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among scholars and international community, that the actual role in mentioned actions of the BRI itself it’s hard to measure. It is only until mid-2019, when China decided to streamline the idea themselves, trying to develop a set of rules that will aim at better definition of Xi Jinping’s “signature policy” (Bloomberg 2019)92.
3.2 Chinese perspective on the Belt and Road Initiative.
Belt and Road Initiative may be claimed to act as one of the three pillars of implementation of 13th five-year plan, next to coordinated with its development of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei area as well as Yangtze River Economic Belt. For a significant portion of the Chinese audiences and thinkers, BRI seems to be treated a development strategy, which has at least two dimensions, domestic and foreign. If regarded as a development strategy of China, it would make it also one of very few developmental strategies of China that would be directed towards foreign territories.
The internal dimension of the BRI is mainly associated with peaceful
“rejuvenation and unification” of all China, which is considered by many as the main goal of the author of the initiative, president Xi Jinping himself. The cross-dimensional characteristics of its elements result in one of the most comprehensive networks of partners through the dedicated sections of central administration in Beijing, governments on regional and municipal levels, education institutions and autonomous regions.
92 “China Moves to Define ‘Belt and Road’ Projects for First Time”, Bloomberg New, April 3, 2019.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-03/china-moves-to-define-belt-and-road-projects-for-first-time.
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Map 4. The railway corridors connecting China and Europe (2017).
Source: Institute of Comprehensive Transportation, NDRC.
A visible element connecting the core area of cooperation within BRI and the domestic development, and other social related policies, is the development of logistic links and wider connectivity between the main industrial areas and cities in the coastal China with the interior, including Xinjian and Inner Mongolia. These areas are acting as a gate to the neighboring states in Central and Southern Asia, as well as European Continent. According to the official press release referring to the cited earlier speech of president Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan, the idea of creating of broader mutual cooperation within Eurasia among other aims at opening up “the transportation channel from the Pacific to the Baltic Sea and to gradually form a transportation network that connects East Asia, West Asia, and South Asia”. During the same speech, there is a reference to over 1700km of shared borders with Kazakhstan, as well as the story of a citizen of Xinjiang region, that suffered due to lack of development. Above elements also direct the attention to the domestic aspect of the initiative related to the interdependence based on cross-border connectivity.
Actions of the above nature are often claimed by the Chinese MFA93 (and other government representatives addressing the issue of changes occurring in Xinjiang after 2016) as those that allow to narrow the developmental gap with the Eastern China and reduce poverty and increase income of local households, which in result help to stop
93 MFA had 3 rotating spokespersons at the time of this research.
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“three evil forces of extremism, separatism and terrorism” and instabilities in society and economy. BRI under the stated justification gain lots of official endorsement in society.
It is claimed also to perform a side action allowing the ruling CPC to legitimize its actions, and validate the argument, that the peaceful development and prosperity could be achieved only thanks to the socialism with Chinese characteristics of the New Era94.
Furthermore, based on the literature available at the time of this study, it can be argued that BRI acts as an element of interconnected strategic approach of China aimed at the future development of the country. This may be one of the main arguments behind intentions to place BRI next to the development strategies of other countries on the path of economic belt and maritime road. It is also important to note, that this action is often referred to as the “co-building”, emphasizing the shared nature of the initiative, which may be a direct reference to claims of Chinese leadership to call it an international public good, and underline the view of Wang Yi of being a platform for cooperation.
In spite the fact that BRI can be regarded as an entity in making, from the Chinese point of view it has to be fully coherent with Chinese model of international relationship, which build mainly on the rules of mutual trust, mutual respect, noninterference in internal affairs, and search for mutually beneficial cooperation and win-win results. The aforementioned qualities make the conditions present in the timeframe in question (2013-2017) resulting in necessity of treating BRI as a “cooperation initiative” or even a
“concept of cooperation”, which drifts into more inclusive mindset, away from the general definitions of strategy, project or initiative. This would also mean that China cannot allow itself to dictate to other partner countries how to formulate its development goals and strategic objectives, which in order to succeed in cross-regional projects has to be taken into account. That can explain the recent to this study emphasis on synergy building.
At the same time, as indicated by what is often referred to as the increase in international assertiveness of PRC, BRI imposes some preconditions among the Chinese elites. Likewise, a country which partners up in “shared development” of the Belt and Road, in practice cannot engage into very comprehensive critic or review of the projects, which is immediately treated as sharing of misinterpretations and false accusations
94 As stated by Xi Jinping in his report to the 19th NPC in 2017.
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towards China95. This paradigm could be interpreted as a strong empirical evidence in support of the argument of the neo-tributary characteristic of the new IR. The above conditionality once more points into a set up where the cooperation should be based and motivated on the sincere desire for mutual benefits, without interfering by the third countries (especially ex-regional powers)96.
Another element necessary to better understand the Chinese perceptions on the BRI is the concept to which this author referred in the past parts, namely of idea of
“Community of Shared Future for Mankind” constantly underlined by CPC Chairman Xi Jinping. That concept became the “tank-engine” for the building of the new international relations of new era, as well as main concept for almost all actions of China in relations to the outside world. According to the arguments presented by the Chinese administration during official communication after year 2013, it is a new vision of the World order by China, which aim at addressing of today’s challenges, with the leading role of the Belt and Road Initiative. Based on the available literature it can be argued, that among motives for the creation of this new approach in China is the notion that for the past 40 years of opening and growth, when China largely gained from the global governance system becoming one of its biggest beneficiaries. Now, when it is more often viewed as a developed country by the outside world97, and during the Chinese leadership promotion of idea of globalization and economy in a flux, China stands ready to defend the global GDP growth, including needs and demands of the developing countries that will allow to sustain peace and build a beautiful world of shared future for mankind”98.
95 Based on analyses of the MFA of PRC regular press conferences between 2016 and 2019.
96 To uphold the Five Principles of Peaceful coexistence creates conflict with the need for stronger presence of China in the global governance and international community.
97 This argument is an element of the EU critic, used in the strategic documents discussing its relationship with China, especially on the economic and investment areas, where several discriminatory practices are still evident. Also, Chinese administration uses argument of its developing character to postpone relevance of selected international obligations, as evident i.e. in the forum of WTO in regard to general procurement.
98 “Communication key to shared future for mankind”, China Daily, May 3, 2019.
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201905/03/WS5ccb6174a3104842260b98f4.html.
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Figure 5. Average Change of the image of BRI across region over time (Jan 2017 – Jan 2019) *.
Source: Included from the research by Garcia-Herrero, Xu Jianwei, 2019, see footnote 101.
The argument stated above is a linking point to the support of many leaders representing the multilateral forums99, winning support among many developing countries and the United Nations100. It is also why BRI can be perceived as an ideological or even geopolitical, since it openly aims at reshaping of the Western build international order (formulation of the new IR), and therefore impact the long-expected reforms of the global governance systems as well as UN and WTO. However positive the image in the official rhetoric, there are more evidence to the worsening image of the BRI among key global actors (Bruegel 2019)101.
The dimensions mentioned so far point to multidirectional framework, overarching the elements of Chinese domestic and foreign policies. One of the most noted dimensions of the domestic front of BRI its in role in “building” sustainability into
99 Projected during the events like Belt and Road Forum, FOCAC and SCO, where in the initial paragraphs of delivered documents and statements there is a direct indication to parties present, and therefore endorsing the stated inside concepts.
100 As the endorsement of the UN Secretary General cited in the previous part of this work.
101 A. Garcia-Herrero and J.W. Xu, “The next step of the Belt and Road Initiative: Multilateralisation with Chinese characteristics”, blog post, Bruegel, April 18, 2019. http://bruegel.org/2019/04/the-next-step-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-multilateralisation-with-chinese-characteristics/.
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economic and financial sectors. Most arguably, the BRI acts as a platform to unload the financing and excess capacities102 of China (including steel and aluminum) into rather undeveloped countries, that by upgrading of their own production capacities and connectivity can act as a catalyst for the progress and opening of the less developed countries. This “spill-over effect” can arguably bring the most added value to the Chinese economy, creating what this author calls a collateral improve to the members of the so-called South-South Cooperation, and support of the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals of the UN103. It may also be the very reason, why instead of the initially stated geographical scope of the BRI being the Eurasian land mass, Middle-East and Eastern Africa, it also includes other African countries, as well as wider Asia-Pacific and Southern America104. As pointed by Bruegel think-tank (2019), the objective of the Belt and Road Initiative seems to have evolved from economic-oriented goal of facilitating export of China’s capacity to a soft power tool strongly associated with infrastructure projects of strategic significance.
Coming back to the last of the five areas mentioned by H.E. Xi Jinping during his speech in Kazakhstan in 2013, they also refer to soft power and the people-to-people exchanges. Years 2018-2019 point to several other cases of China becoming ever more focused on underlining of its cultural and civilizational values and qualities. In doing that it often refers to its 5 millennia long history, on which extensive contacts were undertaken via the ancient Silk Road. This argument, as pointed out during the exchanges conducted with this study is one of the few (if not only) elements in the minds of CPC leadership capable of placing China on equal footing with the Western countries (civilization), the civilization that until these time in history was mostly responsible for the global governance structure, rules-based trade systems and majority of the multilateral institutions. It can also help to unwrap the reasoning behind placing everything that doesn’t fall within the set of aforementioned new Chinese rules of
102 “How will the Belt and Road Initiative advance China’s interests?”, Bruegel, Center for Strategic and International Studies (2019). https://chinapower.csis.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative/.
103 The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted by all United Nations Member States in 2015, provides a shared blueprint for peace and prosperity for people and the planet, now and into the future.
At its heart are the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which are an urgent call for action by all countries - developed and developing - in a global partnership”.
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300.
104 This is the “theater” characterized by biggest demand for capital and investment in connectivity.
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international relations as a zero-sum game or Cold War thinking – as it was already established, the mindset opposite the one presented by the Belt and Road.
The argumentation about the civilization similarly to the economic development plays a role in rooting of the CPC governance and legitimize the party actions. This rhetoric, while increasing since 2016, help to underline the “coherence of the centuries old culture with the socialism with Chinese characteristics”, where one can point to links between cultural validity of sustaining of traditions with the respect to diversity, voluntarism and comfort associated with the virtues of peace and harmony. That still has some relevance, both to streamlining of the concept of BRI as well as impact on the China – Europe relations where the values of the West and Christianity are often discredited internally, and the actions described in the literature review part connected with restoration of the Chinese domestic identity naturally segregates people on both sides on “us” and “them” (from the described in this part Chinese perspective). This thinking can also be applied to the understanding of the Chinese need of the reforms in the international environment, that could also be seen as efforts to institutionalization of new Chinese-led entities, where segregation of group of countries in homogeneous clusters (like UN or WTO) doesn’t support the implementation of the Chinese domestic agenda or foreign cooperation objectives. Therefore, in-line with arguments mentioned in the literature review, there is clear empirical evidence of the idea to reformulate the realist and neoliberalist theories to establish norms that support the development desired by China on the trans-continental and global level, pointing to some elements of tributary historical elements.
The above assessment points to the idea of collateral improve that the BRI performs from the perspective of China allows to draw links to the Cooperation between China and Central Eastern Countries itself. Due to case-by-case inclusion of each project in logistics and infrastructure under the umbrella of Belt and Road, the right to brand a particular action within the initiative often corresponds with the preconditions of declaration of political support and recognition of rules and values in the third countries to the initiative, China, or even the president Xi Jinping himself. This fact, reflected in several examples of state visits of president Xi can be interpreted as yet another (next to examples for included in the literature review) of the tributary approaches to Chinese international relations. Analyzing of the outcome list included at the end of this volume
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(Appendix 1.) underline the most frequent presence of two of the CEE countries, namely Serbia and Hungary. Serbia in context of BRI, emphasize descriptions of “historical connection” associated by socialism as a form of socio-political order (BFPE 2018105).
Serbia also remembers, that China, as one of UNSC P5 didn’t recognize the “unilaterally declared” independence of Kosovo. As indicated by BFPE in reciprocal gesture, Serbia has openly expressed its position in favor of the Chinese side in the territorial disputes that China has in the South China Sea, as well as on the territory of Tibet and Xinjiang.
This kind of declaration surely support the ambition of that country to become the major partner of China in Western Balkans.