nternational cooperation: European needs and Chinese reluctance

As noted before, the Iranian crisis debuted in 2002. In 2003, the IAEA inspectors visited Iran and confirmed the existence of nuclear facilities; the EU then suspended the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) negotiations with Iran. In November of the same year, Iran submitted a “full”

declaration about its nuclear programme to the IAEA; after negotiations in Tehran, the E-3 ministers signed an agreement through which Iran agreed to suspend its enrichment programme in exchange for further negotiations, agreed to sign the Additional Protocol and to adhere to the Protocol in the meantime.

2003 seems to have been somewhat of a watershed year for the EU, since that same year it also implemented the European Security Strategy (ESS) and adopted the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (which advocates effective multilateralism, the

15 Harnisch, S. (2007): Minilateral Cooperation and Transatlantic Coalition-Building: The E3/EU-3 Iran Initiative, European Security, 16:1, p. 6

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promotion of stable international and regional environments, and cooperation with partners), and entered in a Strategic Partnership with China. The EU implemented its Non Proliferation Clause the next year.

In 2004, the E-3 and Iran entered into the “Paris Agreement”; the EU promised to resume the TCA negotiations as soon as Iran confirmed the suspension of its nuclear activities. The agreement included the renewal of the suspension of the Iranian nuclear programme, and under Chinese and Russian pressure, the IAEA board of governors agreed that the suspension could be voluntary instead of legally binding.

This would seem to have been a major step forward; however, before this the IAEA warned that the Iranian declaration on its nuclear activities was incomplete, and that Iran was not fulfilling its obligations, even though in early years it seemed to be cooperating.

Unfortunately, the EU went from mediator to coercer sometime around the end of 2004, at which time it closed the option of limited enrichment for Iran under American pressure¹⁶ ; then, in 2006, the EU drafted the resolution that would move the Iranian file to the UNSC. Furthermore the ideas offered by groups such as the International Crisis Group (ICG), MIT experts or the Atlantic Council, who all proposed technological solutions that would accept limited uranium enrichment or

multilateral fuel production inside Iran, were ignored. It is unclear why these proposals were not considered, but one may suspect US involvement, or simple over-confidence on the EU side, believing that Iran would give in after UNSC sanctions, since they had managed to get China and Russia on board this time.

In 2005, Ahmadinejad won the Iranian elections, rejected the EU proposals, and started to convert uranium, an act which was seen as the transgression of a «red line» by the EU. At this point, the EU succeeded in convincing China and Russia not to veto the IAEA resolution that would formally state Iran was in non-compliance with IAEA statutes and that warned Iran that it had until the next

16 Sauer, T. (2008): Struggling on the World Scene: An Overambitious EU versus a Committed Iran, European Security, 17:2-3, p. 288

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meeting of the IAEA to fulfill its obligations, otherwise its file would be transferred to the UNSC.

This is the moment at which the EU resolved to only resume negotiations with Iran if it suspended its enrichment programme completely.

After its file was sent to the UNSC in February 2006, Iran suspended its voluntary cooperation with the IAEA, accelerated its enrichment programme and announced that it had succeeded in enriching uranium up to 3.5 per cent. In May, the EU succeeded in persuading the US to negotiate with Iran, something unheard of since 1979, although only on the condition that Iran first suspend its

enrichment programme; the EU also managed to convince the US, China and Russia to agree on a new common package for Iran, that included a UNSC resolution that would open the door for sanctions if Iran did not agree.

In October, the DPRK carried out a nuclear test, which likely made all players more nervous. It is possible that this influenced China in favour of UNSC resolutions on Iran, so as to show the DPRK that it was not completely averse to them, and that certain things would not pass. The ministers of every EU member state then agreed to continue talks on Iran inside the UNSC about sanctions against Iran, even though China and Russia were still opposing economic sanctions and military action.

At the end of 2006, UNSC resolution 1737¹⁷ was finally passed; it contained limited economic sanctions, a ban on the trade of nuclear-related materials, and the asserts of ten Iranian companies and twelve individuals were frozen; although they voted in support of it, the text was watered down under Chinese and Russian pressure.

China and Russia, but China especially, oppose sanctions because they are strongly in favour of non-interference in other countries; it is postulated that this is because they fear that one day these sanctions might be turned against them. China has dealings with many countries that may not appreciate China standing with the EU (and the US) opposite a peripheral, resource-rich country such as Iran, in which case this could hurt Chinese trade. In any case, Iran itself is a manna for energy-hungry China.

17 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm

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In 2007, the EU Common Positions 2007/140¹⁸ and 2007/246¹⁹ implemented UNSC resolution 1737 as well as stronger sanctions, by banning trade with Iran in all nuclear and missile-relevant commodities contained in control lists of the NSG and the MTCR; it also restricted the financing of activities to support Iran's development of uranium enrichment capacities, and froze the assets of corporate and governmental entities and individuals involved in Iran's nuclear and missile development programmes.

In December, the US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) about Iran's nuclear programme was released, and concluded that Iran had probably stopped its military programme in 2003²⁰. This report did nothing to convince the EU that Iran was definitely not pursuing nuclear weapon status.

In 2008, the IAEA report about cooperation by Iran was overall positive, to the exclusion of three items, only one of which had a direct connection to nuclear activities ( green salt).

These two reports however, or possibly Iran's obstinacy, may have persuaded the EU to soften their stance, since in 2008 Javier Solana and representatives from the UK, France, Russia, Germany and China presented new proposals to Iran, similar to the 2006 proposals, as well as a «freeze for freeze» offer, through which Iran could keep enriching uranium but would halt the further installation of centrifuges for a while, and the international community would not impose further sanctions. Solana threatened further EU sanctions if Iran turned the offer down; Iran refused the offer (This proposal was declared still valid by an EU statement in 2010). One may wonder if at the time President Ahmadinejad was not posturing for political reasons; it is possible that in a fractious Iran, to be seen as “giving in” to the Western powers, although the terms of the deal were

advantageous, would have harmed him politically. It is worth noting that this was a softening of the EU position, since it accepted some Iranian enrichment, when before that the EU had declared that to be unacceptable. This easing could have been due to the financial crisis and thus reluctance to impose further sanctions, to the realisation that Iran was not backing down, or even possibly to

18 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/august/tradoc_146395.pdf

19 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2007/l_106/l_10620070424en00670075.pdf

20 Van Kemenade, W. (2010): China vs. the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions, The Washington Quarterly, 33:3, p.104

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Chinese influence, since China was also not changing its anti-sanction stance, and was not suffering as much from the financial crisis as the EU, thus creating hopes that it might be of assistance.

2008 – after the Iranian refusal - then saw the implementation of EU Common Position 2008/479²¹, which included more freezing of Iranian assets, more travel restrictions; Position 2008/652²² went further with visa bans on Iranian officials, restrictions on any trade with Iran, as well as calling for the inspection of Iranian cargoes, vessels, banking transfers, etc.

In 2009, Iran informed the IAEA that it planned to start its uranium enrichment to the purity of 20 per cent. UNSC permanent member representatives met in Geneva, and yet another agreement was drafted, under which a new Iranian nuclear facility would be open to inspection, and a major portion of the country's low-enriched uranium (LEU) would be exported to France and Russia for

processing into higher-enriched fuel rods for the US-built research reactor in Tehran. Iran, in the throes of its «Green movement» after the contested presidential elections, once more refused.

The revelation of a second uranium enrichment facility near the holy city of Qom led the board of governors of the IAEA to vote to censure Iran for its refusal to accept tighter scrutiny of its nuclear activities; this enjoyed support from both China and Russia. One may suppose that China's support stemmed from this clear flouting of the rules; China realises the disadvantages inherent to a world where nuclear proliferation is uncontrolled, so while it does not approve of sanctioning Iran, it also does not agree with Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons. In any case, a censure apparently did not entail much punishment. Beijing however refused the Saudi-US initiative to end Chinese

dependence on Iranian oil, unsurprisingly enough since it signed 14.5 billion US dollars of contracts with Iran in 2009 alone.

The punitive measures that have been forthcoming since around 2009 may be seen from the outside as undercutting the EU's soft power approach, and thus contradicting, if not hurting, its image.

However, as diverse as the EU is, there is always someone to balance the hard-liners. Europeans

21 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:163:0043:0049:en:PDF 22 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:213:0058:0070:EN:PDF

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tend to believe in the power of international law and so are not inclined to question Iran's right to peaceful, civilian nuclear energy; what the EU member states are concerned about is Iran's non-compliance with its commitments and obligations as an NPT signatory, particularly as regards Iran's poor record of cooperation with the IAEA and its disinclination to ratify the Additional Protocol;

basically, the EU needs credible explanation for Iran's activities and rock-solid guarantees that its activities are intended for peaceful purposes. This is where China and the EU meet, since they agree on this point. It is also possible that China sees itself as balancing the Western powers, since it has been attached to a narrative of Western aggression against developing countries – not unjustifiably – for some time now.

However, the threat of force and/or sanctions only serves to reinforce President Ahmadinejad and other hard-liners, by drawing public attention together against the threat of external aggression, and away from whatever internal issues the country might be having. In the long term, international exchanges between Western countries and Iran might be the most effective thing; a change of regime might alleviate concerns about the nuclear program, if not stop it altogether.