5.4 Cultural assimilation and image building
5.4.2 Role of cultural assimilation in support of regional competitiveness
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the “The Belt and Road” Initiative.”215. An interesting element underlining the link between 16+1 and BRI has also been stated in this official communique.
The form of exchange introduced above increase the positive science synergies in research. It also reflects moderate critic, which can be a key element to comprehensive scientific discussions. There has been more then few cases of scholars with critical approach to Chinese political involvement in Europe and beyond, which have been denied visas to travel to China if their work fall out of line of officially perceived rhetoric216. This practice, referring also to foreign students in China217, result in increased presence of pro-Chinese scholars and publications, which further enhance cultural assimilation and understanding of Chinese vision of different aspects of bilateral and regional cooperation.
5.4.2 Role of cultural assimilation in support of regional competitiveness
As can be noticed the part reflecting to image building has also quite a high presence of the same two countries that “champion” the 16+1 cooperation. The same countries also show leading role in numbers of official high-level engagements. By looking on the lists of achievement stated in Appendix 2, it can be noticed that both Serbia and Hungary are where many of the mechanism influencing the cultural assimilation has been established. The same countries are the one that most openly adhere to all the elements of new international relations of China. There are also other cultural related initiatives centered in this region, like cultural secretariat established in North Macedonia and youth center that is planned to be open in 2019-2020 in Albania. The increased competitiveness of this sub-region of CEE underlines some analogies to neo-tributary elements in international relations of China, that result in more favorable view of Chinese leadership on countries that can result in higher economic incentives. This phenomenon also decreases the levels of unity within the “block”, that have further implications towards cross-regional assessments and overall relationship.
215 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, January 11, 2016. http://16plus1-thinktank.com/4/20160111/1097.html.
216 Based on experience of this author, who on several occasions could not participate in academic events due to cancelation of presence of scholars from Germany and Australia that were not granted visa to China.
217 “German student’s visa not renewed in China 'after human rights film'”, Euro News, August 12, 2018.
https://www.euronews.com/2018/08/12/german-student-s-visa-not-renewed-in-china-after-human-rights-film-.
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To have a better understanding in bilateral dimensions of 16+1 cooperation it is important to analyze the strategic objectives reflected in relevant documents of China and EU.
The above argument is based on the logic, that 11 of 16 CEEC’s (12th since 2019) are inseparable part of the EU, especially in regard to several aspects of cooperation that include exclusive competences of that organization (i.e. customs, common market trade aspects, trade in services and others). This points to another dimension of analysis of 16+1 cooperation, which has been stated previously as “(11+1) +(5+1)” and more cross-regional take of
“(11/28+1) +(5+1)”. Useful tools of such assessment are the strategic documents consisting of comprehensive assessment of key areas of two-way engagements and policy suggestions.
They also refer to extra-regional implications, and therefore serve as the survey of other political and global policy shifts that are relevant to cross and sub-regional cooperation platforms.
Main areas of strategic relationship between EU and China listed in Figure 16. covers four main categories formulated to answer the “profound and complex changes (…; and) share responsibility for promoting peace, prosperity and sustainable development for the benefit of all”218. Actions included in them forming the Agenda 2020 (going beyond those listed here) were to be reviewed and reported annually during the EU-China Leaders Meetings. As can be noticed in context of previous discussions, many areas and goals of this strategic relationship cover similar cooperation platforms like 16+1, which explains comments regarding the need for enhanced coherence within all of the EU MS. This is another argument that brings the relationship discussed in this part into the “picture” of 16+1 cooperation, resulting in higher validity of arguments about implementation of “divide and rule” strategy of China on European continent.
218 “EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation”, EEAS, November 23, 2013,
https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china_en/15398/EU-China%202020%20Strategic%20Agenda%20for%20Cooperation.
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• Consultation and Coordination on Strategic, Political and Security issues within the EU-China High Level Strategic Dialogue
• Reinforce cooperation in ASEM, ARF and in multilateral fora to establish a rules-based, efficient, transparent, just and equitable system of global governance
• Increase exchanges on public procurement policies leading to China's accession to the WTO GPA
• Step-up coordination at the multilateral level on global
governance issues dealt with by the G20 and WTO
• Strengthening EU-China Customs cooperation
• Reinforce cooperation on science, technology and innovation and within the framework of the Energy Dialogue
• Strengthen collaboration in fields of strategic interest
• Enhance information exchange on space and earth observation
• Ensure the success of governing
frameworks of the EU-China Partnerships
• Strengthen cooperation on aviation environment protection and water
• Encourage the learning of the Chinese language and EU languages in the education systems of the EU and China
• Work on the EU-China Youth Policy Dialogue and the EU-China Symposia on Youth Work Development
• Set up a regular EU-China Tourism Dialogue
Figure 16. Main areas of EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation (2013)
Source: Compiled by this author based on the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation.
As every strategic agenda, since 2013 it has been updated with several adjustments.
On the European side, EC issued two updates in the form of document for a new EU strategy on China (2016) and strategic outlook (2019219), and on China side two policy papers (2014220
219 2016 - Elements for a new EU strategy on China; 2019, EU-China – A strategic outlook.
http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/china/docs/joint_communication_to_the_european_parliament_and_the_
council_-_elements_for_a_new_eu_strategy_on_china.pdf
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf.
220China's Policy Paper on the EU, “Deepen the China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Mutual Benefit and Win-win Cooperation”, April 2, 2014.
Peace and
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and 2018221). Stated documents underline mutual objectives and challenges arising in contemporary bilateral relationships. The main argument for relevance of this documents on the EU side is that is representing shared views of the whole European community, since the processes in case of foreign relations in this grouping are largely retroactive to individual national stands. It is also important to mind that there have been some time gaps between the time when Chinese MFA prepared the answer to the strategies of the EU (in case of China the earlier strategic document has been published in 2003), which also reflect the potential comprehensiveness of changes allowing for debate and overall assessment on regional level.
Comparative overlook on the main areas of this two sets of documents can be helpful to tackle the aforementioned shifts in bilateral cross-regional strategic thinking on global, sub-regional and bilateral level.
5.5.1. Chinese strategic approach to the EU
The first strategic document reflecting the objectives enlisted in the EU-China Agenda 2020 was published in 2014, when the cross-regional strategic partnership entered its second decade, one year into presidency of Xi Jinping and creation of BRI. This was also the time of conceptualizing of a new era, and the conviction of China that the first strategic documented published in 2003 has been already implemented. The document suggests it its first parts that there is an important opportunity that calls for consolidation of comprehensive strategic partnership, arising from “tremendous changes” including deeper multi-polarity and globalization, enhancement of cultural diversity, IT applications and increasing role of emerging markets and developing economies. Most of these elements have relevance from the optic of China, which underlines the unilateral need for development (or building) of new models of global governance that would accommodate tremendous changes occurring in (or with) China.
The first strategic comprehensive document of China introduces also an element of new “China’s EU policy of New Era” of partnership for peace, growth, reform and civilization (indication present also within 16+1 Guideline documents from Sofia and Dubrovnik). The
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzcs/t1143406.shtml.
221 China's Policy Paper on the European Union,
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-12/18/c_137681829.htm.
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strategic classification from the side of China has been divided into different categories than the EU-China Agenda 2020, and consist of eight main areas of cooperation:
▪ Political Field.
▪ Economy and Trade.
▪ Urbanization.
▪ Fiscal policy and Finance.
▪ Industry, Agriculture, Transportation, Science and Technology and IT.
▪ Climate Change, Energy, Environmental Protection, Water Resources and Maritime.
▪ Education, Culture, Press, Publication and Youth Exchange.
▪ Social and Health policy and Judicial and Administrative systems.
The most complex and comprehensive is the political cooperation files, that introduces eight additional objectives:
Figure 17. Elements of China’s strategic cooperation with the EU in the field of policy (above)
Source: Adapted by this author based on the strategic policy paper document of MFA PRC (2014).
Several commonalities between Agenda 2020 and Chinese approach are included in first four goals (in the figure above on the right from the green line), whether remaining four refer to the rules that should be included in carrying out of that cooperation. Two interesting points are the overall goal to “safeguard the victory of WWII” (which cannot be clearly interpreted unless referring purely to postwar international order) and clear indication in point 3 that
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European countries, political groups of the European Parliament and regional organizations of political parties in Europe in the spirit of "going beyond ideological differences and pursuing mutual understanding and cooperation", with a view to establishing a tiered and multi-channel mechanism for cooperation and cement the political foundation of China-EU relations”. The above statements underline who are the main subjects of all cultural assimilation and image building activities carried by the CPC and therefore the government (formula of 1+X meaning there is only one counterpart in both elements 1 and 3).
Figure 18. The Guiding Principles of China-EU Relations (China, 2018)
Source: Adapted by this author based on the strategic policy paper document of MFA PRC (2018).
In the updated version of the Chinese policy paper on the EU four years later, we can observe a major polarization in the rhetoric presented by the MFA. It states, that the 3rd such document only four years after the previous one (not 11 years like in the case on the first two) has been “based on past achievements and in keeping with the times”, with indication on exactly same elements like in year 2014. The main upgrade is reflection on the agreement between president Xi Jinping (the only individual mentioned in the whole document) on consensus of building the “China-EU partnership for peace, growth, reform and civilization”
underpinning that in this relationship (as a strategic one) EU must adhere to all four principles, for the first time listed individually. The stated document touches on China-led platforms and their potential contribution, underlining that acceptance of this platforms (meaning active participation) requires to follow several principles of the new international relations. It also
Uphold mutual
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points to the unique role of the BRI that “as an important global public good from China (…) follows the principle of consultation and cooperation for shared benefits, upholds openness, inclusiveness and transparency, observes international rules and market principles, and pursues high quality and high standards tailored to local conditions”.
It is one of very few elements that draw any connection to 16+1. The document presents also much stronger rhetoric, where majority of elements are listed in the form of specific measures “to deepen the China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in the new era and promote greater development of China-EU relations”. It could be therefore considered to be acting as an effort for streamlining of the objectives stated in 2014, emphasizing the
“trying times” and conceptualization of BRI as a global public good, that is the only measure that can bring tangible result in the time of “crisis”.
5.5.2. EU strategic approach to China
According to EEAS (2016), the joint communication on elements of EU strategy towards China aimed at setting out a policy framework for the bilateral engagement with China for the five years’ time perspective (until 2020). It also underlined that two sides representing two out of three largest economies have changed significantly since last such a communication has been published in 2006 ("EU-China: closer partners, growing responsibilities). Among main drivers of change it underlines the “going global” policy directed for increased role and influence in contemporary system of global governance. It has also been underlined, similarly as in case of domestic elements of the BRI discussed in Chapter 3, that PRC need to restructure its own social and economic model to be based on high quality growth and increased domestic consumption222. Among the challenges listed in that document are China’s increasing external engagement of and global influence, domestic structural economic slowdown, acceleration in economic, social and environmental re-balancing, lack in progress of introduction of more market-driven economy and “authoritarian response to dissent in undermining efforts to establish the rule of law”. The EU seen also its role in helping China in its own reforms leading to open, sustainable and inclusive growth model. The relationship should be based on reciprocal benefits, pragmatic, principled and practical, both political and
222 Although in the EU words it that model has been described as “unsustainable”, which could be an indication that China itself recognized its faultiness.
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economic, China’s assuming responsibilities in line with rule-based international order, and with emphasis on promotion of human rights. The EU upholding the One China policy underlined their will to maintain links with Hong Kong and Macao (based on implementation of Once Country, Two Systems) and develop relations with Taiwan. The role of US as important counterpart has also been emphasized.
Figure 19. Elements of EU’s strategic cooperation with China in 2016
Source: Adapted by this author from Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on elements for a new EU strategy on China, June 22, 2016.
The document with much more extensive analysis and assessments of shifts and changes that in case of Chinese strategy (touching only on the areas of political cooperation), as well as clearly defining the steps necessary to be taken on the side of China, underlines the complex cross-regional and global landscape. It also refers to many areas of cooperation being the elements of 16+1 cooperation. The cooperation mechanism annual guidelines point to many areas of cooperation that are fully aligned with the one of the EU, or due to EU competences may be discussed only within the EU platforms, which in case of only partial membership among Participants of 16+1223 limits the pragmatic utilization of that mechanism.
Among the most important statements underlined in the more recent edition of EU strategy (2019), China should not be regarded as a developing country, and it has already
223 11 out of 16 before April 2019.
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become a global actor with leading technological power. It underlines, that this increase in economic power and political influence should be reflected in greater responsibilities for upholding (not building or changing) the ruled-based international order, with reinstated emphasizes on reciprocity, non-discrimination and openness. It also limits the recognition of widely announced reform during the year 2018 in which the 40th anniversary of opening-up has been widely celebrated224.
Although the outlook underlines the basis stated in the 2016 strategy on China, it explicitly states that “China is, simultaneously, in different policy areas, a cooperation partner with whom the EU has closely aligned objectives, a negotiating partner with whom the EU needs to find a balance of interests, an economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance”. The document, calling for seeking of more balanced policy approaches underline the need for full unity within EU MS. That argument is also where the first official strategic reference to the China-CEEC cooperation appears, stating that “cooperating with China, all Member States, individually and within sub-regional cooperation frameworks, such as the 16+1 format, have a responsibility to ensure consistency with EU law, rules and policies”. As already stated, similar expressions have been already included in the past mechanism guidelines, where i.e. in 2017 in Budapest refer to the importance that China attaches to the China-EU partnership225. Similar statement has been included in the following Sofia Guidelines, where it is stated that all Participants will cooperate “in accordance with the laws, regulations and respective competences of each other and EU standards and policies for EU member states and candidate countries”. Placing that reference in the updated outlook, given its retroactive nature and in spite of wide recognition, could be interpreted as a shortage of internal trust among EU MS, but also shortage of achievements of goals in cooperation of EU with China related to reciprocity and issues of transparency.
224 “Highlights of Xi's speech at a conference celebrating 40 years of reform, opening-up”, Xinhua, China Daily, December 18, 018. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201812/18/WS5c1854a7a3107d4c3a001612_1.html.
225 “The Participants maintain that 16+1 cooperation constitutes an important part of the cooperation between China and Europe as a whole. The Chinese side reaffirms that it attaches great importance to China-EU comprehensive strategic partnership, (…) EU member states and candidate countries within the 16 CEEC’s are committed to the advancement of EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and EU-China Agenda 2020 , including actively promoting practical cooperation in the framework of the EU-China Connectivity Platform, in the Investment Plan for Europe and supporting the conclusion of an ambitious and comprehensive Agreement on Investment between the EU and China”.
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5.6 Growing Chinese political influence in Europe
Objectives of cross-regional strategies touch upon many areas of bilateral relationships of particular EU MS, including growing presence of China in case of economy, culture and politics. It is present in particular in CEE region, which underlines complex identification differences resulting in internal (in Europe) divisions and increased competitiveness. There are several empirical evidences introduced in this study suggesting that selected political elites are willing to align with Beijing on elements stated in EU’s strategy on China, and therefore can be regarded as disrupting the overall unity. In some think-tanks, there is a conviction that
“by leveraging the success of its economic model without political liberalization, Beijing appeals to illiberal elites and Eurosceptic leaders in some parts of Europe in frequent high-level exchanges among diplomats and heads of government”226. There is also a group described in the part related to cultural assimilation efforts, that rewards the China-friendly politicians with foreign trips and visits to China, as well as offer employment in European offices of Chinese
“by leveraging the success of its economic model without political liberalization, Beijing appeals to illiberal elites and Eurosceptic leaders in some parts of Europe in frequent high-level exchanges among diplomats and heads of government”226. There is also a group described in the part related to cultural assimilation efforts, that rewards the China-friendly politicians with foreign trips and visits to China, as well as offer employment in European offices of Chinese