Although the origins of the term predate its actual usage by the fifth-generation of PRC leadership under the Xi administration, the “Chinese Dream” in the scope of the Chinese political vocabulary is ultimately closely associated to Xi Jinping, who used the slogan in late 2013, shortly before attaining the office of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China. Until the BRI became the centerpiece for foreign policy under the Xi administration, the Chinese Dream functioned as the blueprint for the fifth-generation of PRC leadership in the same way the “Three Represents” encompassed policymaking in the Jiang Zemin administration and the “Scientific Outlook on Development” encompassed policymaking in the Hu Jintao administration. However, in terms of the policymaking context, the “Chinese Dream” is unique in that it was proposed early in the Xi administration’s ascension to the reins of power; this is in comparison to the “Three Represents”, which was proposed by Jiang Zemin as his own leadership was coming to an end and was largely meant as a contribution to Chinese socialist theory, and to the “Scientific Outlook on Development”, which Hu Jintao failed to follow up with any distinctive policy decision relating to his vision, and was largely regarded as a “joke”
(Wang Z. , 2013).
There are two ideals associated with the Chinese Dream. First and foremost is recurring theme of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”, which is typically understood to be the restoration of China’s status as a great power prior to the “century of humiliation” that saw it brought low by Western states and Japan. The second and relatively less well-known ideal is “the yearning for a good and beautiful life”, generally
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understood to be the increase of the standard of living for Chinese citizens. Although arguably structured mostly for domestic consumption, slogans are a key aspect of Chinese policymaking, or at least key to the affirmation of such policies in the public consciousness, in that it provides a justification and narrative by which the CPC may demand compliance and action from its citizenry. Like many Chinese policy slogans, the
“Chinese Dream” was initially kept vague; while “rejuvenation” was a consistent theme in all interpretations of the Chinese Dream, neither Xi Jinping, his administration, or the CPC leadership had clarified the conditions required for the fulfillment of this national rejuvenation, and so an understanding of the Chinese Dream was reliant on third-party interpretations (The Economist, 2013). Increasingly, however, domestic political literature promoted by the CPC began to draw attention to the “Four Comprehensives”
outlined by the Xi administration. Incrementally developed from 2012 to 2015, the Four Comprehensives include “comprehensively build a moderately prosperous society”
during the 18th Party Congress in 2012, “comprehensively deepen reform” during the 3rd Central Committee Plenary Session in 2013, “comprehensively strictly govern the Party”
during an October 2014 meeting for the Mass Line Campaign, and “comprehensively govern the nation according to law” during the 4th Central Committee Plenary Session in October 2014 (Ma, 2014). The CPC has assigned particular significance to the Four Comprehensives, framing them as “strategic guidelines” for achieving the Chinese Dream. In other words, the Four Comprehensives are the blueprint by which to achieve the Two Centenary Goals, which include the creation of a “moderately prosperous society” by 2020 by doubling the 2010 per capita income, and the creation of “a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, and
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harmonious” by 2049. Subsequently, the Two Centenary Goals are the benchmarks by which the Chinese Dream will be completely realized (Qu, 2015). These are essentially socioeconomic explanations that tie into the well-being of Chinese society.
Four Comprehensives
• Comprehensively build a moderately prosperous society
• Comprehensively deepen reform
• Comprehensively govern the nation according to law
• Comprehensively strictly govern the Party
Two Centenary Goals
• Create a “moderately prosperous society” by doubling 2010 GDP by 2020
• Create a “modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, and
harmonious” by 2049
Chinese Dream
• The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation
• The yearning for a good and beautiful life
English-language academic literature examines the Chinese Dream under several other dimensions. Looking at Xi Jinping himself, the current president of China has been characterized as both a Chinese nationalist and a staunch believer in the CPC (Kaufman, 2015). Although some of the claims made by the CPC’s media apparatuses are of dubious veracity, they nonetheless serve as a useful indicator of Chinese designs and goals for
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their policies, and coverage of the Chinese Dream in relation to Xi Jinping as a nationalist and a believer in the CPC would suggest a desire to rekindle Sino-Asian pride, and thus a recovery from the national trauma inflicted by the century of humiliation, as well as the legitimization of the CPC as the only organization that can facilitate this restoration of Chinese pride. This has become increasingly pertinent as China asserts itself in the international sphere, striving to maintain the image of political empowerment as the country faces a slowdown to its previous phenomenal economic growth; the goal is to produce a “Strong”, “Civilized”, “Harmonious”, and “Beautiful” China (Kuhn, 2013).
Thus, under these perspectives, the Chinese Dream is not just a promise for socioeconomic health, but also a promise of an increase in geopolitical status to once again place China in a position of advantage in Asia as it once was during its imperial era.
The second ideal of the Chinese Dream, the increased standard of living for Chinese citizens, is at least partially in line with the political and structural background behind the Chinese Dream, as a significant component of the Chinese Dream is nested within one of the CPC’s major claims to legitimacy and its social contract with the Chinese citizenry, that the CPC remains the sole arbiter of politics in China so long as they provide economic benefits to the Chinese people (Kuhn, 2013). Structurally and politically, this is linked to the years 2020 and 2021, which will mark the first of China’s
“Two Centenary Goals”; to commemorate the hundredth anniversary of the CPC in 2021, the 18th Party Congress in 2012, the same congress that saw Xi rise to the position of China’s head of state, gave a surprisingly specific set of goals to achieve by 2020 (Tiezzi, Why 2020 Is a Make-or-Break Year for China, 2015). This includes the promise of a
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“moderately prosperous society”, specified as a doubling of per capita income from 2010, a daunting goal considering the increasingly unequal distribution of wealth in China and the societal unrest that comes with it (Xinhua, 2012). These goals are also of significant relevance to the Xi administration, as his likely second terms as general secretary and president are projected to end in 2022 and 2023, respectively, and thus the fulfillment of the first centenary goal is functionally dependent on the actions of his administration. The Chinese Dream can thus be interpreted as the operationalization of the goal the Xi administration was tasked in from the very beginning. In the shorter term, Xi has also had to contend with the 12th Five Year Plan established by the Hu administration as a blueprint for China’s economic future, and Xi will also have to adhere to the 13th Five Year Plan (The Economist, 2013). This is also in line with Xi’s “Made in China 2025”
project, which is intended to transform China from the “world’s factory” into a “world manufacturing power”, shifting the emphasis from the manufacturing and exporting of low-end commodities to that of high-end commodities and technologies. This is a move perceived to have been made in response to decreased manufacturing demand, increased international competition, and slowing economic growth (Tiezzi, The Belt and Road:
China's Economic Lifeline?, 2015).
The encouragement of Chinese individuals to strive for personal attainment under the framework of a strong state, combined with the structural frameworks guiding Chinese development over the next decade, is particularly relevant to the transformation of China from an investment-based economy to a consumption-based one, a goal shared with one of the proposed motivations of the BRI. The aforementioned social contract that
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allows the CPC to be the sole arbiter of China’s political destiny has been based on stellar economic growth, but as that growth has slowed, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the CPC to claim legitimacy based on economics alone. Such can be seen in the light of increased dissatisfaction towards social issues in China that include but are not limited to corruption amongst social and political elites, the dominance of state-owned enterprises (SOE) in the Chinese economy, the widening rich-poor gap as a result of previous development policies, low GDP per capita, and environmental concerns in rapid urban development (Kuhn, 2013). Party ideology and socialism have proven to be poor substitutes for economic growth; an online poll conducted by the People’s Daily, the mouthpiece for the CPC, revealed that eighty percent of three thousand respondents indicated that they did not support one-party rule or socialism, a result that was so embarrassing to the CPC that the poll was quickly taken down (The Economist, 2013).
As such, while it is unlikely that the Xi administration will relinquish its claim to the political legitimacy of the CPC, the social angle is also being aggressively pursued as a replacement for economics in the Chinese social contract.
Given China’s century of humiliation, it was first believed that the Chinese Dream prioritized “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” over “the yearning for a good and beautiful life”, elevating the empowerment of the state over the empowerment of the people; after all, one of the major lessons derived from the national trauma is argument that the state, above all else, is the primary guarantor of the standard of living for the average Chinese individual. In other words, any increase in the standard of living of the average Chinese individual is conditional on the power of China as a state (Shi, 中
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國夢區別於美國夢的七大特徵 (Zhongguomeng Qubieyu Meiguomeng Qidatezheng, The Seven Major Differences Between the Chinese Dream and the American Dream), 2013). However, domestic literature has increasingly drawn links between “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and “the yearning for a good and beautiful life”, at least in terms of using the Four Comprehensives as a metric, of which guidelines can be seen from the “The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform” adopted by the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee, which share goals in terms of being able to construct a “moderately prosperous society” (Qu, 2015).
Increasingly, the Chinese Dream is taking on a dimension not associated only with the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by becoming not only a “strong”, “civilized”,
“harmonious”, and “beautiful” Asian state, but also with the perception that the Chinese people themselves as individuals may now reap the rewards of China’s economic growth through an increasingly equal society with a higher per capita income and an increased sense of pride in their own country, which in turn translates to international respect, a reversal from the “century of humiliation”. This carries implications in terms of security in the form of social stability, particularly in China’s western provinces, and diplomacy, in terms of being able to attain the respect China believes it deserves from the international community; however, the Chinese Dream is most obviously tied into socioeconomic and geopolitical dimensions, especially in terms of China’s ability to create a more stable economy, to form a more equal society, and to consolidate its place within the international political economic system with regards to manufacturing and
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trade. As the following chapters will explain, these elements create a significant overlap within which the goals of the fifth-generation leadership can be analyzed.
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