Chapter III - Willing as a Reaction to External Conditions
2. Relevant Terms and Vocabulary
2.1 Basic Meaning of Related Vocabulary
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relevant terms in other languages, the terms utilized by later philosophers, who contributed to the philosophy of will. Linguistic analysis of some of those non-English words and terms will be undertaken in later chapters as soon as the need for such analysis may arise.
2.1 Basic Meaning of Related Vocabulary
The following terms are to be linguistically analyzed, since they are directly related to the formation and development of philosophies of willing:
The will, to will (willing), volition, deliberation, to deliberate/to plan, appetite, appetitive ability, to have an appetite (for something), preference (towards choosing something), chosen, to strive, to wait/to expect, doubt, pleasure/satisfaction, to suffer (from desiring something), passion, hope, to hope, to hold/to control (oneself), weakness of will/lack of self-control, power/strength (internal), mood/inclination, choice, to choose (among something), willingly, unwillingly, end/scope/goal, force (external), to force (oneself), to begin (something new), practical mind, activity, action.
Linguistic analysis of the above terms will provide us a wide spectrum of clues on the experiences of a transcendental Ego, which are directly related to willing.
Therefore, it will help us make the next step of our research, namely the philosophical inquiry into the experiences of willing.
Various philosophers may have attached different meanings to some of these words, however, we are not concerned as much with various philosophic conceptions, which may stand behind some of these terms, but rather we are concerned with the very basic meanings, which these terms possess in the ordinary language, which is likely to (but not necessarily) be closer to the real experiences of willing.
The following words should be briefly considered:
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will (θέλησις) – the will, the ability to will, or something inside us, which makes us want, wish or will something.
to will (to be willing) (θέλω) – verb, which expresses the activity of the will, including willing, wanting, desiring, wishing.
volition (θέλημα) – mental object of willing, something which we have in mind, this is similar to the meaning of “volition,” i.e. something that is produced in our mind as a result of willing something.
deliberation (βουλή) – a plan or a scheme to achieve some goal.
to deliberate/to plan (βούλομαι) – to plan or to deliberate upon achieving something, including both the end and the means of achieving it.
appetite (όρεξις) – some internal “thirst” for something, this is likely to be closely related to a physical instinct.
appetitive ability (όρεκτον) – something (an ability or faculty) within us, which is responsible for having an appetite for something.
to have an appetite (for something) (ορέγω) – the activity of having an appetite for something, like feeling a thirst for something.
preference (προαίρεση) – this is a kind of choice, which indicates choosing something in our mind before actually choosing it in our action. “Pre-” in the sense of before something actually happens.
to strive (σπεύδω) – to strive, or to “hurry” towards reaching some end.
to wait/to expect (περιμένω) – to wait for something, literally, implying an expectation that it will happen. This implies waiting for something to happen and wishing that it may happen.
doubt (αμφιβολία) – doubt or uncertainty. It may be either uncertainty about truth or knowledge, or it may be uncertainty about what end to aim for or about what course of action to choose. This word will be highly relative for researching public action, which is characterized by uncertainty about its results.
pleasure/satisfaction (απόλαυσις) – pleasure or satisfaction from reaching something, or succeeding in something. The Greek equivalent literally means “being taken away by
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something,” meaning having some feeling of being carried away from the present state to a more pleasing state of feeling oneself due to something pleasing. This something may include reaching some goal or satisfying some need or desire.
to desire (ποθώ) – to experience a severe drive towards something, towards some experience or possession of something. This feeling often implies something unnatural and distorted, however, does not necessarily carry notion of immorality.
passion (πάθος) – a suffering, or an internal state of ποθώ, may be either a temporary feeling or an enduring characteristic of the soul.
to suffer (from desiring something) (πάσχω) – this internal suffering is certainly a passive experience. Even though it may produce motivation for some activity, it is unlikely to be an active manifestation of human will.
hope (ελπής) – hope in general, or a specific hope – something we wish to happen, no matter whether we can or cannot contribute to making it happen.
to hope (ελπίζω) – to hope, to wish something happening.
to hold/to control (oneself) (κρατάω) – to hold, including “holding oneself” from doing something, which we want to do but believe that it should not be done.
weakness of will/lack of self-control (ακρασία) – inability of someone to “hold himself”
from doing something, which is improper or contrary to some norms or expectations.
This may also mean lack of patience and doing something earlier, than when it should be done.
power/strength (internal) (δύναμις) – internal power or strength do something or to carry out projects or plans, which we deem desirable.
mood/inclination, (διάθεσις) – internal mood to do something or to react to something in a particular way or with particular attitude, which is a trait of person’s character.
choice (επιλογή) – this word indicates either something, which we have to choose, or something, which we have already chosen.
to choose (διαλέγω) – to choose something among various options.
willingly (έκων) – willingly, exercising one's free will. A participle indicating that one does something with his internal assent and not against his will.
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unwillingly (άκων) – unwillingly. This is the opposite of έκων.
end/scope/goal (τέλος) – some destination point towards which our actions and/or striving is directed and targeted or directed.
force (βία) – external force or a pressing circumstance. Including some external pressure, which may force us to act in a particular way, in which we would not otherwise have acted.
to force (oneself) (βιάζομαι) – to be forced by my own self to act in a particular way due to the pressing circumstances.
to begin (something new) (αρχίζω) – to begin something new and not conditioned by previous events or circumstances. This is conceptually related to the philosophical notion of “beginning” or a founding “principle”. Thus, when I begin something, I also lay down some new principle into existence.
practical mind (νους πρακτικός)117 – an ability or function of the “mind,” which indicates the power of the mind to consider and make a person involved in doing something particular. This notion sometimes was understood in contradistinction with the “νους θεωρετικός” (i.e. the theoretical mind)
activity (πραξις) – deed, action or way of doing things. Implies a direct involvement in changing something in the world, of making something tangible happen. This may include all forms of human activity (for example this would include labour, work, and action in Arendt’s category of “vita activa”).
action – in English language this term may have a similar meaning as “activity.”
However, it may also mean a deed or a series of deeds, which have a particular (and usually not a routine one) goal, or are targeted at resolving some particular issue or overcome some difficulty. Arendt associates this term with the concept of “creating something new” or “beginning a new series in time,” that refers to some deed, which is a manifestation of free will and which is not conditioned by any necessary causal chains
117 This term is sometimes used by Arendt, for example when she talks about Aristotle, e.g. in Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: Willing. London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978. P. 58.
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(neither external, nor internal). This conception of Arendt will be analyzed in detail later in Chapter V.
The words, which are presented and briefly explained above, constitute a chosen selection of English lexicon, which is in some way related to willing and action. There are certainly many other words in English and in other languages, which are relevant to our research. However, there is no need to consider all of them at this point, since the task now is to gain a general idea about the wealth of experiences, which are related to willing, and which were reflected in English language. The notions, which stand behind these words, provide us some important clues about the willing experiences, which may stand behind them.
The words presented above will suffice to do some further research into the topic and other words in Greek, English, Chinese and in other languages will also be considered later in the course of our research whenever a need will arise in exploring the corresponding experiences.
It is also useful to recall some other important English terms, which will be encountered in the course of this research, since they may also provide us with some clues on phenomenology of will and action. Such vocabulary includes the following words:
a) Related primarily to willing: “obedience”, “persuading”, “following”,
“reacting”, “conforming”, “nill/counter-will,” “means,” “determinism,”
voluntarism,” etc.
b) Related primarily to action: “act,” “world of appearances,” “political action,” “political/public realm,” “political agents,” “higher order person,” “inter-subjective objectivity,” “responsibility,” etc.
c) Basic concepts and indirectly related terms: “faculty,” “mind,” “self,”
“ego,” “character,” “value,” “thinking,” “judging,” “perceiving,” “soul,”
“feeling,” “reason,” “object,” “subject,” “person,” “individual,”
“personality,” “identity,” etc.
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The wealth of insights, which are provided by the above presented vocabulary, will be considered in a greater detail in different places throughout this research paper.
For now it suffices to have a general understanding of the importance of researching this vocabulary to gain a better understanding of the will.
It is now time to consider some of Hannah Arendt’s contribution to the exploration of linguistics for the purpose of developing some philosophic understanding of the related experience. This will prove useful for us in doing some kind of philosophic research with the words and conceptions of English language, which we have considered in this section.