意志現象學：從鄂蘭出發兼對墨子應用 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學哲學系博士論文. Phenomenology of the Will: Building upon Arendt and 治Applying to Mozi. 立. 政. 大. ‧ 國. 學. Nat. n. al. er. io. sit. y. ‧. 指導教師：汪文聖教授. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 研究生：愛西里爾中華民國一〇二年一月. 0.

(2) Contents. Chapter I – Introduction……………………………………………………….2. Chapter II - Arendt’s Conception of Willing………………….….…………23. 政治大. Chapter III – Willing as a Reaction to External Conditions. …….………..84. 立. ‧ 國. 學. Chapter IV – Immanent Aspects of Willing and Internal Factors Influencing the Will………………………………………………………………………….…….115. ‧. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Chapter V – Will, Action and Collective Phenomenology………………...144. Chapter VI - Applying Phenomenology of Will to the Philosophy of. n. v i n Ch Mozi..…….……………………………………………………………………………173 engchi U. Chapter VII – Concluding Remarks and Proposed Directions for Further Research………………………………………………………………………………206. Bibliography…………………………………………………………………..217. 1.

(3) Chapter I – Introduction. 1. Object and Scope of the Research. Before beginning our research inquiry, let us ask ourselves several questions: Why do we live the way we live? What future are we facing? Why do we have certain plans and not other? Why do we react to various circumstances or events in a particular way, while others react differently? Do we ultimately choose our mode of existence and freely build our future, or we are thrown into a web of causes and factors, which. 政治大 as a whole or any organization 立of people, and to consider our own role in answers, which. determine and condition our lives? We can also ask similar questions about our society. ‧ 國. 學. we may try to give to these questions. To answer these questions we may first ask ourselves what is our will, is it free or somewhat conditioned by some factors or. ‧. circumstances, and how do we express this will in our actions including our involvement. y. Nat. in the public realm. On the one hand, our lives are shaped by many factors, both external. io. sit. and internal to us, on the other, we have an internal feeling that we are free in making. n. al. er. our choices, in deciding what goals to set, and how to act, and consequently we feel. Ch. i n U. v. responsibility for our actions, which were a result of our free choice. How do we resolve this apparent paradox?. engchi. Philosophy began from interrogating. In the same way we begin this research from asking questions. All of them fall within the scope of the research inquiry, which we are about to begin. In philosophy as well as in other aspects of human life, which reflect on human action, it is impossible not to encounter some aspect of phenomenal experience of willing. It is phenomenal, since it is disclosed to our Ego as phenomena of consciousness; it may be called “willing”, since it has to do with something, which either “will” or “will not” happen and its outcome is related to the “wishes,” “plans” and “goals” of human. 2.

(4) Ego, which are in some way related to the so called “faculty of willing”, no matter whether it is a separate “mental faculty” or not. Nothing prevents us from positing a faculty of willing in order to explore the philosophical implications of the various experiences of the human Ego, which are traditionally related to willing. Such experiences are given to the human Ego, and it is possible to look into these experiences by themselves first and then consider their phenomenological meaning and significance. Thus, what is to be explored is the phenomenology of various kinds of experience, which are directly related to what is traditionally called “willing”. This attempt of building a phenomenological model, which would adequately. 政治大 the experiences of a transcendental 立 Ego and on inter-subjective objectifications of describe most or all aspects of what is traditionally called “willing”, is to be grounded on. ‧ 國. 學. relevant phenomena. However, this research is to be assisted significantly by the philosophical reflection of Hannah Arendt, who not only summarized significant. ‧. developments of the philosophy of willing in the Western philosophical tradition, but. y. Nat. also supplied this summary with valuable and valid philosophical reflection. Thus, in the. io. sit. present work the philosophical insights of Arendt into the phenomenology of willing is. n. al. er. to be reassessed and systematized in order to arrive to a scientifically grounded and rigid. Ch. phenomenological understanding of willing.. engchi. i n U. v. The next step is to see the implications of the phenomenology of willing in the field of human action and activity. Philosophical insights of Hannah Arendt in this area are also going to be relevant and useful, at least as a starting point for a further research of the matter. Thus, the political implications as well as the role of willing in the “vita activa” are also to be looked into. This will in turn provide means for looking into the phenomenology of collective willing. After arriving at the appropriate and scientifically verified model of the phenomenology of willing, it will be necessary to test whether this model is open and universally valid. For this purpose, it is to be applied to the philosophical insights of Mozi, a thinker, who belonged to a different philosophical tradition – that of Ancient 3.

(5) China. In order to test the openness of our system, we shall check whether Mozi’s thought may contribute to it, whether it may expand the system by new phenomenological insights. Consequently, in order to see, whether the system is universally valid, we shall attempt to assess to which degree the philosophy of Mozi may be interpreted and understood when considered in view of our system. The above tasks may be justified in view of the central goal of this research paper, which now needs to be briefly described. This important goal of our research is to find a central principle, which would have a firm phenomenological grounding and would be applicable to any philosophical tradition, which is somehow related to willing and action. An attempt to find such a principle will be made in this paper. It will be necessary to. 政治大 willing experiences. This principle 立 should determine whether some given experience or determine whether this principle has a phenomenological objectivity and pertains to real. ‧ 國. 學. some philosophical reflection involve the will or not, related to action or not. So this implies finding a phenomenological definition of both “will” and “action.” In order for. ‧. such principle to be found, formulated, and grounded in experience, it is necessary to. y. Nat. establish a universal theoretical framework, which would be applicable to any willing. io. sit. experience, including external and internal aspects related to willing. The thought of. n. al. er. Hannah Arendt is likely to help us both in finding this principle and in forming such a. Ch. i n U. v. theoretical framework. Once such principle is established, then the possibility of. engchi. applying this principle has to be determined. This will be attempted through application of the theoretical framework to the philosophy of Mozi, which belongs to a very different philosophical tradition – that of ancient China. Such application will show us whether the main principle of the will, as well as the theoretical model, which corresponds to it, are applicable to another philosophical tradition, and whether it is possible to improve that model through such application. It is important to note that the application of the phenomenological framework of will to the philosophy of Mozi is not an element, which is unconditionally necessary for the purposes of the current research. The object of research may be reached even without mentioning Mozi, however, applying the theoretical model to Mozi will help us enrich 4.

(6) the model and test its applicability to other philosophical traditions. It is now necessary to clarify the main object of the research.. 1.1.. Object of the Research. The term “object” is likely to be improper when considering the will. The will is not something which may be objectified, since any objectification would involve distancing and separating from the object for the purpose of theoretical consideration and speculation.. 政治大 it is necessary to experience 立the will and everything, which is directly related to it. If one wants to penetrate deeper into the essence of the subject matter of the will,. ‧ 國. 學. Moreover, when one has “lived through” such experiences, he may not be able to form and present a theoretical account of such experiences, rather he may try to express what. ‧. he has lived through and invite others to undergo similar experiences. This is similar to. y. Nat. many other experiences of our life, which cannot be adequately presented through. io. sit. speculative theorizing. For example, an experience of being a firefighter, a father or a. n. al. er. president cannot be fully described through theoretical presentation. One has to live. Ch. i n U. v. through a corresponding experience in order to gain some understanding of what it. engchi. means and feels like being a firefighter, a father or a president. Formally, the immediate object of the research, which is to be pursued in this paper, is the will and its aspects. However, this is not really “an object,” since it will not be fully objectified, rather it will be “a destination point”, to which our research will try finding its way. The metaphor of “a destination point” is more appropriate than that of “the object,” since a destination point is something that is inherently present in the whole journey and it is not something separate from the journey, this is especially true if a destination point is visible throughout the journey, it attracts our attention throughout the entire travelling time. It also governs our travelling, since it is the purpose of our movement, however, at the same time, it leaves us freedom of movement and of 5.

(7) choosing particular paths, which we may for some reason prefer or judge to be better for our purposes. Moreover, our destination point and our journey comprise a whole, which should not be dissected into parts. Once we reach the destination point, our journey is not something, which may be discarded, but rather it provides some particular meaning for us in reaching this destination point. We should not make a clear-cut distinction between the means and the end of our research. When we have to live through something, we obtain not only the end, but the whole experience of reaching this end in a particular way. For example, when one acquires knowledge about Japanese cuisine, he may acquire it through eating some Japanese food in Japan, or in Canada, or in Africa, he may also. 政治大 family member, or in school. 立No matter what was the way, one will acquire some basic. acquire this knowledge through reading books about it, or through learning from a. ‧ 國. 學. knowledge about Japanese cuisine, however this knowledge would vary on the phenomenological level, and it is really impossible to separate the end from the means of. ‧. reaching this end.. y. Nat. Similarly, the object of the present research is the will, however this object will. io. sit. be reached in considering Hannah Arendt and Mozi’s conceptions, which are directly. n. al. er. related to the will. In other words, the object of our research is not something, what was. Ch. i n U. v. said or implied by Arendt or Mozi, but it is the will itself, however, it is not just the will. engchi. by itself, rather it is the will and how is this will approached by Arendt and Mozi in their philosophies. It should be noted that the object of this research involves a “building upon” the relevant philosophical conceptions of Arendt and Mozi, and this is important enough to be reflected in the title of this paper. This means the following. Hannah Arendt has done a very insightful research into the main questions, which are directly related to the phenomena of the will. Her insights and ideas relate to most of the philosophical issues, which are raised with respect to the will and action. She has also used the phenomenological principles of exploring reality and verifying validity of the philosophical conclusions, which she made. And, most importantly, Arendt has intuited 6.

(8) the main principle, which pertains to will. This principle makes it possible to construct a theoretical model of the will. Such model was outlined by Arendt, however, it has not been rigorously and systematically developed by her. It is the task and object of the present research to continue the research initiative of Hannah Arendt in order to express the main methodological instruments, the main fundamental principle of the will, as well as formulating a universally applicable phenomenological model of the will and action. Such development has to deal with all internal and external factors, which pertain to the will, and it is also likely to involve expansion of the “realm of will” to all areas, where we can encounter phenomena of willing. Such expansion may thus involve “discovering” will in aspects, which were not considered by Arendt as pertaining to will.. 政治大 for two purposes: 1) to see立 whether this model may be applicable to a very different. Once such theoretical model is developed, it will be applied to the philosophy of Mozi. ‧ 國. 學. philosophic tradition without harming that tradition, and whether this may provide us new insights about that other tradition; and 2) to see whether another tradition may. ‧. positively contribute to improving the phenomenological model, which has been already. y. Nat. developed with the help of Hannah Arendt. All of the aspects, which were described in. io. sit. this paragraph are essentially related to the main object of this research and constitute its. n. al. er. main tasks or research objectives. In this way the application of the theoretical model to. Ch. i n U. v. the philosophy of Mozi will contribute to reaching the second purpose of the two main. engchi. purposes indicated above. However, researching Mozi is NOT a purpose or goal per se of the current research inquiry.. 1.2.. Scope of the Research. Essentially, scope of the research is determined by the object of the research. In other words, we will research whatever is directly related to the will and will not research whatever is not directly related to the will. However, this needs some clarification, since it may not be obvious what does and what does not directly relate to the will and also what is the role of Arendt and Mozi in this respect. Something is 7.

(9) directly related to the will if we may show that without considering it, our understanding of the will is deprived of some essential element. For example, one may not understand what is will, without considering the process and the ability of “willing,” or without considering what is an outcome of willing, for example, what is “action.” We also have to consider external and internal conditions of willing as well as instances of conflicting wills. Arendt and Mozi had some important insights into matters, which are directly related to the will. These insights may enlighten us about the nature and/or various aspects of the will. Thus, some of these insights will enter our research. However, they should not be considered within the scope of our research in the sense of being objects of. 政治大 research will be undertaken, not a research of about the will by others. A philosophical 立 our research, since we will research the will per se, and not something, what was said. ‧ 國. 學. the history of ideas. A philosophical research deals not with ideas, but with realities, and it may consider some ideas only as long as they may help understand reality and may. Nat. y. ‧. provide a better account about something, which really exists.. io. sit. The above briefly outlines the object and the approximate scope of the present. n. al. er. research paper. However, some deviations and extensions are to be added in some places. Ch. i n U. v. in order to contribute to the clarity and validity of the main findings.. engchi. 2. Research Methodology. Some aspects of the methodology were already mentioned in our description of the object and the scope of this research. It was mentioned, especially, when we talked about the “destination point” and the experiencing or living through the research, rather than simply going through some speculative or logical process of considering some theoretical concepts and constructions. Methodology for this research inquiry is rather rigid and must exclude any dogmatism, prejudice and subjectivism. This is necessary in order to obtain a grounded 8.

(10) and. scientifically. verified. understanding. of. the. phenomenon. 1. of. willing.. Phenomenological analysis of any aspect of the phenomenon of willing is to begin from the transcendental experience of an individual Ego. Phenomenological reduction shall yield any particular element, which is given to the Ego. Then it is necessary to identify what is constituted by the Ego itself and what is involved in such a constitution. By excluding subjectivism we exclude any subjective positing of philosophical propositions, which are grounded not in phenomenological inquiry, but either belong to the legacy of philosophical tradition, or have their roots in individual axiological, anthropological or even ideological positions. Even though any dogmatism is to be excluded, the present paper will abundantly. 政治大 of willing. Many observations 立 of this outstanding philosopher shall prove useful and. utilize philosophical insights of Hannah Arendt into the matters related to the philosophy. ‧ 國. 學. enlightening for the present philosophical inquiry. Philosophical intuitions of Hannah Arendt shall prove helpful in indicating the places “where to dig”; however, this does. ‧. not mean that no digging is necessary: a lot of further exploration, analysis, reassessment. y. Nat. and systematization are still to be done in order to reach the goals of the present research. io. sit. paper. It should thus not be surprising that some of the ultimate findings of this research. n. al. er. should be at variance with positions held by Hannah Arendt herself.. Ch. i n U. v. Being to a great extent assisted by philosophical contributions of Arendt, our. engchi. research is nevertheless to be grounded on experiences of an empty transcendental Ego, which is the ultimate beginning of any phenomenological inquiry. Even though any particular Ego is loaded by empirical data, gained through past experiences and internalized within the Ego, we shall perform phenomenological reduction with respect both to such empirical “burden” and to any external aspect, which may in one way or another condition the Ego externally.. 1. It is more appropriate to utilize the plural form “phenomena”, since there are many aspects of. the willing. However, “phenomenon” may also be used as a collective term for willing in all of its forms and including all of its aspects.. 9.

(11) The above methodology requires some further clarification. In any case, what is to be taken as a starting point are the internal experiences of the Ego. However, on the one hand, when considering such experiences, we need to eliminate2 the influence of any a posteriori aspects of the Ego on the experiences in question, we should look only into the a priori conditions related to these experiences and analyze these experiences by themselves. On the other hand, we shall also eliminate the influence of any external factors, which are particular to any instance of obtaining such experiences, as long as these external factors cannot be generalized to any Ego and to any point on the timespace continuum. In other words, our research must consider only data, which is free of any particularities pertaining either to the a posteriori burden of the Ego, or to the. 政治大 circumstantial aspect, which立 is not directly related to the object of research.. external conditions peculiar to some particular culture, historical period, or other. ‧ 國. 學. Now this methodological principle may be expanded to divide our inquiry into internal or immanent and external or transcendent aspects. At first, an internal. ‧. experience is to be identified and analyzed by itself. It is necessary to identify what does. y. Nat. this experience involve, whether it involves rational considerations, feelings of. io. sit. discomfort or pleasure, internal strife, how is it related to other experiences, which were. n. al. er. already considered, etc. This will yield characteristics of the experience in question and. Ch. i n U. v. allow us perform appropriate classification of the experience. Next step is to analyze. engchi. how this experience is related to the external world, the world, which is beyond the Ego, and which often conditions the internal experiences related to willing. For this reason, we may say that the phenomenon of willing is to a great extent (not entirely) a reaction to the external world, since willing often arises, when Ego is not satisfied with something external to itself, and wants to change something which extends beyond its immediate subjectivity. Thus, our methodological approach is twofold, however it is not split into two parts, but rather has two primary constituents, which have the same object of inquiry. On the one hand, it includes analysis of relevant philosophical intuitions of Hannah Arendt, 2. i.e. to take in brackets.. 10.

(12) on the other it also includes a phenomenological inquiry into the same object, which is directed at yielding well grounded results, which would have no relationship with Hannah Arendt’s philosophical views on the given matter. For example, Hannah Arendt may provide us with valuable insights into such manifestation of human will as “desire”. Having reviewed this insights and having given them preliminary assessment, we shall consider phenomenology of various experiences related to desire. For example, an experience of desiring to learn a new foreign language, or to earn more money, or to protect the environment, etc. Phenomenological analysis of these various examples of desire will likely show us that there may be significant differences both in origins of these desires and in processes associated with these experiences. After a comprehensive. 政治大 attempt to generalize and systematize 立 our findings will be made. This should yield us. analysis of both internal and external factors, which condition these phenomena, an. ‧ 國. 學. grounded and valid understanding of various aspects of the phenomenology of willing and thus contribute to the ultimate goal of present research inquiry.. ‧. It should be noted that the phenomenological approach, which is to be used in. y. Nat. this paper is to some extent similar to Husserlian methodology. Edmund Husserl is often. io. sit. considered to be the father of phenomenology due to his outstanding contribution to the. n. al. er. development of the phenomenological method, which aims at building philosophy as a. i n U. v. rigorous science (certainly, “a science” in Husserlian sense). No matter whether this. Ch. engchi. proposition is valid or not, it should be acknowledged that Edmund Husserl contributed significantly to the development of the phenomenological method, and this contribution was appreciated by many later phenomenologists. It is also appreciated by the author of this research paper, and many elements of Husserl’s phenomenological approach will prove useful for the purposes of this research, which aims at exploring the phenomenological aspects of willing. Moreover, since this research paper is a continuation of the research done by Hannah Arendt, relationship to Husserlian methodology and phenomenological discoveries is especially relevant due to the significant influence of Husserl’s philosophy on the thought and methodology of Arendt. From the very beginning of her The Life of 11.

(13) the Mind: Willing Hannah Arendt emphasizes the phenomenological problematic. She is concerned not only with phenomena of willing experiences as they manifest themselves to a human Ego, but also the whole history of philosophic conceptions of willing is treated by her as a series of phenomena, which manifest themselves to humanity and are worth of a detailed analysis. For the above reasons it is going to be both useful and highly relevant to utilize many phenomenological principles in the research of the philosophy of willing, which is to be undertaken in the present research paper. Many does not mean all, some phenomenological conceptions will not be heavily involved in the current research. For example, the goal of the current research is not in. 政治大 epistemological apparatus involved 立 in reaching the research goals of this dissertation the field of epistemology, thus there will be less of the phenomenological. ‧ 國. 學. project.. This method may also be explained in the following way. First it is necessary to. ‧. identify something, which has a direct relationship to the will. This something may be a. y. Nat. philosophical concept, which is related to some reality, or it may be some experience, or. io. sit. idea which comes to existence as a result of some willing experience or some mental. n. al. er. activity, which either precedes or follows some willing phenomena. This something. Ch. i n U. v. includes the notion of freedom, of action, of volition and other, it also includes. engchi. experiences of desiring, planning, choosing, etc. This “something” may also include an idea, such as “the will is a spring of action,” etc. To identify something, which relates to will we first look into Arendt’s and/or Mozi’s philosophic thought or to our own experiences and try to understand whether it is related to some reality. After identifying this “something” and establishing whether it is related to reality, it is necessary to understand and explain how it is related to the will. In order to explain this a researcher is invited to go through a corresponding experience of willing and to thus test whether this something is real and there it is possible to include it into the whole body of phenomena and concepts related directly to willing. When this something and its relationship to the will have been explained successfully, it is possible to include it into 12.

(14) the philosophical theory of the will. This means that this something may be later referred to when discussing anything else, which may relate to the will.. 2.1. Phenomenological Grounding. It is necessary to explain the use of the words “phenomenology” and “phenomenological” in this research paper and to clarify what is meant by naming the present research “Phenomenology of the Will.” The term “phenomenological” indicates that there is a “phenomenon,” which is experienced by a human Ego, and this experience may be repeated and confirmed by. 政治大 conditions. In such case this 立“phenomenon” may be claimed to have a relative inter-. other subjects, who would experience a similar “phenomenon” if put in the same. ‧ 國. 學. subjective objectivity and to represent some reality. In practice it is seldom possible to create exact same conditions for perceiving or experiencing something, so there is some. ‧. approximation involved in positing an inter-subjective objectivity of something,. y. Nat. nevertheless this allows us of speaking about “phenomena,” which are objective and. io. sit. which constitute reality and the way it appears to us.. n. al. er. It is important to stress that “phenomena” are internalized by our conscience.. i n U. v. “Phenomena” belong to the noematic side of our conscience, but they are nevertheless. Ch. engchi. internal to it. Therefore, “phenomena” may be directly dealt with by our mental faculties, since they are “ready at hand” and “available” for direct use or processing of our conscious Ego. First, all of the important elements of this model have a phenomenological foundation to support their validity and relative objectivity. It was confirmed that very element is supported by experiences of consciousness, and that whenever it belongs to the world of appearances, it may be constituted to belong to the relatively objective phenomena, with which we can deal. Every major element withstands the test of intersubjective objectivity, once mentioned and described, it is given to consciousness of every human being, and its relative objectivity may thus be posited. This relative 13.

(15) objectivity and phenomenological grounding provides for the following characteristic of this model. Also, all of the main propositions of this model are phenomenologically tested, or verified by experiences of corresponding realities, which may be relatively objectified through inter-subjective verification of their validity. In other words, once we arrive at some proposition (either through logical deduction, or through utilizing others’ propositions, or through some other kind of intuition) we do not immediately accept it as valid, but rather we attempt to somehow experience the reality with which this given proposition may be associated. We may accept this proposition as valid if and only if we are able to confirm its reference to reality through such an experiment. This experiment. 政治大 which would supply an even 立 firmer phenomenological proof of the validity of the. may be either purely mental or may also involve experiences in the world of appearance,. ‧ 國. 學. proposition related to this experience.. Another very important concept, which needs some explanation, is the concept of. ‧. “appearance.” “Appearance” is also a “phenomenon” and it is perceived and internalized. y. Nat. by human Ego. However, “appearance” is perceived by us through vision (and to a lesser. io. sit. extent through other senses).. n. al. er. Explaining the use of the words “phenomenology” and “phenomenological” in. i n U. v. this research inquiry and clarifying the significance of the word “phenomenological” in. Ch. engchi. the title of the present research paper is very helpful to avoid any misunderstanding. However, it should be noted that Arendt herself does not call her work “phenomenological research” and she seldom uses the word “phenomenology” to refer to her own thinking and philosophic findings. Nevertheless, her research is also fundamentally phenomenological in its approach and theoretical modeling. There is a general agreement on this in the circle of Arendt researchers and in the wider circle of phenomenologists. Similarly to Arendt, phenomenological aspects and findings of the present research are not always denoted by the word “phenomenological,” since this is found to be redundant. However, it is necessary to emphasize that our research is 14.

(16) phenomenological in its approach, methodology and even in the structuring of its major theoretical framework. This necessity is dictated by the requirement of rigorousness, which has to be fulfilled in order for the research results of this paper to be taken seriously due to the rigour of developing them and not due to authority, which may or may not be associated with the researcher.. 3. Previous Research on the Topic. In a broad sense it is possible to say that any philosophical inquiry about the will constitutes a research done on the phenomena of the will. In this sense many of the. 政治大 matter, with which we are about 立 to deal in this research paper.. world’s philosophers from ancient times to modernity were doing research on the subject. ‧ 國. 學. However, not all of the above mentioned researchers dealt with the phenomena of the will per se, some of them were involved in a speculative development of related. ‧. concepts and theories. Strictly speaking such philosophers were not directly involved in. y. Nat. researching the same object as we are about to research.. io. sit. Moreover, even fewer researchers researched the topic with the aid of Hannah. n. al. er. Arendt’s and Mozi’s findings. However, this does not mean that philosophers, who did. Ch. i n U. v. not use Arendt’s and Mozi’s findings did not do research on the topic. It should be. engchi. emphasized again that the object of the present research is the will and whatever is directly related to it, thus all of the researchers, who approached this object are considered forerunners of the present research. Even though there were numerous attempts to provide philosophical explanations of the phenomena related to willing, at present there is no well developed and grounded phenomenology of human willing. Researchers are either focused on criticism and evaluation of philosophical theories of major philosophers or on developing their own philosophical systems, which are loaded with positing concepts and dogmatizing their philosophical reflections.. 15.

(17) It may be claimed that philosophical reflections of Hannah Arendt constitute an attempt to build phenomenology of willing. Arendt looked at willing as a phenomenon and attempted to interpret other philosophers’ ideas from a stand point of a phenomenologist. She reflected both upon the phenomena of willing and on the outcomes of willing, namely the “vita activa” (“active life” or “life of activity” in Latin). However, Arendt’s work did not yield a satisfactory phenomenological model, which is well grounded in the internal experiences of a transcendental Ego. Her treatises, which are directly concerned with willing carry a character of a philosophical discourse on the philosophical development of the concept of will and lack scientific rigidity of phenomenological analysis.. 政治大 findings of Hannah Arendt,立 it shall start from the point where Arendt left off and take For these reasons the present research shall further develop phenomenological. ‧ 國. 學. the research on a new level, on the level characterized by overall coherence and rigid philosophical inquiry grounded in experiences of a transcendental Ego.. ‧. Even though the primary source of the proposed analysis is internal human. y. Nat. experience, it will also prove helpful to look into intuitions of other philosophers on. io. sit. these matters, despite the fact that some of them approached these matters not from a. n. al. er. phenomenological position, but often carrying other philosophical frameworks and/or. Ch. i n U. v. dogmatized theories into their philosophical reflections. In the Western philosophical. engchi. tradition intuitions of Aristotle, Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger are to be given special attention, while in Chinese philosophy the thought of Mozi is to be explored. The above thinkers are to be involved not as objects of research but rather as collaborators in the present philosophical inquiry. All of them brought in valuable contributions to the philosophy of willing and may be considered forerunners of current research inquiry. Up to now there has been some research done on Hannah Arendt’s philosophy of will and on her reflection on the issue of political freedom, which is not directly related to the philosophical conception of willing, but is, nevertheless, related to it through the common notion of freedom. A book written by Gabriel Masooane Tlaba Politics and Freedom: Human Will and Action in the Thought of Hannah Arendt is a good example 16.

(18) of a research inquiry into both the thought on political freedom and on the philosophy of human will of Hannah Arendt. There is also a relatively large number of articles and dissertation papers on Arendt’s philosophy of human willing, including research on the sources of her thought. This research is very valuable and even enlightening for a deeper understanding of Arendt’s philosophy of will, thus much of it will prove helpful for the purposes of the present research inquiry. However, none of the researchers, who reflected upon the thought of Arendt, attempted to use the insights of this thought to construct a systematic framework, which would systematize our understanding of the phenomena of will as a specific object of philosophical inquiry. It is precisely this kind of research which still needs to be done in order to both further our understanding of the. 政治大. phenomena of willing and also to better appreciate the philosophical implications of. 立. Arendt’s thought.. ‧ 國. 學. A number of researchers explored Arendt’s conception of will. Research of Stephan Kampowski, Suzanne Jacobitti, Lawrence Biskowski, Leah Bradshaw, Margaret. ‧. Canovan, J. Glenn Gray, Dean Hammer, Jerome Kohn, Maurizio Passerin d’Entreves are. y. Nat. people, who contributed significantly to the research of Hannah Arendt’s conceptions of. io. sit. willing, action and related aspects of the mental life and political theory. Most of these. n. al. er. researchers treat Arendt’s conceptions taken apart from one another or consider the same. Ch. i n U. v. connections as Arendt herself explicitly described. Thus, there is a need to explore. engchi. possible integrated theoretical frameworks, which may be used to unite Arendt’s conceptions into an integrated theoretical system. Moreover, the above mentioned researches have a tendency to treat Arendt’s thought on will from a political thinking perspective and not from a philosophical perspective of researching human mind and its faculties. A vivid example is the work of Susanne Jacobitti titled Hannah Arendt and the Will, the work has a philosophical title, but it is constructed mainly from a political theory perspective and aims at providing conclusions, which pertain mainly to political thought. This perspective is valid, but with respect to the philosophy of the will as a mental faculty, such perspective often yields erroneous or misleading results. Moreover, it does not contribute much to utilizing 17.

(19) Arendt’s ideas for developing a coherent theory of will and action. Such shortages should be accounted for and this makes us conscious of a need to do some further research on Arendt to try contributing to developing such a coherent theoretical framework of will and action. Another important shortage of the research of scholars, who were mentioned above is that it does not consider Arendt’s findings from a strictly phenomenological perspective. This made it difficult and sometimes impossible for the above mentioned researchers to develop a sound foundation for their speculative arguments and for testing results of these arguments for validity in the real life. Moreover, this lack of phenomenological orientation and approach prevented these researchers from creating a. 政治大 dissertation will attempt making 立 a phenomenological contribution in view of these. coherent phonological model of will and action. The research inquiry of the present. ‧ 國. 學. shortages and will try to overcome some difficulties, which arise when treating Arendt’s thoughts with a phenomenological approach. The main characteristics of our. ‧. phenomenological approach were already mentioned above.. There has been no research on phenomenology of will in Mozi’s philosophic legacy,. y. Nat. sit. which is worth mentioning. However, some scholars attempted to approach Mozi’s thought from. n. al. er. io. the perspective of moral agency and willing. Most of their studies belong to comparative. i n U. v. philosophy and carry a rather descriptive character, rather than a new philosophic exploration.. Ch. engchi. One of such scholars is Erica Fox Brindley, who in her book Individualism in early China: human agency and the self in thought and politics approaches implied notions of individualism, freedom, conformism, agency and other, which have a direct relationship to willing experiences. Another important research is reflected in Mo Tzu’s Religious Blueprint for a Chinese Utopia: The Will and the Way by Scott Lowe. This book is a commentary on various parts of Mozi’s writings, it is less specialized in the problematic of will, but also makes some thoughtful contributions to researching the will in Mozi’s thought. An article by Bryan Van Norden A Response to the Mohist Arguments in “Impartial Caring” is also worth mentioning as a successful attempt to interpret and rethink some of Mozi’s argumentation, which is directly related to his moral thought. However, all of this research fail to look at Mozi’s philosophy from a perspective of a coherent phenomenological model of willing and action, and is thus not protected from incoherence and segmentation.. 18.

(20) It is now time to proceed to considering some of the other important factors, which have contributed to motivating this research.. 4. Motivation for the Research. The above mentioned shortages of the previous research on will and action in general and on Arendt’s conception of will in particular all constitute an important motivation for the present research, however, such motivation is not enough, since any research, which is conditioned by lack of research is retrospective. However philosophic and phenomenological inquiry have to be positively orientated towards discovering the. 政治大 has been motivated by a search 立of truth about willing and action.. truth, and not to “filling some gaps.” The present research inquiry is not an exclusion, it. ‧ 國. 學. However it is also necessary to indicate what other aspects of the state of philosophical research, as well as existential motivating factors, have contributed to. ‧. motivating this research inquiry.. y. Nat. Before starting any research inquiry it is necessary to understand why is this. io. sit. research relevant and needed? In short, researching phenomenology of willing is. n. al. er. relevant and there is a need for it, since any conscious human action is related to willing,. Ch. i n U. v. and the world in which we live is to a great extent an outcome of human action, it is. engchi. impossible to overlook the importance and relevance of the human action. This relevance to the everyday life and to the shaping of the world in which we live makes this research relevant for the academic world also. However, this doesn’t mean that this research does not have relevance from purely academic perspective as well: Edmund Husserl emphasized the need for developing phenomenological understanding of all areas of human life, since phenomenology may yield us scientifically grounded philosophical understanding of the manifold phenomena of human life. As long as a researcher wants to avoid dogmatism and postulating moral and anthropological philosophical conceptions and at the same time wants to understand the nature of various experiences related to willing, he called to make a phenomenological 19.

(21) inquiry into the given experiences and may attempt modeling these experience to arrive at a philosophical model, which would be valid in explaining and evaluating various experiences related to willing and, consequently, to human action. It may be summarized that the primary motivation for and the ultimate goal of such an inquiry is to further and enrich our understanding of transcendental experiences of human Ego and collective experiences of groups of people (e.g. what is meant by “collective will”, etc.). Having understood the principles and the processes involved in phenomenology of individual human willing, it is possible to extend the research scope to the phenomena of collective willing. This extension is relevant for the same reasons as the research of individual willing, namely to understand the principles, conditions and. 政治大 for philosophies of politics,. processes of human action, which to a great extent shapes the world in which we live.. 立. This may have implications. sociology, economics,. ‧ 國. 學. historiosophy and other philosophical disciplines dealing with groups of people. However, these fields are beyond the scope of the present research.. ‧. The secondary motivation for this research is to obtain means for. y. Nat. phenomenological exegesis of philosophical traditions, which deal with various aspects. io. sit. of the phenomenon of willing. Many philosophers attempted to give philosophical. n. al. er. interpretations of the phenomena of willing and their intuitions are very helpful for our. Ch. i n U. v. research, since it may provide valuable clues on what needs to be researched and what. engchi. kinds of experiences of willing may not be overlooked. This motivation is very important, since there is a need for a phenomenological assessment of various philosophical theories of willing, and there are presently no valid systems, which may be used to interpret philosophies of will, which belong to different Western philosophical schools and traditions. Moreover, present research is motivated by the need to interpret Chinese philosophical tradition with respect to phenomenology of willing. This would through light on how willing has been perceived by Chinese philosophers, and what kind of transcendental experience of willing influenced development of Chinese philosophy. For this reason philosophy of Mozi is to be given special attention in the present study. On 20.

(22) the one hand, it will be explored whether philosophy of Mozi can contribute to phenomenology of willing, on the other hand an attempt to interpret philosophy of Mozi with the phenomenological model built in the course of present research. In case it will be possible to do such an interpretation, it is likely that the phenomenological approach to willing may be applied to any Chinese philosophical tradition, which is in some way related to willing. Motivation for researching the will also includes the need to have a deeper insight into the principles, experiences and outcomes of willing, which shapes the world in which we live. It is important to understand not only the principles governing the internal mental life of individuals, but also the real outcomes of human willing. Thus,. 政治大. there are both theoretical and practical aspects to the motivation for researching the. 立. willing.. ‧ 國. 學. Theoretical aspects include the need to develop a coherent theory of the will and to provide a better account of the main philosophical concepts related to the will. There. ‧. is a need to provide phenomenological grounding to many notions, such as “volition,”. y. Nat. “desire,” “appetite,” “attention” and many other and to provide a theoretical framework. io. sit. for relating these conceptions to the will.. n. al. er. Practical aspects include the need to build our willing experiences as well as free. Ch. i n U. v. actions in a way, which has a totality. For example, when we do something out of. engchi. necessity, we should not consider ourselves involved in free willing, since we would fool ourselves and will not be masters of our own lives. For example, when we are bound to pay a tax, which will be used for supplying armour for the war in Iraq, we should not consider ourselves free in either paying the tax or in supporting the war in Iraq, we are forced by our government to do both of these things. In this case we are deprived both of our free will as well as of our political freedom, we pay the tax out of necessity (even if we do this without hesitation). Having understood this we may either try to protect our freedom (both internal and political) through some means, or we may refuse the claim that the government always protects rights and freedoms of its citizens, and thus avoid any further manipulation and lies. 21.

(23) The issue of will and freedom is especially important in the modern world, where the word “freedom” may be used to mean almost anything, including necessity (for example, when we are told that we have “a freedom to choose anyone to govern our country” and are provided with two or three presidential candidates). It is also important in the modern age of “emancipation,” when someone may be “emancipated” and everyone else gets enslaved. In other words our research is also motivated by the need to provide a better account of the nature and manifestation of the will as well as by the need to provide some help for becoming masters of our own will and action and thus gaining some existential benefit from conducting this research.. 政治大 As the main methodological 立 and motivational aspects of this research inquiry. ‧ 國. 學. have been presented and examined, it is now time to begin pursuing our research objectives. For this purpose it will be of great help to critically examine Arendt’s. ‧. philosophical treatment of the issues related to willing and action and to see how her. y. Nat. contribution to these issues may be used for the purposes of our research inquiry and for. n. al. er. io. sit. building a phenomenological framework or model of willing and action.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 22.

(24) Chapter II – Overview of the Arendt’s Conception of Willing and Action. 1. Basic Intuitions. The goal of this Chapter is to gain an overall picture of Hannah Arendt’s conception of will and to provide a preliminary critical analysis of her ideas. A deeper analysis of Arendt’s methodology and some particular aspects of her thought is left for Chapter 4. In her study of human mind Arendt distinguishes three basic mental faculties:. 政治大 and also tries to form a general 立 framework of relationships between these faculties, thinking, willing and judging, she dedicates a separate volume to each of these faculties,. ‧ 國. human mind.. 學. thereby attempting to present a coherent and conceptually self-sufficient theory of. ‧. Some scholars claim that Arendt’s thoughts on willing and on the self are. y. Nat. incoherent and thus difficult to comprehend and use. Susanne Jacobitti, for example,. n. er. io. al. sit. expresses the following criticism of Arendt’s thought:. Ch. i n U. v. It is in fact difficult to find a coherent account of the self in Arendt's work. At. engchi. times she seems to associate the self with the body, as something that also "appears" in the world. At other times, she seems to associate the self clearly with the will. At still other times, she suggests the self is something separate from mind, body, and soul that holds them all together. And at still other times, she speaks of a thinking ego, a willing ego, and a judging ego, each following its own imperative as though nothing held them together and the self were only occupied territory taken over from time to time by one of the three autonomous egos.3 3. Jacobitti, Suzanne. Hannah Arendt and the Will. Political Theory, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Feb., 1988),. P. 62.. 23.

(25) Despite such criticism, in the present Chapter an attempt will be made to provide a coherent account of Arendt’s thought on willing, as well as on its relationship to the self and to action. Regarding the difference between thinking and willing Arendt says that there is "a basic conflict between the experiences of the thinking ego and those of the willing ego.”4 This conflict is due to a difference of basic mode of operation of thinking and willing. In Arendt’s opinion, willing is involved with particular affairs of the world, while thinking is detached from these affairs and deals with generalizations and mental constructs, which are above time and particular things of the world.. 政治大 subjected will to reasoning.立 Arendt believes that such conclusions of many thinkers are. Arendt notices that many thinkers doubted the very existence of will and/or. ‧ 國. 學. due to a bias inherent to everyone who is involved in “professional thinking”. Arendt, therefore, rejects such conclusions and decides to “take the internal evidence of an I-will. ‧. as sufficient testimony to the reality of [the willing faculty, K.C.].”5. y. Nat. Arendt looks into the history of philosophy to “find thinkers with widely. io. sit. different general philosophies raising identical arguments against the Will”. 6 Arendt. n. al. er. briefly considers some philosophers who have dismissed these willing experiences as. i n U. v. illusory, these include Spinoza, Hobbes, Mill, and Schopenhauer.7 Arendt finds that all. Ch. engchi. of the objections “raised against the very existence of the faculty [of the Will, K.C.] is, first of all, that they are invariably raised in terms of the modern notion of consciousness – a notion just as unknown to ancient philosophy as the notion of the Will.”8 However, instead of demonstrating that all of such objections are false, Arendt presents us a counter evidence of the existence of will as an autonomous faculty. 4. Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: Willing. London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978. P. 4.. 5. Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: Willing. P. 5.. 6. Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: Willing. P. 23.. 7. Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: Willing. Pp. 23-25.. 8. Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: Willing. P. 25.. 24.

(26) 2. Internal Evidence of the Reality of the Will. Thus, it is now necessary to consider what are (in Arendt’s view) the main “internal evidences” of the reality of the will. One of the most obvious internal evidences is people’s "awareness" that when we have done something, “we could also have left undone what we actually did.” 9 This gives us a feeling that we are free to choose between doing something and not doing it. It should be noted that this “internal experience” may be misleading, we may “feel” something, but it may actually not be so. However, this is not what concerns Arendt here,. 政治大 autonomous mental faculty.立 In order to support this claim she holds that such awareness. she is concerned with providing a phenomenological basis for claiming that willing is an. ‧ 國. 學. is an authentic internal experience of the human mind.. Arendt also gives some examples of such an “awareness”:. ‧. y. Nat. The touchstone of a free act – from the decision to get out of bed in the morning. io. sit. or take a walk in the afternoon to the highest resolutions by which we bind. n. al. er. ourselves for the future – is always that we know that we could also have left undone what we actually did.10. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Every decision made by a human person is associated with choice of either making or not making such a decision. However, it should be noted that human decisions may not necessarily be associated with praxis and future. For example we may decide who we are, or what our Homeland is, or what is and what is not related to the history of our family. Our decisions normally involve choice, but this choice is not necessarily related to the future. Thus, it may be claimed that there are some limitation. 9. Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: Willing. P. 5. 10. Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: Willing. P. 26. 25.

(27) to Arendt’s conception of will, which arise from the limits of her overall framework of mind theory. Such limitations are to be further considered in the following Chapter. This internal experience of willing is related to a sense of power, which Arendt denotes by the feeling that “I-will-and-I-can.”11 This is the power to do something. This is related to how does a person want to appear to other observers in the world. In this discussion it is necessary to consider one important aspect of willing. Can it be claimed that willing is concerned only with future matters, which are in my power, or willing includes something, which is beyond my power? Can I will something, which is not attainable by me both in the near and in a distant future? For example, when I’m willing that everyone be polite and full of compassionate love, is my willing faculty. 政治大 faculty of willing. However, 立in the next Chapter it will be claimed that any “thoughtinvolved in this? Arendt seems to deny that such aspirations are associated with the. ‧ 國. 學. object” may become an object of willing faculty, no matter whether it is attainable by the willing subject or not. In fact, for many thought-objects it is difficult and sometimes. ‧. impossible to determine whether they are within the scope of my power, and people may. io. y. sit. immediate power.. Nat. take risks and spend efforts to try to attain goals, attaining which is beyond their. n. al. er. In respect to this, Arendt appears to contradict herself, when she notices that “the. i n U. v. will's worrying disquiet can be stilled only by the I-can-and-I-do.”12 She holds that there. Ch. engchi. is some worry, restlessness and uncertainty associated with willing. This uncertainty or tension ceases to exist as soon as action proves that “I-will-and-I-can”, the uncertainty is resolved and becomes certainty. Thus, in Arendt’s view, only something that is feasible and attainable may be included in the realm of willing. It will be shown in the fourth Chapter, that it is often impossible for a person to determine what is and what is not feasible for him, and thus it is impossible to determine exactly what is and what is not potentially attainable. It will be also shown that something may be an object of willing regardless of whether it is attainable or not. 11. Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: Thinking. Pp. 214-215. 12. Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: Willing. P. 37.. 26.

(28) 3. Looking for the Origin of the Philosophical Notion of Will. Arendt looks into the history of concepts to find the roots of the conception of will in the history of philosophy. We may agree with Susanne Jacobitti that “much of what Arendt says about the will is quite traditional.”13 Indeed much of what she herself says about the will is borrowed from other philosophers and it is necessary to pay a very close attention to what Arendt expresses about the willing, when she explicitly cites others. Arendt claims that it was Saint Apostle Paul, who first brought forth the notion. 政治大 should want not only to act 立 according to God’s commandments but also to want what is. of will as an internal mental faculty. Arendt notices that Jesus Christ taught that we. ‧ 國. 學. right and pleasing to God, to be pure and holy not only in action but in spirit also, to avoid any hypocrisy. Jesus Christ preached that to look at a woman with lust is already. ‧. committing adultery in one's heart. Thus, a person is called not only to avoid acting. y. Nat. (committing adultery in action), but also of willing (committing adultery in heart/mind)14.. n. al. er. io. his inmost self”.. sit. A person is thus called to change his own will and to find “delight in the law of God “in. Ch. i n U. v. Arendt indicates that there is a fundamental difference between the two Laws: the. engchi. Old Law (of the Old Testament) and the New Law (of the New Testament, brought by Jesus Christ). She puts it this way: “Law itself is understood as the voice of a master demanding obedience; the Thou-shalt of the law demands and expects a voluntary act of submission, an I-will of agreement. The Old Law said: thou shalt do; the New Law says: thou shalt will.”15. 13. Jacobitti, Suzanne. Hannah Arendt and the Will. Political Theory, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Feb., 1988),. P. 59. 14. Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: Willing. Pp. 66-68.. 15. Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: Willing. P. 68.. 27.

(29) Arendt’s attempt to find the roots of “will” in the New Testament is natural, she wants to find the ultimate beginning of the notion of the inner faculty called willing. However, her position in this respect is weak. The Ten Commandments of the Old Testament include two Commandments not to will something, i.e. not to will anything that belongs to your neighbour. Old Testament tells us much about willing and not willing to obey God’s Commandments. Arendt thus makes a simplification, which misrepresents the theology of the Two Testaments with respect to willing. Nevertheless, Arendt is correct in indicating that St. Paul was first to introduce the notion of an “inner person”, this notion was not known to the people of the Old Testament. Arendt claims that:. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. It was the experience of a imperative demanding voluntary submission that led to the discovery of the Will, and inherent in this experience was the wondrous. ‧. fact of a freedom that none of the ancient peoples – Greek, Roman, or Hebrew. y. Nat. – had been aware of, namely, that there is a faculty in man by virtue of which,. io. sit. regardless of necessity and compulsion, he can say “Yes” or “No,” agree or. n. al. er. disagree with what is factually given, including his own self and his existence,. i n U. v. and that this faculty may determine what he is going to do.16. Ch. engchi. Arendt looks into the teaching of St. Paul, who is preaching and presenting the teaching of Christ. St. Paul speaks in terms of two conflicting laws, the law of the mind and law of the flesh, Arendt claims that in this conflict of laws St. Paul came up with a conception of will. She says:. If the will did not have the choice of saying “No,” it would no longer be a will; and if there were not. 16. counter-will within me that is aroused by the very. Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: Willing. P. 68.. 28.

(30) commandment of the Thou-shalt, if, to speak in Paul’s terms, “sin” did not dwell “within me” (Romans 7:20), I would not need a will at all.17. St. Paul's internal experience of two conflicting laws was later rethought by St. Augustine and rephrased in terms of a conflict within one’s own will: a positive "I will" to do something, but also a negative "I nill". Arendt puts it in this way: “Augustine does not speak of two laws but of “two wills, one new and the other old, one carnal and the other spiritual,” and describes in detail, like Paul, how these wills struggled “within” him and how their “discord undid [his] soul”18”19 Arendt claims that this tension is inherent to human will. She sums up St.. 政治大. Augustine’s thought in the following way:. 立. ‧ 國. 學. The split occurs in the will itself; the conflict arises neither out of a split between mind and will nor out of a split between flesh and mind. This is attested by the. ‧. very fact that the Will always speaks in imperatives: “Thou shalt will,” says the. y. Nat. Will to itself… It is in the Will’s nature to double itself… For this reason you. n. er. io. al. sit. always need two antagonistic wills to will at all…20. Ch. i n U. v. Arendt seems to be agree with St. Augustine that will has this conflicting nature. engchi. inherent in it, any willing has a corresponding counter-willing (or “nilling”), in other words, there is no willing, which is total/entire. However, as long as an affirmative willing is stronger than the negating nilling, there is a positive balance of willing, which normally results in action. In other words, there has to be a commitment strong enough to overcome the negative “nilling”, which attempts to nullify this commitment. Arendt also indicates in Responsibility and Judgment: 17. Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: Willing. P. 69.. 18. St. Augustine of Hippo. Confessions, bk. VIII, chap. V.. 19. Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: Willing. P. 87.. 20. Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: Willing. P. 94.. 29.

(31) …we discovered another human faculty that is split into two, not because it is opposed by an altogether different part of human nature, but because its very essence is to exist only as two-in-one. This split within the will itself, however, is a contest and not a dialogue. For if, on the contrary, the will were one, it would be superfluous, which means that it would have no one to command.21. Arendt explicitly indicates that this “split” of the will is actually will’s mode of existence. Without such split, there would be no purpose in giving commands, since a command means that “someone” has to obey it, and doesn’t want to obey.. 政治大 have a “counter-will,” since立 we may agree to obey to what our will tells us to do. We. Arendt’s conclusion requires some criticism. In fact it is no always necessary to. ‧ 國. 學. may not have any resistance stemming from the will itself. In fact we have more resistance to will coming from our appetites and desires, rather than from the will itself.. ‧. Thus, this model of “two-in-one” may be accepted, but only conditionally, this situation. y. Nat. of “two-in-one” is possible but is not always necessary with respect to the will.. io. sit. In the history of philosophy this “nilling” is usually denoted by the concept of. n. al. er. “weakness of the will.” However, it should be noted that a “nilling” is by itself a kind of. i n U. v. willing, while “weakness” is simply a lack or shortage of willing. These conceptions. Ch. engchi. shall be treated in a greater detail in the following Chapters of this paper. For St. Augustine the will may be harmonized once it is transformed into “love”. It is “love”, which has no internal contradictions, it is a Christian love towards God and towards people, which does not differentiate between people, since it does not seek any gain for the self, but rather makes a person directed towards others in serving them through personal sacrifice. This conception of “love” is not deeply analyzed by Arendt in relation to her philosophy of will, but it is important for the purposes of current research, especially since it will contribute to universalizing application of will to various phenomena of human life and to all parts of the time continuum. 21. Arendt, Hannah. Responsibility and Judgment. New York: Schocken Books, 2003. P. 121.. 30.

(32) Arendt indicates that in this discovery of the willing faculty, there is a discovery of authentic human freedom. Freedom from all of the conditions, where a person finds himself, and ability to initiate or create something new, something which breaks the causal chain of events. Arendt makes the following conclusion:. Inherent in this experience [of willing, or, as Arendt puts it, “of an imperative demanding voluntary submission”, K.C.] was the wondrous fact... that there is a faculty in man by virtue of which, regardless of necessity and compulsion, he can say “Yes” or “No,” agree or disagree with what is factually given, including his own self and his existence, and that this faculty may determine what he is going. 政治大. to do.22. 立. ‧ 國. 學. Arendt agrees that human will is free, a person may be willing to act in any way he decides to act. However, Arendt does not develop a detailed philosophical model of. ‧. human will and freedom. She does not go deep into the philosophical speculations about. y. Nat. positive and negative freedom, about various kinds of determinism etc. To some extent. io. sit. she seems to be following the spirit of St. Paul, who “was content with sheer. n. al. er. descriptions and refused to 'philosophize' about his experiences.”23. i n U. v. This may also be deduced from her criticism of “profession thinkers”, who were. Ch. engchi. unable to avoid many “fallacies” due to their professional “bias” towards thinking and disinterested speculation. For this reason in the history of philosophy “men of thought were no longer willing to abandon philosophy altogether and say, with Paul, “we preach Christ crucified”... and let it go at that.”24 Arendt puts expresses her concern about philosophic treatment of the issues related to will in the following way:. 22. Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: Willing. P. 68.. 23. Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: Willing. P. 57.. 24. Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: Willing. P. 3.. 31.

(33) …an inevitable flaw in …examinations of the willing faculty …that every philosopher of the Will is conceived …not by men of action but by philosophers … [who are, K.C.] more inclined to ‘interpret the world’ than ‘to change it’.25. According to Arendt, “professional thinkers” are to a large extent deprived of real experiences of action, they are not phenomenologically aware of the “essences” (in Husserlian sense) of willing experiences and therefore are not able to escape “the thinker’s bias” towards conceptual treatment of the willing faculty. This notion of Arendt certainly has some truth to it, however, it provides. 政治大 “will.” Philosophical reflection 立 is often prompted by real life experiences including. somewhat erroneous explanation of thinkers’ difficulty in theoretical account on the. ‧ 國. 學. phenomenological perception of various realities. Such realities may include science, art, technology, psychology, medicine, etc. Philosophical reflection on such realities does. ‧. not have to be erroneous due to the fact that a philosopher is not a professional, who is. y. Nat. always involved in related practices. Thus, Arendt’s claim that philosophers are. io. sit. fundamentally unable to reflect upon political action due to their not-involvement in. n. al. er. such action, is erroneous theoretically, even though it may be not erroneous practically.. Ch. i n U. v. Moreover, it may be noted that Arendt herself is not a politician, nevertheless she hopes. engchi. to provide a better theoretical account of political theory and philosophy of willing and action, and this hope may certainly be a justifiable one. It should also be noted that in her treatment of the will Arendt utilized much more ideas of St. Augustine’s than those of the “men of action,” which actually indicates that St. Augustine was more successful in accounting on will and its freedom than the “men of action,” who attempted to negate “freedom” and “spontaneity” altogether (for political purposes..). It should be noted that “freedom” and “spontaneity” are the factors, which determine whether something is related to will or no. Thus, it will be claimed that these 25. Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: Willing. P. 195.. 32.

(34) notions belong to the central principle of the will, which is sought for in this research paper, the principle of determining whether something is directly related to willing and action. It will be necessary to formulate this principle and to perform a phenomenological research on it before constructing a coherent theoretical model of the will. These issues will be discussed in more detail later in this research paper. A very thoughtful reflection on Arendt’s concern with “thinkers’ bias” in relation to the “will” is given by Max Deutscher:. In the end, it is not the bias of thought in addressing will that is the problem. We can admit that a predisposition to thinking might encourage writers to downgrade. 政治大 everything that is thought 立 about is other than thought. …One might remark,. willing in relation to it. This is not inevitable, however. Except for thought itself,. ‧ 國. 學. indeed, on the tendency to some form of idealism, which every systematic thought displays… So we can take ourselves to be given fair warning of our. ‧. likely ‘deformation professionelle’, but not therefore to have an excessive. y. Nat. mistrust of theories of the will in particular. To put it shortly – a theory of will is. n. al. Ch. engchi. er. io. thinker’ or ‘professional activist’.26. sit. not an instance of willing, no matter who produces it, whether ‘professional. i n U. v. It is evident that Arendt’s claim does not withstand academic criticism. However, her observation about “thinker’s bias” is a useful “warning” to all philosophic theorists, regarding all matters related to real life, including their reflection on willing and action, especially political action, which they do not experience directly.. Arendt also presents her understanding of the willing faculty as a journey into the history of philosophical and political thought and tries to find some answers in philosophical reflection as well as in political realities. 26. Deutscher, Max. Judgment after Arendt. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2007. P.. 152.. 33.

(35) 4. Three Mental Faculties Framework I: Thinking. For Arendt willing is one of three mental faculties (another two faculties are thinking and judging). It is thus worthwhile considering what does Arendt mean by a “mental faculty” and “mind”. Arendt holds that the mind is above all causal chains and conditions of the natural world 27 . Mind is detached from the flow of causes, consequences, and laws which operate in the realm of physical world. Mind is by no means the brain or the “brain-power” 28 . At the same time Arendt distinguishes mind from soul, which for. 政治大 Thus, Arendt concludes 立 that it is the mind, which has a capability of making us. Arendt is inseparable from body and its senses, and is thus grounded in the physical world.29. ‧ 國. 學. free from the natural world, and thus it makes us unique and “human”. Max Deutscher expresses Arendt’s idea about thinking’s “withdrawal” from the. ‧. “world” in recalling:. y. Nat. io. sit. ...Arendt’s original demarcation of thinking as a withdrawal from the world (of. n. al. er. social and political engagement). In this sense ‘world’ names the site of our. i n U. v. being willing – and, to stretch a phrase, of being nilling. (Nilling as willing-not.). Ch. engchi. Conceptually, we have left the site of the will in withdrawing to think.30. Mr.. Deutscher. thoughtfully. relates. this. “withdrawal”. to. Husserl’s. “transcendentation” in the following way:. 27. See Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: Thinking. Pp. 70-72.. 28. Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: Willing. P. 56.. 29. See Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: Thinking. Pp. 30-35, 72.. 30. Deutscher, Max. Judgment after Arendt. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2007. Pp.. 153-154.. 34.