國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
32
of the CEEC’s are the Eastern flank of NATO. One of marking the new cooperation between the two Eastern powers was the naval drill in Baltic Sea and selective presence of PLA Navy in the Black and Mediterranean Sea’s51. Moscow also as the only country, possesses the highest level of bilateral relationship with Beijing called “comprehensive strategic partnership for coordination for a new era”52. This may be an important element pointing attention of the Atlantic alliance toward China. As emphasized by the German foreign minister during the NATO Summit in 2019, “China is set to become the subject of the 21st century on both sides of the Atlantic (…) China is a challenge on almost every topic. It is important to gain a better understanding of what that implies for NATO”53. NATO is an important binding element of historic link between one of most important relationships sated above, the Serbia-China relations. It is the bombing by the NATO forces of PRC Embassy in Belgrade in 1999 that is often underlining the exceptional nature of stated relations.
Map 2. NATO members and 16+1Participants
Source: Developed by this author based on the map from Wikipedia (CC).
51 F.S. Gady, “China, Russia Kick Off Bilateral Naval Exercise ‘Joint Sea’”, the Diplomat, April 29, 2019 https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/china-russia-kick-off-bilateral-naval-exercise-joint-sea/.
52 “China, Russia agree to upgrade relations for new era”, Xinhua, June 6, 2019.
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-06/06/c_138119879.htm.
53 For NATO, China is the new Russia, https://www.politico.eu/article/for-nato-china-is-the-new-russia/.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
33
Another important actor that is often not included in discussions about the CEE region is Kosovo, a country that in February 2008 unilaterally declared independence from Serbia, recognized by only a select group of countries. The above declarations posed mixed reactions among different actors, especially in cases where similar separatist movements are present. It is therefore not surprising that the reaction of the People’s Republic of China was quite strong. During the regular press conference two days after the Kosovo declaration, the PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Jianchao's stated that “the resolution of the Kosovo issue bares on peace and stability of the Balkan region, the fundamental norms governing international relations as well as the authority and role of the UNSC. (…). The unilateral move taken by Kosovo will lead to a series of consequences. China is deeply worried about its severe and negative impact on peace and stability of the Balkan region and the goal of establishing a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo”54. This strong position suggests that China oppose the independence of Kosovo, however in the same press conference the Chinese MFA denied any open declaration of such an opposition. Kosovo is also one of the most important issues that need to be resolved between the EU and Serbia in regard to its future membership in the organization. This territory surrounded by CEEC’s can play an important role in the complex political relationship between an already quite fragmented sub-region of the Western Balkans. Another example of the role this country in stated relationships were the consultation of Serbian president Aleksandar Vuvic with Ambassadors of Russia and China in Belgrade in 2018, where he asked for support in blocking the move against the formation of a regular army in Kosovo with the notion that “its allies Russia and China do not recognize Kosovo’s statehood”55.
54 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Jianchao's Regular Press Conference”, PRC MFA, February 19, 2008.
http://www.china-un.org/eng/fyrth/t408646.htm.
55 “Serbia asks for China and Russia’s help over Kosovo plans to create regular army”, AP, December 4, 2018.
https://www.scmp.com/news/world/europe/article/2176391/serbia-asks-china-and-russias-help-over-kosovo-plans-create.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
34
1.2.5 Gateway to Europe and Backdoor to Revisionism - conflicting concepts
Based on the theories discussed so far, it can be stated, that from the perspective of several schools of thought in the contemporary IR, the most feasible path to development and acceptance of complex coexistence of regional actors is the overall effectiveness of a given system of interaction and its nature or processes within it. That effectiveness is based on the distribution of certain deliverables, nature of power, or creation of interdependence that stimulate multiple (often independent) determinants, shaping any given relationship and order. It may include elements like identification, enthusiasm, potential gains and costs, or shifts arising from transitions of power.
One of the widely recognized aspects of any cross-regional cooperation is the level of regional integration, including the drive for institutionalization or enhancement of cooperation frameworks, that can be reflected in potential gains, predicted increase in regional presence of a certain counterpart, or enhancement in existing networks, contributing to exchanges building the overall proportions of interdependence. In the case of the stated cooperation (16+1), there are several aspects related to the geographical location of CEE, their level of development, the values embodied in historical perspectives, and other elements discussed on the course of this work. They are also connected to the ideas of possible gains and state of interdependence, with an increase in elements related to soft power and building leverage among the 16 CEEC’s vis-à-vis China. The aforementioned geographical aspect is of special importance in shaping of the ongoing relationship, based on the ideas of cross-regional relations the role 16+1 can play in the regional presence of China, implementation of BRI and overall changes in China-rise. The concept of Central and Eastern Europe acting as the most natural “gateway of Europe” could be underlined as one of few elements shared in both sides of the researched relationship, including its larger cross-regional dimension.
As stated so far, the degree to which 16+1 acts as a framework utilizing the region as the gateway to Europe will be conducted based on the general assessment of the levels and nature of the impact that the platform generates. A large portion of literature and assessments reviewed for this research contain several elements pointing to the non-voluntarily in the stated relationship (as a gateway), and accusations of implementation of “divide and rule” strategy (as a backdoor) underlining the drivers for
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
35
change in regional balance, associated with an increased presence of China. This underlined second concept stated in the conditionality presented in this work title, related to the possible revisionist nature of PRC cooperation in CEE, a pragmatic reconceptualization of China rises and aforementioned neo-tributary elements. That includes also the idea presented during several international engagements of China itself. It also emphasizes the Chinese exceptionalism projected by the identity of its government as the representative of the developing world and emerging economies, that by taking a more pro-active role after 2008 has the economic and industrial potential to complement the development efforts of various partners and international organizations56.
To better understand the idea of potential revisionist characteristic of China’s rise and its projection within the 16+1 process, it may be useful to have a closer look at a few elements underlined in available thought. Revisionism could be defined as an action directed towards challenging or reshaping of something pre-existent. In case of IR, it can be described as the situation where international order is defined as a “settled rules and arrangements between states that define and guide their interaction”57 that are being shifted in any given way. As it has been mentioned the rise of China is a widely recognized fact, but there are diversified voices referring to its nature and consequences.
That ongoing debate is where the revisionism of China can be noticed, under the argument that any institutionalized framework of cooperation with its resources and opportunities enable challenges to the international order (Goddard 2018). Actors who are called revisionist are the ones that build or shape network structures strategically, as a tool for searching power and influence through their ties to other actors. Goddard argues, that actors who are considered revisionist search for institutional frameworks with some degree of leverage to overturn the status quo. In case of limited impact of these actions, the same actors are willing to innovate in search of alternative institutional systems. With the claimed declaration of China to build a new international
56 The role proclaimed by the PRC related to implementation of UN Agenda 2030 and individual SDG’s as well as other environmental related agreements. These ideas have been expressed on several SCO and BRICS Summits, and become an increasing rhetoric evident during more comprehensive exchanges like G20 meetings.
57 G. J. Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order, (Princeton University Press, 2011), page 12.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
36
relation, unique sets of values in these relations and increased numbers of China-led international frameworks (branded as products of political innovation) like 16+1 and BRI, it can be argued that this country may carry some revisionist objectives embodied in its strategic goals.
It is however still not clear to which extent China wishes to work in the existing liberal system or to reshape the norms present in the current states of cross and sub regional relationships. There are arguments suggesting that PRC tries to embrace more of a status quo-oriented approach with a particular emphasis in the global trade regime, being the area where it has gained the most in past decades (Combes 2012). However, that position presents evidence of a lack of will in accepting of commitments and norms that would limit that country or placed it in at any disadvantage, resulting in relatively high concerns over the international governance systems. As a result, it could be understood as a selective revisionist power, and as a counterpart that recognizes the international order and rules-based system, but does not accept all of its existing elements with particular focus on those emphasizing the U.S. hegemony (Glaser 2019)58. The above arguments point to the relevance of the question included in the topic of this volume, that could be addressed by streamlining the ideas evident in different levels of China present in Europe. The nature of stated changes based on the determinants of voluntarism in the 16+1 framework reflected within its effectiveness, together with any additional elements presented in this work may help in the assessment of Chinese political rationale within 16+1 and BRI.
1.2.6 Summary of the conceptual state of Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries
There are limited studies looking at the involvement of cooperation mechanism that interfere (catalyze, synergize or even create havoc) in the wider comprehensive strategic cross-regional interdependence. The key to answering the research questions of this work relates also to the wider policies of the relationship in the study (regional dimension of the EU and China) measuring the impact in internal politics, external
58 B. Glaser, “China as a Selective Revisionist Power in the International Order”. A report of a seminar presentation by at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, January 2019.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
37
actions, and future policy developments, as well as influencing the system of global governance.
Most of the available research focuses only on national perspectives, which builds on the argument, that the 16+1 mechanism is a quasi-institution, which acts as a set of bilateral relationships of China with 16 CEEC’s. To correctly examine the issue of individual identification and undertaking the attempt to assess the impact of 16+1 on the relationship of EU and China a more comprehensive analysis is required. The available analysis is largely conducted on the think tank levels or sub-regional experts (either in EU or Asia studies) and ought to serve the supportive argument of pre-stated hypothesis for the policymakers and analysts, and therefore often carries a certain degree of bias. The topic of 16+1, and the wider scope of engagement of the EU and China, is generally bipolar, with the views of high effectiveness and complementary versus a vehicle of implementation of unilateral policy objectives under the form of new rules of international relations, and by that influencing to a certain degree the political and economic sub-regional coherence. Since most of the key factors lay within the documents issued within the framework of 16+1, they are highly interconnected with the external policy documents, also related to UE and its exclusives competences.
1.2.6.1 Historical perspective
Central and Eastern Europe is a region where many countries who were first to recognize People’s Republic of China are located, nine of which celebrate the 70th anniversary of the establishment of aforementioned relations in the year ending this research (2019). This fact is often underlined at the opening remarks of the Chinese leadership, pointing to the long tradition of friendly relations with the PRC, a proof of good bilateral contacts, understanding, base for trust and drive for mutual cooperation59. It could be therefore assumed that countries in the region of CEE should somehow enjoy special, or even preferential conditions to enhance their bilateral and regional engagements. This is also an element emphasized in the part touching on main regional
59 Based on the analysis of the press releases of bilateral meetings of Chinese and CEEC’s leaders.
‧
actors. It is assumed by all sides that Participants share an old, constant60, and strong traditional friendship with Beijing. This relationship lasted in the 1980’s and 1990’s until present, in times when most of the states discussed went through economic and political transformations, including the military conflicts.
There are many opinions regarding the importance of the CEE region in Chinese political discourse. It is largely agreed, that regional identity (under the notion of presence of such universal cognition) is associated with the communist heritage, that as touched upon in parts related to regional identity was interrupted with events in 1989 and 1991. However, the last decade of the 20th century cannot be described as insignificant in the sub-regional perspective (Kowalski 2017). It was that time, when premier Li Peng while on his official visit to Romania (1994) announced the alignment of the Chinese regional policy (for CEE) with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence61 and readjusted the relationship with the region undergoing transition processes. China continued to project itself as a “mini-Middle Kingdom” within sub-regional economic-political blocks (Lam 2015). China, as a Non-aligned country that does not wish to enter into alliances62, “has been active in nurturing business and geopolitical groupings with varying degrees of cohesion”63. It is also important to signal the role of advanced and complex infrastructure plans, which are important determinants of different regional and ex-regional actors and elements of a contemporary world with an increasing presence of Xi Jinping’s BRI.
As indicated by Martin Hala (2010), the ideological and political landscape has changed dramatically during 1989 to 2009. In his opinion that change is connected with
60 This notion does not recognize the decision to abandon socialism and to strive towards inclusion in the Wester value system of majority of the CEEC’s, and persistent views of few other countries on their efforts to actively join the EU integration process.
61 The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were originally conceived by India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and China’s first premier, Zhou Enlai, in 1954. They are: (i) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, (ii) mutual non-aggression, (iii) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs (iv) equality and cooperation for mutual benefit and (v) peaceful co-existence. After Mao Zedong declared that China has finally stood up after a century of humiliation in 1949, these sets were placed as a base Chinese independence, largely different from the domination realism of IR.
the Diplomat, June 26, 2014; https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/reflecting-on-chinas-five-principles-60-years-later/.
62 China possess only one alliance-like agreement with DPRK, the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty signed in 1961.
63 W. W.L. Lam, Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping: Renaissance, Reform, or Retrogression?, (Routledge:
1 edition, 2015), page 202.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
39
the collapse of communism, and the hectic transformation inspired by the Western values and liberal economic approach. After the years of relative stability, the 2007-2008 years of economic crisis enhanced the common negativity in an economic environment which catalyzed the flaws in each country’s own development model.
Figure 1. EU Members states attitudes to China before and after the 2008 economic crisis.
Source: Adopted by this author from ECFR policy brief “The Scramble for Europe”, 2011.
Those years also brought back the attention of many of the CEEC’s towards China and vice-versa. Hala claims, that the post-crisis narratives of the EU in the 2010s created new opportunities to the rising East flank of the EU, which “voluntarily” engaged into regional grouping that restored the past “divide” between West and East. This argument is based
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
40
on the concept of rapprochement of the traditional old friends, driven by perspective of possible gains. It could be regarded as important element of all the processes leading to establishment of 16+1 mechanism back in 2012. In his analysis, Hala goes even further, suggesting that an outcome of Chinese diplomatic efforts to usher the “Globalization 2.0.” is to help in the internationalization of what is known as “China (development) model”.
According to the research conducted in 2017 (ECFR) aiming at assessing of the Chinese power levels within Europe, the post crisis presence presents evidence of selective economic and political involvement in the EU characterized by a “cherry picking”
strategy, focusing primarily on China’s own strategic objectives. The major difference that happened over the last decade, when such a study was first conducted by the same scholars, is that PRC is already well established in Europe, while the continent “seeks its engagement with China on peacekeeping and support for fragile states, but at best these actions happen only side by side and not jointly”64. The reactions to that shift in China’s power projection caused the EU to turn towards a more realist engagement, increasing the emphasis on reciprocity and an introduction of new rules, including those directed towards the screening of investments. It is crucial to underline, that the ECFR findings point not to the rise of protectionism in Europe, but rather a shift in rules of engagement (not directed towards the confrontation). It also directly points to the argument, that based on the evolvement of the China-EU relationship, it may be claimed that 16+1 is a tool of implementation of the “divide and rule” strategy in practice, and that the support of the EU integration of China on official level is only normative in its function.
1.2.6.2 Bipolarity in analysis
On the Chinese side portions of research are being streamlined with the scholars’
network showing the extra-territorial (out of China) concentration of critique and leadership of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, which together with other Chinese government think-tanks is rather positive in assessing of 16+1 cooperation mechanism, by building mostly on evidence of its pragmatism in singular cases and among selected
network showing the extra-territorial (out of China) concentration of critique and leadership of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, which together with other Chinese government think-tanks is rather positive in assessing of 16+1 cooperation mechanism, by building mostly on evidence of its pragmatism in singular cases and among selected