Chapter III - Willing as a Reaction to External Conditions
9. Relationship of Willing to Other Faculties
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These factors may influence or Ego in a somewhat similar way as external factors influence us. However, there is a danger to mix these factors with the factors, which pertain to our free will. We may think that whatever initiative, or need, or appetite, which arises from within us, is essentially ours, and we are free in bringing this factor into existence. If we make such a mistake, our free will is in a serious risk of being overtaken by some factors, which are destructive for our freedom. Being assured about our freedom we may eventually become slaves.
These internal forces are the factors which are essentially “imprinted” in our character, and which contribute to producing some of our “inclinations,” which make us more inclined towards some peculiar ways of thinking and some peculiar ways of making judgments and towards some peculiar behavior, which is done “freely,” but with a reduced level of freedom.
Our character may certainly be shaped by many other factors both external and internal. External factors may include our environment and the world of appearances, which influences our lives. Internal factors may include both the factors, which undermine our freedom as well as the factors related directly to our free will. For example, we may freely choose to fall asleep late in order to finish some important work.
If we do this often, our body and our character may undergo a certain change and an inclination for going to bed very late is developed, this inclination may even undermine our freedom and prevent us from going to bed early on the days, when we are willing to fall asleep earlier.
Having made the important distinctions between some basic “acts,” that either belong to or not belong to our free will, we are now able to proceed to the further analysis of the will and its relationship with other mental faculties.
9. Relationship of Willing to Other Faculties
The role of the mind’s reasoning and the role of human feelings of various types should now be considered. The relationships of these “faculties” with the framework of
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the philosophy of willing must be identified and researched. This would not only show the significance of willing, but also will contribute greatly to our understanding of its relationship with the other mental faculties.
It should be noted that the framework of the three mental faculties, which is presented by Arendt in her theoretical treatment of the “life of the mind” is not the most adequate framework and there is no need to dogmatize it and to hold on to it in our research.
Intuitively, we may construct different schemes, which would include different autonomous or semi-autonomous mental and sub-mental faculties, which would describe real internal mental experiences with various degrees of adequacy depending on the nature of experiences with which we are dealing.
However, the framework, which is presented by Hannah Arendt, is a relatively convenient model, which can account for most experiences and there will be no major fallacies arising from the application of this model for most of our experiences. The experiences, which are difficult to account for in this model, include religious experiences, experiences of semi-conscious Ego and experiences related to moral judgments and conscience. These experiences are outside the scope of the present research inquiry, consequently, it will suffice for the purposes of our research to utilize the Arendtian model of three mental faculties.
However, Arendt’s model needs some alteration in order to apply to reality in a more adequate manner. The alterations, which are necessary, will now be discussed in some detail.
First, it is necessary to reduce the degree of autonomy of one faculty from another. Willing has to rely on some input provided to it by thinking. For example, we have to think about various choices and determine meaning of various factors, events and things, which relate to the object of willing in question. At the same time thinking may be influenced by willing. Once our willing has issued some command, has set some goals to reach, it influences thinking, it makes us think more about something related to the object of willing and less about something, with which our will has no relationship.
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Similar two-way relationships exist between willing and judging. When we are willing something, we tend to make biased judgments. And when we have made some judgments, they influence what goals and means we are likely to will. From the above examples and discussion it may be inferred, that there is an interdependence and inter-influence between all the three mental faculties.
It should be noted that thinking and judging have a two-fold significance for the willing. On the one hand, they provide some necessary and valuable input, which is utilized by the willing for the purpose of choosing its goals and means and for making particular volitions. On the other hand, thinking and judging may exert some influence on the willing and make it issue some imperatives, which it would not issue otherwise.
In other words, thinking and judging may also reduce will’s freedom and autonomy and may make it subject to some particular input. For example, we may judge that to be impolite is unacceptable and improper in our society, then we may be inclined to willing to behave in polite way. If we would not make such a judgment, we would possibly not be willing to be polite, but to express ourselves in a more straight forward and even aggressive way, whenever our will finds it appropriate for reaching some goals. Then our will would not be limited by our judgment.
Another alteration to Arendt’s model is to make will responsible not only for free acts, but also for any free influence on the Ego, including influence on mental activities of the Ego, such as thinking, attention, interest and other. It was already indicated long ago by St. Augustine, that “the mind is not moved until it wills to be moved.”156 St.
Augustine indicates that any “movement of mind” (that is, any mental activity) requires will’s involvement. However, this expression needs some qualification. We often think about something mechanistically or automatically due to habit or some neurological necessity, which we have. In other words, in some instances we do not exercise any freedom, when we think. Thus, in order to accept St. Augustine’s proposition, we need to specify that “moving one mind” excludes any “automatic” and “necessary” mental operation.
156 trans. from Saint Augustine. De Libero Arbitrio Vuluntatis. 3.1.2.
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Max Deutscher also indicates that thinking activity is also subject to the willing, which is required to initiate such activity:
As an abstention from acting, thinking is an abstention only from that activity from which on disengages so as to think about it. ‘Thinking is an abstention from acting’, while true, obscures the fact that to think is its own action of a sort, and involves being willing to think. Thinking is itself an activity, which we practice willingly or unwillingly.157
This thoughtful critical remark involves an important distinction, which should be made between “abstention from activity” and “abstention only from that activity from which on disengages so as to think about it.” The former is erroneous, since thinking itself is an activity, while the former is what Arendt implies, when she talks about thinking’s “withdrawal from the world.”
It is important to emphasize that objects of the will may include many things, which do not correspond to anything in the world of appearances, and are purely mental constructs. This “extension” of will’s realm was already discussed earlier in this research paper.
Another important element, which can be added to the Arendtian framework of the three faculties, is the union of the various “acts” of the three faculties in the object, to which these “acts” are directed. This union or “correlation” and the related issues were already discussed in some detail earlier in this chapter.
Having accounted for all of the additions and alterations to Arendt’s framework pertaining to the will, in its internal aspect, we may conclude that a more coherent and well grounded theoretical model or framework of the will has been devised. This theoretical framework has the qualities of systematic methodological approach and a coherent inter-relationship between its elements.
157 Deutscher, Max. Judgment after Arendt. P. 154.
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Main elements of this theory were already discussed, presented and supported with phenomenological examples. Additional details need to be identified and described in future research inquiries, also additional phenomenological testing and verification of the principles described in this model will certainly be useful and awaits further research efforts.
10. Conclusion
In this chapter we dealt with the most important aspects of human willing – with the internal aspects of the willing itself, with the internal factors, which influence the will, including the other mental faculties in their relationship to the will. Essentially, the above discussion in connection to the discussion developed in the previous Chapters presents us the main elements of a coherent systematic theory of the will.
This Chapter’s research allowed us to see a difference between internal aspects, which are directly related to the will and are characterized by freedom and spontaneity, and the internal factors, which are not directly related to will and may exert some influence on human behaviour and even on the life of the mind, thereby limiting the freedom of the will. It was noted that such factors may also influence operation of the other two mental faculties and impose a naturalistic mindset on a person. Moreover, we explored will’s relationship with the other two mental faculties (i.e. thinking and judging), and found out that there is a reciprocal relationship between all of these faculties. Will may directly influence (and even sometimes condition) thinking and judging, while thinking and judging may also influence willing and thereby limit its freedom and autonomy. There is thus only a relative autonomy of each of the mental faculties from one another.
This Chapter’s research utilized some of the research results of Chapters II and III, especially with respect to Arendt’s contribution to the notion of the three autonomous mental faculties, as well as the notion of factors, which limit freedom of the will, this notion was developed and applied in the research of Chapter III. The results of
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Chapters III and IV combined together comprise a theoretical framework of human willing and main phenomena, which are related to it. However, it is also necessary to look into external manifestation of will, which is denoted by the concept of “action.”
This is the task of Chapter V.
The subsequent Chapter will be dedicated to the political implications of the will and will touch upon the issue of collective willing. Also in the next Chapter the inter-subjective objectivity of the willing phenomena will be examined and phenomenology of hyper-Individual (or collective) willing will be explored. The research results of Chapter V should allow us expanding the phenomenological model of the individual willing to action and also to the realm of collective willing. This will yield us a more comprehensive model of the phenomenology of willing and action.