Crossley (2001) argues in his book The Social Body: Habit, identity and desire that we are never in complete possession of ourselves. Our perceptible being is captured in schemas of collective representation. From the moment of birth, and even before, our anatomical state and embodied visibility are made to signify social meanings and we, accordingly, are positioned in social place. (p. 141)
Drawing on Romanyshyn’s theory of “mirroring”, which states that we use the mirror to style the self we want to be; to create the image which will make others see us as we want to be seen, Mead argued that human capacity for choice and tendency towards reflection is acquired through experience in the form of habit. We have reflective and reflexive habits. The structure of the social world is incorporated within habitus. Mead exemplified his theory with games and the meanings of playing during one’s childhood. Habit is the process through which one comes to view themselves through the eyes of a “generalized other” and forms the basis of self-identity (Duncan, 2007). In this way, we see ourselves from outside like a “looking glass”, through the eyes of others, and the schemas of collective representation that order and make meaningful the particularities of our embodiment (Crossley, 2001; Duncan, 2007, 2010).
Crossley (2001) synthesizes previous research, suggesting that reflexivity and reflection are themselves rooted in habit. He views reflection and reflexivity as achievements of a process tending form the individual or particular, towards the universal and social. We acquire the habit of self-objectification and reflection by way of our involvement in the social world. Sociological objectification extends that form of self-objectification, which gives us a sense of me, the objectification rooted in our incorporation of the role of the other, further extending the possibility of
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knowledge and mastery attainable by that route. To be reflective or reflexive is to transcend one’s own particularity and we do this by assuming the role of others, particular, and generalized others, the process of which can be approached through an openness to otherness, and, thereby, further transcendence of particularity. Since we reflect others point of views on ourselves, and one’s body is one’s ‘point of view’, we may act upon ourselves so as to change ourselves. He suggested that our self
understanding is shaped by these (collective) representations and the way in which they classify and differentiate us, and even our bodies are shaped by these collective representations (Crossley, 2001).
According to Crossley, we get to form self-identity and self-knowledge through collective representations and social interactions and all these acquisitions are rooted in repetitive habits. We can finally embody our own self-identity and change
ourselves to become the one a generalized other sees us, including shaping our views towards our own body physiques. Being muscular is a collective representation of gay males. Gym provides a venue where gay men can interact with each other. Under this social interaction and collective representation, gay males begin to reflect this
muscular image on them. They draw upon cultural narratives concerning
homosexuality, masculinity, pride, social status and the male body physique, and they act on their embodied selves in highly dissatisfying attempts to achieve or resist the dominant body ideal (Duncan, 2007).
Duncan (2007, 2010) adopts Crossley’s “reflexive embodiment” as theoretical foundation in his research. In 2007, he interviewed with four gay men to demonstrate how each negotiates an athletic, muscular body ideal with reference to understandings of masculinity, pride, and gay sexuality. Duncan (2010) further fosters reflexive embodiment to analyze gay men’s embodiment practices in relation to discourses and
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norms in “gay subculture”. The findings suggest that muscular body generates both social status and self-esteem, and spread out notions of everyday masculinity that imply rationality and control to resist gendered assumptions about gay men’s body image relationships.
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Minority stress is first theorized by Meyer in 1995, in which Meyer describes it as psychosocial stress derived from minority status (Meyer, 1995). There are two hypotheses associated with Minority Stress Theory; one is Social Selection Hypothesis, and the other is Social Causation Hypothesis. Social Selection
Hypothesis holds that there is something inherent to being in a minority group (e.g..
genetics) that makes individuals susceptible to health problems. However, it is clear that genetic and dispositional factors do not fully explain the health disparities observed in minority groups. Social Causation Hypothesis suggests that minority group members face difficult social situations that lead to poor health (Dohrenwend, 1966). Minority Stress Theory extends the social causation hypothesis, which suggests that such difficult social experiences explain health differences between minority and majority individuals. According to Social Stress Theory, social situations do not lead directly to health for minority individuals, but that difficult social situations cause stress for minority individuals, which accrues over time, resulting in long-term health deficits (Meyer, 2003). Meyer also indicates that minority stress describes chronically high levels of stress faced by members of stigmatized minority groups. It may be caused by several factors, including poor social support and low socioeconomic status, but the most well understood causes of minority stress are interpersonal prejudice and discrimination. When the individual is a minority person in a stigmatizing and discriminating society, the conflict between him or her and the dominant culture can be onerous (Meyer, 1995). Thus, the concept is based on the premise that gay people, like members of other minority groups, are subjected to chronic stress related to their stigmatization. Such stress will, therefore, lead to adverse health outcomes.