policy.
India is another budding rival of China in Asia. Although these two countries made friends by working together in the promotion of the national independent movement in the third world during the 1950s, they became enemies and encountered a military clash in 1962. Sin o-Indian relationship beg an to impro ve in the late 1980s. China and India signed two agreements on maintaining peace and tranquility and confidence building measures in the border area in 1993 and 1996 respectively. President Jiang Zemin
Jun e Te ufe l Drye r, “Sin o-Jap an ese Re la tion s,” J ourna l of Co nte mpora ry C hin a, Vol.10 , No.2 8, p.3 75.
visited India in November 1996 . As Beijing was cultivating a more friendly relationsh ip with New Delhi, it was sho cked by India’s going nuclear in May 1998 and Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes’ characterization of Ch ina as “a majo r threat to Indian security.”42 Beijing was furious and accused India “running against the international trend of peace.”4 3
However, this event was not a bo lt fro m the blue because Sino-Indian geopolitical rivalry has never been stopped in the following three issue-areas. The first is the Pakistan issue. While China has sought to improve relations with India, it has maintained a long -term strategic partnership with Pak istan, which India has waged three wars against in the five decades since its independence.
New Delhi believes that China has used the Sino-Pakistan alliance to check the growing influence of India in Asia. Tibet is the second issue. Alth ough Ind ia h as publicly affirmed Beijing’s position that Tibet is part of China, it did not welcome China’s incorp oration of Tibet, which otherwise may serve as a buffer between these two countries. China has been irritated that India has allowed the Dalai Lama an d his exile g overnment to reside in Dharmasala and to campaign for Tibetan independence. The third issue is the two segmen ts of the 2,500 mile Sino-India border that are still disputed: th e southeastern Himalayan Mountains, now administered by India, and the Aksai Chin Plateau, through which a major Chinese hig hway linking Tibet and Xinjian g.
Solutions to these troubled issues have to be found in order for
C hin a N ew s Dig est-G lob al (e le ct roni c new s), Dec e mber 12, 1 998 . C hin a Da ily , M ay 19, 1 998 , p.4.
China to establish a truly good neig hboring relationship with In dia.