國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
This argument can even further be strengthen by returning once more to the notion of national identity introduced in chapter three. For Russia this concept is tightly linked with being considered a nature-given great power. It is thereby really interesting to briefly look at what has happened immediately after the Sochi Olympics. Namely, the start of the annexation of Crimea at the end of February, less than a week after the conclusion of the Sochi Olympics. Many
researchers have been baffled by the seemingly inconsistent behavior of Russia, turning from a hospitable and welcoming Olympic host for all nations of the world, to an aggressive, calculative, and hostile international player within the matter of a few days. However, the researcher of this current study would like to stress in this regards that it was not Russia’s prime Olympic intention
to improve its international image in general. Instead, the country wanted to be regarded once again as a great power, referring back to its former USSR times. Thus, it could be argued that following the successful organization of the Sochi Olympics, and therefore having proven its great capabilities, the next step was initiated. That is, following the recapture of its power status, as a second step also parts of its former territory were tried to be reclaimed (cf. Petersson 2014, p.
30).
4.2 A Comparison with Regards to Technologicalization and Civil Liberties
Both host nations relied heavily on the use of high-tech applications for the purpose of data collection, the dispersal of protests, and surveillance. However, while conducting the intended comparison, there are striking differences between the two, which immediately caught the researcher’s eyes. Most salient is naturally the great disparity in size and scope of the respective security operations. Russia primarily focused on a rather narrow area for its CCTV surveillance initiative, in total having installed 1,400 cameras. A number that can be considered sufficient in
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
order to monitor the Olympic venues as well as the proceedings in the city of Sochi. However, simply by contrasting Sochi’s city area of 176 km² to Beijing’s 16,800 km², the truly massive
mismatch shall become obvious. With a total population of 17 million people in 2008, the Chinese government utilized the surveillance power of around 300,000 CCTV cameras. Hence, more than 200 times the amount that was used in Sochi. Consequently, accounting for one CCTV camera for every 56 Beijing residents in 2008. Thus, although functions of the CCTV cameras used are similar, Sochi solely amounts to a tiny fraction of the monitoring efforts observed in China.
With such a heavy investment on security technology on the part of Beijing, then certainly also comes a difference in motivation and intended use. While Russia’s communication
interception system was mainly directed towards foreign visitors and remained only in place for the duration of the Sochi Olympics themselves, China’s plans were long-term, entailed an inward
focus, and are directed towards a nation-wide expansion of the system. As has been discussed previously, even by the year 2008, China had already set its ultimate objective to what it is likely to achieve in the years ahead. Namely, its ‘Sharp Eyes’ or ‘Skynet’ initiative. A system that will cover the entire Chinese territory and, in fact, accounts for facial recognition. Under these circumstances, it shall further not be a surprise that all 300,000 CCTV cameras connected and equipped with an immense control system have remained in place following the Beijing Olympics. They were actually also further integrated in the already existing ‘Golden Shield Project’
As one can then may already reasonably infer by having had a closer look at the discourses surrounding China’s securitization process prior to the Beijing Olympics, the newly acquired technology was predominantly applied to target the three identified dissident groups. While being publicly claimed to prevent terrorist attacks, the system assisted in tracking down and
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
subsequently carrying out harsh and vigorous actions not only against Falun Gong practitioners, Tibetans, and Uyghurs, but, in fact, against anyone not aligning with the government’s policies
and values. Consequently, representing violations against civil liberties in terms of people’s right to privacy, the right to restrictions on government surveillance, and even further against
numerous civil rights, such as the right of protection from discrimination based on ethnicity and religion. Samatas, in this respect, correctly highlighted that “states which adopt excessive security and surveillance technologies to combat terrorism, as well as to address social problems,
ultimately threaten their own human rights, [and] civil liberties” (2011, p. 3361). Based on the
perspective of the Chinese government, it saw the Olympics, and the responsibility of providing safe Games, as an opportunity to not only secure to Beijing Olympics, but also its regime.
Although also Russia was subject to Islamic insurgencies and ethnic conflicts, particularly in the North Caucasus, plans of similar type had not been considered. In fact, the Russian
governing style does not suit such a measure. Simultaneously, enforcing such a large-scale surveillance operation in Sochi did not appear to be practical and beneficial. The city of Sochi itself does usually not require such high security standards, and an extension of the system into the North Caucasus did not make much sense, given its rough and difficult terrain.
A striking similarity; however, can be detected when comparing how both host nations have dealt with the risk of anti-government protests. In fact, at least on paper, both countries made the opportunity to protest available and provided designated - often rural and isolated - protest areas. However, those who were brave enough to actually file an application for a protest authorization were either declined, persecuted, or even put under arrest. Therefore, both Russia and China did not grant its people the freedom of assembly. Despite the fact that all eyes of the international community were gazing on them. and this particular liberty actually being firmly
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
established in both nation’s constitutions (Article 35 of China’s State Constitution from 1982, and Article 31 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation from 1993).
4.3 Comparison with Regards to Warfare During Periods of Peace and Civil Liberties Military presence during the Olympic Games has been a rather common practice since the Munich massacre of 1972. Yet, the extent of such practice and under what circumstances military is being deployed is essential. South Korea’s Olympics in 1988 have; for instance, seen large
numbers of military personnel. However, this had occurred and was thoroughly justified by the fact that North Korea had actively tried to sabotage the Games during its preparation phase by launching several attacks, including the bombing of a Korean Air flight bounding to Seoul. In the same way, also the 1996 Atlanta Olympics had experienced a pipe bombing at the Centennial Olympic park, executed by an American anti-abortion religionist. As a result, making the presence of military personnel at an international sporting event vindicable.
By reason of the alleged security threats posed by Tibetan separatists, the Falun Gong, and Islamic Uyghurs, the Chinese government allocated 100,000 military troops and anti-terror forces to the Olympic site. Another 150,000 security personnel and nearly 290,000 volunteers were also assigned to guarantee security for the Beijing Olympics. Hence, totaled up, the number of
security staff at the Beijing Olympics is higher than the number of the entire population of Sochi.
Nonetheless, also Russia’s government has resorted to the use of military forces. Among the full amount of 100,000 security forces, 22,000 military troops had been on duty. Apart from Russia’s
significantly lower numbers in terms of military personnel, also the way the militarization of the host cities was presented differed quite substantially. Russia attempted to expose its military staff and machinery to as little civilians as possible, having made the concealment of its military
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
involvement paramount. In stark contrast, China purposely made its military the center of attention, by visibly militarizing the streets of Beijing and having positioned short-range air defense missiles nearby one of the most popular and iconic Olympic venues of the Beijing Games. This major difference leads back to each host nation’s prime intentions and objectives.
Once again, while Russia and China both represent authoritarian regimes, their way of
securitizing the events varies considerably. Russia was eager to present its capabilities as a great power, while it did not want to reveal its large military presence to manage threats, that are principally internal. China, on the other hand, wanted to visualize its birth as a superpower and thus was eager to assert and portray its military might. At the same time conspicuous military presence also functions as a way to deter potential attacks.
Concerning the establishment of restricted security zones and thus an infringement of people’s mobility rights, China as well as Russia acted in conformable ways. Both banned people
who were not residents of the Olympic city and not affiliated with the Olympics from entering Beijing and Sochi, respectively (ticket holders, staff, journalists, and athletes were naturally excluded). A large number of security checkpoints had been set up on all major roads and railway stations leading into the cities. While attempting to pass one of them required intensive security inspections, such as X-rays of luggage and vehicles, as well as identification checks. In fact, even trucks registered outside of the city were not permitted to enter, causing local businesses to complain about not being able to receive nor ship their products. Russia additionally created a
‘forbidden zone’, even further restricting mobility as no civilian was allowed in these territories.
4.4 Conclusion
The implementation of strict security measures, such as the installment of additional
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
monitoring devices as well as an increase in security personnel, are undoubtedly understandable, if being done with a balance between security and civil liberties in mind. That is, given that successfully held Olympics, while on-going, generate a lot of interest, but the latter quickly vanishes once the events have concluded. Yet, failing to provide safe Games will haunt the host city, and likely even the entire nation, for decades. Thus, putting an immense amount of pressure on the respective two governments. Nevertheless, despite the fact that both countries have experienced the same kind of international pressure and both being under an authoritarian rule, a number of interesting disparities between the two have been detected. Hence, strongly suggesting that regime type is not the only nor prime factor to determine how a nation is guaranteeing
security. In this respect, it further does not represent the main element determining to what extent civil liberties will be infringed upon in the process either. In fact, as it has been demonstrated in the comparison drawn within the three sections above, factors such as a country’s history, national identity, cultural components, and specific objectives that have motivated the nation to serve as an Olympic host in the first place, play key roles.
Major differences have been noticed among the two country’s course of conduct. Including oppositional roles and messages being conveyed during the securitization process, a sharp
distinction in the visible militarization of the host cities, and significant variations concerning the aggressive violations of people’s right to privacy and the right to restrictions on government
surveillance through the implementation of gigantic monitoring systems.
Nevertheless, a number of the processes involved in securitizing international sporting events are; in fact, uniform and consistent. At least among authoritarian nations, that is. The establishment of large-scale restricted zones including the successive infringement of people’s mobility rights, and the strategic curbing of people’s freedom of assembly to organize protests, represent actions that have been observed from both nations in remarkably similar ways.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Chapter 5. Conclusion
5.1 Significance and Implications of this Study
Considering that the state and the development of civil liberties within China and Russia had been under fire and close scrutiny even long before the hosting of the Olympic Games, many experts have hoped and suggested that the allocation as the Olympic host would provide
authoritarian regimes with the motivation and incentive to improve its provision of basic civil liberties. Including, among others, the right to privacy and the freedom of assembly. However, as has been thoroughly demonstrated within the entirety of this thesis, this has not proven to be the case. Ye confirms this with remarkable honesty and directness:
this is exactly what surprised some Westerners. They thought the Beijing Olympics would bring some changes to this East Asian nation, but to their disappointment, it did not. The Games proved not only the existence of the China model, but also its success. (2008) It is thereby important to note that a great variety of civil liberties are, in fact, granted to the people of China and Russia within the two states’ respective constitutions. Yet, many of them
solely exist on paper, but not in practice.
Returning to the initially posed research questions of this paper on a) how security has been guaranteed and b) whether the identified actions taken by the governments a re reasonable,
particularly in the light of possible reductions in civil liberties; this study has adequately demonstrated how the Chinese government has first convinced the relevant audience of an existential threat through, so it appears, particularly for this purpose designed speech acts.
Subsequently, extraordinary security mechanisms have been carried out, subcategorized by the author as measures regarding ‘technologicalization’; as well as the usage of military personnel, warfare machinery and techniques at times of peace. In the case of the Sochi Olympics, the Russian government authorities have noticeably avoided spreading fear or intensifying security
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
threats. Quite to the contrary, it was intended to belittle the existing security risks and thus to give the impression of a competent and capable Russian state. Nevertheless, also Russia has used high-tech applications for the purpose of data collection, the dispersal of protests and
surveillance; while having further utilized its military might.
What is crucial in understanding why the host nations have acted in their distinct ways; and thus being able to dig deeper into the subject matter, is the realization that both Olympic hosts had their own agenda and motivation for serving as the organizer of the Games. For the Russian government, this was represented by its overarching goal to regain its former great power status on a global stage. A characteristic of utmost importance for Russia and its people, since the status is deeply linked with the national identity of the country, as previously outline in this thesis.
Thus, given Russia’s targeted goals and the immense pressure of the international community to
deliver safe Games (particularly in a post-9/11 security environment), Russia fell back into old patterns of conduct. That is, despite Putin having had previously claimed that the country would represent itself in a new light (The Sydney Morning Herald, 2016). Given its rather deficient record on civil liberties in the past, the Russian government kept – in fact perhaps unsurprisingly – suppressing civil liberties even further in order to ensure security. That is, by; for instance, strategically preventing its people to access their right to freedom of assembly or infringing on people’s right to privacy through wiretapping and intensive surveillance. However, it is essential
to point out that the amplification of such civil liberty violating measures had only been
implemented and operated shortly before and during the 2014 Sochi Olympics. Upon conclusion of the events, the Russian government returned to its approach on civil liberties that it had carried out prior to the Games. That is, an approach that nonetheless violates civil liberties, but to a lesser extent, because the additional measures implemented for the purpose of the Olympics had been revoked. Nonetheless, when expanding one’s gaze beyond the sphere of the Olympic Games and
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
the focus on civil liberties, by applying a broader perspective, the researcher has detected a strong connection between Russia’s goals for the Sochi Olympics (including its gained confidence) and the country’s hostile actions, just days after the Games, by annexing Crimea.
China’s motivation for serving as the organizer of the Games, on the other hand, is
comprised of its desire to globally showcase its birth as a new superpower. However, this thesis has found that doing so was not the only intention. China, while already having a rather notorious record on the subject of civil liberties and human rights, also used the Olympic occasion to harshly and systematically crack down on all internal forces that it considered hostile to the government. Rather harmless oppositional groups, such as the Tibetans or the ethnic minority of Uyghurs, and even strictly non-violent entities like the Falun Gong, have repeatedly been brought in connection with attacks and the label of terrorism through an intensively fabricated and
manipulated discourse during the securitization process. In that way, the Chinese government has justified the implementation of drastic measures. The latter included arranging the absolute surveillance of all public areas of a 17 million people city – Beijing. Moreover, violence was inflicted and unjust incarcerations into what is officially labelled as ‘re-education camps’ have been made without any proper and legal reasoning behind.
Even more worrisome is the fact that many of these ‘security measures’ have remained in
place, even after the end of the Beijing Olympics. In fact, this thesis has argued and provided evidence that a number of arrangements had been implemented with the intent, and were
designed in a way, that they would be able to serve a permanent function. Beijing’s massive new surveillance system with an additional 300,000 CCTV cameras; for instance, had been
incorporated in the already existing former system right from the very beginning. While it has subsequently continuously seen further expansions even since, with the ultimate goal of eventually covering the entire territory of China by what is called the ‘Skynet’ initiative. The
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
nation-wide surveillance system is expected to be operational within a few years of this writing, and represents an enormous addition to what had been started being built under the pretext of the Beijing Olympics. In that sense, China has utilized the Olympic Games as a subterfuge to not only curb its peoples’ right to privacy and the right to restrictions on government surveillance
temporarily, but permanently. Furthermore, the extreme propaganda and the intentional
radicalization of public opinion against the Uyghur minority in the forerun of the Olympics also had long-term consequences. While it initially enabled the government to receive broader public support for its crackdown on the ethnic group, the actions in 2008 merely represented the
radicalization of public opinion against the Uyghur minority in the forerun of the Olympics also had long-term consequences. While it initially enabled the government to receive broader public support for its crackdown on the ethnic group, the actions in 2008 merely represented the