2. Literature Review
2.3 Predicting Tensions and Conflict
2.3.1 Academic Predictions of Tensions and Conflict
Prophecies of regional war are by no means new, having been commonplace both before and during the past nearly four decades of relative regional calm. Over the years, many academic researchers have touched upon their predictions about the future of tensions or conflict in the South China Sea and the Asia-Pacific region
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more broadly. These scholars come from many different disciplines and the reasoning behind their claims is equally diverse.
In his influential article published twenty years ago, Aaron Friedberg writes,
“it is Asia that seems … likely to be the cockpit of great power conflict. The half millennium during which Europe was the world’s primary generator of war … is coming to a close. But, for better and for worse, Europe’s past could be Asia’s future.”
“Europe’s past,” need it be said, was one of political upheaval, the redrawing of
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national boundaries, and tens of millions of deaths. Friedberg, a er nearly two decades of regional integration and so-called economic miracles, continues his predictions in the same vein, stating, “World history is replete with examples of the troubled, o en violent, relations between fast-rising states and their once-dominant rivals. … [T]he resulting disputes have seldom been resolved peacefully.” By no 50 means has Friedberg been the only one making such predictions about the future of state interaction in the region.
Scholarly attention to regional tensions has particularly risen since around 2010, and academic discussions have focused on historic trends as well as future predictions about regional tensions. Discussing historic trends in South China Sea tensions, a policy report from March 2014, for instance, argues that a “defining feature of the international relations of East Asia over the past five years has been the steady increase in tensions in the disputes over territorial sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction in the South China Sea.” In a similar vein, a report from May 51 2016 begins with the assertion that “[t]ensions in the South China Sea have risen
49 Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” International Security 18(3): 5–33, 1993, p. 7, quoted in Amitav Acharya, “Will Asia’s Past Be Its Future?,”
International Security 28(3): 149–64, 2004, p. 149, <https://dx.doi.org/10.1162/016228803773100101>.
50 Aaron L. Friedberg, “Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics,” The National Interest , 39–40, June 21, 2011, <http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/zselden/coursereading2011/Friedberg.pdf>, quoted in Miles Kahler, “The Rise of Emerging Asia: Regional Peace and Global Security [Working Paper 13-4],”
Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, May 2013, p. 4,
<http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/wp13-4.pdf>.
51 M. Taylor Fravel, Policy Report: US Policy Towards the Disputes in the South China Sea since 1995 , S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, March 2014, p. 1,
<https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/PR140330_US_Policy_Towards_Disputes.pdf>
dramatically over the past year as China tries to alter the status quo through massive land reclamation and island construction activities.” Not only do these examples, 52 among countless others like them, assert that tensions are increasing, they also stress specific timeframes during which that escalation has taken place. Yet those claims are made without reference to verifiable, impartial, empirical evidence.
As for future tensions, predictions of escalation far outnumber those of deescalation, and such claims range from ones forecasting heightened tensions or volatility to ones suggesting those tensions are harbingers of armed conflict or war. 53 In the latter camp, recent disputes have been referred to as “ample early warning signs of trouble in East Asia,” an “explosive situation,” and as preparations for 54 55 war. On a more general level, the region has been called a potentially “more 56 contested and dangerous place over coming decades” and a “war-prone 57
environment,” with some authors even suggesting the possibility of nuclear warfare.58
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These assertions that tend towards predicting the worst case scenario of full-blown war are many in number. Needless to say, less extreme predictions of
52 Jonathan Berkshire Miller, Tensions Continue to Boil in South China Sea , Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, May 29, 2016, p. 3,
<http://studies.aljazeera.net/mritems/Documents/2016/5/29/4b10b189241a43478b9f862f4d1985a6_100 .pdf>.
53 Leszek Buszynski, “The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and US–China Strategic Rivalry,”
The Washington Quarterly 35(2): 139–156, 2012, p. 140,
<http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12springbuszynski.pdf>.
54 Justin Logan, “War over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands,” CATO Institute, February 20, 2013,
<http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/war-over-senkakudiaoyu-islands>.
55 Steven I. Levine, “The China Fallacy: How the US Can Benefit from China’s Rise and Avoid Another Cold War,” Journal of Contemporary Asia , ahead-of-print, 1–3, 2013, p. 1,
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00472336.2013.802613>.
56 Amitai Etzioni, “Who Authorized Preparations for War with China?,” Yale Journal of International Affairs 37(Summer), 2013, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2273837>.
57 Hugh White, “Power shi : rethinking Australia’s place in the Asian century,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 65(1): 81–93, 2011, pp. 81, 88, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2011.535603>.
58 Aaron L. Friedberg, “Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics,” The National Interest 39–40, June 21, 2011, <http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/zselden/coursereading2011/Friedberg.pdf>.
59 Amitai Etzioni, “Who Authorized Preparations for War with China?,” Yale Journal of International Affairs 37(Summer), 2013, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2273837>.
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volatility or heightened tensions are even more common. Highlighting the back-and-forth ostensibly defensive actions of rival claimants and the US in the South China Sea, one article argues that “these actions produce an escalatory cycle which will lead to a further rise in tension in the South China Sea.” Another author 60 commenting on the strategic competition between China and the US in the maritime area forecasts that “[t]he maritime order will continue to be challenged, tension will increase and the limited geographical space at sea in East Asia will be more crowded with ships, submarines, and aircra which heighten the risk of conflict.” Many 61 others in academia have made similar predictions that various factors will lead to an escalation of South China Sea tensions that could affect the Asia-Pacific region more broadly. Despite coming from individuals with academic backgrounds, who are no 62 doubt familiar with the importance of using verifiable evidence to support
hypotheses, a review of the literature suggests that virtually all predictions about tensions in published academic articles draw upon simple assumptions or
incomplete evidence. While such claims are not necessarily incorrect – and casual observation would perhaps lead one to conclude that many will prove to be accurate in the long term – their heavy reliance on assumptions or intuition suggests that new fact-based approaches, such as those developed in this dissertation, are needed for analyzing the important issue.