The most important unexplored factor to consider here is the role of the US. In this study, as we are concentrating on the bilateral relationship between the EU and China, we have chosen to set aside, inasmuch as that is possible, the role of the US in these matters. We have considered that including the US would, realistically, make the study too vast, and impossible to realise in our time frame.
That said, we wish in this chapter to explain a little about the American role, so as to not be accused of negligence.
As the world's prime power, the US cannot be ignored, and has moreover been at the forefront of creating many of the world's international institutions and agreements, amongst them the NPT. The EU-China relationship has warmed up only when the EU-US and/or US-China relationships have stalled, as happened in 2003 after the fallout of the second Iraq war, at which point China and the EU signed their Strategic Partnership Agreement, and came closer together. One could construe the interest Beijing expressed as to the EU as a “variable” of its relationship with the US. In this way, what Beijing is concerned with when it comes to the EU is the promotion of multipolarity (changed
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into multilateralism to suit European sensibilities), access to the vast European market, access to European technology, and preventing Taiwan from making progress on the international scene.
The US's turn towards more unilateralist policies in the early 2000s can be construed as part of the reason why the EU became more focused on non-proliferation then, taking over from the otherwise-occupied America; the EU's preference for multilateral institutions and practices also made it a prime candidate for the fight against non-proliferation, by nature a collective endeavour.
American influence has been understood by certain analysts to be an important part of China's sudden reversal on non-proliferation matters in the nineties; the US successfully convinced China to stop providing Iran with nuclear technology and conventional weapons in the nineties, at which time China was generally clearing up its act with regards to non-proliferation; it joined the NPT in 1992, joined the CTBT in 1996 (although it has not ratified the treaty – neither has the US) and set about ordaining export controls, all of which proclaimed China's new, compliant attitude towards non-proliferation. While, as mentioned before, American influence has been portrayed as being a major part of this reconversion, this change of heart is also understood as being part of China's 'peaceful rise', an attempt at convincing the entire international community that China plays by the rules and should not be feared. Furthermore, the benefits of non-proliferation for itself personally are not lost on China as the only legal Asian nuclear state, even if India's status is currently similar.
However, it is arguable that the US's most important place in the current EU-China relationship is in the matter of the arms embargo. While no-one expects the EU-US relationship to falter in favour of either the EU-China or US-China relationships, the arms embargo is a matter where China could reasonably expect the EU to act without American input – which is what the EU thought to do.
However, the lift, announced in 2004, never happened, mostly due to US refusal of the idea.
II.Iran's nuclearization
As of late, the most pressing subject when it comes to non-proliferation would be what is currently happening with Iran. While the EU has been at the forefront of trying to deal with the issue – which
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is the fear of Iran illegally obtaining nuclear weapons, illegally since Iran is as of now still a
signatory of the Non Proliferation Treaty – China has been stalling efforts towards this goal, mainly by refusing to condone sanctions on Iran. Since 2003, the EU has been the main actor when it came to either negotiating with or pushing sanctions on Iran, while China has been either abstaining from voting or blocking sanctions, although has did supported some UN sanctions (as an aside, China proliferated to Iran in the nineties, until the US put a stop to it). China's general distaste for
sanctions is usually suspected to stem from its traditional suspicion of Western countries, legacy of the «Century of Humiliation» and from the fear that it might one day be the next target. The US has refused to deal with Iran while it does not accede to certain preconditions, which might explain the EU's leading position in this case. China and the EU have found themselves at similar positions on the matter, though, since they are both proponents of diplomatic solutions and firmly opposed to the use of force. However, the EU recently decided to set an embargo on Iranian oil – possibly spurred by the attacks on the British embassy in Tehran in 2011 - starting in July 2012, so that countries that buy a lot of Iranian oil may have time to adapt. China has been vocal in its criticism of the measure; China needs Iranian oil. However, this move should enable China to demand cheaper prices from Iran as a consequence, since Iran will have to make up for losing one fifth of its oil demand – the EU – and is currently involved in a dispute over price/payment with Iran, planning on cutting crude oil imports by half in March 2012.
The EU is pushing for China to recognize the threat it believes Iran poses to the world; with both the EU and the US at its heels, China may come to a change of heart. It is possible that it is using the price dispute as a way to limit its consumption without alienating the Iranians politically, or losing face; it would seem that of late it is acting slightly more in EU interests.
It does bear mentioning here that according to recent reports, Iran may not actually be developing nuclear weapons, but only civil nuclear energy, as it has claimed.
Iran fits in with the three preponderant reasons to acquire nuclear weapons: security, prestige, and domestic interests. While many have called Iran «irrational», especially in the US and Israel, it would seem fairly logical for the country to seek nuclear weapons; after all, it is situated in one of
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the most volatile regions in the world, surrounded by the US (with whom it has had no relations since 1979) in the West (Turkey, Iraq), East (Afghanistan, Pakistan) and in the South (Persian Gulf States allied with the US, US fleet in the Persian Gulf). The Bush administration also
categorized Iran as a member of the infamous «axis of evil» which created more external pressure on the state. Countries with nuclear weapons, such as, for instance, North Korea, or Pakistan, do not get attacked, while countries without them (Afghanistan, Iraq) do.
Iran has been attacked by a neighbouring state before; the Iran-Iraq war lasted eight years, killed hundreds of thousands of Iranians, and then-American-backed Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against the Iranians, which was Iran's first impulse to restart its nuclear programme6. Iran has no regional allies other than Syria, currently in the midst of a civil war of sorts, with its
government roundly condemned for the brutality of its repression. Israel also reinforces Iran's sense of insecurity, while bringing to mind the double standards applied when it comes to nuclear
weapons.
Nuclear weapons also bring with them additional prestige; one need but look at the Indian example.
With nuclear weapons, Iran might get to be the main regional power in the Middle East, especially as Iraqi power was waning through the nineties, coming to an end after the US invasion, thus signaling the termination of the traditional Iraqi – Iranian balance of power in the region. A nuclear Iran would plausibly be more aggressive, since the nuclear deterrent would mean it had less to fear.
Moreover, nuclear weapons tend to be seen as prestigious by domestic public opinion. Iran also has several internal groups that have parochial interests in acquiring nuclear weapons, that include scientists, universities and the military to name but three.
These facts make Iran likely more determined to acquire nuclear weapons than the EU/US are to stop it. After all, the cases of Israel, India, and Pakistan suggest that other countries will come to accept this fact. If Iran were to obtain nuclear weapons, it is unlikely that it should pose a threat to the EU.
6 Sauer, T. (2008): Struggling on the World Scene: An Overambitious EU versus a Committed Iran, European Security, 17:2-3, 273-293, p. 282
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However, if one looks at its past, Iran has never used chemical weapons, even in retaliation for Iraq's chemical attacks against itself, which does speak favourably of its capacity for self-restraint.
It seems unlikely that Iran should seek to hide its nuclear capacities if it already has them; Israel (Iran's primary regional rival) and the US (Iran's primary adversary) are both already nuclear powers, so the benefits of hiding nuclear know-how, such as not spurring ones adversaries into seeking nuclear power (which is what India tried to do) do not apply here. Iran is already paying the costs of nuclear opacity (sanctions, counterbalancing coalition, the possibility of
preemptive/preventive strikes being talked about) while it does not profit from the benefits of being a nuclear power (nuclear deterrence, the prestige, etc.). Furthermore, in the past, Iran has tested weapons such as ballistic missiles, and has a record of always testing its most advanced weaponry.
If Iran were close to attaining, or had attained nuclearization, there would be little to no reason for it to hide it. In this regard, perhaps it is simply biding its time; or perhaps it is seeking to establish a nuclear option, in which it would have the capacity to quickly assemble a nuclear weapon if necessary, but not actually possess one, much like Japan.
There has been a lot of skepticism expressed about Iran's desire for civilian nuclear energy, since it would seem that such a resource-rich country should not need nuclear energy to preserve its exports as Iran asserts. Iran has one per cent of the world's population, eleven per cent of proven global oil reserves, and sixteen per cent of the world's natural gas resources. However, Iran's energy growth has exceeded its supply growth, which would lead to a decline of oil exports7, thus making its leaders politically vulnerable since Iran relies on proceeds from oil exports for about eighty per cent of its revenues. Iran's population has more than doubled since before the revolution, going from 30 million in 1971 to 78 million today; however, its oil production is still at 70% of pre-revolutionary levels. In the meantime, domestic consumption has risen by 75% since 1990, which reinforces the fact that Iran needs nuclear energy, or some alternate source of energy.
Iran envisions itself as a regional great power, and in this vein does not see why it should not use its
7 Liu, J. and Wu, L. (2010) Key Issues in China-Iran Relations, Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, Vol.4, n°1, p. 50
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influence in the region to its advantage, much as other powers do in theirs. Moreover, its position was only strengthened by the overthrow of the Taliban and the fall of Saddam Hussein, both major enemies of the Iranian regime. From this point of view, its acquisition of nuclear weapons would be justified, if only as proof of its status.
In the meantime, Iran knows it has little to fear from the West, militarily at least, for now; while a US or an alliance military threat might be an effective one, it is not really credible; it will not be seen as legitimate by the international community and will likely provoke violent reactions, particularly in the Middle East; Iran can also retaliate by firing intermediate ballistic missiles against Israel, by destabilizing Iraq, by using its influence with Hamas or Hezbollah, or by
destabilizing exports if it seeks to close the Strait of Hormuz as it has been threatening to do lately.
Furthermore, the US is still occupied with Afghanistan, and Iraq to a lesser degree, so another war would be extremely improbable, while the EU as a civilian power seeks to limit the use of force.