General consensus amongst academic, business, and governmental circles is that the 21st century will be an “Asian century”, and the phenomenal rise of China puts the country at the center of the “Asian century” (Asian Development Bank, 2011). As such, international engagements with China will require an understanding of what appears to be the most ambitious and significant Chinese foreign policy campaign to date, which will continue to influence how bilateral and multilateral ties with the PRC is defined, even as China explicitly aims to become, by its standards, a developed country and a “moderately prosperous society”.
The BRI has been heavily promoted by the Xi administration, and seems to synergize with previous policies such as the “Chinese Dream”, the “new model of great power relations”, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). It comes at a complicated time when the PRC is attempting to establish itself as a modern powerhouse in the international community, but faces signs of an economic slowdown, a decrease in their currency reserves, vulnerabilities in its economic structures, and a dilemma of overproduction in certain industrial fields (Rudolf, China’s ‘Silk Road’ Initiative Is at Risk of Failure, 2015). From the foreign relations front, China not only contends with various Asia-Pacific states over maritime territorial claims in the East and South China Seas, but also with the perception that China’s rise is an ongoing threat to their national interests and security (Feng & Cheng, 國際社會對"一帶一路"倡議的評價 (Guojishehui Dui Yidaiyiluchangyi De Pingjia, The International Community's Evaluation of the "One Belt, One Road" Initiative), 2014). Further afield, China must also contend with the
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American presence and commitments in the Asia-Pacific, which was initially emblematic of the Obama administration’s “rebalance to the Asia-Pacific”, the shift in United States foreign policy previously nicknamed the “pivot to Asia”. Although where or not the Trump administration is still pursuing this strategy is in question, that neighboring Asian states wary of China’s rise, some of which are traditional U.S. allies, are hoping for an increased American presence is unlikely to have changed (Lang, 2015).
Although marketed as a platform in which to pursue “win-win” solutions, the BRI is, by virtue of it being governmental policy, fundamentally a self-serving initiative that either seeks to promote Chinese interests or to address dilemmas facing the country.
Although the specifics of the BRI continues to be ambiguous and vague, understanding the dilemmas that China faces can lend a vital perspective to how the PRC itself may view the BRI and its actual goals. Significant amounts of academic research have gone into examining the components of the BRI, with the motives and geopolitical interests of the PRC extrapolated from actual individual phenomena, such as through the lenses of data of economics, security, and trade, as well as combinations thereof. These are highly essential methods of analysis and will be used in this research. However, comparatively less research has been done on the BRI from the perspective of the policies the Xi administration. Furthermore, while risk analyses have been done by academics and other research groups from the perspective of foreign states considering investments into the BRI, comparatively less research has been done in the internal risk assessments from the perspective of the PRC.
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A possible explanation for this imbalance might be explained by the relative opaqueness of policymaking in the PRC, and what may be perceived as a tendency for the domestic academia in China to reflect the optimism of their national initiative; while acknowledging that challenges exist, Chinese academic literature almost always maintains praise of China’s ruling leaders and almost never casts doubt upon their decision-making. Even less research has been done in connecting the BRI with existing policy under Xi’s leadership, especially with the “Chinese Dream” policy, touted as the hallmark of the Xi administration yet regarded as mostly a set of domestic policies but with international implications. It is within this gap that this thesis positions itself.
The ambitious scope of the BRI demands attention due in significant part to its implications, real or imagined, that have or will affect the policies of regions affected by its long reach. Southeast Asian economies are increasingly tied to Chinese trade. Central Asian, South Asian, and East African states are taking increasing amounts of Chinese loans and infrastructure projects to develop their own domestic growth agendas. India and Russia are wary of increasing Chinese influence on their continent, and Europe and the United States are cautious about how this Chinese megaproject will affect the global economy and international trade. The BRI, whether intentionally or not, concerns much of the world, and the age-old dilemma of realism casts uncertainty and doubt upon Chinese intentions. It would be an understatement to say that an understanding of the BRI’s goals and motivations is vital.
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There is a degree of difficulty in extrapolating actual government policy from statements, policies, and their manifestations due to the aforementioned opaqueness of the policymaking process in the PRC. It is further made difficult by official government policies and rhetoric sometimes being at odds with facts on the ground, as well as the ongoing situation regarding the BRI, which has been defined as an evolving platform.
However, China has inherent geopolitical and strategic interests that are likely to inform decision-making in Beijing, which can ultimately be compared against existing analyses of the BRI. Furthermore, although the means and mechanisms of Chinese policy goals remains ever opaque, the fifth-generation leadership has increasingly announced specific metrics by which to judge the success of these aforementioned goals. Such components can be viewed through and compared against an assessment of risks facing the PRC, which lends further insights into what the BRI aims to achieve.
Ultimately, this thesis argues that while the Maritime Silk Road is aimed at addressing Chinese security issues, it is ultimately the Silk Road Economic Belt that is the centerpiece of the BRI for the fifth-generation leadership, and that it is a strategy that uses international measures to resolve domestic issues, particularly that of socioeconomic reform. This thesis also seeks to examine the inherent risks associated with the BRI, especially from the potential perspective of the fifth-generation leadership, which include not only international concerns such as the political unreliability of some of its projected partners in the BRI blueprint and its inability to convince neighboring states that its intentions are peaceful, but also more important domestic issues that stem from the increasing necessity of reform, the economic slowdown, and the social troubles that come
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with these. This thesis does not, however, seek to assess the likelihood of success of the BRI from any dimension.