從中國第五代領導人的政策觀點分析"一帶一路"計畫 - 政大學術集成

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(1)International Master’s Program in International Studies National Chengchi University 國立政治大學國際研究英語碩士學位學程. Analysis of the Belt and Road Initiative from the Perspective of the Chinese Fifth-Generation Leadership 從中國第五代領導人的政策觀點分析"一帶一路"計畫. Student: Ru-Shin Chen Advisor: David Lorenzo. June 2017.

(2) Abstract The Belt and Road Initiative is one corner of the Chinese fifth-generation leadership’s policymaking under the Xi Jinping administration, and should be understood as part of a cohesive whole. This study assesses the BRI, its actual goals, and its risks when analyzed alongside China’s geostrategic and socioeconomic positions, similar policies from previous generations of Chinese leadership such as the Western Development Strategy, and existing concurrent policies from the fifth-generation Chinese leadership such as the Chinese Dream and the Four Comprehensives. While not mutually exclusive with other explanations proposed for the BRI, this study suggests that due to its synergy with existing policies and its exceptional urgency, the fifth-generation leadership primarily uses the BRI as one tool amongst many to accommodate its economic reform, to export the production overcapacity of state-owned enterprises, and to mitigate any risks of an asset bubble collapse.. 一帶一路倡議是中國第五代領導人的政策之一，應該被視為整體戰略的一部分。為了評估一帶一路倡議的實際目的與風險，研究中國地緣政治與社會經濟局勢、前幾代中國領導人的政策（如西部大開發）、現任第五代領導人的政策（如中國夢與四個全面）。雖然並非與其它相關的分析相互排斥，結論指出一帶一路與第五代領導人其它政策具有協同效應、同時面對相對的急迫性，是中國第五代領導人經濟改革、輸出國營企業生產能力過剩、減輕資產泡沫破裂風險的工具之一。.

(3) Acknowledgements This thesis is a work of patience, not only on the part of the author, but much more so on the part of those providing invaluable support. Words alone cannot express the gratitude Dr. David Lorenzo deserves for his guidance over inexperienced mistakes and after several false starts. Nor can I thank Dr. Joyce Juo-Yu Lin and Dr. Chung-chian Teng enough for serving as committee members and providing me with valuable feedback while I fumbled in the dark. All of this was made possible with the International Master’s Program in International Studies at the National Chengchi University, and I must extend my thanks to the professors who paved the path to this very point.. I must also thank Dr. Hsien-chao Chang for having encouraged me to pursue my academics and making all this happen in the first place. Barbara and Andreas kept me going through some of the darkest days and greatest hurdles. And, of course, I am forever indebted to my mother for having the love and patience to support my convoluted and at times turbulent journey after all these years, through thick and thin, in every possible way available to her..

(4) Table of Contents Chapter 1 – Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1.1 – Research Purpose ..................................................................................... 5 Chapter 1.2 – Research Methods .................................................................................... 9 Chapter 1.3 – Research Limitations .............................................................................. 11 Chapter 1.4 – Research Outline .................................................................................... 12 Chapter 2 – Literature Review .......................................................................................... 13 Chapter 2.1 – The Belt and Road Initiative .................................................................. 13 Chapter 2.2 – The Chinese Dream ................................................................................ 24 Chapter 3 – Geopolitical Considerations of Chinese Policy............................................. 32 Chapter 3.1 – China as a Land Power ........................................................................... 32 Chapter 3.2 – China’s Eurasian Calculus ..................................................................... 46 Chapter 4 – National Position and Challenges ................................................................. 53 Chapter 4.1 – China’s Transformation.......................................................................... 53 Chapter 4.2 – The Path to Reform ................................................................................ 64 Chapter 5 – Risk Analysis................................................................................................. 73 Chapter 5.1 – Risks in Policy........................................................................................ 73 Chapter 5.2 – Risks in Asia........................................................................................... 78 Chapter 5.3 – Regional Opposition............................................................................... 82 Chapter 6 – Conclusion..................................................................................................... 90 Chapter 6.1 – The Future of the BRI ............................................................................ 91 Chapter 6.2 – The Implications of the BRI ................................................................... 96 Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 100.

(5) List of Abbreviations ADB AIIB ASEAN BCIM BRI BRICS CCA CPC CPEC EEU FTAAP IMF INSTC MSR OBOR PLA PLAN PRC SDR SOE SREB TPP WTO. Asian Development Bank Asian Infrastructure Development Bank Association of Southeast Asian Nations Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Belt and Road Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa Connect Central Asia Communist Party of China China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Eurasian Economic Union Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific International Monetary Fund International North-South Transport Corridor Maritime Silk Road One Belt, One Road People’s Liberation Army People’s Liberation Army Navy People’s Republic of China Special Drawing Rights State-Owned Enterprise Silk Road Economic Belt Trans-Pacific Partnership World Trade Organization.

(6) Chapter 1 – Introduction On September 7, 2013, while meeting with President of Kyrgyzstan Almazbek Atambaev in Bishkek, Chinese President Xi Jinping unveiled the “Silk Road Economic Belt”, described as a proposal to establish a platform for closer regional cooperation between China and countries in Central Asia (Tang D. , 2013). No more than a month later on October 3, 2013, Xi presented a speech before the Indonesian Parliament outlining his vision for the future of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), encapsulated in a “Maritime Silk Road”, connected by cross-border infrastructure (Wu & Zhang, 2013). These two concepts were soon referred to as the “Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road”, otherwise known as the “One Belt, One Road (OBOR) Initiative”, and eventually named the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) in 2017 official English-language materials, considered to be a major cornerstone of Xi’s policies. By November 12, 2013, its importance was cemented in the agenda of the Communist Party of China (CPC) when mention of the BRI was included in Section VII, Article 26 of “The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform”, adopted by the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC (Communist Party of China, 2013).. The BRI has since become China’s top foreign policy, characterized as an evolving project with a heavy emphasis on infrastructure and connectivity. Even prior to the unveiling of the BRI, China, fueled by its booming economy, was making significant investments in Africa and Central Asia, consolidating its access to markets and resources. 1.

(7) in neighboring regions through the establishment of economic corridors, railway connections, and gas and oil pipelines (Rudolf, Infographic/China Mapping Silk Road Initiative, 2015). Publications from China stressed “win-win” solutions, marketing the BRI as a multilateral platform upon which all development projects might be jointly achieved through cooperation and investment (Xie, Wang, He, & Yuan, 世界如何共贏? 中國正在破題 (Shijieruhegongying Zhongguozhenzaipoti, How Can the World Be WinWin? China is Answering the Question), 2014). The PRC has similarly attempted to allay suspicions and concerns from other states about the possibility that the BRI is a geopolitical strategy disguised as an international economic project, especially after the U.S. rebalance to Asia under the Obama administration, Sino-Indian rivalries complicated by Chinese engagements with Pakistan, and the ongoing territorial disputes with East Asian and Southeast Asian states in the East and South China Seas (Sohu Business, 2014).. However, although more than three and a half years have passed since the BRI was unveiled, and despite repeated pushes by Xi to promote the initiative in many foreign policy ventures, the nature and scope of the BRI remains ambiguous and unclear. Official materials initially released by the PRC did not include concise information on the precise measures being carried out nor the countries participating in the BRI, leading to intense speculation by academics. On February 14, 2014, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying explained to reporters that the BRI “is just an idea for cooperation” and “an open-ended platform”, putting into question the concreteness of China’s blueprint for the initiative in the eyes of some observers (Business Standard,. 2.

(8) 2014). The National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Commerce eventually published “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road” in March 2015 to clarify Chinese intent, mechanisms, and goals, but the wording of the document is considered by some to be vague (National Development and Reform Commission, 2015). There have been no official changes to preconceptions since, with even the Belt and Road Forum held in Beijing in May 2017 offering little more in the way of clarification or new information compared to the March 2015 document (Tiezzi, What Did China Accomplish at the Belt and Road Forum?, 2017). Its issue of messaging has also been further compromised by suspicions by other states with interests in the region; despite Chinese attempts to bill the BRI as primarily motivated by economic and trade concerns, with an emphasis on win-win outcomes, states with stakes in the AsiaPacific region not only worry that China’s rise through the BRI may come at the detriment of their own national interests, but that the BRI has components beyond pure economy and trade (Feng & Cheng, 國際社會對"一帶一路"倡議的評價 (Guojishehui Dui Yidaiyiluchangyi De Pingjia, The International Community's Evaluation of the "One Belt, One Road" Initiative), 2014).. The BRI deserves a certain degree and category of attention in no small part because it is unprecedented in many ways. It is, by far, the most ambitious of China’s foreign policy projects since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, in terms of the financial capital involvement, the geographical reach across half the world, and the scope of the projects involved with the initiative. It is occurring at a time where China. 3.

(9) has become the second-largest economy in the world, but where it is experiencing an economic slowdown in a manner reminiscent of the events leading up to the collapse of the Japanese asset bubble. Just as importantly, the BRI has been established by a man characterized as “the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping”, a general secretary of the CPC who has consolidated a tremendous amount of power within the hierarchy of the Chinese leadership (The Economist, 2013). The increasing unilateralism in which the fifth-generation leadership becomes involved in key party and state positions, and enacts its decision-making process during such times suggests a comprehensive vision and, perhaps more importantly, a comprehensive set of policies towards the challenges that China faces today. Thus, the BRI cannot be regarded in a vacuum, but instead demands an examination into not only how initiative fits into the fifthgeneration’s existing policies such as the Chinese Dream, but also how it contrasts against policy trends enacted by previous Chinese generations of leadership from Deng and onwards.. Fundamentally, this thesis seeks to ask: Given the vague and ambiguous nature of the BRI, what are the primary goals it is meant to achieve when seen from the perspective of China’s fifth-generation leadership? What answers can be gleaned at the intersection of the BRI and the existing policies of the fifth-generation leadership? And what are the issues that the BRI is meant to address, as well as the obstacles and risks that may hinder its success?. 4.

(10) Chapter 1.1 – Research Purpose General consensus amongst academic, business, and governmental circles is that the 21st century will be an “Asian century”, and the phenomenal rise of China puts the country at the center of the “Asian century” (Asian Development Bank, 2011). As such, international engagements with China will require an understanding of what appears to be the most ambitious and significant Chinese foreign policy campaign to date, which will continue to influence how bilateral and multilateral ties with the PRC is defined, even as China explicitly aims to become, by its standards, a developed country and a “moderately prosperous society”.. The BRI has been heavily promoted by the Xi administration, and seems to synergize with previous policies such as the “Chinese Dream”, the “new model of great power relations”, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). It comes at a complicated time when the PRC is attempting to establish itself as a modern powerhouse in the international community, but faces signs of an economic slowdown, a decrease in their currency reserves, vulnerabilities in its economic structures, and a dilemma of overproduction in certain industrial fields (Rudolf, China’s ‘Silk Road’ Initiative Is at Risk of Failure, 2015). From the foreign relations front, China not only contends with various Asia-Pacific states over maritime territorial claims in the East and South China Seas, but also with the perception that China’s rise is an ongoing threat to their national interests and security (Feng & Cheng, 國際社會對"一帶一路"倡議的評價 (Guojishehui Dui Yidaiyiluchangyi De Pingjia, The International Community's Evaluation of the "One Belt, One Road" Initiative), 2014). Further afield, China must also contend with the. 5.

(11) American presence and commitments in the Asia-Pacific, which was initially emblematic of the Obama administration’s “rebalance to the Asia-Pacific”, the shift in United States foreign policy previously nicknamed the “pivot to Asia”. Although where or not the Trump administration is still pursuing this strategy is in question, that neighboring Asian states wary of China’s rise, some of which are traditional U.S. allies, are hoping for an increased American presence is unlikely to have changed (Lang, 2015).. Although marketed as a platform in which to pursue “win-win” solutions, the BRI is, by virtue of it being governmental policy, fundamentally a self-serving initiative that either seeks to promote Chinese interests or to address dilemmas facing the country. Although the specifics of the BRI continues to be ambiguous and vague, understanding the dilemmas that China faces can lend a vital perspective to how the PRC itself may view the BRI and its actual goals. Significant amounts of academic research have gone into examining the components of the BRI, with the motives and geopolitical interests of the PRC extrapolated from actual individual phenomena, such as through the lenses of data of economics, security, and trade, as well as combinations thereof. These are highly essential methods of analysis and will be used in this research. However, comparatively less research has been done on the BRI from the perspective of the policies the Xi administration. Furthermore, while risk analyses have been done by academics and other research groups from the perspective of foreign states considering investments into the BRI, comparatively less research has been done in the internal risk assessments from the perspective of the PRC.. 6.

(12) A possible explanation for this imbalance might be explained by the relative opaqueness of policymaking in the PRC, and what may be perceived as a tendency for the domestic academia in China to reflect the optimism of their national initiative; while acknowledging that challenges exist, Chinese academic literature almost always maintains praise of China’s ruling leaders and almost never casts doubt upon their decision-making. Even less research has been done in connecting the BRI with existing policy under Xi’s leadership, especially with the “Chinese Dream” policy, touted as the hallmark of the Xi administration yet regarded as mostly a set of domestic policies but with international implications. It is within this gap that this thesis positions itself.. The ambitious scope of the BRI demands attention due in significant part to its implications, real or imagined, that have or will affect the policies of regions affected by its long reach. Southeast Asian economies are increasingly tied to Chinese trade. Central Asian, South Asian, and East African states are taking increasing amounts of Chinese loans and infrastructure projects to develop their own domestic growth agendas. India and Russia are wary of increasing Chinese influence on their continent, and Europe and the United States are cautious about how this Chinese megaproject will affect the global economy and international trade. The BRI, whether intentionally or not, concerns much of the world, and the age-old dilemma of realism casts uncertainty and doubt upon Chinese intentions. It would be an understatement to say that an understanding of the BRI’s goals and motivations is vital.. 7.

(13) There is a degree of difficulty in extrapolating actual government policy from statements, policies, and their manifestations due to the aforementioned opaqueness of the policymaking process in the PRC. It is further made difficult by official government policies and rhetoric sometimes being at odds with facts on the ground, as well as the ongoing situation regarding the BRI, which has been defined as an evolving platform. However, China has inherent geopolitical and strategic interests that are likely to inform decision-making in Beijing, which can ultimately be compared against existing analyses of the BRI. Furthermore, although the means and mechanisms of Chinese policy goals remains ever opaque, the fifth-generation leadership has increasingly announced specific metrics by which to judge the success of these aforementioned goals. Such components can be viewed through and compared against an assessment of risks facing the PRC, which lends further insights into what the BRI aims to achieve.. Ultimately, this thesis argues that while the Maritime Silk Road is aimed at addressing Chinese security issues, it is ultimately the Silk Road Economic Belt that is the centerpiece of the BRI for the fifth-generation leadership, and that it is a strategy that uses international measures to resolve domestic issues, particularly that of socioeconomic reform. This thesis also seeks to examine the inherent risks associated with the BRI, especially from the potential perspective of the fifth-generation leadership, which include not only international concerns such as the political unreliability of some of its projected partners in the BRI blueprint and its inability to convince neighboring states that its intentions are peaceful, but also more important domestic issues that stem from the increasing necessity of reform, the economic slowdown, and the social troubles that come. 8.

(14) with these. This thesis does not, however, seek to assess the likelihood of success of the BRI from any dimension.. Chapter 1.2 – Research Methods This thesis will use qualitative research methodologies to examine the BRI, reviewing literature in the form of academic articles, news articles, and websites in academic, business, governmental, and journalistic circles. Specifically, for the purposes of the research question, this thesis will primarily be using textual analysis and discussions of risk assessment. This will involve assessing the position of the PRC from perspectives not limited to geopolitical, economical, and social paradigms, examined through the compilation of recent data, official government documentation, and existing analysis conducted by other academic writers. This must also be compared with their counterparts in regards to the BRI to examine the intersection between these elements. Although much of the issues surrounding the BRI pertain to the study of the international political economy, it is worth reiterating that this is primarily a work of policy research. Furthermore, although research will be heavily dependent on Western and Sino-Asian sources, particularly English- and Chinese-language sources, it will also include but not be limited to English- and Chinese-language sources from the regions affected by the BRI, including Africa, Central Asia, Central Europe, Eastern Europe, Russia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.. 9.

(15) The BRI is a project that has roots in Chinese policy measures prior to it, but was only formally introduced and established in late 2013. Other policies of the Xi administration have had a similar lifespan, owing to Xi’s rise to power in late 2012, thus depriving this thesis of the benefit of extended hindsight. As the initiative is presently still undergoing development and evolution, a significant amount of literature and research sources ultimately come from official documents and statements from the PRC. Complementing this will be research into PRC policies, especially from the Xi administration but also from historical trends, from relevant academic reviews and informational outlets such as periodicals and news sources. In particular, the thesis will be looking at official policy on issues relevant to the BRI and the Xi administration, such as the “Chinese Dream” in particular, as well as the relevant analyses and explanations for these policies. By looking at the BRI from a broader policymaking context, this study can better ascertain the nature of the BRI as the leadership possibly sees the initiative.. While this thesis will primarily be viewing the BRI from the basis of existing PRC policy, it will also draw from existing arguments and data sources on the BRI as a guide to the issues that China faces and hopes to remedy, including geopolitical positions, political reform, economic trends, and social concerns. Third-party sources will be of utility in providing an adequate understanding, primarily focused on academic journals and news sources, and official PRC data may also be useful in ascertaining implications in PRC policy.. 10.

(16) Chapter 1.3 – Research Limitations This thesis faces a number of significant research limitations. The People’s Republic of China (PRC), the paramount driver of the BRI, is not a particularly transparent government, with a transparency score of 13 out of 100, characterized as “scant to none”, based on a Transparency International open budget index (Transparency International, 2016). The PRC’s opaque policymaking process creates a limit in which extrapolation and speculation may be formed from official and public documents and statements. Exacerbating this limitation is the focus on PRC policy through the Xi administration, the incumbent president of the PRC and the general-secretary of the Communist Party of China, and the master architect behind the BRI. Not only is the Xi administration an ongoing and relatively young topic of research, with Xi having assumed the office of general secretary in 2012 and president in 2013, Xi himself has proven to be a departure from traditional PRC politics, upending the typical “rule by consensus” style of previous Chinese administrations, invoking comparisons to the days of Mao Zedong. There is thus a relatively limited amount of “hindsight” upon which research might be based upon, and significant amounts of speculation. This also applies to the BRI, an ongoing endeavor subject to changes and development, which may complicate the research process. While not necessary a limitation in the traditional sense, it adds a potential hurdle to accuracy, especially when considered in light of the above two limitations. There is thus a greater reliance on up-to-date information from sources such as news and periodicals over traditional academic research outlets such as academic journals.. 11.

(17) As the author is only proficient in the English and Chinese languages, there is a linguistic limitation to the research process. This results in a reliance on either English or Chinese translations of relevant non-English or non-Chinese literature, or secondary reporting of non-English or non-Chinese literature, although most of the expected literature is expected to be in English or Chinese.. Chapter 1.4 – Research Outline The thesis is organized into six chapters that examine the BRI. Chapter 1 serves as the introduction, which also includes research purpose, methods, limitations, and outline, as seen above. Chapter 2 serves as the literature review examining the blueprint and composition of the BRI, as well as the “Chinese Dream” policy that captures much of the PRC’s fifth-generation. Chapter 3 examines the geopolitical considerations of China, which provides the context against which Chinese history and policies must be judged against. Chapter 4 delves into the national position of China, from its economic and policy transformations to its current trajectory and agenda of reform. Chapter 5 performs a risk assessment of the BRI within the context of current Chinese policies and positions extrapolated from Chapters 3 and 4. All of this serves to provide an analysis of the motivating factors and possible goals surrounding the BRI in relation to the existing policies of the PRC’s fifth-generation leadership. Chapter 6 serves as the conclusion to the thesis in summarizing the findings and the nature of the initiative, examining the implications and other notes of concern in this major foreign policy project.. 12.

(18) Chapter 2 – Literature Review This chapter will function as the literature review, primarily covering the vision of the BRI as it is commonly understood. This chapter is thus divided into two sections. The first section will provide an overview of the BRI, clarifying the layout and projected functions of both the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the Maritime Silk Road (MSR). The second section will cover existing literature on Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream” and its related policies. These sections will be vital to examining the links that the BRI shares with and the position it occupies within the Chinese Dream further along the thesis, and thus lend some perspective into how the BRI is perceived within the decision-making process of the Xi administration.. Chapter 2.1 – The Belt and Road Initiative The “Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road”, initially known as the “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) Initiative but later renamed the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) in official English-language materials, is a Chinese megaproject that promotes “the connectivity of Asian, European and African continents and their adjacent seas”, thus widely understood as creating an international infrastructure network leading in and out of China. It was first unveiled on September 13, 2013, in a speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered at Nazarbayev University in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, whereupon Xi disclosed his plans to establish a Silk Road Economic Belt that would retrace the steps of the ancient Silk Road from China through Central Asia and into Europe (Tang D. , 2013). This announcement was followed. 13.

(19) afterwards by another speech to the Indonesian Parliament in which he proposed the Maritime Silk Road, which would link Chinese and Southeast Asian economies to those of South Asia, East Africa, and Europe through a maritime route that runs through the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea (Wu & Zhang, 2013). The two are thus collectively referred to as the “Belt” and “Road”, and the entire initiative seems to have positioned itself as the centerpiece of Xi’s foreign policy agenda. According to the “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road” document, jointly published by the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Commerce in March 2015, the framework of the BRI is based on six economic corridors. The New Eurasian Land Bridge, the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor, and the ChinaCentral Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor are associated with the Silk Road Economic Belt, whereas the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor and the ChinaIndochina Peninsula Economic Corridor are associated with the Maritime Silk Road; the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is associated with both (National Development and Reform Commission, 2015).. Officially, the BRI is an altruistic initiative seeking win-win solutions for an increasingly interconnected Eurasian continent, a natural response to an increasingly multipolar and globalized international system, meant to enhance cooperation and relationships with China’s neighbors and beyond (National Development and Reform Commission, 2015). However, literature and research on the BRI suggest several ways in which the initiative ultimately addresses several issues the PRC faces and serves the. 14.

(20) Chinese national interest. The question is not which of these dimensions are more valid than the others, as they are all likely valid; rather, the question is which of these goals are more immediately relevant to the policies of the fifth-generation leadership. As the BRI is suggested to be a multi-faceted strategy, these goals are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and can, in fact, achieve multiple goals in tandem. Simon Shen compared the BRI to the Marshall Plan to outline the possible motivations of the fifth-generation leadership in pushing for this initiative: Boosting exports, exporting currency, countering a rival in the form of the United States, fostering strategic divisions, and siphoning away diplomatic support (Shen, 2016). Thus, broadly speaking, these proposed goals can be categorized into four categories that actually experience significant overlap in the proposed goals of the BRI: Socioeconomic, security, diplomatic, and geopolitical. To ascertain the true motivations of the fifth-generation leadership, the hypothetical primary goal would need to fulfill the following three criteria:. 1. Achieve or avoid a result conducive or disastrous, respectively, to Chinese socioeconomic, security, diplomatic, and/or geopolitical interests; 2. Relate to symptoms or signs that such is an issue that can only be addressed and/or become a threat to Chinese interests within the immediate future, such as within the tenure of the Xi administration; 3. Be goals that the fifth-generation leadership can directly address or resolve with tangible results, likely within the tenure of the Xi administration.. 15.

(21) (Rudolf, Infographic/China Mapping Silk Road Initiative, 2015). In terms of the socioeconomic dimension, it is commonly agreed that the BRI is influenced by trade concerns relating to overproduction in areas such as steel, and that the creation of infrastructure networks to facilitate interregional trade is motivated by the need to find new markets by which to export Chinese overproduction (Kennedy & Parker, Building China’s "One Belt, One Road", 2015). This is particularly pertinent in no small part because China’s economic development has been predicated on a significant amount of credit and investment into the manufacturing industry and real estate, a situation similar to the prelude of the collapse of the Japanese asset bubble, thus motivating China to avoid this particular fate (Yurichuk, 2011). The initiative is thus potentially a tool in the transformation of the Chinese economy from investment-driven to consumption16.

(22) driven and from export-driven to service-driven, thus creating a more sustainable growth pattern that addresses the complications that have accumulated from decades of China’s meteoric economic growth (Huang Y. , 2015).. In relation to these issues, it is perhaps unsurprising to note that aside from their endpoints, the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road intersect once at the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Research argues that this is not a coincidence, as a major component of the BRI is to turn China’s western and central provinces, relatively poor compared to the economically robust coastal regions to the east, into major trade regions, thus compensating for the imbalance in development and wealth distribution amongst China’s territories (Kennedy & Parker, Building China’s "One Belt, One Road", 2015). This is particularly relevant in terms of maintaining social stability in these restive provinces resentful of Beijing’s rule.. In terms of security and in relation to the economic disparity experienced in western China, there is the issue of national security and human security, as the PRC continues to wrestle with unrest amongst the Tibetan population but in particular Uyghur population in Xinjiang Province, and Beijing is believed to be attempting to allay Uyghur grievances with robust economic growth and higher standards of living through the economic revitalization of the region, as opposed to addressing cultural and religious issues that tie into Islamic extremism (Bhattacharji, 2012). Denying Xinjiang to Islamic extremism is of particular importance to China if it is to expand its influence through the BRI, not only for the sake of national security, but also because the majority of states in. 17.

(23) the regions part of the BRI, including Central Asia, East Africa, and the Middle East, have Islamic majorities, some of which have voiced dissatisfaction with how the PRC has handled the Xinjiang issue (Chen, 2015).. However, the most significant component of Chinese security issues relating to the BRI is that of energy security, which concerns matters of import, securing resources necessary for Chinese economic growth, particularly in energy. The Indian Ocean comprises of eighty percent of the world’s seaborne oil trade (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2014). Russia is attempting to build new pipelines to China to sell gas and oil through its Power of Siberia network as the Russian economy continues to struggle (Cohen, 2015). And Central Asia is a potential exporter of gas, gold, minerals, oil, rare earths, and uranium to China (Pannier, 2015). The BRI is also projected to address the two largest bottlenecks in the oil trade, the Strait of Hormuz and the Malacca Strait, which comprise of forty percent and thirty percent of the world’s seaborne oil trade respectively (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2014). Pipelines and infrastructure networks running into the Persian Gulf from China via Pakistan and/or Central Asia under the Silk Road Economic Belt would address the Strait of Hormuz, whereas the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that connects the Pakistani port city of Gwadar with the Chinese city of Kashgar in Xinjiang Province would provide an overland alternative to the Malacca Strait. These alternatives would provide China extra options in the event of international crises that see these chokepoints under constraint for whatever reason (Ramachandran, 2015).. 18.

(24) In terms of diplomacy, another common argument is that a major component of the BRI is a soft power campaign that can be considered an extension of the “China’s peaceful development” policy implemented by the Hu Jintao administration and the fourth generation PRC leadership in 2003. Aside from trying to portray China’s development as non-threatening, the BRI is also framed as a platform in which China trades low-conditional investments for diplomatic goodwill, as seen by the eagerness of the PRC and the Chinese media to frame such cooperative ventures under the BRI as “win-win” or “mutually beneficial” (Xie, Wang, He, & Yuan, 世界如何共贏?中國正在破題 (Shijieruhegongying Zhongguozhenzaipoti, How Can the World Be Win-Win? China is Answering the Question), 2014). By taking a “business is business” approach to international investments, China has created a different image for itself relative to the U.S. and Russia, where the former often grants investments based on human rights performance whereas the latter does so with geostrategic concerns (Clarke, 2015). These low-condition high-interest Chinese loans are thus considered valuable for funding national infrastructure megaprojects, particularly in Central Asian, South Asian, and East African states, where corruption makes it difficult for the government to remain accountable in accepting these loans, and thus comes fraught with its risks (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015). Of all the states in Central Asia, South Asia, and East Africa, Bhutan is considered by Transparency International as the least corrupt with an index value of 65 (out of 100, where a higher score represents lower perceptions of corruption), but the second least corrupt state of India falls sharply to 38, and the remaining states in these three regions struggle to rise past 30 (Transparency International, 2016). This permits the fostering of closer ties with states in the region, and is also argued. 19.

(25) to be an attempt by Beijing to redirect attention from ongoing political and diplomatic disputes that China has with neighboring states, such as with India, Japan, and Vietnam, particularly in regards to maritime claims in the East and South China Seas; closer economic ties and inter-reliance on Chinese trade is thus a possible solution that Beijing seeks to blunt these political disputes (Yale, 2015).. In terms of geopolitics, the hard power dimension must also be surveyed. With the Maritime Silk Road seen in the light of the maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas, as well as the Sino-Indian rivalry, there are geostrategic components to consider. Fears persist that the Chinese artificial islands in the East and South China Seas, and Chinese investments in ports in the Indian Ocean may be militarized. Key to this perspective, in relation to Chinese energy security concerns, is the “String of Pearls” theory, which suggests that Chinese engagements with foreign ports in the Indian Ocean, while seemingly commercial in nature, could eventually be used for military purposes by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) for the purposes of power projection into the Indian Ocean, with the String of Pearls being used to “strangle” regional rival India with a containment strategy (Marantidou, 2014). China has rejected this theory, insisting that Chinese engagement in the Indian Ocean is not directed against any state, and the Maritime Silk Road may partially be an attempt to replace the narrative of the String of Pearls (Zhou, 2014). However, PLAN vessels docked in the ostensibly commercial Colombo International Container Terminal in Sri Lanka in September and October of 2014, and the PLAN announced plans in November 2015 to establish a naval base in. 20.

(26) Djibouti, thus fueling concerns of a military dimension to the Maritime Silk Road, which has in turn exacerbated Indian concern and cynicism towards the BRI (Aneja, 2014).. Finally, China is attempting to establish institutions such as the AIIB, the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which are not only tied into the BRI, but also considered to be counterweights against equivalents such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which are dominated by the U.S. or its allies (Cossa & Glosserman, 2014). This argument is consistent with some of the rhetoric that the Xi administration has used, such as the insistence that Asian matters should be left for Asians to resolve, thus implying that the U.S. should not interfere with what China regards as its sphere of influence (Blanchard, With one eye on Washington, China plots its own Asia 'pivot', 2014). This is especially pertinent since Chinese domestic literature regard American influence in the Asia-Pacific with scorn, characterizing American involvement in the region as the assumption that they are the “natural leader” of Asia, and similarly lambasts non-Chinese-led institutions such as the ADB as lacking in comprehensive utility (Wang M. , 2015). Such further complicates the circumstances in the Asia-Pacific region in no small part because some Asia-Pacific states look for increased U.S. involvement to counteract against China, provide regional security, resolve disputes over maritime claims and resources, and guarantee their own national interests (Lyon, 2015). Within domestic literature, this is particularly necessary in significant part because of the previous “rebalance to Asia” policy under the Obama administration; although it is questionable as to whether the Trump administration will. 21.

(27) continue to pursue this policy, they are ultimately considered as symptoms of a rival American presence in the Asia-Pacific, forcing China to seek safer geopolitical options in every direction but eastwards (Li & Li, 2015). Furthermore, it speaks to China’s desire to reshape the international system from one dominated primarily by the U.S. to a multipolar system in which China has a more significant say, although domestic literature empathetically rejects the idea of a Chinese-led international system (Wang M. , 2015).. There is thus the argument that the BRI is a component of a wider strategy by China to replace the U.S. as the dominant power in the Asia-Pacific or at least to reduce U.S. influence in the Asia-Pacific through the use of multipolar institutions not dominated by the U.S. (Churchman, 2015). It can thus be said that China is creating a separate economic order through trade infrastructure that it can assert influence through, much in the manner that the U.S. and its allies exert influence and control international trade through the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Bretton Woods system; similarly, it represents a contingency plan to progressively minimize Chinese dependence on an international trade system historically led by the U.S. Even if foreign states taking part in the BRI do not share China’s vision for a different future political landscape, it at least recognizes that China is providing a great deal of funding and investments to accommodate their own domestic infrastructural and economic agendas (Parameswaran, 2017). In this vein, China seems to be attempting to closer ties with the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), even as Russia’s floundering ruble, threatened by Western sanctions in response to Russian involvement in the Ukranian Civil War, makes gas and oil sales to China a priority, which in turn decreases its ability to stop China from. 22.

(28) expanding its influence into Central Asia, long considered by Russia as within its sphere of influence (Gabuev, 2015).. Potential Belt and Road Initiative Goals Geopolitical Diplomatic Circumvent regional disputes Generate goodwill through investments Response to U.S. policy towards Asia Creation of China-centric networks Realignment of influence China’s peaceful rise Security Socioeconomic Energy security Alleviation of production overcapacity Need for blue-water navy Economic reform and transformation Regional stability Wealth distribution to inland regions. It bears repeating that the above suggestions for Chinese motivations behind the BRI are not mutually exclusive, and much in the literature about the BRI suggests that these goals are being pursued in tandem with each other. The question the thesis seeks to ask instead is which of the proposed motivation is most important and pertinent to the Chinese fifth-generation leadership under the Xi administration. As an administration of significant political power not seen since the Deng Xiaoping era, the Xi administration potentially retains a unified comprehensive vision and policy set to address Chinese concerns, as opposed to a variety of smaller policies born from consensus-based decisionmaking. This is especially relevant since the BRI is acknowledged to possess components that address Chinese domestic concerns, such as domestic industrial overproduction and wealth inequality. And to ascertain these concerns, it also becomes vital to examine Xi Jinping’s domestic, wide-encompassing policy: The Chinese Dream.. 23.

(29) Chapter 2.2 – The Chinese Dream Although the origins of the term predate its actual usage by the fifth-generation of PRC leadership under the Xi administration, the “Chinese Dream” in the scope of the Chinese political vocabulary is ultimately closely associated to Xi Jinping, who used the slogan in late 2013, shortly before attaining the office of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China. Until the BRI became the centerpiece for foreign policy under the Xi administration, the Chinese Dream functioned as the blueprint for the fifthgeneration of PRC leadership in the same way the “Three Represents” encompassed policymaking in the Jiang Zemin administration and the “Scientific Outlook on Development” encompassed policymaking in the Hu Jintao administration. However, in terms of the policymaking context, the “Chinese Dream” is unique in that it was proposed early in the Xi administration’s ascension to the reins of power; this is in comparison to the “Three Represents”, which was proposed by Jiang Zemin as his own leadership was coming to an end and was largely meant as a contribution to Chinese socialist theory, and to the “Scientific Outlook on Development”, which Hu Jintao failed to follow up with any distinctive policy decision relating to his vision, and was largely regarded as a “joke” (Wang Z. , 2013).. There are two ideals associated with the Chinese Dream. First and foremost is recurring theme of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”, which is typically understood to be the restoration of China’s status as a great power prior to the “century of humiliation” that saw it brought low by Western states and Japan. The second and relatively less well-known ideal is “the yearning for a good and beautiful life”, generally. 24.

(30) understood to be the increase of the standard of living for Chinese citizens. Although arguably structured mostly for domestic consumption, slogans are a key aspect of Chinese policymaking, or at least key to the affirmation of such policies in the public consciousness, in that it provides a justification and narrative by which the CPC may demand compliance and action from its citizenry. Like many Chinese policy slogans, the “Chinese Dream” was initially kept vague; while “rejuvenation” was a consistent theme in all interpretations of the Chinese Dream, neither Xi Jinping, his administration, or the CPC leadership had clarified the conditions required for the fulfillment of this national rejuvenation, and so an understanding of the Chinese Dream was reliant on third-party interpretations (The Economist, 2013). Increasingly, however, domestic political literature promoted by the CPC began to draw attention to the “Four Comprehensives” outlined by the Xi administration. Incrementally developed from 2012 to 2015, the Four Comprehensives include “comprehensively build a moderately prosperous society” during the 18th Party Congress in 2012, “comprehensively deepen reform” during the 3rd Central Committee Plenary Session in 2013, “comprehensively strictly govern the Party” during an October 2014 meeting for the Mass Line Campaign, and “comprehensively govern the nation according to law” during the 4th Central Committee Plenary Session in October 2014 (Ma, 2014). The CPC has assigned particular significance to the Four Comprehensives, framing them as “strategic guidelines” for achieving the Chinese Dream. In other words, the Four Comprehensives are the blueprint by which to achieve the Two Centenary Goals, which include the creation of a “moderately prosperous society” by 2020 by doubling the 2010 per capita income, and the creation of “a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, and. 25.

(31) harmonious” by 2049. Subsequently, the Two Centenary Goals are the benchmarks by which the Chinese Dream will be completely realized (Qu, 2015). These are essentially socioeconomic explanations that tie into the well-being of Chinese society.. • • • •. • •. • •. Four Comprehensives Comprehensively build a moderately prosperous society Comprehensively deepen reform Comprehensively govern the nation according to law Comprehensively strictly govern the Party. Two Centenary Goals Create a “moderately prosperous society” by doubling 2010 GDP by 2020 Create a “modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, and harmonious” by 2049. Chinese Dream The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation The yearning for a good and beautiful life. English-language academic literature examines the Chinese Dream under several other dimensions. Looking at Xi Jinping himself, the current president of China has been characterized as both a Chinese nationalist and a staunch believer in the CPC (Kaufman, 2015). Although some of the claims made by the CPC’s media apparatuses are of dubious veracity, they nonetheless serve as a useful indicator of Chinese designs and goals for 26.

(32) their policies, and coverage of the Chinese Dream in relation to Xi Jinping as a nationalist and a believer in the CPC would suggest a desire to rekindle Sino-Asian pride, and thus a recovery from the national trauma inflicted by the century of humiliation, as well as the legitimization of the CPC as the only organization that can facilitate this restoration of Chinese pride. This has become increasingly pertinent as China asserts itself in the international sphere, striving to maintain the image of political empowerment as the country faces a slowdown to its previous phenomenal economic growth; the goal is to produce a “Strong”, “Civilized”, “Harmonious”, and “Beautiful” China (Kuhn, 2013). Thus, under these perspectives, the Chinese Dream is not just a promise for socioeconomic health, but also a promise of an increase in geopolitical status to once again place China in a position of advantage in Asia as it once was during its imperial era.. The second ideal of the Chinese Dream, the increased standard of living for Chinese citizens, is at least partially in line with the political and structural background behind the Chinese Dream, as a significant component of the Chinese Dream is nested within one of the CPC’s major claims to legitimacy and its social contract with the Chinese citizenry, that the CPC remains the sole arbiter of politics in China so long as they provide economic benefits to the Chinese people (Kuhn, 2013). Structurally and politically, this is linked to the years 2020 and 2021, which will mark the first of China’s “Two Centenary Goals”; to commemorate the hundredth anniversary of the CPC in 2021, the 18th Party Congress in 2012, the same congress that saw Xi rise to the position of China’s head of state, gave a surprisingly specific set of goals to achieve by 2020 (Tiezzi, Why 2020 Is a Make-or-Break Year for China, 2015). This includes the promise of a. 27.

(33) “moderately prosperous society”, specified as a doubling of per capita income from 2010, a daunting goal considering the increasingly unequal distribution of wealth in China and the societal unrest that comes with it (Xinhua, 2012). These goals are also of significant relevance to the Xi administration, as his likely second terms as general secretary and president are projected to end in 2022 and 2023, respectively, and thus the fulfillment of the first centenary goal is functionally dependent on the actions of his administration. The Chinese Dream can thus be interpreted as the operationalization of the goal the Xi administration was tasked in from the very beginning. In the shorter term, Xi has also had to contend with the 12th Five Year Plan established by the Hu administration as a blueprint for China’s economic future, and Xi will also have to adhere to the 13th Five Year Plan (The Economist, 2013). This is also in line with Xi’s “Made in China 2025” project, which is intended to transform China from the “world’s factory” into a “world manufacturing power”, shifting the emphasis from the manufacturing and exporting of low-end commodities to that of high-end commodities and technologies. This is a move perceived to have been made in response to decreased manufacturing demand, increased international competition, and slowing economic growth (Tiezzi, The Belt and Road: China's Economic Lifeline?, 2015).. The encouragement of Chinese individuals to strive for personal attainment under the framework of a strong state, combined with the structural frameworks guiding Chinese development over the next decade, is particularly relevant to the transformation of China from an investment-based economy to a consumption-based one, a goal shared with one of the proposed motivations of the BRI. The aforementioned social contract that. 28.

(34) allows the CPC to be the sole arbiter of China’s political destiny has been based on stellar economic growth, but as that growth has slowed, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the CPC to claim legitimacy based on economics alone. Such can be seen in the light of increased dissatisfaction towards social issues in China that include but are not limited to corruption amongst social and political elites, the dominance of state-owned enterprises (SOE) in the Chinese economy, the widening rich-poor gap as a result of previous development policies, low GDP per capita, and environmental concerns in rapid urban development (Kuhn, 2013). Party ideology and socialism have proven to be poor substitutes for economic growth; an online poll conducted by the People’s Daily, the mouthpiece for the CPC, revealed that eighty percent of three thousand respondents indicated that they did not support one-party rule or socialism, a result that was so embarrassing to the CPC that the poll was quickly taken down (The Economist, 2013). As such, while it is unlikely that the Xi administration will relinquish its claim to the political legitimacy of the CPC, the social angle is also being aggressively pursued as a replacement for economics in the Chinese social contract.. Given China’s century of humiliation, it was first believed that the Chinese Dream prioritized “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” over “the yearning for a good and beautiful life”, elevating the empowerment of the state over the empowerment of the people; after all, one of the major lessons derived from the national trauma is argument that the state, above all else, is the primary guarantor of the standard of living for the average Chinese individual. In other words, any increase in the standard of living of the average Chinese individual is conditional on the power of China as a state (Shi, 中. 29.

(35) 國夢區別於美國夢的七大特徵 (Zhongguomeng Qubieyu Meiguomeng Qidatezheng, The Seven Major Differences Between the Chinese Dream and the American Dream), 2013). However, domestic literature has increasingly drawn links between “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and “the yearning for a good and beautiful life”, at least in terms of using the Four Comprehensives as a metric, of which guidelines can be seen from the “The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform” adopted by the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee, which share goals in terms of being able to construct a “moderately prosperous society” (Qu, 2015).. Increasingly, the Chinese Dream is taking on a dimension not associated only with the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by becoming not only a “strong”, “civilized”, “harmonious”, and “beautiful” Asian state, but also with the perception that the Chinese people themselves as individuals may now reap the rewards of China’s economic growth through an increasingly equal society with a higher per capita income and an increased sense of pride in their own country, which in turn translates to international respect, a reversal from the “century of humiliation”. This carries implications in terms of security in the form of social stability, particularly in China’s western provinces, and diplomacy, in terms of being able to attain the respect China believes it deserves from the international community; however, the Chinese Dream is most obviously tied into socioeconomic and geopolitical dimensions, especially in terms of China’s ability to create a more stable economy, to form a more equal society, and to consolidate its place within the international political economic system with regards to manufacturing and. 30.

(36) trade. As the following chapters will explain, these elements create a significant overlap within which the goals of the fifth-generation leadership can be analyzed.. 31.

(37) Chapter 3 – Geopolitical Considerations of Chinese Policy This chapter examines the geopolitical considerations of Chinese policy, especially in how it pertains to the BRI. This chapter is thus divided into two sections. The first section will discuss the common understandings of land power versus sea power, and how Chinese policymaking is largely focused on the former rather than the latter. The second section will delve into China’s ambitions with regards to engaging in Eurasia, and the strategies contained therein, especially with regards to railways and trade. These sections are vital for establishing the context in which Chinese leadership, regardless of generation, have made and will continue to make decisions with regards to policy, and domestic and international development, especially with regards to the BRI’s scope in Eurasia.. Chapter 3.1 – China as a Land Power Beijing has repeatedly insisted that the BRI, initially referred to as just “One Belt, One Road” in Chinese, is an “initiative” and not a “strategy”, and has in fact also explicitly discouraged the use of the words “project, program, or agenda”. Regardless of the preferred terminology, the BRI hopes to attain a vast reach over the Eurasian continent and the Indian Ocean, thus carrying significant geopolitical implications that should be seen through geopolitical lenses. The issues facing China itself which would allegedly be addressed by the BRI also play into an analysis of Chinese geopolitics, such as with regards to its energy security through the sea lines of communication or the economic inequality between its coastal and inland regions. By admission of its own. 32.

(38) domestic academia in spite of the insistence by the PRC that the initiative is not a geopolitical strategy, the BRI possesses and requires geopolitical and strategic considerations, such as with regards to land power and sea power (Li & Li, 2015). When analyzing the BRI and taking note of the two primary components, the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt and the sea-based Maritime Silk Road, it is not difficult to cast the initiative against the debate of land power versus sea power, especially given the context of the objectives of both China and the BRI.. The most prominent proponent of sea power was U.S. Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914), who argued in several books, most prominently The Influence of Sea Power on History which coined the term “sea power” in the study of modern international relations, that control of the seas translates to power. Describing the sea as “a great highway; or better, perhaps, of a wide common”, then-Captain Mahan pointed out that the costs and speed of transportation has always been more efficient in maritime trade when compared to overland trade, and that the basis of international trade was thus tied closely to merchant fleets transporting goods across both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans with a navy of sufficient power to grant safe passage (Mahan, 1890).. By contrast, the most prominent proponent of land power was British scholar Halford John Mackinder (1861-1947), who established the Heartland Theory, most prominently in the article “The Geographical Pivot of History”, which became the basis of the understanding of land power in international relations. The eponymous Heartland includes a significant part of Russia, but also prominently includes Central Asia; its. 33.

(39) central position to the “World Island” of Europe, Asia, and Africa would afford access to and control over resources of all three continents. Mackinder had, in fact, argued at the end of “The Geographical Pivot of History” that any possible Chinese expansion “might constitute the yellow peril to the world’s freedom just because they would add an oceanic frontage to the resources of the great continent, an advantage as yet denied to the Russian tenant of the pivot region” (Mackinder, 1904).. (Pieraccini, 2016). Before considering whether China qualifies as a land power or sea power, it is important to understand the fundamentals of its modern geopolitics. Historically, imperial dynastic China was concentrated along the coast east of the fifteen-inch isohyet line, where abundant rainfall and favorable agricultural conditions allowed the Han ethnic group to grow in the eastern third of China. By contrast, the lands northwest of this Han heartland, occupying modern-day western China, are populated by groups considered Chinese ethnic minorities today. These regions were of great strategic and military 34.

(40) interest to imperial China, in part because nomadic civilizations such as the Mongols would periodically go to war against imperial China. However, it is also because the mountainous regions further inland functioned as a buffer zone against threats further inland, which China had traditionally and institutionally considered to be of greater concern (Stratfor, 2012).. The Qing dynasty eventually came to control the hinterlands, but the geographical circumstances of western China ensured that they were much poorer than the coastal east, leading to inequality and social unrest, especially in the aftermath of the invasions of China in the 19th and 20th centuries. The aggravation of this issue provided the context in which Mao Zedong and the Communist Party of China were able to garner support in China’s inland regions through the 1930’s, which would in turn ensure their victory in the Chinese Civil War. Conscious of the circumstances that gave to its rise, the CPC has thus typically been conscious of the importance of creating socioeconomic equality between coastal China and inland China, and continues to be a geopolitical imperative for the PRC (Stratfor, 2012).. Even after the Opium Wars that devastated Chinese power in the 19th century, the first time China had been truly threatened by naval invasion relative to Japan’s unsuccessful invasion of the Korean peninsula, the Qing dynasty favored wresting Ili in Xinjiang from Russian influence over countering an encroaching Japanese presence in the Korean peninsula, prioritizing inland China over coastal China (Fairbank, 1969). And even after a devastating Japanese invasion from the sea during the Sino-Japanese Wars. 35.

(41) and while fighting the Kuomintang during the Chinese Civil War, the Communist Party of China focused on securing control of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, and eventually, after the civil war, Xinjiang and Tibet (Stratfor, 2012). Chinese dynasties regarded the inland regions through a military-strategic lens, while the PRC is beholden to political and economic imperatives in the region; regardless, modern China over the last two centuries has consistently considered its inland regions to be of vital geopolitical importance, especially in terms of ejecting non-Chinese or non-CPC influence, often more so than powerful maritime threats, at least until recently.. As such, historically, China has primarily been considered as a land power. As the head of the imperial Chinese tributary system, China focused on its continental neighbors for trade, most prominently Korea and Vietnam, and the ancient original overland Silk Road remains China’s most well-known trade effort (Kang, 2010). In fact, land power is considered the basis by which Chinese dynasties maintained its imperial tributary system, which maintained a relatively stable order amongst China and its surrounding “barbarians”, and was vital for the development of the late Chinese imperial state as a trade power, in contrast to the U.S. being an economic power (Li & Li, 2015). While China has never directly controlled the eponymous heartland of Central Asia, its dynasties have historically attempted to exert either influence or direct control over modern-day Tibet and Xinjiang at the periphery of Central Asia, sometimes at the cost of sea power. By contrast, with the exception of Zheng He’s trade voyages under the Ming dynasty in the 15th century, there have been few prominent instances of Chinese naval adventures, especially not for the projection of power. The prominent naval forces. 36.

(42) developed during the Song dynasty to resist the Mongol invasion were appropriated by the Mongol-led Yuan dynasty, but would eventually be scrapped under the Ming dynasty to focus on defending against continued inland threats once again (Fairbank, 1969). In more contemporary times, Chinese designs for becoming a maritime power are also hampered, despite having a coastline that stretches for almost fifteen thousand kilometers, by geography; the Chinese coastline is surrounded by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and various Southeast Asian states, many of which form the “first island chain” and, despite robust economic and trade relations, harbor a sense of varying degrees of wariness towards Chinese political ambitions in the region, which could hamper Chinese regional goals (Kaplan, 2010). It is telling that even the most prominent domestic proponents of Chinese sea power recognize that Chinese sea power is and will be fundamentally limited by China’s inherent geographical realities (Zhang W. , 2003).. Mackinder’s Heartland Theory found purchase through much of the 20th century, in both World Wars and then during the Cold War, where a counter or at least containment of Russian power was persistently sought by the West. However, there is today an inclination within the international relations discipline to favor Mahan’s theory of sea power over Mackinder’s theory of land power, in no doubt helped by the victory of American sea power over Russian land power at the end of the Cold War and the capability of the United States to control international trade through the Navy’s dominance across the world’s oceans, and the navy’s ability to deter attacks from overseas (Friedman, The Next 100 Years, 2009). Having learned from these lessons, there are also signs that China is seeking an increase in their own sea power. There has. 37.

(43) been an increasing trend of consciousness within the PRC in general and the People’s Liberation Army Navy in particular which speaks of a need to safeguard China’s maritime interests in order to guarantee its prosperity (Zhang W. , 2012). Continuing feuds with neighboring states over control of the South China Sea remain one of the most significant items in international relations with regards to China. The commissioning of China’s first aircraft carrier Liaoning in 2012 spoke clearly of China’s intentions of joining the club of countries with aircraft carriers. Xi Jinping himself stated to the Politburo in July 2013 that China needed to “continually do more to promote China’s efforts to become a maritime power” (Martinson, 2015).. However, the argument of land power versus sea power is not necessarily a universalist debate. Mackinder’s Heartland Theory in its original form was written from the perspective of British policy towards Eurasia, a premise difficult to apply to the United States an ocean away, which used the Heartland Theory mostly as a basis of a strategy to contain Russia as opposed to attaining power. Similarly, a landlocked country such as Switzerland would have little stake in the theories of sea power. Xi’s insistence to the Politburo that China needs to “become a maritime power” further supports the view that the Chinese leadership does not actually consider the country at present to be a maritime power; it would thus not be difficult to argue that China is and has historically been a land power, nor would it be difficult to argue that China would continue to play to their strengths at present, especially given the term limits of the Xi administration.. 38.

(44) This is not to diminish the importance of China’s maritime ambitions, nor to diminish the position that the Maritime Silk Road plays in the BRI. There is every indication that the Chinese fifth-generation leadership is determined to transform China into a maritime power for its security interests. There has been a change of thinking as early as 2012 that suggested that China has devoted too much emphasis on “maintaining stability” with its neighbors, and that it instead needs to maintain its maritime rights instead (Wang & Luo, 國際體系轉型與中國周邊外交之變:從維穩到維權 (Guojitixi Zhuanxing Yu Zhongguo Zhoubianwaijiao Zhibian: Cong Weiwen Dao Weiquan, The Transformation of the International System and Changes to China's Peripheral Diplomacy: From Maintaining Stability to Maintaining Rights), 2013). However, from the perspective of the fifth-generation leadership, the goals of the Silk Road Economic Belt are more imminently and immediately achievable compared to the Maritime Silk Road, which should be considered a long-term, cross-generational investment. Unless the Xi administration breaks traditions, the fifth-generation leadership of the PRC will be stepping down in 2023 after serving two five-year terms, with Xi ending his second term as general secretary in November 2022 and as president in March 2023.. While no specific metric has been officially and publicly proposed by the PRC as to the milestones or extent to which the PRC intends to develop its sea power, the domestic academic literature in China, particularly that of the Chinese “sea power school”, provides several hints. To facilitate China’s “peaceful rise” or “peaceful rejuvenation”, the development of Chinese sea power should primarily be focused on safeguarding the sovereignty of the PRC. However, such literature, such as from. 39.

(45) prominent Chinese sea power proponent Zhang Wenmu, concedes that while Chinese sea power should always be “limited” to self-defense, it has the “unlimited” scope of China’s overseas interests, especially when safeguarding China’s increasingly important energy security, and that such sea power is fundamentally military in nature. This includes not only the goals of “national unification” to break the first island chain that “contains” China from the Pacific Ocean, but also to guarantee Chinese energy imports that come in mostly from the Indian Ocean (Zhang W. , 2003). Furthermore, it is suggested that for China to develop sea power, it must have both military sea power, denoting a state’s wartime naval capabilities, and comprehensive sea power, which encompasses political and economic factors; a state cannot have one without the other (Zhang W. , 2012). Putting aside the geopolitical dimensions of sea power that the Xi administration desperately wishes to avoid when speaking of the BRI, if the Maritime Silk Road represents China’s hope to develop comprehensive sea power, then contemporary Chinese literature on the subject insists that there must also exist a security and military element, specifically in the form of the People’s Liberation Army Navy, and especially against possible unfriendly U.S. action.. The People’s Liberation Army Navy faces limitations in its goals of creating a naval buffer zone beyond China’s shores and guaranteeing energy security in the Indian Ocean through which it receives most of its energy imports. With the former, China faces polities wary of its increasing influence, including Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, among others, most of which are aligned with the United States. With the latter, Chinese power projection into the Indian Ocean, which must contend with a regional rival in the. 40.