2. Literature Review
2.2 E ects of State Involvement on Tensions
2.2.2 US Involvement and Tensions
In the other camp are those asserting that US involvement has an effect on tensions in the South China Sea. As a non-claimant stakeholder, US interests rest in the
securing of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) through what is one of the most vital shipping routes globally and the maintenance of the status quo in regional relations,
18 See {2.2.5 Ambiguous Statements Linking State Involvement and Tensions}.
19 Julie Bishop, “ABC AM, Perth - Interview with Kim Landers,” Minister for Foreign Affairs, Government of Australia, July 13, 2016,
<https://foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/Pages/2016/jb_tr_160713.aspx>.
20 Award, Permanent Court of Arbitration, July 12, 2016, X, 1203, B, 16,
<https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2086>.
21 In a sense, competing schools of diplomatic thought on the roles of China and the US in regional relations have emerged. Perceptions of China are divided between viewing it as the aggressor or as a partner in peaceful development. Likewise, views of the US are split between viewing it as the hegemon or as a guarantor of regional security and stability.
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in which international waters and airspace remain under the governance of international regimes, the regional balance of power remains multipolar, and Washington continues to enjoy its role as a leader and key decision maker in the Asia-Pacific region. Its interests in maintaining the status quo in the region further 22 depend on the continued relevance of middle powers, including ASEAN, Australia, India, Japan, and South Korea; no abrupt changes to the de facto independent status of Taiwan; and ongoing support from regional allies for its leadership role.
Chinese policymakers and media have been at the center of the camp arguing that US involvement, and that of foreign powers in general, increases tensions in the South China Sea. Internally, Beijing’s rationale is sound. Because the maritime territorial disputes concern Chinese sovereignty, they are a domestic issue by
definition. For outside forces to get involved is a breach of sovereignty, even more so than it is for those states with overlapping claims to assert their own. 23
Chinese leaders’ statements clearly reflect its approach to the South China Sea disputes and the notion that foreign involvement leads to escalation. Following US President Barack Obama’s suggestion that the South China Sea disputes be
addressed at the ASEAN Summit in Bali in November 2011, then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao warned him against the involvement of “external forces,” declaring that the issue would not be up for discussion at the meeting. In August 2014, Chinese 24 Foreign Minister Wang Yi, participating in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting, remarked, “Some countries outside the region are restless, and stir up tensions … might their intention be to create chaos in the region? … China and ASEAN [can] safeguard well the peace and stability of [the] South China Sea, [and]
22 Jonathan Spangler, “Claimant and Non-Claimant Views on SLOCs and Freedom of Navigation,”
Issue Briefings 7, Taipei: South China Sea Think Tank, 2015,
<http://scstt.org/issue-briefings/2015/11/>.
23 Ralph A. Cossa, “Security Implications of Conflict in the South China Sea: Exploring Potential Triggers of Conflict,” Honolulu: Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998, p. C-2, <http://www.geocities.ws/kweibohuang/SChinaSea.pdf>.
24 Alex Spillius, “China warns Barack Obama over South China Sea ‘interference’, The Telegraph , November 18, 2011,
relevant disputes should be addressed by countries directly concerned.” Following 25 US Navy acknowledgement that it had flown a P-8 Poseidon, its latest and most advanced scout aircra , over the South China Sea in February 2015, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying responded, “third countries should say less and stop stirring up trouble.” 26
In October 2015, interactions between the PRC and the US further exacerbated perceptions that US involvement in the South China Sea increased regional tensions. On October 27, the USS Lassen , a guided-missile destroyer, passed within 12 nm of Chinese-occupied Subi Reef and Mischief Reef. The operation was 27 part of the US Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program intended to “exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention.” In response to the high-profile move, Beijing accused the US of 28 acting “illegally” and summoned Max Baucus, the Beijing-based ambassador to China, to a meeting with Chinese vice-foreign minister Zhang Yesui. The Chinese embassy in Washington warned that the US should “refrain from saying or doing anything provocative and act responsibly in maintaining regional peace and stability”. US officials’ guarantees that more freedom of navigation operations 29 would take place in the future and the timing of the operation – just two days before the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under the United Nations Convention on the Law
25 “Beijing hits out at US South China Sea proposal,” AFP/Yahoo! News, August 11, 2014,
<http://news.yahoo.com/china-hits-us-proposal-south-china-sea-063321948.html>.
26 “US Navy flies new plane over disputed South China Sea,” RT, February 26, 2015,
<http://on.rt.com/7nt5ae>.
27 Keith Johnson and Dan de Luce, “Washington’s Muddled Message in the South China Sea,” Foreign Policy , November 5, 2015,
<http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/05/washingtons-muddled-message-in-the-south-china-sea-lassen -fon-subi/>.
28 “Maritime Security and Navigation,” Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, US Department of State,
<https://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/maritimesecurity/>.
29 Tom Phillips, “Beijing summons US ambassador over warship in South China Sea,” The Guardian , October 27, 2015,
of the Sea (UNCLOS) in the Philippines’ arbitration case against China released its Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility – only fueled perceptions in Beijing that US involvement in the South China Sea increases the level of tensions.
Since then, these assertions by government officials have continued. As an article written by Chinese Ambassador to the European Union Yang Yanyi on May 28, 2016, claims, “it is the United States that has been sending more and more military vessels and aircra s in close proximity to China’s coastal waters,
constituting grave threats to China’s security on land and sea, and threatening to escalate tensions in Asia. More and more Chinese people have good reasons to believe that the U.S. is no longer just an invisible hand behind the rising tension in the South China Sea.” More recently, in remarks on July 2, 2017, following the 30 transit of the USS Stethem , a US Navy destroyer, near the Paracel Islands, China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang commented, “China and ASEAN member states have cooled down and improved the situation in the South China Sea. The US
… deliberately stirs up troubles in the South China Sea … [China] strongly urges the US side to immediately stop such kind of provocative operations that violate China's sovereignty and threaten China’s security.” 31
Yet it is not only Chinese officials that have suggested a correlation between US involvement and escalation. US professor and defense analyst Michael T. Klare, for example, has commented,
In China’s eyes, [the US] is partisan in the island disputes and … Washington is actively spurring Japan and the Philippines to assume a more assertive stance
… feeding distrust and resentment of the United States, and increasing the likelihood that future incidents at sea – however they are provoked – could
30 Yang Yanyi, “The European Sting publish an article by H.E. Ambassador Yang Yanyi, Head of the Chinese Mission to the EU, entitled Some Prevailing Arguments and Perceptions over the South China Sea Issue Are Simply Wrong,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, March 28, 2016, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/nhwt/t1367333.shtml>.
31 Lu Kang, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Remarks on US Missile Destroyer Stethem Trespassing China’s Territorial Waters off Xisha Islands,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, July 2, 2017,
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1474745.shtml>.
spark a clash between Chinese and U.S. vessels. … [R]egardless of whether it was Obama’s intention when he pivoted to the Pacific, he has surely increased the chances that rash and potentially incendiary behavior by any one of the countries … could lead to war. 32
Such assertions that US involvement in the South China Sea is a cause of increased tensions are common. While those coming from a Chinese perspective 33 demonstrate a particular tendency towards making these claims, they are by no means alone in their suggestions, as those from other backgrounds have also forwarded similar claims.