Coding Career Tracks of Tigers

在文檔中 習近平「打虎」:反貪抑或肅敵? - 政大學術集成 (頁 55-58)

Chapter 1: Introduction

3.1. Coding Career Tracks of Tigers

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Chapter 3: Colleague Network of Tigers

In Chapter 2 we discuss the temporal and provincial/functional distribution of tigers and their succession. The time point of tigers’ downfall, the provincial/functional belongings of tigers and the professional background their successors are all independently distributed tiger attributes. In the following two chapters, we turn to relational data and study the network of senior corrupt cadres. We are interested in the structures in which these tigers are interconnected. We are particularly keen on the question whether there are local structures in the network that qualify as factional groups.

In this chapter, we apply techniques of network analysis to identify potential factional groups. Fallen tigers are the nodes of this network and their colleague relations are ties. We compile information of their entire career tracks and code all meaningful overlapping during their decades-long services. Then we take advantage of a kind of centrality measurement, PageRank, to help us decide whether the circles that stand out in visual inspection actually qualify as factional groups.

3.1. Coding Career Tracks of Tigers

The first step in drawing the sociogram is to accurately code tigers’ career tracks, including what institutions they have served in and the exact period of time of their services in each of the institutions. It is far more complicated than it may appear thanks to the sophisticated and sometimes confusing organizational system of CCP.

We flesh out the coding methods of career tracks in this section.

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First, we trace the career track of a cadre to the point when he is first promoted to vice-divisional level. In cases of incomplete data, we start from the first position we know about as long as it is at or above vice-divisional level. Some cadres have early careers of positions without clear administrative rank levels. In these cases, we start from their earliest positions with identifiable rank levels that are above vice-divisional.

Admittedly, we rely on educated guess in some cases of extraordinarily incomplete information, especially for PLA officers.

Second, we only register the principal position of a cadre at each given time. A CCP cadre often occupies multiple positions for the mere reason that they are institutionally auxiliary to his principal position. These auxiliary positions do not yield meaningful overlapping of working experience and thus we do not register them.

For example, there is a period when provincial party chiefs conventionally chair the standing committee of provincial People’s Congress. In these cases, we do not register the positions of provincial People’s Congress.

Third, CCP cadres seldom exit in an outright retirement. There is a semi-retirement status, known as “retirement from leading posts”, in which the cadre is transferred to

“second-front” institutions like People’s Congress, CPPCC, and mass organizations.

Positions in these “second-front” units are not registered unless a cadre works in those units even before semi-retirement. In other words, as long as a cadre retires or semi-retires, he shall not make any new colleague ties in our data.

Fourth, most local institutions below provincial level are not only horizontally commanded by local parent units (塊, kuai) but also by their vertical parent units (條,

tiao). In principle, we register both the horizontal and vertical parent units. Therefore,

a typical civilian position shall generate two entries, one under a geographical province and the other under a functional ministry. Some local institutions, however,

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are directly and exclusively under vertical jurisdiction in spite of their provincial locality. Examples of this kind include SOEs directly supervised by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) and the universities at vice-ministerial level under the direct jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. A cadre’s service in this kind of institutions shall be registered only once under the vertical parent units.

Fifth, many tigers have served in institutions that no longer exist or have been renamed since their service. For example, the former Ministry of Commerce was merged to the newly founded Ministry of Internal Trade in 1993, the latter of which were then restructured to form the National Administration of Internal Trade under the State Economic and Trade Commission in 1998. The former Ministry of Labor and Social Security and the former Ministry of Personnel were merged to form the new Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security in 2008. The once mighty Office for Economic Restructuring was merged into the National Development and Reform Commission in 2003. For these institutions that have been abolished, we register career information according to what they were at the time of our relevant cadres’ services. Examples of renamed institution include CNPC that was formerly the Ministry of Petroleum Industry. For these institutions with changed names, we register relevant working experience by the current names of these institutions.

Sixth, some institutions are neither abolished nor renamed but they are reorganized, separated from their original parent units and restructured into new ones. For example, the Chongqing Municipality was a part of Sichuan Province prior to 1997 and has been an independent provincial-level local unit thereafter. If a cadre served in such an institution continuously before and after the juncture of restructuring, his service shall be registered twice, once under the previous parent unit before the juncture and the other under the new parent unit after the juncture.

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Seventh, two institutions related to Xinjiang are worth special attention. The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) is a paramilitary unit with political and economic functions located in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. It originates from the troops collectively civilianized in the 1950s as a force to safeguard and develop Xinjiang. It is a de facto province within a province. XPCC has full administrative authority over its medium-sized cities, settlements, and farms. It is independent of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region government although they do closely interact due to geographical and functional propinquity.31 The XPCC is therefore coded as an independent province.

The other Xinjiang-related exception is the Xinjiang Work Coordination Group (XWCG) of CCP. It provides the coordinating mechanisms for the party’s central leadership to directly pilot Xinjiang issues. Its responsibilities are not geographically limited to the province itself but cover all affairs in relation to Xinjiang elsewhere. It was established in 2002 and chaired first by Luo Gan and then by Zhou Yongkang, both as a Standing Member of Politburo and the Secretary of CPLC. In 2012, Yu Zhengsheng, a Standing Member of Politburo and the Chairman of National Committee of CPPCC, chaired the group. In this thesis, the chairmanship of XWCG is coded as a superordinate position to all other Xinjiang-related institutions.

在文檔中 習近平「打虎」:反貪抑或肅敵? - 政大學術集成 (頁 55-58)