China has been one of Iran's main supporters at the UNSC. Beijing's calls to avoid sanctions against Tehran have been but one example of the deeper relations between the two countries, as is Iran's bid to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation set up by China.
In recent years, Iran has been encouraged to «Look East»25 (reminiscent of India's «Look East»
policy), due to Western pressure and sanctions. This has opened both trade and strategic
opportunities for China there. US companies are prohibited from doing trade with Iran, and things have only got worse recently, with EU companies also retreating from the country, opening the breach wide for China (and India). In 2006, Iran became China's first source of imported oil; China also gained a spot in the Iranian arms market during the Iran-Iraq war. Two major deals, one in 1992, the other in 1996, made China Iran's second supplier of conventional arms (after Russia) between 1995 and 2005. However, these made up only eighteen per cent of the total value of Iran's arm imports; nothing China has sold to Iran has affected the conventional military balance in the region.
It is China's contributions in the form of scientific expertise, as well as dual use technologies, that have proved the most useful.
There are three broad areas of concern when it comes to China and Iran's military/weapons
cooperation. First, China's assistance in the development of Iran's asymmetric capacity, specifically of the kind that might interfere with Gulf shipping and/or disrupt/damage American naval
25 Calabrese, J. (2006) China and Iran: Partners Perfectly Mismatched, Middle East Institute, p. 4
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operations; in 1987, China sold Iran Silkworm antiship missiles. Second, China's sale to Iran of battlefield and cruise missiles, as well as production technology. This has since stopped because of US pressure; in 1987 China pledged to abide by the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines, in 1989 it banned the export of ground to ground missiles as well as all MTCR class missiles, and in 2000 it issued export control laws governing missile technologies.
Third, China's trade and cooperation with Iran in the domain of nuclear technology. China allegedly trained Iranian nuclear scientists in the eighties, and helped build the nuclear research facility at Isfahan, although this also ended in the nineties faced with US pressure. Nonetheless, the issue since 2002 is the political support China has offered Tehran, in the face of increasing international pressure.
Chinese nuclear diplomacy abides by three principles: no intervention in the domestic affairs of another country, no nuclear proliferation, and no disruption of energy supplies from the Middle East.
China unsurprisingly emphasizes Iran's right to civilian nuclear energy under the NPT and publicly contests Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons. As they maintain that negotiations via dialogue and consultations are the only way to solve this issue, they are quick to praise any Iranian cooperation;
in the past, it has also expressed support for EU (and Russian) diplomatic initiatives; in 2006, China agreed to UNSC resolution 169626, that gave Iran one month to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities; after Iran failed to halt uranium enrichment China finally voted with the majority of the IAEA Board of Governors in favour of referral to the UNSC, and fell in line with the majority once more at the UNSC for the passing of resolution 1737 that officially sanctioned Iran.
Resolution 1737 blocked the import/export of sensitive nuclear materials and equipment, while also freezing the assets of persons and entities supporting Iranian proliferation-sensitive nuclear
activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery programs. Once more, Iran did not comply, so in 2007 UNSC resolution 174727 banned Iranian arms exports, and froze the assets and restricted the travel of additional individuals engaged in the country's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
26 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm 27 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8980.doc.htm
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Beijing however will not endorse economic sanctions, for fear of jeopardizing itself or opening the door to any possibility of the use of force. It also insists that Iran should be dealt with in the
framework of the IAEA, possibly either to avoid the Western bias of the UNSC, or the stronger sanctions that would be suggested by a referral to it. Either way, this is evidently aimed at keeping Iran out of the UNSC and thus both protecting its economic assets in the country, and avoiding running afoul of the US.
While Iran, considering China, has the one aim – winning Beijing's support and thus dividing the major powers – China's considerations in this matter are far more varied. China first seeks to protect its energy interests in the country. It is also opposed to what it deems «power politics», the use of sanctions or force, which increases its sympathy towards Iran, already present since Iran is a developing country faced with Western pressure, which is something China tends to identify with.
China also believes, as do Russia and certain members of the EU, that too much pressure on Tehran is likely to backfire. China moreover wants to cultivate the image of a «responsible stakeholder» in the international community and needs to keep a stable relationship with the US. Additionally, China has come to accept global arms control and non-proliferation norms (particularly for the advantage they give China itself), and so does not approve of an Iran with nuclear weapons. China opposes Iran's objective of acquiring nuclear weapons for fear of its destabilizing effects in the region, but still wants to ensure unfettered economic cooperation with the country for its own economic development and therefore its own stability. Finally, Beijing wants to ensure that its support for Tehran does not jeopardize its relations with Iran's Arab neighbours (possible profitable relationships) which is why it issued a communiqué in support of a nuclear-free Middle East. If China sides with Western powers against Iran, this has a great possibility of damaging its relations with other developing countries and energy partners, such as Sudan, Venezuela or Angola, which would damage both its economic relations and China's perception of itself as a leader of the developing world. China also needs good relations with the EU to expand trade and investment, obtain market-economy status, and persuade it to lift the arms embargo enacted in 1989.
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Furthermore, going against the EU (and the US) in the matter of Iran could tarnish China's international image, precisely when it is trying to position itself as a responsible great power.
The energy cooperation between the two countries mostly consists of the export of large quantities of crude Iranian oil to China. In April 2007, China replaced the EU as Iran's largest petroleum trade partner28; Iran was the third largest oil exporter to China in 2009 after Saudi Arabia and Angola – this would make Iran account for about fifteen per cent of China's annual oil consumption. The Iranians have often been unimpressed by Western economic sanctions since according to them, there are always secondary markets for Iranian resources, namely China or India. The Iranian energy industry badly needs foreign investment and technology, but China's total investments are dwarfed by Iran's investment needs. Furthermore, China's investment in overseas oil is extremely diversified, not concentrated in Iran; as of late it has been shifting towards Africa and Central Asia29, away from the Persian Gulf and the risks, as well as the uncertainties, associated with deeply
anchored American military power, local instability, and the maritime transportation of oil. China is also not as useful as Iran would need it to be as a supplier of advanced energy technology, since Chinese firms are lagging behind their Western counterparts.
Trade with Iran is only a very small part of China's overall trade, but China is Iran's second largest trade partner. If trade with Iran is however such a small part of Chinese trade, it must be that economic matters are not China's main motivator in siding with Iran, which would be surprising.
Furthermore, as one of Iran's largest trade partners, China has far more clout than it used to with Iran.
28 Liu, J. and Wu, L. (2010) Key Issues in China-Iran Relations, Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, Vol.4, n°1, p. 45
29 As EU bans Syrian oil, China, India likely to fill void, The Globe And Mail (2011, September 4) http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/africa-mideast/as-eu-bans-syrian-oil-china-india-likely-to-fill-void/article2153476/ accessed May 12, 2012
China, Kazakhstan Sign Loan-for-Oil Deal, Wall Street Journal (2009, April 18) http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123996097676128865.html accessed May 12, 2012 Nigeria, China Sign Major Oil Deal, Wall Street Journal (2010, May 15)
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703460404575243892823004542.html accessed May 12, 2012
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China does not want to have to take a stand; the best way for it to avoid this is to keep the UNSC from taking action in the first place. The best way to attain this objective would be to get Iran to be more cooperative and open with the IAEA. Beijing does seem to find it difficult to believe that Iran will actually pose a threat.