China’s Periphery Policy and Changing
Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region
Suisheng Zhao
(Assoc ia te Profe sso r, Grad uat e Scho ol of In te rnat ion al Stud ie s, Univ ersit y o f De nve r)
Abstract
For a long time, China was seen as a regional power without a regional policy. Since the early 1980s, reform-minded Beijing leaders have made a deliberated effort to devise an integrated regional policy, known as “zhoubian zhengce” (periphery policy) or “mulin zhengce” (good neighboring policy). This policy of seeking mutual interests with Asian neighbors has served China’s interests in establishing a stable regional security environment and promoting economic modernization along pragmatic lines. In particular, China has maintained and expanded strategically important relations with Russia, newly independent Central Asian republics, two Koreas, and major Southeast Asian countries after the end of the Cold War. However, China still faces many serious challenges if it want to further improve its security environment in the periphery. Although Beijing’s leaders have declared the victory of the good neighboring policy, the success has largely been along its land borders in the north and West. The security environments along China’s East and South frontiers, particularly the coastal frontiers where China’s
major economic and political centers are located, have not been improved as much. Some new problems have also been occurring in these areas. The key issue in China’s periphery policy is how China can pursue its vital national interest without disrupting regional stability and if China can bring its belligerent behavior in line with its benign face. This paper analyzes the formation of China’s periphery policy, the subsequent change in Beijing’s relations with its Asian neighbors and the impact on the regional security environment, and the challenges Beijing faces in Asia.
Keywo rds: foreign policy of China, Security environment in
Asia-Pacific, Sino-Russian relationship, Sino-Japan relationship, Sino-ASEAN relationship
Although China has been seen as a rising power with global significance in the post-Cold War world, its security relies heavily upon maintaining good relations with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region. A Chinese strategist, Wu Xinbo, admits that although China has a great power self-image it does not have adequate strength to play the role commensurate to this self-image. Therefore, “China is still a country whose real interest lies mainly within its boundaries, and to a lesser extent, in the Asia-Pacific region where developments may have a direct impact on China’s national interests… In terms of interests and resources, it is fair to say that China is a regional power with some limited global interests.”1 With limited capacity in traditional economic and
military terms, China has to focus its resources on the Asian-Pacific region. Over one decade ago, Steven Levine stated that “outside Asia, China’s role is determined more by what China may become than by what it already is.”2 This statement is still true today. Thus Beijing has to formulate its foreign policy in particular to response to issues close to home.
For a long time in the early years of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), however,China was “a regional power without a region al policy.”3 The tensions with many of its neighbo ring countries became an important source of threat to Chin a’s national security. Beijing was in constant alert against possible invasion s of hostile powers via its neighborin g countries and fo ught several wars with neighb ors or with hostile powers in neighboring countries to defuse the threat. China’s relations with Asian Pacific countries began to improve gradually in the recent decades after it made a comprehensive periphery policy. This improvement has significant impact on its security environment.
This paper tries to analyze the recent changes in Beijing’s policy and relations with its Asian neighbor and its impacts on China’s security environmen t. It starts with an examination on
Jou rnal of Con te mporary C hina , Vo l.10 , No.2 7, p.2 94. St eve n I. Levi ne , op. cit .
St eve n I. Le vin e, “C hin a in Asia : The PR C as a Re gi ona l Powe r,” i n Ha rry Ha rdin g, ed., C hina ’s Foreig n Re la tion s i n t he 1 980s (Ne w Ha ve n, C.T.: Yal e Uni versi ty Press, 198 2), p .107 . De nny R oy, in a bo ok of 19 98, stil l be lie ve d tha t “C hin a ha s n o ap pare nt ‘A si an p oli cy’,” De nny Ro y, Ch ina ’s Forei gn Rel ati ons (Lan ham, M .D.: R owma n & Lit tle fie ld Publi shers, 1998 ), p.8.
Beijing’s making of its periphery policy, then goes on to explore the sub sequent changes in Beijing’s security environment. The last section will analyze th e challeng es to Beijing’s periphery policy in the Asia-Pacific region.
Beijing’s “Good Neighboring Policy”
Ch ina often calls its Asian n eighbors “periphery countries” (zhoubian guojia). Although it was always aware of the importance in maintain ing stable relations with these periphery countries for its national security, Beijing was never able to make an integrated policy toward neighbo ring countries. There were many factors responsible for the absence o f China’s regional po licy. One was the frequent do mestic turmoil and policy change, which severely limited China’s ability to mak e any coherent foreig n po licy, including regional policy. The second was China’s traditional cultural comp lacency an d the legacy of sinocentrism, which took China as the cen ter of Asia for granted. The third was what Levin e called China’s ambiguo us p osition in the region : “more than merely a regional actor, but still less than a global power,” which left China in an uncertain relationship with its Asian neighbors. The fourth was China’s unique position in the bipolar Cold Word setting, which forced Beijing to see its security in global rather than reg ional terms.
Most of these factors began to change after China launched market-oriented economic reform and opening up to the outside world in the early 1980s. Externally, while China confronted with no serious security threat th rougho ut the 1980s, its strategic position in the triangular relationship between the US, the USSR,
and the PRC declined alon g with the detente between the two superpowers and the end of the Cold War. Internally, Deng Xiaoping and his reform-min ed colleagues were d etermined not only to halt the domestic political turmoil that characterized the early years of the PRC but also to create a favorable international environment for econo mic modernization. In response to the new situation, the reform-mind ed leaders in Beijing made a deliberated effort to devise an integrated regional policy, known as “zhoubian zhengce” (periphery policy) or “mulin zhengce” (g ood n eighboring policy), to cope with the changes that challenged Ch ina’s u nderstanding of its relations with neighboring countries.
A study by You Ji and Jia Qingguo pointed to three new trends in Asia that led reform-minded leaders to pay a special attention to its perip hery.4 Th e first was the prosp ect of a “pacific cen tu ry,” which Beijing embraced with the h ope that fast econ omic growth in the Asia-Pacific region could offer new energy to China’s economic prosp erity. Taking the o pportunities created by the restructuring of the world eco nomy, China was determin ed to integrate its eco nomy with the rest of the region. The second was the emergence of “new Asianism,” which claimed that the success of Asian mod ernization was based o n its unique values. Th is concep t resonated in th e hearts of many Chinese leaders, reformers and con servatives alike, because it challenged the Western ideological and economic centrality. Chin ese leaders
You Ji an d Ji a Qing guo , “Chi na ’s Re -e merge nc e and It s Fore ign Pol ic y Str ate gy,” in Jo seph Y. S. C he ng, ed., Chi na Re v iew , 1 998 (Hon g Ko ng: Ch ine se U niv ersit y Pre ss, 1998 ), p.1 28.
wan ted to help drive this evolving trend of Asianism b y working closely with its Asian n eighbors. The third was the develop ment of regional or su b-region al blocs fo llowing the collapse of the bipolar system. Beijing decided to take advantage of the collectivism that migh t provide n ew mech anisms u seful for China to face the West. “multilaterialism, albeit highly limited, developed as China started cooperation with neighboring states on transn ational secu rity problems (e.g., en vironmental pollution, illeg al immigration, drug-trafficking, organized cross-b order crime, etc.).”5
In ligh t of these new dev elopments, Beijing’s leaders began to make a periphery policy that would help China to achieve the goal of creating a regional enviro nment co nducive to its economic modernization an d national security. According to Liu Huaqiu, Director of the Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council, the objectives of the good neighboring policy was to “activ ely d evelop friendly relations with the surroun ding countries, p reserve regional peace and stability, and p romote regional economic coo peration.” To carry out this policy, Chinese leaders showed a benign face to negotiate with neighbo ring countries over a series of disputes. As Liu stated,
“China advocates dialogues and negotiations with o ther countries as equals in dealing with the historical disputes over boundaries, territorial lands, and territorial seas and seeks fair and reasonable solutions. Disputes that
Wu B aiy i, “Th e Ch ine se Se cu rity Con ce pt a nd i ts Histo ric al Evo lut ion,” J ourna l o f C ont emp orary Chi na, Vol .10, N o.27, p.278 .
cannot be settled immediately may be set aside temporarily as the parties seek common ground while reserving differences withou t letting those differences affect the normal relations between two countries.”6
Specifically, Beijing’s p eriphery policy was aimed at explo ring the common groun d with Asian co untries in both economic and security arenas by conveying the image of a responsible power willing to contribute to stab ility and co operation in the region.
It is important to no te that Beijing’s good neighboring policy, just lik e any other parts of its foreig n policy, was closely related with its reform-minded leaders’ objective of economic modernization. In order to achieve a high rate of eco nomic growth , these leaders looked for the common ground in coo peration with neighbo ring countries in order to take a share of the rapid economic growth in the region. This economic motiv ation was very influential in guidin g China’s periphery p olicy, evid ent in their attempt to make diplomacy “serving domestic economic construction” (waijiao fuwu
yu guonei jingji jiangsh e) after the inception of mark et-oriented
economic reforms.7 Their efforts have been very successful. The overall foreign policy goal since the late 1970 s has been set to maintain a peaceful intern atio nal en viron ment for eco nomic
Liu Hua qiu , “Zhon ggu o ji ang yio ngyu an zhi xin g dud i z hiz hu d e w aij ia o z he ngc e,” (C hi na Will A lwa ys Pu rsue Pe ac efu l Fore ign Pol ic y of Ind ep end en ce and Sel f-de ter mi na tio n), Qui shi, No .23, De ce mbe r 199 7, p.3 .
Liu Tsai -ming , “Zh uan fan g x ing wa ij iao buz ha ng,” (A Spe c ial In te rvie w of Ne w Fore ig n M inist er), Wen hui Bao, Ju ne 27, 1 998 , p.A3 .
modernization. Reform-minded Chinese leaders argued that economic power was both a means and an end of foreign p olicy. They defined economic modernization in the terms of economic security of the nation. A Chinese scholar described that economic security
“und erscores the safety and survivability of those economic parts or sectors vital to the country’s growth, the liveliho od , and its wh ole econ omic i nterests. Indisp ensable for achiev ing such a security are elements ranging from favorable internal and external business environments, to stron g international competitiveness, to status and capab ilities in world politics. The final goals for economic security are to enhance national economic power, to secure domestic markets while expanding external ones, and to guarantee national interest and adv antage in competition and cooperation abroad.”8
In order to obtain economic power and security, Beijing was interested in the economic development models of Japan and other successful East Asian Newly Industrial Countries (NICs) and tried to lure of economic gains from increased trade and investment between China and these Asian countries. As a result of this policy effort, China traded more and more with Asian countries than with other regions after the 1980s. The total trade amount with Asian countries was only $16.6 billion in 1980, but it reached $48.5
Wu B aiy i, “Th e Ch ine se Se cu rity Con ce pt a nd i ts Histo ric al Evo lut ion,” J ourna l o f C ont emp orary Chi na, Vol .10, N o.27, pp.27 9-28 0.
billion in 1990 and $175.69 billion in 1995, right before the Asian financial crisis, counted for over 60 percent of China’s total foreign trade.9
In the traditional security arena, political leaders in China have made every effort to preven t their neighboring countries from becoming military security threats. A number of periphery countries were perceived as posing such threats due to the following two reasons: one was border d ispute and the other was their relation s with outside p owers ho stile to China. Accordingly, Beijing’s periph ery policy has two security goals in mind: one is to settle border disp utes “through consultations and negotiations”10 and the other is to preven t alliances of its neighbors with outside powers hostile to China. Th e first policy goal has involved China in a search for secure b oundaries and a look for peaceful settlements in land and maritime territorial disp utes. The second policy goal has involved China in dev elopin g strategic relationships an d finding common g rounds with Asian countries in resisting pressures on market penetrations and human rights issu es from Western powers. Under these circumstances, China’s periphery policy has been shap ed principally by the dynamics o f two major sets of relations. One is the dyn amics between China and the global power of the United States. The second is the interactions between China and
Ya n Xue ton g, Zh ong guo de Jue qi, Gu oji Hu anj ing pi ngg u ( Th e Ri se of Ch ina : An Ev al uat ion of th e Inte rna tio na l Env iron me nt ) (Tian jin : Ti an jin Re nmin Ch uba n Sh e, 1 998 ), P.2 83.
Jia ng Ze min’s re port to t he 1 5th Nat iona l C ong ress of t he C CP, Xinhu a, Oc to ber 16, 1 997 .
region al rivals such as Japan and Ind ia.
Beijing’s special attention to its periphery does not mean that China is willing to turn its back on the world and simply cultivate its own garden. As You and Jia said, Beijing’s periphery policy
“is not just about putting the backyard in order. PRC’s diplomatic history has clearly showed that troubled relations with the surrounding nations in the past had seriously narrowed China’s foreign policy options, especially toward major powers…. Closer integration with Asia has become a must in China’s regional foreign policy initiatives.”11
In other words, establishing good relationships with neighbors is aimed at providin g Chin a with a more secured environment in its periphery as a leverage to increase its influence in world affairs.
Improvements of China’s Security Environment in
the Asia-Pacific
Indeed, China’s security environment in its periphery improved greatly since it began to formulate and implement the good-neighboring p olicy. In his study of China’s peripheral security enviro nment (zhoubian anquan huanjin g), a Chinese security expert, Yan Xuetong, asserted that as China foun d more and more common security interest (gongtong anqu an liyi) with peripheral countries, China began to en joyed a more peaceful environment together with its neighboring countries in recent years. The result was an
increased mutual tru st between China and its neighbors and an enhanced national security for China.
Yan’s assertion was based on h is observation that China and its neighbo rs sh ared two fund amentally common security interests. One was to prevent a world war and a new cold war from taking place and the second was to avoid reg ional military conflict. According to Yan, alth ough some countries might be con cerned about China’s rise to upset the balan ce of power, most countries agreed with China’s terms of strategic b alance in the region. Yan divided China’s periphery coun tries into three categ ories according to the d egrees of their agreemen t with China’s terms of strategic balance. The first category of countries sh ared China’s interest in developing a reg ional multipolarization in which China would be one of important strategic power and play a b alancing role. These countries included Pakistan, North Korea, Burma, Nepal, Cambo dia, Malaysia, Singapore, Russia, and central Asian states as they hoped to see China becoming powerful to reduce the pressure of the U.S. intervening in their internal affairs. The seco nd category of countries included Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philipines, Vietnam, New Zealand, an d India, which hoped to maintain current strategic balance in which the US had the strategically advantaged position. These countries didn’t want to see China to become a balancing power to the U.S. But they did not have major conflicts of interest with China. The third category of countries, mainly the U.S. and Jap an, concerned o ver the rise of China and wanted to establish a multilateral mechanism in China’s periphery to prevent Ch ina from becoming a security threat to their interests. Yan believed that b ecause China shared
common strategic interests with most of the periphery countries, China had enjoyed and could continue to enjoy a favorable security enviro nment in the periphery for the near future.12
It was indeed a prudent policy that China made the efforts to find shared strategic interests with neighb oring countries. Implementing this policy, China has improved its relations with most of periphery countries in the recent decades. This improv ement came roughly in two chronological stages: the late Cold War period o f the 1980s and the post-Cold War period of the 1990s. The first stage started with China’s economic reform and opening up to the outside world in the early 1980s. Two policy shifts were significant in this period. The first was to ab andon ideology as the guidance and develop friendly relations with neighbors regardless of th eir ideolo gical tenden cies and po litical systems (b uyi yishi xingtai h e shehui zhidu lun qingsu). This policy shift was stated in a Chinese foreign policy history book as one of the five major policy shifts in the 1980s.13 The second significant policy shift was to change the practice of defining China’s relations with its neighbors in terms of their relation s with either of the So viet Union and the United States (yimei
huaxian, yisu huaxian). China wo uld develop normal relations with
Ya n Xue ton g, Zh ong guo de Jue qi, Gu oji Hu anj ing pi ngg u ( Th e Ri se of C hina : An Eval ua tio n o f t he Int erna ti ona l En viro nmen t) (Tia nji n, C hin a: Tia nji n R en min C hu ban She , 19 98), p p.234 -236 .
Tian Pe iz eng , e d., Gaig e Ka ifan g yil ai de Zh ongg uo Wai jia o (Chi ne se Di plo mac y sin ce t he Re form and Op eni ng up) (Be iji ng: Shi jie Zhish i C huba n She, 1993 ), pp .6-7.
neighboring countries regardless of their relatio ns with the Soviet Union and the United States. These policy ch anges resulted in an improvement of China’s relations with some periphery countries previo usly in tension during the period.
One goo d example was the normalization of relationship with Mongolia, which had long been perceived as a Soviet satellite in China’s northern frontier. A border agreement between the two countries was signed in Novemb er 1988. Another example was China’s effort to improve its relationship with India. This effort resulted in the ice-breaking visit of In dian Prime Minister, Rajive Gandhi, to Beijin g in Decemb er 1988 , the first such visit after the Sino-In dia border war in 1962. China declared that this visit marked the beginning of normal relationship between these two countries.1 4 Maintainin g a good relationship with North Korea and, at the same time, improving relationship with South Korea was a third example. The so-called “traditional frien dship” between China and North Korea had always been d elicate, as North Korea had been swung between Moscow and Beijing for many years. This relationship became particularly difficult in the 1980s when differences in ideology, economic and p olitical systems, and foreign policy were growing between these two communist neighb ors. However, Beijing managed fairly good relationship with the North while successfully established close relations with the South at the end of the 1980s. The improvement of relationship with Taiwan
Xi e Yi xin g, Zh ong guo Dan gda i Waij iao S hi (Histo ry of Con te mp ora ry C hin ese Di plo mac y) (Be ij ing: Zh ongg uo Qi ngni an C hub an Sh e, 199 6), p.4 30.
was still another example. To create a peaceful international enviro nment for its mod ernization drive, Deng Xiaoping decided to shift Beijing’s policy from “liberatin g Taiwan” by force to a peaceful reunification offense by suggesting talks between the Chinese Co mmunist Party (CCP) and the Nationalist Party (KMT) in the early 198 0s. Yie Jianying, the Chairman of th e National People’s Congress Stan din g Committeee, specifically proposed
santong (three lin ks, i.e., commercial, postal, and travel) an d siliu
(four exchanges, i.e., academic, cultural, economic, and sp orts) between the two sides.15 Although the Taiwan government suspected Beijing’s policy as “united front” tactic at first, it respon ded to Beijing’s peaceful inducement under domestic pressures and began to ease restrictions on trade, investment and travel to the mainland after 1986 .16 By the end of the 1980s, economic and cultural exchanges across the Taiwan Strait developed rapidly.
The Tiananmen Massacre in 1989 and the subsequent end of the Cold War marked the beginning of the second stage of improvement of China’s relations with periphery countries. The massacre led to economic sanctions by an d deterioration of relation s with Western countries. However, it had little negative impact on China’s relations with its Asian neighbors as the human rights record s in most of these countries were not better than that in China. To a certain extent, these Asian gov ernments were sympathy to China’s authoritarian rule and struggle against pressures from
Be iji ng Re vi ew , Vo l.24, No.40 , Oc tob er 5 , 19 81, p .11 .
Su ishe ng Zha o, “Ma na ge me nt of R iv al Re la tio ns Ac ross the Ta iwa n Stra it: 19 79-199 1,” Issu es and Stu die s, Vo l.29, No.4, April 1993, pp.77 -78.
the Western countries. It was really ironical that while China’s relations with the Western co untries soured, its relations with Asian-Pacific neighbors improved.
Taking example of th e improvement of the relations between Ch ina and th e Sou theast Asian coun tries, China normalized diplomatic relation s with several influential Sou theast Asian countries in the early 1990 s: Indonesia (August 8, 1 990), Singapore (October 3, 1990), Brunei (September 30, 1991), and Vietnam (November 1991 ). In spite of the rising concern over the China threat among many Southeast Asian countries, they n ot only sided with China against the U.S. pressures on the human rights issue, but also accepted Beijing’s position that the reunification with Taiwan was China’s domestic affair. Chin a was invited to attend the ASEAN p ost-Ministerial Conference in 1991 and became a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 and ASEAN’s comprehensive dialo gue partner in 1996. Since then, China has actively participated what they called “shanhui jizhi” (three meeting mechanism) of ASEAN Foreign Ministerial Meeting, Enlarged ASEAN Foreign Ministerial Meeting, and ARF.1 7
The Asian financial crisis that started in summer 1997 provided a good opportunity for China to further improve its relations with Southeast Asian countries. Although China was not immune from its effect, it withstood the crisis better than many of its neighbors. As the World Bank Global Economic Prospects and the Developing
Ya n Xue ton g, Zh ong guo de Jue qi, Gu oji Hu anj ing pi ngg u ( Th e Ri se of C hina : An Eval ua tio n o f t he Int erna ti ona l En viro nmen t) (Tia nji n, C hin a: Tia nji n R en min C hu ban She , 19 98), p .287.
Countries (1998/99) indicated the aftermath of the crisis, “China’s growth is one source of stability for the region.”1 8 Beijing’s leaders took a policy of “stand-by-Asia” and even sent several billion dollars in aid to afflicted Southeast Asian economies. In response to the speculation that China would have to devaluate its currency, Renminbi, under the economic pressures, China’s premier, Zhu Rongji, repeatedly promised to maintain its currency stable. A Chinese devaluation would set off competitive devaluation across the region. This “beggar thy neighbor” competition could undo Southeast Asian countries’ recovery efforts and would have devastating economic and political consequences for the whole region. China’s positive response to the crisis in comparison to Japan’s paralysis helped China gain influence very significantly. Because Southeast Asia now depended to a hitherto unprecedented degree on China’s ability to stabilize its currency, China hereby significantly improved its relations with Southeast Asian countries, particularly in economic terms. During the Asian financial crisis, China obtained the power to shape Asia-Pacific development in ways that it never had previously. As a result, at the first ASEAN-plus-1 summit meeting between the leaders of nine ASEAN members and Chinese president Jiang Zemin in Kuala Lumpur in December 1997, a joint declaration was published to establish a good-neighboring and mutual-trust partnership between China and ASEAN oriented towards the 21st century.19
The Wo rld Ba nk , Gl obal Ec onom ic Prospe c ts a nd Dev el opi ng Co untri es, 19 98/ 99: Bey on d Finan ci al C ri sis (Wash ingt on D .C .: t he Wo rld B an k, 19 99), p.34.
In the 1990s, China also significantly improved relations with its neighbo rs in the no rth and no rthwest. Formal d ip lo matic relationship with South Korea was established on August 24, 19 92, which marked the su ccess of China’s policy to secure balanced relationship with both south an d north Koreas. To contin ue maintaining the balance relationship, Beijing was very careful not to ang er the North Korea by refraining itself from developing any military contact and security relations with the South Ko rea. Instead, it focused on bilateral trade and inv estment relations with the South while made every effort to keep strategic relations with the North. In this position, Chin a hoped to better defend its interests in the future reunificatio n process of two Koreas. As You Ji indicated, “this strategy envisages the likely orientation of China’s strategic interest in a Korea that is reunified, peacefully. China hopes to see that there will not be a US military presence after Korea’s reunificatio n. It hopes to see that the reunified Korea will take a position that is pro-China rather than pro-Japan.”2 0
Follo wing the disintegration o f the Soviet Union, China also secured a good start with the newly independent central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan , Kyrg ystan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan in 1992. Three of the five central Asian states share borders of more 3,0 00 kilometers with China. Securing its relation s with these countries is crucially imp ortant to ensure China’s bo rder
Wang Yong, “Ch ina , ASEA N Stre ss Pe ac e: Summit Ag ree s on Ap proa ch,” C hin a Da ily , De ce mbe r 17 , 199 7, p.1 .
You Ji, “Chi na and Nort h Ko rea : A Fra gi le Re la tion ship of Stra te gic C onve ni enc e ,” J ourn al o f C ont emp orary Ch ina, Vol .10, No.28 , p.39 6.
area stability and energy supplies, or as a Wall street Journal report in dicated, to “buttress the twin pillars of its future economic growth: political stability and plentiful energy.”2 1 According this report, China shared with these countries over the concern that radical Islam, insp ired by the examp le of Taliban-co ntrolled Afg hanistan, would stir ethni c and pop ular rev olt. Ch ina’s westernmost region is inhabited by Turkic-speaking Muslim Uighurs and fears fu ndamentalist fervor. Russia h as been b ogged down in guerrilla war with Muslim nationalists in Chechnya. Tajikistan, Kyrgy zstan and Uzbek istan have cast militant Islam as their main enemy. This common con cern led these co untries to work with China to contain ethnic fundamentalism. Eag er to prevent Islamic militancy from fu eling separatism in Xinjiang, China has dispatched waves of senior politicians and military delegatio ns to Central Asia. It gave parachutes, medicine and other supplies to airborne forces and border g uards in Tajikistan, which has been convulsed by civil war. It also pledged military aid to Uzbekistan, which has been raided annually by an Afghanistan-based opposition group called th e Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan . Another important issues on th e agenda for China’s relations with these central Asian states is energy supplies as these cou ntries could be an excellent source for China’s future en ergy supplies. According to this report, China’s own con servative estimates show oil imports fillin g h alf the six million barrels a day it will need by 20 10,
An dre w H igg ins And Ch arl es Hut zle r, “Chi na Se es Key R ole For C ent ral Asia In En surin g Ene rg y Sup pli es, St abi lit y,” The Wa ll Stre e t J ourna l, Jun e 1 4, 2 001.
up from just under a third today and zero less than a decade ago. Its need for natural g as, too, is projected to soar fivefold, to 3.9 trillion cubic feet. To meet demand, China has been explo ring frantically in Xinjiang, a search Exxon and other energy giants have joined at various times, and also invested in two oil field s in Kazakstan.22
To maintain good relations with bordering central Asian states, Chinese president Jiang Zemin took a lead to put “Treaty of Enhancing Military Mutual Trust in the Border Areas” signed by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgystan in Shanghai in April 1996. This group was since then known as the “Sh anghai Five.” At first, the Shanghai Five was designed as a talking shop on minor issues of borders and territory amon g China and its Cen tral Asian neighbors. Yet in a few short years, the group has begun to address political and military question s, and shared problems like organized crime. The five countries signed a “Treaty of Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Bo rder Areas” in April 199 7. At its June 2001 meeting in Beijing, the Sh anghai Five accepted a new member, Uzbekistan, and agreed to meet und er a new n ame, th e Shang hai Coop eration Organization . Rep ortedly, India and Pakistan are both interested in joining, possibly by the 2002 meeting in Moscow. Some Western reporters believe that this group has a strategic significance. An Australian newspaper stated that “The newly formed Shanghai Co-operation
An dre w H igg ins And Ch arl es Hut zle r, “Chi na Se es Key R ole For C ent ral Asia In En surin g Ene rg y Sup pli es, St abi lit y,” The Wa ll Stre e t J ourna l, Jun e 1 4, 2 001.
Organisation, bracketing China, Russia and four Central Asian republics, is p oised to emerge as a potent force against United States influence and a rising tide of Islamic militancy in the region .”23 A reporter of The Christia n Science Monitor also b elieved that “The Shanghai meeting of Russia, China, and four Central Asian nations is an effort to develop an organization that could one day offer a modest geopolitical counterweight to Western alliances. Its timing and substance are considered significant, with Russia and China already drawing closer after sign ing a number of bilateral agreements.”24
Indeed, Beijing’s relationship with Russia improved spectacularly in the recent decad es.The most important factors that brought these former co mmunist giants close were twofold. First, the Soviet/Russian search for security and economic reform matched China’s yearning for stability in the aftermath of Tiananmen. Second, both countries were resentful over the high-handed behavior of the US. While growing American pressure increasingly irritated China, the Western reluctance to provide large-scale assistance disappointed Russia. Thus, “there was an increasing con vergence of views between Moscow and Beijing over the need to create alternative poles in world affairs to the one dominated by the US.”25 This convergence of views paved the way for the improvement
Joh n Sc hau ble , “Russia -Ch ina a lli anc e eme rg es a s a fo il to U .S.,” The Sy dn ey M ornin g He rald , June 16 , 200 1.
R obe rt Ma rqua nd, “Ce ntra l Asia ns g roup to c ount erw ei gh U.S.: Russia , C hi na , a nd fo ur re pub li cs mee t t o ex pa nd sol ida ri ty a nd op pose se para ti sm,” The C hristi an Sci en ce M onit or, Jun e 1 5, 20 01.
of the Sino-Ru ssian relations.
Following Boris Yelstin’s first official visit to China in December 1992, Beijing and Mo scow institutionalized a twice-a-year summit meeting system at president and premier levels. A Western ob server found that this sustained summit dip lomacy was similar to “th e Gorbachev-Reagan (the Yeltsin-Bush ) summits” in 1985-92, which helped put an end to the Cold War.26 Jiang and Yeltsin met five times in six years by the end of 1997. In spite of Yestsin’s critical health situation, the sixth summit was held in a Moscow h ospital in November 1998 and Yeltsin visited Beijing for the sev enth su mmit in December 1999. The 1999 Sino-Russian Summit Culminated in a Landmark Joint Commun ique criticizing American hegemony and denouncing the use of “h uman rights in-terventions” by foreign countries. China officially declared Chechnya a matter of Russia, stating, “The Chinese side supports the government of the Russian Republic’s action in fighting terrorism and splitism forces.” For its part, the Russians officially supported China’s sovereignty over Taiwan. The communique criticized the U.S. both for its attempt to ratify the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as well as for its refu sal to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Th e communique states, “The Russian side supports the Chinese side in opposing the position of any cou ntry
Pe te r Fe rdina nd , “C hin a and Ru ssi a: A St rate gi c Pa rtn ershi p?” C hin a Rev ie w, Autu mn/Win ter 199 7, p.1 9.
He nri Eyra ud, “From Con front at ion to Part ne rsh ip,” C hin a St rate gic Rev ie w, Vol .3, No .1, Spr ing 199 8, p.1 58.
under any form of bring ing the Chinese province of Taiwan into a (anti-missile defense) plan.”27
Sino-Russian Relationship was first defined as a “constructive partnership” in 1994 and “strategic” was added in the Sino-Russian Joined Commu nique published on April 25, 1996, fou r days after the publication of US-Japanese Jo ined Security Statement on April 17, 19 96. This relationship was finalized as a “strategic cooperative partnership orien ted towards the 21st Century” in 1997. After the retirement of Yaltsin , Chinese leaders continued the partnership with Yaltsin’s successor, Vladimir Putin. At the Ju ly 2001 summit in Moscow, the presidents of the two former communist powers signed the Good Neighborly Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation to defend mutual interests and boost trade. Accord ing to a Reuters’ report, this frien dship pact “provided a legal framework for friendship n ow re-established after decades of mistrust ov er bo rder and ideological disputes.”28
The Sino-Russian partn ership resu lted in the declaration of the demarcation of the eastern section of Sino-Russian bo rder at the Jiang-Yeltsin Beijing summit in Nov ember 199 7. A China Daily commentary celebrated that
After six years of close cooperation on the basis of consultation, mutual understanding and mutual concessions, the 4,300-odd-kilometer frontier will become a landmark of peace and friendship between the two countries and
R eu ter s, “Russia and C hin a Sig n Fr ien dship A gree men t,” N ew Yo rk Ti me s, Ju ly 16, 2 001 .
peoples, laying a solid foundation for stronger good-neighborly relations and regional stability and prosperity.29
As a result of successfully implementing the periphery policy, China’s security along its bord ers has been substantially improved. China b ecomes more confidence in its security env ironment when there is less immediate military threats to China’s security. A Chinese official publication proudly declared th at “Today, let’s lookin g aro und our neighboring areas from east to west an d from north to south. we have basically established a relatively stable periph ery environment around our neighboring areas. Our cou ntry has established go od neighboring relations with all our neighb ors. This is the best period since the found ing o f the PRC.”30
Challenges to China’s Security Environment in the
Asia-Pacific
Indeed, China’s periphery policy has served its interest in estab lishing a stable regional environment and promoting economic modernization along prag matic lines. There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Beijing’s leaders in furthering good relations with neighbors when Jiang Zemin, at his report to th e 15th CCP National Congress in October 1997, stated that “China’s modernization requires a stable international environment” in Asia as elsewh ere.
C ommen ta ry, “A Produ ct ive Summit ,” Ch ina Dail y, N ove mber 1 2, 19 97, p.4.
Tian Pe iz eng , e d., Gaig e Ka ifan g yil ai de Zh ongg uo Wai jia o (Chi ne se Di plo mac y sin ce t he Re form and Op eni ng up) (Be iji ng: Shi jie Zhish i C huba n She, 1993 ), p.2 0.
31 China’s ability to develop good neighbo ring relations has certainly been enhanced by the successfu l power transfer from Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin at the 1 5t h CCP’s National Congress in September 1997. This new leadership has made it clear that China’s best interest is to make cooperation rather than conflict in Asia.
However, China still faces many serious ch allenges if it want to further improve its security environment in the periphery. Although Beijing’s lead ers have declared the victory of the good neighboring policy, the success has largely been along its land borders in the north and West. The security environment along China’s East and South frontiers, particularly the coastal frontiers where China’s major economic and political centers are located, have not b een improved as much. Some new problems have also been occu rring in these areas. In particular, there are at least four sets of challen ges that Beijing’s leaders have found difficult to deal with. One is the divisive territorial dispute with several neighbors; the second is the rivalry with other regional p owers; the third is the fear of its weak neighbors on the threat of China; and the fourth is the management of the most impo rtant relationship with the U.S..
China’s Border Disputes with Neighbors
The first challenge is to settle border disputes in the following three categories.32 The first categ ory is over land boundaries.
Jia ng Zemin ’s rep ort to the 15 th Part y Na ti ona l C ong ress o f th e C CP, B ei jing Xinh ua, O ct obe r 16 , 199 7.
Before th e arrival of Western imp erialist powers, territorial boundaries along Chin a’s frontiers had little significance under the tributary system. After the decline of the Chinese Empire in the 1 9th century, Western powers not o nly took over many of China’s tributaries but also pushed the frontiers forward into areas that China would have preferred to control itself. These new frontiers were often institutionalized in what China called “u nequal treaties.” As a result, after the founding of the PRC, communist leaders in Beijing found themselves in a series of territorial disputes with its neighbors. The second category is over so-called “lost” territories: Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan . The third category is over maritime boundaries involv ing both bilateral and multilateral relations. Bilaterally, China is in dispute with Vietnam over th e demarcation of the Tonkin Gulf and with Japan over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyutai in Chinese), a g roup of rocky islets lying on the edge of the continental shelf about 1 00 miles northeast of Taiwan. Japan considers these islets as part of the Ryukyu s whereas China claims them as p art of the Taiwan province and therefore part of Chin a. The major multilateral dispute is over the Spratly/Nansha islands in the South China Sea where is believed to be a potentially resource-rich region possessing oil deposits. Beijing draws a maritime boundary running from Taiwan
Ha rol d C . H into n c ha rac te riz ed th em int o fo ur c at eg orie s a nd I re grou p th em in to thre e . Ha rol d C. Hin ton, “Chi na a s a n Asia n Powe r,” i n Thoma s W. Rob inson a nd Dav id Sha mba ugh , e ds., Ch ine se Fore ig n Poli cy : Th eory an d Pract ic e (Oxford , U.K.: Cl are ndo n Pre ss, 199 5), pp .352 -357.
southwestward virtually along the coasts of the Philippines and East Malaysia and Brunei an d then northward mo re or less along the coast of Vietnam. The Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam have disp uted this claim.
Bo rder issue is related to sovereignty, which is Beijing’s most important concern in its foreign relations. Beijing has been firm in negotiatio ns over all three catego ries of territorial disputes. The progress towards th e settlemen t of these disputes has been made, albeit very limited. The most important progress is over land dispute with Russia, which shares a total of 4,3 00-odd-kilometer borders: about 4,245 00-odd-kilometers on the Manchurian sections and 55 kilometers between Kazakstan and Mongolia. China made p rogress in this settlement primarily because most of the areas in question do not in general contain Chinese populations. China signed the first border agreement in May 1991 with the U.S.S.R. on the Manchurian sectio ns of the common border. In September 1994, the second agreement was reach ed on the delimitation of the Sino-Russian border in th e Altai regio n, between Mongolia and Kazak hstan. Ratified in 1996, it led to th e concrete demarcation in 1997. Sino-Russian Joint Statement in November 1997 promises that the two sid es “will complete demarcation of the Western section of the Sino-Russian border within the agreed perio d of time.”3 3 The Chinese-Russian Border Demarcation Commission was disbanded upon its work drawing to an end in April 1999 when more than 2,084 border signs and markers along
“Sino -Russia n Join t St at eme nt on R el ati ons,” C hin a D ail y, Nov embe r 12 , 19 97, p .4.
their borders were set up and 2,444 islan ds on the border rivers were divided. About 1,163 of these islands go to Russia and the others go to China. The only unsettled territories are three large islands: two on the Ussuri Riv er and one on the Argun River, all of which are currently controlled by Russia.
The Chinese government has been extremely firm on the second category of territory disputes because it believes that people in these territories are ethn ically and historically Chinese. Taking back these territories involves not only the vital security interest of China but also the legitimacy of the regime. Beijing recovered Hong Kong in 1997 and Macao in 19 99. Taiwan is now the focu s of disp ute in this category. Beijing has tried to use the same way to recov er Taiwan as it did with Hon g Kong and Macao by economic inducement and proposing a “o ne country, two systems” formula since the early 1980s. But this peaceful offense has not achieved its objectives. While total trad e across the Strait rose from $5 billion in 1990 to $ 25 billion in 1997 and to $32.386 billion in 2000, making Taiwan the second (after Jap an) larg est supplier to the main land and China the third largest market of Taiwanese goods, political relationship between the two governments remains officially nonexistent and hostile. In frustration and to show its determination, Beijing launched a series of military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in 1995-96.3 4 However, military coercion has not stopped Taiwan’s political centrifu gal tendency
Fo r a st udy o f t his cri si s, se e Sui sh eng Zha o, e d., Ac ross the Ta iwa n St rait : Ma inl and Chi na, Ta iwa n, an d t he 1995 -199 6 C ri si s (Ne w York : R out led ge , 199 9).
either. President Lee Teng-hui proposed a “special Sate-to - state relationship” in July 1999 in spite of Beijing’s military threat. Chen Shui-ban, th e candidate o f pro-independent party, DPP, was even elected as Taiwan’s 10th president in the fiercely contested 2000 election. Altho ugh Beijing has made it clear that it is willing to figh t a war if necessary to recover Taiwan it still has to concern abo ut the reactions of the Un ited States and other Asian-Pacific countries as well as the resultant rupture of China’s economic development. Beijing’s leaders have been left very little room to maneuver in this effort of national reunification.3 5
The progress in the third category dispu te is extremely limited. In the cases of dispute ov er Tonkin Gulf and Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands, no agreement or compromise has been reached with Vietnam and Japan. In the South China Sea, while Beijing has showed certain degree of flexibility by suggesting “shelving the dispu tes and working for jo in t d evelop ment” (gezhi zhengyi,
gongtong kaifa ), China’s maritime neighbors h ave been very
assertive in contesting Beijing’s sovereignty claims. As one study indicated, “although China has offered join development to other claimants, its concept of joint develo pment seems to involve join development of th e producing oil and gas fields on oth er claimants’ continental shelves—and then only after China’s sovereignty has been recognized.” In addition, as the same study po inted out, Beijing has continued to “insist on bilateral so lutions and its
Su ishe ng Zha o, “D ea dlo ck: Be iji ng’s Na ti ona l Re un ific at ion Strat eg y Aft er Lee Te ng-h ui,” Proble ms of Post-C ommu nism, Vo l.48 , No .2, M arc h-Ap ril, 2001 , pp.4 2-51 .
interest and sincerity in participating in a mu ltilateral cooperative solution remains in doubt.”36 China’s position has been criticized and even rid iculed by other claimants in the South China Sea. Although Beijing and Hano i reached an agreement in defining their disputed 1,300-kilometer land border after Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji wrapped up his visit to Vietnam in December 19 99, no resolution was found over the two large islands groups-the Paracels (or Xisha and Zhongshao), which Chin a has occupied since 1974 and had a military clash with Vietnam in 1988. Vietnam still occupies most of the Spratlys that China claims sovereignty. The Philippines has stepped up its claims over the Spratlys in recent years. Protesting on Chinese construction activity on Filip ino-claimed Mischief Reef in 1998, the Philippin es military set up patrols in the disputed archipelago and announced that the Ph ilippine navy will fire warning shots if Chinese vessels get closer than five miles to challenge its patrols.37 Beijing has not given up its claims of sovereignty ov er these islands because they are extremely important for Chin a’s security and energy supply. Sovereignty over these islands keeps all o f China’s op tions open reg arding resources, should any be discovered. However, Beijing’s sovereignty claim may eventually bring Chin a to the fore with all cou ntries in South east Asia. Were that happen ed, “China’s ability to use force is constrained by the possibility reactions of the United States,
M ark J. Va le nc ia, Hon M . Va n D yke , a nd No el A. Lu dwi g, S harin g th e Resou rce s o f the S out h C hi na Se a ( Hono lul u, H .I.: Univ ersit y of Ha wa ii Press, 19 97), pp.77 & pp .99.
Japan, and ASEAN, which would p robab ly view such action as an attempt by Beijing to dominate the South China Sea.”3 8 Although sovereignty claim is crucially important for Beijing’s leaders, it is certainly an extremely difficult decision for them to squander China’s military resources and their political capital to seize these barren flysp ecks.
Rivalry with Other Regional Powers
The second major ch allenge to China’s peripheral security is how to work with o ther reg ional powers, namely, Japan and In dia, to secure p eace and stability to gether in the Asian-Pacific region. For obv ious historical and geo political reaso ns, China’s relationship with Jap an has always b een difficult. Japan was Ch ina’s most cruel an d destructiv e enemy for a half century between 18 95 to 19 45. Japan also allied with the U.S. to con tain Ch ina before these two cou ntries estab lished diplomatic relation s in 1 972. Alth ough a Sino-Japan peace treaty was signed in 1978 , this formally friendly relationship has been larg ely superficial. Wh ile Ch in a has regarded Japan as a successful model o f econo mic modernizatio n and tried to lu re Japanese trade and investments, Japan has b een unwilling to build u p a potential rival unnecessarily. Japan ese loans and inv estment h ave come to China on a very lavish scale for years. According to one stud y, in the p eriod between 19 80 and 199 6, the total amount of Japanese investment in Chin a was $14 .6 billion in comparison to $34 .6 billion from
M ark J. Va le nc ia , Hon M. Van Dyk e, a nd N oe l A. Lud wig, 1 997 , p. 88 .
fo ur small East Asian Tigers of Hong Kong , South Korea, Singap ore, and Taiwan.3 9
Disappointed Beijing’s leaders hav e thus blamed Japan for its arrogant and unfair trading practice. In particular, they have been extremely alerted against any signs of Japan ’s remilitarization. Beijing has played the “guilt card” as a weapon. During Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in November 1998, the first visit by a PRC president, Jiang reminded Japanese leaders at almost every public occasion that the past is far from forgiven or forgotten. Beijing has done everything to discourage Japan from aspiring to leadership o f the region or taking on a greater global or regional political role. At a seminar on Northeast Asian Security held in Shanghai, Chinese strategists asserted that “Northeast Asia is the only region where China has a strategic advantage. One of China’ s strategic goals should be to delay Jap an’s advancement toward becoming a major military po wer.”4 0 However, China’s strategy has not been very effective. When President Jiang visited Japan expecting to dominate the scene, the Japanese refused a formal written apology over the war atrocities even thoug h South Korea received this apology earlier, refused to exclude the Taiwan Strait from its security agreement with the U.S.. Japan also refused to
Xi ao min Ron g, “Ex pla ini ng the Pa tte rns o f Jap an ese Fore ign Dire c t Inv estme nt i n C hin a,” J ou rn al of C onte mpo rary Ch ina, Vol.8, No.2 0, M arc h 1 999, p.132 .
R en Xia o, “Ton gbe iyi a a nqu an x ingsh i de xia nz hua ng yu wei la i,” (The C urren t an d Futu re Se curi ty Sit uat ion in Nort he ast Asia ), Guoj i Zhan wan g (In tern at ion al Out look ), No.7 , 199 6, p .11 .
utter the “three no’s” (no support to Taiwan independence, no support to one China, one Taiwan, an d no support to Taiwan’s bid to join the United Nations) on the Taiwan issue although President Clinton made the pledge in his visit to Beijing earlier. In the meantime, no matter what China thinks, Japan has taken a more and more critical position on China’s military modernization efforts. As June Teufel Dry er indicated, “China’s economic growth was accompanied by increase in the defense budget that av eraged 12-13 % each year. Given the absence of any external invasion threat and the presence of many domestic problems, this worried the PRC neighbors. Japan began to complain about the lack of transparency in Beijing’s defen se decision-making.”4 1 In response, Japan has made China the major target of its national defense strategy. It is hard, in this case, to be optimistic about the future relationship between these two important countries in the Asia-Pacific region. This rival relationship is certainly a major ch allenge to the success of China’s p eriphery policy.
India is another budding rival of China in Asia. Although these two countries made friends by working together in the promotion of the national independent movement in the third world during the 1950s, they became enemies and encountered a military clash in 1962. Sin o-Indian relationship beg an to impro ve in the late 1980s. China and India signed two agreements on maintaining peace and tranquility and confidence building measures in the border area in 1993 and 1996 respectively. President Jiang Zemin
Jun e Te ufe l Drye r, “Sin o-Jap an ese Re la tion s,” J ourna l of Co nte mpora ry C hin a, Vol.10 , No.2 8, p.3 75.
visited India in November 1996 . As Beijing was cultivating a more friendly relationsh ip with New Delhi, it was sho cked by India’s going nuclear in May 1998 and Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes’ characterization of Ch ina as “a majo r threat to Indian security.”42 Beijing was furious and accused India “running against the international trend of peace.”4 3
However, this event was not a bo lt fro m the blue because Sino-Indian geopolitical rivalry has never been stopped in the following three issue-areas. The first is the Pakistan issue. While China has sought to improve relations with India, it has maintained a long -term strategic partnership with Pak istan, which India has waged three wars against in the five decades since its independence. New Delhi believes that China has used the Sino-Pakistan alliance to check the growing influence of India in Asia. Tibet is the second issue. Alth ough Ind ia h as publicly affirmed Beijing’s position that Tibet is part of China, it did not welcome China’s incorp oration of Tibet, which otherwise may serve as a buffer between these two countries. China has been irritated that India has allowed the Dalai Lama an d his exile g overnment to reside in Dharmasala and to campaign for Tibetan independence. The third issue is the two segmen ts of the 2,500 mile Sino-India border that are still disputed: th e southeastern Himalayan Mountains, now administered by India, and the Aksai Chin Plateau, through which a major Chinese hig hway linking Tibet and Xinjian g. Solutions to these troubled issues have to be found in order for
C hin a N ew s Dig est-G lob al (e le ct roni c new s), Dec e mber 12, 1 998 . C hin a Da ily , M ay 19, 1 998 , p.4.
China to establish a truly good neig hboring relationship with In dia.
The China Threat to its Weaker Neighbors
With th e rapid economic growth, China has been regarded as the coming superpower in the 21 st century. This realization has given rise to the speculation about a “China threat,” particu larly among China’s weak neighbors. They worry that, after China modernizes, Beijing would like to h ave East Asia as its exclusive sphere of influence, a modern equivalent of the tradition al tributary system. Beijing has den ied this speculation and offered repeated assurance that “China will never seek hegemon y.”44 However, this assurance has not eased the fear of Chin a’s weaker neighbors.
To be objective, military expansion cannot be considered a serious Chinese objective at least in the foreseeable future because China lacks the military power and faces immen se internal and external challenges to take an expansionist policy in Asia. The presence and influence of th e U.S. and the strength of dy namic region al po wers, such as Japan and India, have defined and will continue to define the boundaries within which China’s power may be asserted. Unless unforeseeable vacuums of power d evelop in Asia, it is difficult to conceive of China acquiring the hegemonic role that the U.S. lo ng had in the Western Hemisphere or that the U.S.S.R. played in Eastern Europe.
However, there is a perception gap between Ch ina and its weaker neighbors: “China, viewing itself in global terms, does not
Jia ng Zemin ’s rep ort to the 15 th Part y Na ti ona l C ong ress o f th e C CP, B ei jing Xinh ua, O ct obe r 16 , 199 7.
always realize h ow stron g it is when place in regio nal context. The rest o f Asia, viewing China in a regional perspective, does not always realize how weak it is on a global scale.”45 In this case, although China remains relatively weak in many of the measurable indicators of power, China’s weaker neighbors see China in terms of its co nsiderable potentials and the long historic record of cultural and political domination of the region. Ch ina is slow to understand and properly respond to the suspicion and fear of its weaker neighbors. Talking ab out Ch ina’s relations with Southeast Asian countries, for example, a Chinese scholar believed that “as soon as the mutual tru st is established, good neighboring relation s and partnerships would be able to comp lete.” He asserted that “the found ation for the mutual trust has been laid. The only problems are to overcome some barriers to the mutu al trusts.”4 6 However, the nature of the relationsh ip is much more ambivalen t than this understanding. As one Western scholar indicated , “while most of ASEAN’s policies towards Ch ina are guided by the economic perspectives of a huge Ch in ese market, exp laining ASEAN’s constructive engagement strategy towards China, Beijing’s ambiguous foreign and secu rity policies are simultaneously a major concern in the region.” Accordin g to this scholar, “Th e rapid modernization
St eve n I. Levi ne , op. cit .
Zha ng Xi zhe ng , “Zhong guo t ong do ngme ng de muli ng hux in hu oba n gu an xi,” (The good ne igh bori ng, mu tua l t rust, a nd p art ershi p be tw ee n C hin a a nd ASEAN) , i n Zhe ng Yushou , ed., H uole ng zh an shi qi de zho nggu o w aij iao (Ch ine se Dipl omac y in the Post-C ol d Wa r Era) (Hon g Ko ng: Tia nd i Tu sh u, 1 999), p.224 .
programs of China’s armed forces (including its nuclear arsenal), Beijing’s territorial claims in the entire South China Sea and its gunboat policies towards Taiwan have raised widespread concern over irredentist tendencies in China’s foreign security agand a.”4 7 The fear of the perceived China threat is partially responsible for stimulating a rush to arms in many Asian-Pacific cou ntries after the end of the Cold War.48 Many of Ch ina’s weak neighbo rs have determined to enhance their defense self-reliance capacities and military preparedness to better deal with regional contingencies.
This ambivalent relationship has been further complicated by China’s traditional attitudes toward its weaker neighbors. While pursuing a good neighboring policy, it continues to see periphery countries with a degree of condescension. Taking the example of China’s attitudes toward Vietnam, a weaker neighbor that China ruled for centuries in history, the Chinese still view their influence in Vietnam as generous and civilizing. Deng Xiaoping justified China’s invasion in 1979 in terms of teaching a lesson to the disrespectful Vietnamese wh o enjoyed substantial Chinese sup port during the war against the Americans but sided with th e Soviet Union and challenged Chinese sovereignty over the islan ds in the
Fra nk U mb ac k, “ASEA N an d Ma jor Po wers: Ja pa n an d Ch ina—A C han gin g Ba la nce of Powe r?” in Jorn Do sc h a nd Ma nfre d Mol s, e ds., Int erna tio nal Re lat ions in the Asia -Paci fic : Ne w Patt erns of Po we r, Int erest, a nd Co ope rati on (Ne w York : St. Ma rti n’s Press, 200 0), p.17 4. Fo r one il lumi nat ion of t he arms ra ce p ost-C old War A sia-Pa c ific , see De smond Ba ll , “Arms a nd Afflue nc e: Mi lit ary Ac qui siti ons i n t he Asia -Pa ci fic R eg ion ,” Int erna tio nal S ec urity , Vo l.18, N o.3, Winte r 19 93/9 4, pp .78-112 .
South China Sea after the war. Vietnam join ed ASEAN, a h igh-profile international org anizatio n, to reduce its isolatio n and vulnerability to the Chinese threat in 1995. Apparently, Chinese leaders have been displeased to see Vietnam’s membership in ASEAN. However, they have no options b ut to live with the fact that its weaker neighbors could mak e alliance in coping with China. How to handle this situatio n is certainly a serious ch allenge to China’s periphery policy.
Relations with the United States
Managing the relatio nship with the United States, the only superpower in the po st-Cold War World, is the most significant challenge for China to establish a positive security environment in its periphery. The U.S. is a forwardly deployed power in Asia-Pacific, maintains fo rmal security treaties with Japan and South Korea, and is the primary weapon supplier to Taiwan. Whether or not Beijing can successfully handle above-mentioned other challenges, to a large extent, depends on the nature and level of American inv olvement in Asia an d on the U.S. policy toward China. The U.S. has the ability to influence China’s periphery policy b y affecting the policies of some of China’s neighbors and the overall security environ ment in th e Asian-Pacific reg ion . However, China’s ability to influence U.S. policy is very limited because it does not have much leverage over the U.S. policy, which is largely a ho stage to its do mestic politics.
The Sino-U.S. relationship has been in a state of roller coasting Since Tiananmen. It deteriorated after 1989 and warmed up briefly during the perio d between President Jiang’s visit to Washington
in Octo ber-November, 1997 and President Clinton’s visit to Beijing in June-Ju ly, 1998. Howev er, Sino-U.S. relations have been under strain again since late 1998. The U.S. Co ngress was angry over charges of China’s nuclear spying and political payoffs, the Clinton administratio n’s careless handling of U.S. tech nolog y transfer to China, reports of China’s new suppression of p olitical d issidents, import obstacles as the Chinese economy slowed, and PLA missile buildu p along the Taiwan Strait. As the domestic criticism over Clinton administration’s engagement policy increases, the Sino-U.S. relationship was pushed onto a difficult path. Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji’s visit to Washington in April 1999 failed to halt this down -turn. The NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy on May 7 , 1999 further drifted these two countries toward the edge of co nfrontation. Althou gh the d ownward spiral was temporarily arrested, the relationship, as a Chinese scholar indicated, was “stabilized only at a low level” in the last mon ths of the Clinton administration. 49
When George W. Bush took the Wh ite House in January 20 01, Chinese leaders became especially co ncerned about the outlook for U.S.-China relations as Bush had termed Ch ina as a “strategic competitor” rather than a p artner that President Clinton termed earlier. This concern was proved real as a series of in cidents in the first four months after Bush took office seriously strained Sino-American ties. The most important one was the incidental
Jia Qin gguo , “Frust rat ions a nd Ho pes: C hi nese Perc ep tio ns of the Enga ge ment Po lic y de ba te i n the Unit ed St ate s,” J ournal of C onte mpo ra ry C hin a, Vol.10 , No.2 7, p.3 25.
mid-air collision between a U.S. Navy EP-13 spy plane and a Chinese fighter jet on the South China Sea on April 1, 20 01. Although this incident was finally resolved without lasting impact, Sino-U.S. relatio nship was further strained. As a Washington Post article reported aftermath o f the crisis, “China’s lead ers are increasingly concerned that Washington and Beijing are headed for a confrontation as China emerges as an economic and military power in Asia.”50 A series of actions taken by the Bush administration in its first 100 days of tenure seemed confirm Beijing’s concerns. Bush backed a natio nal missile defen se system, which China feared would negate its nuclear deterrent. Over Chinese objections, the U.S. g overn ment p ermitted Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian unprecedented access to the United States, allowing him to stop twice in America and meet lawmak ers in his tran sit visit to New York City an d Houston in June 2001. Bush also shelved the peace process of the Korean Pen insula and hosted the Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, at the White House. He approved a multibillion-dollar weapons package for Taiwan in May 20 01, including, for the first time, offensive weapons such as submarines. A pro-China Hong Kong magazin e listed all these action s and believed that
“Although it is still hard to say that the United States is ready to invade China, all th is showed that the United States was in deed openly creating a tense military
Joh n Po mfret , “Chi na Gro wing Un ea sy a bo ut US R el at ion s,” Washi ngto n Post, Ju ne 23, 2001 , p.A1 .
confrontation atmosphere and raising the political pressure against Ch ina for the purpose of driving China into a war panic.”51
The deterioration of Sino-U.S. relations is certainly not conducive to China’s effort to secure its periph ery. China’s foreign policy estab lishment has been worried that the foundations are being set now for long-term aggressive competition with the United States. This is not something that these Chinese leaders want to see. However, to handle the relations with the U.S. has always been difficult for the Chin ese leaders since the end of the Cold War. Many Chin ese leaders, particularly th ose in the PLA, have been deepl y suspiciou s ab out U.S. co ntainment poli cy dressed as engagement. They have pointed o ut that while preach ing strict Chinese compliance with international arms control agreements in the n ame of regional stability, the U.S. has increased its arms sales to Taiwan an d strengthened its defense links with Japan and South Korea. China has been particularly alarmed over the U.S. announcement to build the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system co vering the Asia-Pacific following a surprise North Korean rocket test in 19 98. TMD may not only be used to protect Taiwan fro m Chinese missiles but also give Japan a more active role in regional security matters. The U.S. military intervention in Yugoslavia has seriously fed China’s paranoia about Taiwan and Tibet. To add to this concern, China has seen the decision by the Philippin e Senate on May 28,
“U.S. Policy o f C ontain ing China : Re sul t o f B iased, Lo psi ded Information ,” Gu angj iao jin g (Wide -An gle Mi rror), No.34 4, M ay 16, 2 001 , p.33 .
1999 to reopen its territory for joint exercises with U.S. forces as another link in an American chain of containment against Ch ina. China has been particularly ap prehensive about the shift o f th e U. S. military and strategic focus fro m the Atlantic to the Pacific, which would have serious consequence on China’s periphery policy. An article in Beijing’s Liaowang Zhoukan (Outlook Weekly) speculated that in the Asian -Pacific Region, “follo wing the ‘new U.S.-Japanese defense guidelines,’ the United States will step up its deploymen t of Theater Missile Defense and strengthen its military alliance, and the po ssibility of the establish ment of an” eastern NATO “cannot be ruled out.” It further indicated that
“In line with the shift of the focus of U.S. military strategy from Europe to Asia, the U.S. military will redeploy its forces in the west Pacific, step up activities by military planes and ships, expand the scope and frequency of its aggressive reconnaissance ag ainst China, and step up activities for ad vance military probing.”5 2 Ch ina cannot change the U.S. forward dep loyment and the web of alliance in Asia at least in the foreseeable future. Therefore, working with the U.S. is no t a choice but a necessity. Beijing has to find ways to stabilize relatio ns with the U.S. in order to create a favorable regional environment for its perip hery policy. Confrontation with the U.S. will not only complicate China’s
Sh an Mi n, “Wha t is t he Unt ie d St at es In te ndin g t o D o w ith it s Ch ina Se cu rity St rate gy,” Liao wa ng Zhou kan (Out look We e kly), No .18, Apri l 30 , 20 01, p .31.
periph ery policy but also rend er a high cost for its modernization efforts. As one Western rep orter p ointed out, “the direction of Beijing’s relations with the United States could exert a strong influence on China’s development plans, forcing funds to be funneled into defense spending instead of econo mic growth.”53
Conclusion
To establish and maintain a peaceful security environment in its periphery, China has tried to appear as a benign power that focused on economic development and has tried to improve relations with its Asian neighbors. However, it has been assertive and even belligerent when dealing with issues relating to what it considers as vital national interests, such as territorial disputes. These two pronged efforts have often transmitted conflicting signals to its neighbors and make it difficult for China to meet the challenges discussed above. The disparity between China’s belligerent behavior and “benign” face may bring uncertainties ahead in the Asia-Pacific, particularly considering the rapid growth of China’s economic and military power toward the 21st century. China could become more assertive in taking back Taiwan and resolving maritime disputes in its own terms. China’s regional rivals and weaker neighbors would have to be more concerned about China’s might and threats. China’s growing power could also rub against longstanding U.S. interests in Asia.
However, this situation has not seemed bothering Beijing’s
Joh n Po mfret , “Chi na Gro wing Un ea sy a bo ut US R el at ion s,” Washi ngto n Post, Ju ne 23, 2001 , p.A1 .
leaders very much. They have become more confident in dealing with its neigh bors because of the increase in China’s economic and military capacity. In his summary of the security environment for China’s rise in the Asia-Pacific, a Chinese scholar, Yan Xuetong, stated th at China and its neig hbors have shared the goal of their security strategy as all of th em have wanted to maintain region al peace and stability. It is n ot a surprise to any cou ntry that China as big power wants to be placed in an advantageou s position in the strateg ic balance. This is a normal interest and demand in intern ational politics and will not pose a th reat to the security of other states. “China h as shared certain common security interests with all peripheral cou ntries and has no co nflict in the overall in terest with an y cou ntries althoug h there are some contradiction s in national border and reu nification issues.”5 4 But it remains to be seen if this optimistic view can prevail.
※本文於第一屆兩岸遠景論壇《新世紀•新發展•新願景－－亞太情勢 與兩岸關係》學術研討會上發表。
（收件：2001 年 7 月 25 日，修正：2001 年 9 月 26 日，採用：2001 年 10 月 12 日）
Ya n Xue ton g, Zh ong guo de Jue qi, Gu oji Hu anj ing pi ngg u ( Th e Ri se of Ch ina : An Ev al uat ion of th e Inte rna tio na l Env iron me nt ) (Tian jin : Ti an jin Re nmin Ch uba n Sh e, 1 998 ), p.23 8.
