2. Literature Review
2.2 E ects of State Involvement on Tensions
2.2.1 China’s Involvement and Tensions
China’s interests lie in the maintaining or reclaiming of sovereignty over islands and sea features considered to be historically Chinese and the regulation of South China Sea maritime territory and airspace, which would allow it to manage resource
exploration and exploitation and ensure that actors from outside the region are unable to interfere in what is regarded as a domestic issue. As an extension of these interests, Beijing is also concerned with restoring its place in the global system following an extended period of foreign incursions, maintaining Chinese 8 Communist Party (CCP) legitimacy domestically through displays of strength
internationally, and reinforcing its role as the leader in the East Asian regional order.
In one camp, policymakers, scholars, and pundits assert that China’s
involvement in the disputes is the major source of tensions. Chinese involvement and actions are o en framed by commentators as aggressive provocations that disrupt the status quo and run up against established norms or regulations governing
regional relations. In July 2011, then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton cautiously 9 accused China of escalating tensions without explicitly naming the country,
declaring, “all of us have a stake in ensuring that these disputes don’t get out of control, and in fact, the numbers have been increasing of intimidation actions, of ramming [and] cutting of cables.” Other officials in the administration have further 10 advanced this line of reasoning, one example being when “a senior US State
Department official said that while ‘no claimant is solely responsible for the state of tensions … a pattern of provocative and unilateral behaviour by China has raised
8 This era is commonly referred to as the “century of humiliation” (百年國恥).
9 Jonathan Spangler, 2015, “Let’s Get Real about the South China Sea ‘Status Quo’,” Issue Briefings 9, Taipei: South China Sea Think Tank, 2015, <http://scstt.org/issue-briefings/2015/360/>.
10 Michael T. Klare, “The United States Heads to the South China Sea,” Foreign Affairs , February 21, 2013,
serious concerns about China’s intentions and willingness to adhere to international law and standards.’” In a joint press conference with US Secretary of Defense Ash 11 Carter and his Philippine counterpart Voltaire Gazmin on April 14, 2016, Carter asserted, “in the South China Sea, China’s actions in particular are causing anxiety and raising regional tensions.” In an official statement by US Senator John McCain, 12 Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Senator Dan Sullivan, following the Award of July 12, 2016, issued by the Tribunal in the Philippines v.
China arbitration case, they are forthcoming in their accusations, stating that “China faces a choice. China can choose to be guided by international law, institutions, and norms. Or it can choose to reject them and pursue the path of intimidation and coercion. Too o en in recent years, China has chosen the latter. The world will be watching to see the choice China makes.” 13
These statements by US government officials have continued under the current administration. More recently, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in July 2017, US Secretary of Defense James Mattis criticized China’s militarization efforts as
“undermin[ing] regional stability,” arguing that its “construction activities in the South China Sea differ from those in other countries [due to] the nature of its
militarization, China’s disregard for international law, its contempt for other nations’
interests, and its efforts to dismiss non-adversarial resolution of issues. … [The US]
cannot and will not accept unilateral coercive changes to the status quo.” To a large 14 extent, US government and military officials have been the most vocal in their
11 Rowan Callick, “Taiwan escalates contest of the seas,” The Australian , July 14, 2014,
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/taiwan-escalates-contest-of-the-seas/story-e6frg6so-1226987445836>.
12 Ash Carter and Voltaire Gazmin, “Joint Press Conference by Secretary Carter and Secretary Gazmin in Manila, Philippines,” US Department of Defense, April 14, 2016,
<https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/721687/joint-press-conference -by-secretary-carter-and-secretary-gazmin-in-manila-phili/>.
13 John McCain and Dan Sullivan, “Statement by Senators McCain and Sullivan on South China Sea Arbitration Award,” US Senate, July 12, 2016,
<https://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2016/7/statement-by-senators-mccain-and-sulliva n-on-south-china-sea-arbitration-award>.
14 James Mattis, “News Transcript: Remarks by Secretary Mattis at Shangri-La Dialogue,” US Department of Defense, June 3, 2017,
<https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1201780/remarks-by-secretary
assertions about the relationship between Chinese state involvement and South China Sea tensions.
East Asian leaders, particularly those of ASEAN member states, have been relatively cautious in public, but more outspoken in private, about their accusations that Chinese involvement increases tensions in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, there have been various instances of vocal criticism. For example, in the midst of the Haiyang Shiyou 981 standoff between China and Vietnam, the Permanent Mission of Vietnam to the United Nations protested Beijing’s actions in a letter sent to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, which stated, “China’s activities, in violation of international law, escalate tension in the East Sea. … [The two countries’ sovereignty]
dispute is not the cause of the on-going escalating tension in the East Sea … The current tension is caused by China’s illegal placement of Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig within the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of Viet Nam”. The 15 Philippines, in its arbitration case against China, repeatedly accused China of escalating South China Sea tensions. These accusations can be found in many of the documents that its legal team prepared throughout the arbitral proceedings. Its Memorial submitted to the Tribunal on March 30, 2014, for example, states, “[t]he dispute between the Parties concerning their maritime entitlements in the South China Sea escalated significantly following the official espousal of the nine-dash line claim to the United Nations in 2009.” It further asserts, “China’s conduct has 16
complicated and escalated the disputes in the South China Sea, and imperilled the peace and stability of the region.” Although rival claimants have in the tensest cases 17 explicitly denounced Beijing’s involvement and actions for being the primary cause of increased tensions, government officials have o en avoided mentioning China
15 “Viet Nam continues opposing China’s illegal rig placement at UN,” Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 3, 2014,
<https://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/nr040807105001/ns140704040726/view>.
16 “Memorial of the Philippines: Volume I,” Government of the Republic of the Philippines, March 30, 2014, p. 8,
<https://files.pca-cpa.org/pcadocs/Memorial%20of%20the%20Philippines%20Volume%20I.pdf>.
17 “Memorial of the Philippines: Volume I,” Government of the Republic of the Philippines, March 30, 2014, p. 242,
specifically in making these statements. Instead, they have opted to use cautious, diplomatic wording that calls upon all parties to avoid involvement that might lead to increased tensions. 18
The US and rival claimants have not been the only ones asserting that China’s involvement escalates South China Sea tensions. In an interview on July 13, 2016, Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop stated, “Australia has been calling on China for some time to halt reclamation work and not to militarise its structures and we certainly urge all parties to take steps to ease tensions, to refrain from provocative actions that would escalate tensions and lead to greater uncertainty,” clearly implying a link between Chinese involvement and heightened tensions. 19 Furthermore, the five arbitrators in the Philippines v. China arbitration case concluded in their Award of July 12, 2016, that China had aggravated the disputes over “the status of maritime features in the Spratly Islands” as well as those about the countries’ “respective rights and entitlements” and “the protection and
preservation of the marine environment” at Mischief Reef. As the examples above 20 demonstrate, assertions about the relationship between Chinese state involvement and South China Sea tensions have become a common theme for policymakers and analysts in both claimant and non-claimant states. 21