On September 7, 2013, while meeting with President of Kyrgyzstan Almazbek Atambaev in Bishkek, Chinese President Xi Jinping unveiled the “Silk Road Economic Belt”, described as a proposal to establish a platform for closer regional cooperation between China and countries in Central Asia (Tang D. , 2013). No more than a month later on October 3, 2013, Xi presented a speech before the Indonesian Parliament outlining his vision for the future of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), encapsulated in a “Maritime Silk Road”, connected by cross-border infrastructure (Wu & Zhang, 2013). These two concepts were soon referred to as the
“Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road”, otherwise known as the “One Belt, One Road (OBOR) Initiative”, and eventually named the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) in 2017 official English-language materials, considered to be a major cornerstone of Xi’s policies. By November 12, 2013, its importance was cemented in the agenda of the Communist Party of China (CPC) when mention of the BRI was included in Section VII, Article 26 of “The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform”, adopted by the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC (Communist Party of China, 2013).
The BRI has since become China’s top foreign policy, characterized as an evolving project with a heavy emphasis on infrastructure and connectivity. Even prior to the unveiling of the BRI, China, fueled by its booming economy, was making significant investments in Africa and Central Asia, consolidating its access to markets and resources
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in neighboring regions through the establishment of economic corridors, railway connections, and gas and oil pipelines (Rudolf, Infographic/China Mapping Silk Road Initiative, 2015). Publications from China stressed “win-win” solutions, marketing the BRI as a multilateral platform upon which all development projects might be jointly achieved through cooperation and investment (Xie, Wang, He, & Yuan, 世界如何共贏?
中國正在破題 (Shijieruhegongying Zhongguozhenzaipoti, How Can the World Be Win-Win? China is Answering the Question), 2014). The PRC has similarly attempted to allay suspicions and concerns from other states about the possibility that the BRI is a geopolitical strategy disguised as an international economic project, especially after the U.S. rebalance to Asia under the Obama administration, Sino-Indian rivalries complicated by Chinese engagements with Pakistan, and the ongoing territorial disputes with East Asian and Southeast Asian states in the East and South China Seas (Sohu Business, 2014).
However, although more than three and a half years have passed since the BRI was unveiled, and despite repeated pushes by Xi to promote the initiative in many foreign policy ventures, the nature and scope of the BRI remains ambiguous and unclear. Official materials initially released by the PRC did not include concise information on the precise measures being carried out nor the countries participating in the BRI, leading to intense speculation by academics. On February 14, 2014, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying explained to reporters that the BRI “is just an idea for cooperation” and “an open-ended platform”, putting into question the concreteness of China’s blueprint for the initiative in the eyes of some observers (Business Standard,
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2014). The National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Commerce eventually published “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road” in March 2015 to clarify Chinese intent, mechanisms, and goals, but the wording of the document is considered by some to be vague (National Development and Reform Commission, 2015). There have been no official changes to preconceptions since, with even the Belt and Road Forum held in Beijing in May 2017 offering little more in the way of clarification or new information compared to the March 2015 document (Tiezzi, What Did China Accomplish at the Belt and Road Forum?, 2017). Its issue of messaging has also been further compromised by suspicions by other states with interests in the region; despite Chinese attempts to bill the BRI as primarily motivated by economic and trade concerns, with an emphasis on win-win outcomes, states with stakes in the Asia-Pacific region not only worry that China’s rise through the BRI may come at the detriment of their own national interests, but that the BRI has components beyond pure economy and trade (Feng & Cheng, 國際社會對"一帶一路"倡議的評價 (Guojishehui Dui Yidaiyiluchangyi De Pingjia, The International Community's Evaluation of the "One Belt, One Road" Initiative), 2014).
The BRI deserves a certain degree and category of attention in no small part because it is unprecedented in many ways. It is, by far, the most ambitious of China’s foreign policy projects since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, in terms of the financial capital involvement, the geographical reach across half the world, and the scope of the projects involved with the initiative. It is occurring at a time where China
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has become the second-largest economy in the world, but where it is experiencing an economic slowdown in a manner reminiscent of the events leading up to the collapse of the Japanese asset bubble. Just as importantly, the BRI has been established by a man characterized as “the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping”, a general secretary of the CPC who has consolidated a tremendous amount of power within the hierarchy of the Chinese leadership (The Economist, 2013). The increasing unilateralism in which the fifth-generation leadership becomes involved in key party and state positions, and enacts its decision-making process during such times suggests a comprehensive vision and, perhaps more importantly, a comprehensive set of policies towards the challenges that China faces today. Thus, the BRI cannot be regarded in a vacuum, but instead demands an examination into not only how initiative fits into the fifth-generation’s existing policies such as the Chinese Dream, but also how it contrasts against policy trends enacted by previous Chinese generations of leadership from Deng and onwards.
Fundamentally, this thesis seeks to ask: Given the vague and ambiguous nature of the BRI, what are the primary goals it is meant to achieve when seen from the perspective of China’s fifth-generation leadership? What answers can be gleaned at the intersection of the BRI and the existing policies of the fifth-generation leadership? And what are the issues that the BRI is meant to address, as well as the obstacles and risks that may hinder its success?
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