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Beijing’s rail stations (cf. China Internet Information Center 2008a) Interesting to note is also that
no trucks with a license plate from outside of Beijing were allowed to enter the city for the time of the Olympics. Thus, having caused several businesses to close for the time of the Games. As a consequence, without work, large numbers of migrant workers were also forced to leave Beijing as they do not hold a residence permit. In comparison, the security arrangements with regards to mobility taken at the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics in 2002; for example, appear rather loose.
Although having taken place just one year after the 9/11 attacks. During the Olympics in Salt Lake City, cars were not permitted within an area of 300 feet from the Olympic facilities, while several air exclusion zones in close proximity to the venues and other important institutions had been set up. Yet, despite these reasonable measures, no further restrictions regarding mobility had been imposed.
2.4 Conclusion
By applying the generated analytical framework for the purpose of this study, chapter two has shed light on the three stages of the process, which ultimately has led to infringements on civil liberties before, during, and after the Beijing Olympics. Its core and foundation is thereby based on the securitization process. As demonstrated above, a plethora of speech acts – many of
which issued via government officials and various government media channels – have successfully installed the notion of the existence of an existential security threat due to the hosting of the Beijing Olympics. In this respect, particularly the threat ensuing from three specific groups had been mentioned. Namely, Tibetan separatists, the Falun Gong, and Islamic
‘Terrorists’ from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The three created security discourses regarding each of the groups has been studied and dissected in detail above. In that way, this
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chapter has portrayed under what premise (or even smokescreen) the Beijing Olympics had been exceptionally heavily secured.
Once the foundation for further actions had been established through the securitization process, the Chinese government was able to implement a number of security arrangements, measures and even crackdowns, which would have resulted in greater opposition under different circumstances. Furthermore, as it has been shown, certain aspects with regards to the two
investigated security measure categories - ‘technologicalization’ and the ‘warfare during periods of peace’ - have not only served the purpose of keeping the Olympic Games safe. Instead, many of the arrangements have also been used, or in fact were directly intended, to crack down on the three groups that represent thorns in the side of the Chinese government. That is, primarily due to the fact that they constitute dissenting and counteractive voices to the Chinese Communist Party, and only secondarily because of the actual rather limited threat that they may pose. In connection with the security actions taken, this thesis has detected a number of civil liberty infringements and reductions, for the specifically targeted groups above, and the Chinese population overall.
Some of which were only in place temporarily before and during the Olympics, such as the limitations on the freedom of mobility. Others, on the other hand, especially with regards to the right to restrictions on government surveillance, the freedom of assembly, and the right to privacy, have to a great extent remained permanent. Given this fruitful analysis of the Beijing Olympics case, a similar approach will be followed for the examination of Russia’s 2014 Sochi Olympics in chapter three.
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Chapter 3: Sochi Olympics – Security Measures and Civil Liberties
Chapter 3 is destined to provide a thorough examination of the second selected case of this study, namely the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. It will commence by accurately situating the discourse surrounding the securitization process of the Games into context and perspective, while further highlighting and explaining the role the Russian government has taken throughout the proceedings. Russia’s prime objectives for the Games as well as its concerns will additionally be
identified, as both are of paramount importance for understanding why the government has secured the Olympics Games in the specific way that it did. Subsequently, the individual security measures taken during, and even before the official start of the Sochi Olympics will be
determined, investigated upon, and assessed. That is, particularly with regards to the respective use and intentions behind, as well as potential infringements on civil liberties that have occurred in consequence of the arrangements.
3.1 The Securitization Process
Following the introduced and established background information in section 1.3.2 of this thesis, one of Russia’s underlying Olympic objectives was to showcase to the world that it had regained its great power status. A connection thereby is purposely established between today’s
Russian Federation and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), of which Russia views itself as the righteous successor state after the dissolution of the USSR in December 26 in 1991. Yet, Russia itself experienced quite significant distress and burden following the
dissolution. This included economic and financial difficulties as well as a constitutional crisis in 1993. Combined with a rather negative international image, primarily in the West, while
perceptions vary in Eastern Europe and Asia; reshaping the view on the nation and its tremendous
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capabilities was desirable. Putin was thus eager to demonstrate a ‘new Russia’ to the Olympic
participants, the journalists, and the international audience (The Sydney Morning Herald 2016).
Petersson agreed in this regards that:
hosting the Winter Olympics in 2014 provides Russia with an opportunity to show that it has reestablished itself among the world’s great powers after the social turmoil and
economic upheaval that followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s.
(2014, p. 31)
While successful Sochi Winter Olympics would also guarantee the re-strengthening of Vladimir Putin’s leadership and could further allow the formerly popular resort of Sochi to be revitalized.
Part of doing so, and hence achieving all these goals, is therefore undoubtedly the provision of secure, peaceful, and undisturbed Games.
Thus, security - and implementing harsh measures to ensure the former - was of vital importance. Yet, before getting to this specific element, it may be interesting to further delve into why Russia emphasized and cared so much about its recognition as a great power externally (and internally). This, in fact, is strongly linked with how Russia views itself and what many Russians themselves would claim as their nation’s identity. Every country possesses a number of specific
ideas about themselves or recalls certain events that bind its people together as one. To exemplify this for the case of Germany; for example, this would include its reunification in 1990 after decades of separation. Another element is the nation’s long tradition in having produced core teachings and works in the fields of science, music, and philosophy in the past. Thus, Germany is also called ‘the land of poets and thinkers’ (cf. Kitsou 2013, p. 25). At the same time, one
component of Greece’s national identity; for instance, is represented by it being one of the ancient birthplaces for democracy and civilization. With regards to Russia, its status as a
superpower is one of the key aspects that define Russian identity. Putin himself pointed out that
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“Russia has been a great power for centuries, and remains so” (BBC 2014b), while also Petersson speaks of the widespread belief that centers around “Russia as a nature-given great power” (2013,
p. 303). On this note, one may then wonder how Russia could be possibly elevated (if it is not actually already at that level) to the status of a great power by simply hosting the Olympics. The author would thus highlight at this point that while Russia’s capabilities do matter in this context,
the focus here is definitely set on being recognized by other nations as well as by its own people as such a power. Therefore, by hosting the Olympics, Russia’s capabilities may not be altered or increased, yet the perception of it might very well.
Thus, when attempting to analyze the various speech acts that have been initiated prior to the hosting of the 2014 Sochi Olympics, it has to be understood that the events had quite
obviously been substantially politicized. Furthermore, as any kind of mishap or incident would have destroyed the image of Russia that was intended to be portrayed, anti-government protests, revolts, as well as terrorist attacks had to be prevented by all means. The implementation of extensive security measures had therefore been planned and was justified through a number of potential security threats.
Quite surprisingly; however, especially when compared to the Beijing Olympics, Russia’s
leadership could mostly be seen rather downplaying the security threats than inflating them. Putin assured in an interview with Irada Zeynalova, an Azerbaijani-Russian journalist, that:
[w]e do everything with understanding, with clear understanding of the operational situation developing around Sochi and in the region as a whole; we have a perfect understanding of what it is, what is that threat, how to stop it, how to combat it. (The Embassy of the Russian Federation to the Republic of Kazakhstan 2014)
While the threat of a potential terrorist attack was being acknowledge, “extremists are always
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trying to make a name for themselves, especially in the run-up to some major events” (ibid.),
Russia constantly confirmed that it was in control of the situation and thoroughly prepared. As a result, instead of actively trying to convince the people of the existing threats and elevating fear, Russian authorities provided reassurance and highlighted that there was no need for concerns.
Putin stated in a joint interview with ABC News, CCTV and Rossiya-1 that “[o]ur task and that of the organizers is to ensure the security of the athletes and guests at this major sports event, and we will do everything to ensure this” (Around the Rings 2014). To provide a stronger sense of security, speech acts furthermore often referred to Russia’s past experience of having
successfully secured other large-scale events, such as the 2013 G20 Saint Petersburg summit at the Constantine Palace. Even Alexei Navalny, a Russian political activist and one of Putin’s harshest critics, expressed that “the security measures which are in place will guarantee security in Sochi” (BBC 2014a). While he also did not fail to highlight that Putin’s summer residence is
located in Sochi, and thus it may be a good indicator for the level of safety in the city. In that way, among other things, trying to address and appease international fears and concerns.
Indeed, it has been primarily foreign media which have spread the notion of severe security threats and danger for the Sochi Olympics. Such notions even received further support and gained popularity following the terrorist attacks in major Russian metropolises, such as the suicide bombings targeting public transportation in Volgograd in Southern Russia at the end of 2013.
CNN, for instance, published an article with the headline ‘Russia bombings raise questions about
Sochi Olympics security’ (Cohen and Mullen 2014). The incidents at a train station (December 29) and in bus No. 1233 bound to the downtown area of Volgograd (December 30), had caused 34 deaths in 2013, barely two months before the Games. Following initial misallocations of the terrorist attack, an Islamist terrorist group with the name Vilayat Dagestan (part of the Caucasus Emirate) claimed to have been responsible for the bombings.
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Nevertheless, Russia’s leader and security experts showed themselves quite confident
about the security measures that had been in place in Sochi. In fact, it was assumed that terrorist attacks, if occurring at all during the Sochi Olympics, would likely be carried out outside of the established safety zones surrounding the city. To be more precise, attacks were intrinsically more probable in the North Caucasus. This, in fact, seemed likely since the North Caucasus had seen a militant uprising of Islamist groups for years, first and foremost, by the so-called Caucasus Emirate.
Islamic Insurgencies in the North Caucasus
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the North Caucasus region has been
suffering from numerous ethnic conflicts. In order to be able to elaborate on the background and causes of these terrorist threats for the Sochi Olympics, a brief historical overview will be provided. Violence started to surface in the North Caucasus with the First Chechen War17 from 1994 to 1996 between Russia and the unrecognized secessionist government of the Chechen Republic. The conflicts ended positively for the separatists, since the Russian forces had
experienced a defeat in the battle of Grozny. Thus, the Chechen Republic subsequently gained its independence from the Russian Federation. However, Chechnya’s independence severely lacked
international recognition. Furthermore, although the Chechen war had ended, different forces within Chechnya kept fighting for power and hence violent conflicts reemerged in the already war-torn region. Shortly after the end of the First Chechen War, Chechnya then declared itself as an Islamic Republic in 1997.
The Second Chechen War followed quickly afterwards in 1999, having been triggered by
17 It shall be remarked at this point that from Russia’s perspective, the conflicts in Chechnya cannot be labeled as a ‘war’, but merely represent an armed conflict in the Chechen Republic and neighboring territories.
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Islamist forces from Chechnya proclaiming the Russian Dagestan region as an independent state.
Russia immediately sent forces and the following active battles lasted for less than a year. By the middle of the year 2000, Chechnya’s independence was being revoked and Russia took once again control over Chechnya. Nonetheless, insurgencies of a certain level remained throughout the years.
Bearing the historic circumstances in mind, a militant Jihadist organization developed in 2007 under the leadership of former President of the Chechen Republic (2006 to 2007), Dokka Umarov. The group referred to itself as the ‘Caucasus Emirate’ and pursued its mission towards
an independent Islamic state and the expulsion of Russian forces from the North Caucasus. In fact, the Caucasus Emirates did not solely incorporate parts of Chechnya, bu t actually drew from support in a number of provinces in North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Adygea, and Dagestan. Indeed, also Dagestan and Ingushetia had seen many years of militant Islamist uprisings, involving suicide bombings and attacks on the local police.
Dokku Umarov himself, leader of the Caucasus Emirate, had released a statement in a video just half a year before the Sochi Olympics that his organization would conduct brutal attacks during the Olympic events. Umarov further stated that the Sochi Olympics were being hosted on the graveyard of many Muslims, who had fought against the Russians in the 19th century in the region. He thereby further highlighted that this very territory would belong to his people, and all means necessary will be applied in order to prevent the Olympics from taking place (Corcoran 2014). In fact, much of the North Caucasus region used to be the land of the Circassians (a predominantly Sunni Muslim group, indigenous to the North Caucasus). That is, prior to having been displaced or murdered by the Russian Imperial Forces during the Caucasian War from 1817 to 1864. The Caucasus Emirate therefore requested violence against the Russians
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by stating that:
I call on you, every mujahid, either in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan or on the territory of the Caucasus to use maximum force on the path of Allah to disrupt this Satanic dancing on the bones of our ancestors. (Grove 2013)
However, despite these threats and the Caucasus Emirate’s affiliation with Al-Qaeda, Putin
stands by his promise for safety. Chief Executive of Intelligent Risks, Neil Fergus, considered the fulfillment of the promise highly credible. Fergus actually further downplayed the threat ensuing from the Caucasus Emirate by underlining that the organization does not possess a supportive network in Sochi. Thus, it will be nearly impossible to slip through the extensive security apparatus in place (Corcoran 2014). The author of this present study would like to further dwell on this, as it is believed to be an important point. Sochi, although situated near the Georgian border, nevertheless has a significant distance to the Dagestan Republic and Chechnya. For this very reason, it may render itself quite difficult for Caucasus Emirate terrorists to operate in Sochi without local support.
Apart from the inherent threats that the Sochi Olympics pose due to its location, the intention to host the events exactly here is quite strategic. Knowing that it is a critical area, naturally more security forces would have to be deployed to the region. This, in turn, could already account for more stability in the North Caucasus. Furthermore, the Olympics, as a gigantic project, also assist in developing the region’s infrastructure, helps the local economy, and constitutes a factor that increases tourism in the area during the Olympics and afterwards. All of this was seen as possibly easing the existing tensions
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Secondary Security Threats: The Circassians and Gay Rights Activists
Apart from the most salient security threat for the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, two other aspects have been identified during the process of this thesis, as they have also received attention within the security discourse. As mentioned above, Sochi and the North Caucasus region have a special meaning to Circassians. In fact, Nichol et al. indicate that “Sochi was historically the
capital of an area populated by the Circassians (encompassing the Adyghes, Kabardians, Shapsugs, and Cherkess), peoples of the North Caucasus who speak dialects of the Circassian language” (2014, p. 4). However, during the Caucasian War from 1817 to 1864 the Russia
Empire had incorporated the region as its own. Most noteworthy in this regard is yet what happened in the final year of the war, which is (at least from the side of the Circassians)
understood as a genocide on its people. It is estimated that around 400,000 Circassian have lost their lives, while many more had been forced to migrate.
Moreover, the 2014 Sochi Olympics unfortunately fall in the year of the 150 years’
anniversary of the tragic incident of 1884. While one of the Olympic venues is located at
Krasnaya Polyana, the very location at which Russian soldiers had celebrated over the victory of the Caucasian War. Hence, all in all, representing a powder keg, which could have exploded and could then have caused violent protests at any moment, particularly since Russia had received a tremendous amount of international attention during the events. The Circassians themselves voiced their demands for a boycott of the Olympics, unless Russia publicly admits and apologized for the Circassian genocide, which it still does not acknowledge at the time of this writing. A member of the Circassian Cultural Institute, Zack Barsik, had reasonably stressed that
“[w]e don’t want the Sochi Olympics to happen on our ancestors graves’ (CBC News 2012).
At the same time, Russia also feared abundant protests from the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,
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and Transsexual (LGBT) community and foreign gay right activists, which could tarnish the
and Transsexual (LGBT) community and foreign gay right activists, which could tarnish the