2. Literature Review
3.2 Data Selection
3.2.2 Linking GDELT 1.0 Event Database Data to Real-World Events
Note: Tensions are monthly aggregates based on the inverse of Goldstein values on a
conflict–cooperation spectrum from -10 to +10. Higher values represent higher tensions (i.e., more conflictive events); lower values represent lower tensions (i.e., more cooperative events).
3.2.2 Linking GDELT 1.0 Event Database Data to Real-World Events
The general validity of the data can be confirmed by manually comparing the events occurring within a given month to the level of tensions for that month ( Tensions ).
This approach to verifying that the data reflects real-world events is standard in relevant studies. For example, it can be observed that September 2016 witnessed 107 the first of two spikes in the level of tensions ( Tensions = 1.715) of the past two years. In that month, several relevant events took place that would be considered to be conflictive according to the statistical data: the Philippine government released photographic evidence of an increasing Chinese naval presence near Scarborough Shoal; failure by ASEAN member countries following their summit meeting to 108
107 Pascal Abb and Georg Strüver, “Regional Linkages and Global Policy Alignment: The Case of China–Southeast Asia Relations,” Issues & Studies 51(4): 33–83, December 2015, pp. 56–57; Christina Davis, Andreas Fuchs, and Kristina Johnson, “State Control and the Effects of Foreign Relations on Bilateral Trade,” University of Heidelberg Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series 576, November 2014, pp. 22,
<http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/17673/1/davis_fuchs_johnson_2014_dp576.pdf>.
108 Michael Peel, “Divided Asean nations issue mild statement on South China Sea,” Financial Times, September 9, 2016, <https://www. .com/content/ee78dad2-75a6-11e6-b60a-de4532d5ea35>.
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mention the recently concluded arbitration case in their official statement was attributed by many analysts as bowing to pressure from Beijing; US President 109 Barack Obama made several public statements reiterating US commitment to remaining involved in the South China Sea; Beijing criticized the US government 110 for its involvement and suggested it aimed to work with ASEAN countries to prevent foreign interference; and the Japanese government announced that it would be 111 providing military aid to South China Sea claimants and joining US naval patrols in the area. 112
It should be reiterated here that there are various words indicative of more conflictive events. As set forth in the Goldstein scale that the data are based on, these have varying levels. For example, the most conflictive event “Military attack; clash;
assault” produces a value of -10, and other conflictive events produce values that are decreasingly conflictive. Relevant examples include “Ultimatum; threat with negative
109 Paterno Esmaquel II, “No mention of Hague ruling in ASEAN chairman’s statement,” Rappler, September 7, 2016,
<http://www.rappler.com/world/regions/asia-pacific/145523-asean-statement-hague-ruling-south-ch ina-sea>; Michael Peel, “Divided Asean nations issue mild statement on South China Sea,”
Financial Times, September 9, 2016,
<https://www. .com/content/ee78dad2-75a6-11e6-b60a-de4532d5ea35>.
110 Tom Phillips, “G20: Obama warns Beijing against South China Sea aggression,” The Guardian , September 3, 2016,
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/03/g20-obama-warns-beijing-against-south-china-se a-aggression>; Mary Alice Salinas, “ASEAN: Obama Reaffirms US Role in South China Sea,” VOA, September 8, 2016,
<https://www.voanews.com/a/southeast-asia-summit-leaders-express-concern-about-south-china-s ea/3498519.html>; Fareed Zakaria and Barack Obama, “Exclusive Interview with President Barack Obama,” CNN, September 4, 2016,
<http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1609/04/fzgps.01.html>.
111 Martin Farrer, “Beijing warns US to stay out of South China Sea dispute,” The Guardian , September 8, 2016,
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/08/beijing-warns-us-to-stay-out-of-south-china-sea-dispute>; “Li Keqiang Expounds China’s Stance over South China Sea Issue at the 19th
China-ASEAN Summit,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, September 8, 2016,
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/LKQCXDYHZLDRXLHYBDLWJXZSFW/t13966 93.shtml>.
112 Emiko Jozuka, “Japan to join US in South China Sea patrols,” CNN, September 16, 2016,
<http://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/15/asia/japan-south-china-sea-patrols/index.html>; Tomomi Inada,
“Transcript of Tomomi Inada’s Remarks: The Evolving Japan-U.S. Alliance--Keeping Asia and the Pacific Peaceful and Prosperous,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 15, 2016,
sanction and time limit” at -6.9, “Threat without specific negative sanction stated” at -4.4, “Issue formal complaint or protest” at -2.4, and “Charge; criticize; blame;
disapprove” at -2.2. From these examples, it can also be seen how different types of 113 tensions (e.g., diplomatic tensions or military tensions) relate to one another based on the data. Diplomatic tensions typically fall within the tensions range of -7.0 to -0.1, whereas military tensions fall within the range of -10.0 to 7.6. As for tensions resulting from intended actions versus unintended incidents, the data does not explicitly differentiate between these because it measures not the unintended incidents themselves but the intended actions taken in response to them.
Based on the dataset, South China Sea tensions again peaked in September 2017. That month began with the unexpected news that PLA vessels had been conducting live-fire naval exercises near the disputed Paracel Islands since August 29 and that the military drills were scheduled to continue until September 4. 114 During the same week, it was reported that Pentagon officials had confirmed that, for the first time, the US Pacific Command had set a schedule for conducting
freedom of navigation operations to challenge China’s claims in the South China Sea and planned to do so two or three times over the following months. Later in the 115 month, it was reported that, on the weekend of September 23–24, Philippine coast guard personnel and police aboard a Navy patrol vessel fired upon one of six Vietnamese fishing boats operating within the Philippines-claimed exclusive economic zone off the coast of Pangasinan, killing two Vietnamese fishermen and arresting five others, a er the boat had fled and then rammed the Philippine vessel.
113 Joshua S. Goldstein, “A Conflict-Cooperation Scale for WEIS Events Data,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 36(2): 369–385, June 1, 1992, pp. 376–377,
<https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002792036002007>.
114 “Vietnam protests over Chinese military drill in South China Sea,” Reuters, August 31, 2017,
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-vietnam-china/vietnam-protests-over-chinese-military-drill-in-south-china-sea-idUSKCN1BB2CG>; Hua Chunying, “Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on September 1, 2017,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, September 1, 2017,
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1489255.shtml>.
115 Gordon Lubold and Jeremy Page, “U.S. to Challenge China With More Patrols in Disputed Waters,”
The Wall Street Journal , September 1, 2017,
<https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-readies-plan-to-increase-patrols-in-south-china-sea-1504299067
Immediately a er the incident, Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Alan Peter
116
Cayetano, who was attending the ASEAN Informal Foreign Ministers Meeting at the United Nations in New York, expressed his condolences to Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Phạm Bình Minh, stating, “We would like to offer our sympathies over the unfortunate loss of life and give you our
assurance that we will conduct a fair and thorough investigation into this matter.” 117 In the same month, Philippine Secretary of Defense Delfin Lorenzana confirmed that the Philippines would be moving forward with its most substantial upgrade of
infrastructure in the South China Sea, using funds from the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ Modernization Program to pave the runway on Thitu Island to allow for further development of the feature. 118
Similarly, the general validity of the data can be confirmed manually by looking at months with data suggesting a relatively low level of tensions (i.e., a high level of cooperation). November 2011, which had the lowest level of tensions
( Tensions = -3.019) in nearly five years of data, provides a case in point. Several events took place in that month that would be considered cooperative according to the data: the governments of China and Malaysia announced that the two countries had signed an agreement to cooperate on security and other issues related to the South China Sea; tensions were seen as decreasing following an agreement 119
between China and the Philippines to resolve the territorial dispute through bilateral
116 Manuel Mogato and Mai Nguyen, “Philippines vows fair probe a er Vietnamese fishermen killed,”
Reuters, September 25, 2017,
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-vietnam-fishing/philippines-vows-fair-probe-a er -vietnamese-fishermen-killed-idUSKCN1C00C5>; Felipe Villamor, “Philippines Promises Vietnam a Full Investigation Into Fishermen’s Deaths,” The New York Times , September 25, 2017,
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/world/asia/philippines-vietnamese-fishermen.html>.
117 “DFA assures Hanoi of fair, thorough probe of death of two Vietnamese fishermen,” PTV News, September 25, 2017,
<http://ptvnews.ph/dfa-assures-hanoi-fair-thorough-probe-death-two-vietnamese-fishermen/>.
118 Ralph Jennings, “Philippines Plans Low-Key Upgrades in Disputed Spratly Islands,” VOA, September 29, 2017,
<https://www.voanews.com/a/philippines-upgrades-spratly-islands/4049381.html>.
119 “China and Malaysia agree on military cooperation in the South China Sea,” The Guardian , November 2, 2016,
dialogue; Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Perfecto Yasay stated that the 120 country would set aside the disputes and praised Beijing’s willingness to allow Filipinos to fish in the Scarborough Shoal area; and Donald Trump’s surprise 121 victory in the US presidential election led to suggestions that the US could decrease its military involvement in the South China Sea. 122
As with conflictive events, it should be reiterated here that there are various words indicative of more cooperative events. As outlined in the Goldstein scale upon which the data are based, these cooperative events have varying levels. For example, the most cooperative event “Extend military assistance” produces a value of 8.3, and other cooperative events produce values that are decreasingly cooperative. Relevant examples include “Make substantive agreement” at 6.5, “Endorse other’s policy or position; give verbal support” at 3.6, “Agree to future action or procedure, to meet or to negotiate” at 3.0, and “Assure; reassure” at 2.8. 123
It is worth noting that, based on the dataset, South China Sea tensions do not follow any clear long-term trend of escalation or deescalation. This observation may contradict the assertions of some commentators that tensions are gradually
increasing or decreasing. Instead, it is evident that tensions follow a pattern of volatility, in which tensions can vary dramatically from one month to the next based on events contributing to those fluctuations. Although there is minimal evidence of long-term trends, short-term trends of increasing or decreasing tensions over
120 Jane Perlez, “Philippines’ Deal With China Pokes a Hole in U.S. Strategy,” The New York Times , November 2, 2016,
<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/world/asia/philippines-duterte-south-china-sea.html>; Jun Endo, “Duterte’s pivot to Beijing brings calm to South China Sea,” Nikkei Asian Review , November 9, 2016,
<http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Duterte-s-pivot-to-Beijing-bring s-calm-to-South-China-Sea>.
121 Lynda Jumilla, “PH to temporarily set aside sea row with China - Yasay,” ABS-CBN News, November 20, 2016,
<http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/11/20/16/ph-to-temporarily-set-aside-sea-row-with-china-yasay>.
122 “What does a Trump presidency mean for China?,” CCTV, November 10, 2016,
<http://english.cctv.com/2016/11/10/VIDEVI0Gd6He 43G40hf3ul161110.shtml>.
123 Joshua S. Goldstein, “A Conflict-Cooperation Scale for WEIS Events Data,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 36(2): 369–385, June 1, 1992, pp. 376–377,
<https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002792036002007>.
periods of three to six months are apparent. As such, it would likely be more accurate for analysts to view South China Sea tensions not as trending over the long term but as characterized by short-term trends and long-term volatility. This issue is explored in greater detail in {4.3.1 Trends of Escalation and Deescalation}.
3.2.3 State Involvement Data Selection from GDELT 1.0 Event Database for RQ1