EU strategic approach to China

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points to the unique role of the BRI that “as an important global public good from China (…) follows the principle of consultation and cooperation for shared benefits, upholds openness, inclusiveness and transparency, observes international rules and market principles, and pursues high quality and high standards tailored to local conditions”.

It is one of very few elements that draw any connection to 16+1. The document presents also much stronger rhetoric, where majority of elements are listed in the form of specific measures “to deepen the China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in the new era and promote greater development of China-EU relations”. It could be therefore considered to be acting as an effort for streamlining of the objectives stated in 2014, emphasizing the

“trying times” and conceptualization of BRI as a global public good, that is the only measure that can bring tangible result in the time of “crisis”.

5.5.2. EU strategic approach to China

According to EEAS (2016), the joint communication on elements of EU strategy towards China aimed at setting out a policy framework for the bilateral engagement with China for the five years’ time perspective (until 2020). It also underlined that two sides representing two out of three largest economies have changed significantly since last such a communication has been published in 2006 ("EU-China: closer partners, growing responsibilities). Among main drivers of change it underlines the “going global” policy directed for increased role and influence in contemporary system of global governance. It has also been underlined, similarly as in case of domestic elements of the BRI discussed in Chapter 3, that PRC need to restructure its own social and economic model to be based on high quality growth and increased domestic consumption²²². Among the challenges listed in that document are China’s increasing external engagement of and global influence, domestic structural economic slowdown, acceleration in economic, social and environmental re-balancing, lack in progress of introduction of more market-driven economy and “authoritarian response to dissent in undermining efforts to establish the rule of law”. The EU seen also its role in helping China in its own reforms leading to open, sustainable and inclusive growth model. The relationship should be based on reciprocal benefits, pragmatic, principled and practical, both political and

222 Although in the EU words it that model has been described as “unsustainable”, which could be an indication that China itself recognized its faultiness.

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economic, China’s assuming responsibilities in line with rule-based international order, and with emphasis on promotion of human rights. The EU upholding the One China policy underlined their will to maintain links with Hong Kong and Macao (based on implementation of Once Country, Two Systems) and develop relations with Taiwan. The role of US as important counterpart has also been emphasized.

Figure 19. Elements of EU’s strategic cooperation with China in 2016

Source: Adapted by this author from Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on elements for a new EU strategy on China, June 22, 2016.

The document with much more extensive analysis and assessments of shifts and changes that in case of Chinese strategy (touching only on the areas of political cooperation), as well as clearly defining the steps necessary to be taken on the side of China, underlines the complex cross-regional and global landscape. It also refers to many areas of cooperation being the elements of 16+1 cooperation. The cooperation mechanism annual guidelines point to many areas of cooperation that are fully aligned with the one of the EU, or due to EU competences may be discussed only within the EU platforms, which in case of only partial membership among Participants of 16+1²²³ limits the pragmatic utilization of that mechanism.

Among the most important statements underlined in the more recent edition of EU strategy (2019), China should not be regarded as a developing country, and it has already

223 11 out of 16 before April 2019.

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become a global actor with leading technological power. It underlines, that this increase in economic power and political influence should be reflected in greater responsibilities for upholding (not building or changing) the ruled-based international order, with reinstated emphasizes on reciprocity, non-discrimination and openness. It also limits the recognition of widely announced reform during the year 2018 in which the 40^th anniversary of opening-up has been widely celebrated²²⁴.

Although the outlook underlines the basis stated in the 2016 strategy on China, it explicitly states that “China is, simultaneously, in different policy areas, a cooperation partner with whom the EU has closely aligned objectives, a negotiating partner with whom the EU needs to find a balance of interests, an economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance”. The document, calling for seeking of more balanced policy approaches underline the need for full unity within EU MS. That argument is also where the first official strategic reference to the China-CEEC cooperation appears, stating that “cooperating with China, all Member States, individually and within sub-regional cooperation frameworks, such as the 16+1 format, have a responsibility to ensure consistency with EU law, rules and policies”. As already stated, similar expressions have been already included in the past mechanism guidelines, where i.e. in 2017 in Budapest refer to the importance that China attaches to the China-EU partnership²²⁵. Similar statement has been included in the following Sofia Guidelines, where it is stated that all Participants will cooperate “in accordance with the laws, regulations and respective competences of each other and EU standards and policies for EU member states and candidate countries”. Placing that reference in the updated outlook, given its retroactive nature and in spite of wide recognition, could be interpreted as a shortage of internal trust among EU MS, but also shortage of achievements of goals in cooperation of EU with China related to reciprocity and issues of transparency.

224 “Highlights of Xi's speech at a conference celebrating 40 years of reform, opening-up”, Xinhua, China Daily, December 18, 018. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201812/18/WS5c1854a7a3107d4c3a001612_1.html.

225 “The Participants maintain that 16+1 cooperation constitutes an important part of the cooperation between China and Europe as a whole. The Chinese side reaffirms that it attaches great importance to China-EU comprehensive strategic partnership, (…) EU member states and candidate countries within the 16 CEEC’s are committed to the advancement of EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and EU-China Agenda 2020 , including actively promoting practical cooperation in the framework of the EU-China Connectivity Platform, in the Investment Plan for Europe and supporting the conclusion of an ambitious and comprehensive Agreement on Investment between the EU and China”.

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