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religion, hence representing serious civil rights violations.
The example above has been briefly outlined in order to demonstrate the impact that a successful securitization of an issue and its subsequent measures may have. The securitizing actor, the respective government and its representatives, thereby occupy a dangerously powerful position. That is, since they can shape public opinion regarding the degree of danger a potential threat may has and thereafter determine what constitute the necessary measures to be taken. Due to these conditions, scholars should not simply accept a security threat to be given or solely rely on and analyze the respective speech acts uttered by the individual governments. But instead he/she has to reveal the underlying power structures that facilitate the securitization process.
Furthermore, scholars should take a step further and deconstruct the institutional power of the securitizing actor, as has been tried to be done in this section thus far. It shall furthermore be the responsibility of this thesis to use the Critical Application of Securitization Theory (CAST) approach in order to critically assess and challenge implemented security measures and policies, and introduce dissenting opinions. All of which will be addressed within the following sections of chapter 2.
2.2 Technologicalization and Civil Liberties
Technologicalization represents the second stage to be analyzed in the process of potential civil liberty infringements, following the successful persuasion of the public about the existence of a supposedly existential threat through the securitization process. Since the established
category of technologicalization is incorporating all elements related to high-tech applications for the purpose of data collection, the dispersal of protests, and surveillance; it is closely associated
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with reductions of people’s right to privacy, the freedom of assembly, and the right to restrictions
on government surveillance, accordingly
Technologicalization indeed was heavily promoted by the Chinese government as soon as Beijing was elected as the Olympic host city in 2001. Primarily highlighted and expressed was the further empowerment of local police forces through the use of high-tech security technologies and the increased capability to counter terrorist threats during the Beijing Olympics. The
equipment itself was predominantly provided by private companies such as the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company, Nortel, IBM, and Philips. In particular, a proliferation of observation cameras with an increase of thousands of devices within what was entitled the 'Grand Beijing Safeguard Sphere' occurred during the years preceding the Beijing Olympics. It has to be noted that official numbers of the exact amount of additionally installed CCTV devices have never been disclosed by the Chinese government. Yet, based on estimates by Roche, approximately 300,000 CCTV cameras had been installed (2017, p. 134).
The use of applications such as surveillance cameras undoubtedly represent a common practice in terms of securing Olympic events. They thereby generally serve two functions. First, since they allow security forces to monitor all important and critical areas of the Olympic facilities - and in some cases also the host city itself - potential threats and risks can be detected immediately. Thus, enabling security personnel to avert disasters and attacks before they can occur. Secondly, and probably more surprisingly, they also regulate the behavior of the observed.
That is, once individuals believe that they are being watched (whether this is actually the case or not), they will control their own behavior. Yet, apart from these two functions, there certainly are also further aspects for which the surveillance system may be utilized, as will be further
elaborated below.
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Especially interesting is this regard is that the new surveillance system for the Beijing Olympics had been intended to be fully integrated into the already existing ‘Golden Shield Project’ and its ’Great Firewall of China’ right from the very beginning. In that sense augmenting
the existing system and adding an additional layer to its capabilities. Therefore, not only accounting for extensive censorship of content that is regarded as undesirable and subversive online through China’s great firewall, and being able to intercept phone calls and other forms of
communication. But also assisting in closely monitoring nearly the entire city of Beijing due to the gigantic number of CCTV cameras. Furthermore, although being based on cutting-edge technology from the early 2000s, the system was nevertheless sufficient enough to automatically detect unusual movements, such as running individuals, according to the claims made by its manufacturers.
Following the introduced notion earlier about the multifunctionality of such a
comprehensive surveillance system, it is quite striking that these massive numbers of CCTV cameras - originally argued to serve security purposes during the Beijing Olympic events – have
not been solely purchased for the declared cause. One of the main fears of the Chinese
government had been the organization of anti-government protests, which would be visible to the entire world. Particularly the Falun Gong, which had initiated one of the largest non-violent protests in recent Chinese history in the year 1999, was expected to take the opportunity to do likewise once again. Such assumptions became even further plausible during the Beijing
Olympics, given the aggressive online campaign of the Falun Gong addressing organ harvesting, the reeducation camps, and other related matters. Thus, multiple measures in order to prevent protests from occurring had been arranged by the Chinese government officials. First of all, the Chinese government prohibited all kinds of protests, apart from those, that had previously acquired one of the new permits, which authorized individuals to demonstrate in specifically
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assigned locations (so-called protest parks). The number of issued permits; however, appears to have been extremely low or close to none. In fact, according to BBC reports, “China has received a total of 77 applications to stage protests during the Olympic Games period – but none has been approved” (Bristow 2008b). Interestingly, 74 applications had been withdrawn, which might not
be surprising, because it had been reported that applicants were threatened to be sentenced to undergo reeducation in labor camps, or have been put under house arrest (cf. Embassy of Switzerland in Beijing 2008). Secondly, the surveillance system itself would account for a rapid detection, and thereafter quickly initiate the following dispersion of the unauthorized protests.
Collectively, both measures represent a strong violation against the freedom of assembly, namely the right of individuals to come together and collectively express their ideas. This civil liberty is however officially granted in Article 35 of the State Constitution from 1982, in which it is stated that the “[c]itizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration” (The State Council of the People’s
Republic of China 2014).
Another indicator for the concealed intentions behind the establishment of such an
immense surveillance system is the fact that the entire system remained in place after the Beijing Olympics. Not only that, but the high-tech system even saw further enhancements with the result that by the year 2015 it was claimed that a hundred percent of Beijing's public spaces are being covered by surveillance cameras (cf. Mudie 2015). This specific measure certainly assists local police forces to detect potential security threats. While in the aftermath of the Olympics, it may serve the reasonable purpose of reducing the number of crimes being committed. Yet, it
nonetheless represent a significant decline in civil liberties in terms of people’s right to privacy and the right to restrictions on government surveillance, since the Chinese government was then able to track nearly every step one takes within the city.
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Being exposed to surveillance almost everywhere, apart from one’s own home, inevitably
raises the notion of an absolute police state. While this impression may not be commonly shared among the majority of the Chinese citizens, this nonetheless is highly relevant to a number of marginalized groups. That is even more so, when one believes the many critics who claim that the surveillance systems are primarily being used to track down dissidents and disperse protests against the Chinese political system and its Communist Party (cf. South China Morning Post 2012). Particularly when recalling the previous section of this thesis concerned with the securitization process, a connection between the surveillance system and the identified three groups, which are seen to represent a threat to the Chinese government and its people, can be drawn. The Chinese government can utilize the implemented system not only to secure the Olympics, but simultaneously also its regime.
To be more precise, the advances made in terms of policing capabilities through the expertise and technology of the mostly western tech giants, can be used against the separatist Uyghurs, the Tibetans, and the Falun Gong. In fact, the surveillance system has not only remained in Beijing, but has been expanded to other major Chinese cities and deemed
problematic areas as well. Earlier in 2018, the Chinese government had installed around 1,000 facial recognition cameras at various mosques within the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
The efforts are part of a $46 million project to increase surveillance in Xinjiang’s Moyu County, which will be integrated into China’s security apparatus (Financial Times 2018). However, the
ambitions certainly do not stop here, as China is pushing forward its ‘Sharp Eyes’ or ‘Xue Liang’
surveillance initiative. The system is planned to operate nation-wide, including the most rural areas of the country. While it is publicly claimed to assist in reducing crime rates and being one of the pillars for a ‘social credit system’ – applying a person’s personal data including criminal records and financial data in order to rank an individual – it almost inevitably has to result in
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harsh cuts to civil liberties and basic freedoms (cf. South China Morning Post 2018).
Returning once more to the Beijing Olympics themselves and in order to illustrate the magnitude of the surveillance operation at that time, it may also be helpful to briefly compare it to the preceding summer Olympics in Athens just four years before. For this purpose, quite an extensive surveillance system with the name C4I had been implemented, consisting of around 1,660 CCTV cameras (Samatas 2011, p. 3353). However, despite the number being significantly lower than the 300,000 CCTV cameras at the Beijing Olympics, it nevertheless evoked memories of the Greek Regime of the Colonels in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which was a far-right military rule. Thus, the idea of maintaining the surveillance system after the Olympic event resulted in strong rejections from the Greek public (cf. Samatas 2011, p. 3347). Even though it is still partially operating today to manage traffic control. The comparison between Greece and China thereby strongly highlights the differences in the perception of surveillance based on the historical background and current regime type of a nation.
This becomes even more obvious when referring to the comments made by the
International Olympic Committee (IOC) Marketing Manager Geirhard Heiberg, who criticized the extensive and highly visible presence of ‘sinister’ looking police and military forces during
the Beijing Olympics. A situation that he deems to be frightening and unwanted (ICE News 2008). Similarly, according to Roche, Beijing had failed to find a desirable balance between maintaining security and the festive nature of the Olympic events (2017, p. 134).
Lastly, other technology-related security mechanisms that have caused raised eyebrows among the international audience of the Beijing Olympics was the use of Radio Frequency Identification tags incorporated within the Olympic Games' tickets themselves (Fussey et al.
2016, p. 184). This chip, developed by Beijing’s Tsinghua University, incorporated the ticket owner’s personal details and allowed for tracking the individual's current location and
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consequently his/her movement around the city.