Chapter III - Willing as a Reaction to External Conditions
4. External Factors and Their Relationship to the Will
4.3. Arendt’s Contribution
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which are derived by the logical reason as a function of external factors. The second question may be rephrased as follows: does Ego enjoy a freedom of irrational spontaneity? However, a deeper research and demonstration of the possibility of such freedom will be presented in a later chapter, which is dedicated specifically to freedom and action.
Why is it relevant to mention other dimensions of human phenomenological experience? This is essentially relevant for universal expansion of will’s scope of application. Similarly to “love”, traces of will may be discovered in every dimension of human experience. These elements are not fully theoretically developed in this paper, since they are outside the main scope of current research, however, mentioning them is useful for indicating the universal applicability of the theoretical framework of will, which is being developed in the course of current research inquiry.
4.3. Arendt’s Contribution
Arendt maintains that human mind may be autonomous with respect to external (extramental) factors (even though in practice the mind is often conditioned by them).
Mental activities including willing are not determined by either external objects or by some kind of “Progress” or “development of History.” The very existence of such development is doubted by Arendt, she calls it “the pseudo-divinity named History of the modern age.”121
Arendt does not undertake a detailed analysis of external factors and their influence on volition. However, she holds that human mind is autonomous of these factors. This autonomy means that whatever belongs to the world of appearances, may not necessarily take a direct control of human will and his actions. Rather, human beings are able to mentally detach themselves from the causal chains, which rule in the world of appearances.
121 Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: Postscriptum to Thinking. P. 5.
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She says that “we can maintain with Kant the autonomy of the minds of men and their possible independence of things as they are or as they come into being.”122 This
“independence of things” implies men’s mental independence from external factors, which exist in the world of appearances. However, Arendt does not provide much evidence in support of this claim and does not provide us with a detailed analysis of the
“things,” from which men may be independent. This is especially sad due to the importance of this claim for the most of her philosophical ideas and claims. She posits this freedom and independence, but does not do a thorough research about the foundations and real evidence of this independence.
She indicates that such independence is only “possible” but not necessary. And adds that in most cases this is not the case – in most cases men do not act freely and their activity is determined by something else. She seems to fully agree with Bergson in the following:
…that “although we are free whenever we are willing to get back to ourselves, it seldom happens that we are willing.” And “Free acts are exceptional.”123 (Most of our acts are taken care of by habits, just as many of our everyday judgments are taken care of by prejudices.)124
The clarification, which is added by Arendt and placed in brackets, indicates two things. First, that Arendt agrees with Bergson and thus wants to add something to his words. Second, that Arendt indicates what is responsible for most of “our acts” – that is
“habits.”
122 Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: Postscriptum to Thinking. P. 5.
123 Bergson, Henri; trans. by Pogson, F. L. Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, Harper Torch-books, New York, 1960. Pp. 240, 167.
124 Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: Willing. Pp. 32-33.
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Another contribution made by Arendt with respect to external objects in their influence on the will is her comment about desire or appetite. In explaining meaning of desire she indicates the following:
Practical reason is needed to come to the aid of desire under certain circumstances. “Desire is influenced by what is just at hand,” thus easily obtainable – a suggestion carried by the very word used for appetite or desire, orexis, whose primary meaning, from orego, indicates the stretching out of one’s hand to reach for something nearby.125
For Arendt, desire is something directly related to human will. She seems to hold that desire is the internal appetite for something, which may be a manifestation of the will. Essentially, she does not provide a rigorous and clear definition of the term and mixes it with willing. However, for the purposes of present research, “desire” is some blind drive or “thirst” for something, it is not something, which man has, when he freely wills something. However, contrary to Arendt’s position, desire is a force (almost blind), which may escape the command of our mind and undermines its independence and freedom.
We will deal with “desire” in more depth and detail in a section dedicated specially to desire. Now it may be indicated that desire belongs to internal factors, which relate to will, but do not constitute a manifestation of the will.
Even though Arendt’s understanding of desire is not satisfactory and is rejected as invalid, her ideas about desire are still important, since they reflect her insights about the will. These insights are especially important to consider now, since they relate to external factors and their relationship to the will.
Arendt says the following:
125 Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: Willing. P. 58.
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…when the fulfillment of a desire lies in the future and has to take the time factor into account is practical reason needed and stimulated by it. In the case of incontinence, it is the force of desire for what is close at hand that leads to incontinence, and here practical reason will intervene out of concern for future consequences.126
Here we can see how Arendt connects the desire, the future and practical reason.
For the purposes of current discussion, we may consider Arendt’s “desire” to mean the will. Then what she says may be rephrased as follows: the will is “initiated” or “moved”
by some attraction to something, which is either close at hand, or which is potentially within reach of a human being through some kind of planning (i.e. deliberation about future acts and outcomes), which may be done by the “practical mind.” In other words, some external appearance or reality, which either exists in present (and may have consequences for the future), or is not yet existent but is potentially feasible and may
“exist” in future – such external “reality” is subject to processing by the practical mind and become an object of “desire” or attraction, and thus may initiate our will (i.e. make us willing some object).
The above described mechanism is the essence of will’s relationship to external factors. Thus, Arendt provides us with the most important intuition in this respect. The only extra work to be done is to clarify and systematize some aspects of this relationship and to avoid using the notion of “desire,” which is not appropriate for expressing will’s attraction to something, since “desire” undermines freedom, which is the essential characteristic of will. This claim about will’s freedom has not yet been proven or argued for, this will be the task of a later Chapter.