Chapter 3 The Air-Sea Battle Concept as a Conventional Doctrine
1. Background
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Chapter 3 The Air-Sea Battle Concepts as a Conventional Doctrine
A military doctrine presenting principles of war is unfolded diversely by its background, but when one simply seeks for the background from only military aspect, it will be a case to ignore fundamental reasons behind the military background because the doctrine is always existed by political intention while transcending the military view point.
In this chapter, background of the ASB doctrine will be excavated with regarding it as a byproduct derived from political motivation. With it, the background will be explained by focusing on inter-relation between grand strategy and doctrine because objectives of a grand strategy can be materialized by efforts to achieve political goals. Next, it will also discuss why the ASB would be a conventional doctrine based on regular war concepts, while studying its characteristics and expectable scenarios.
1. Background
The Continental U.S. has overcome its geographical limitation due to blocked status by the two oceans, the Pacific and the Atlantic and the U.S. has also used that situation as a passage for national development. Historically, modernization of U.S. in the early of 19th century can be described as the era denying intervention of European powers in order to protect democracy, and the efforts could be realized thanks to the isolated geography. Specifically, U.S. recovered national sovereignty from the Western powers while fencing off the external influence from Europe in the Revolution War. In 1823, the Monroe Doctrine declared its foreign policy, announcing non-intervention of U.S. in Europe, non-intervention of European
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countries in America, and reprobation of European colonialism.53
Meanwhile, the isolation by the oceans was also a national task that U.S. should surmount though it played a role of seawall blocking enemy’s invasions because with acceptance of advanced civilization from Europe competencies of U.S. needed overseas territorial expansion beyond the American Continent for further development. Hence, territorial expansion in earnest started from the Spanish-American War while occupying soils in the Caribbean Coast and Philippines, and the expansion brought remarkable prosperity and wealth as well as development of domestic industry. However, it generated strategic dilemma simultaneously. First, protection of trade and market was required to include overseas territories into its objects for continuous prosperity and maintenance of sovereignty. Secondly, potential enemy powers threatening territories, sovereignty, and citizens of U.S. should be removed.
Through this historical process, the U.S. has protected the value of democracy from foreign threats as well as has promoted the political ideology over the world until now.
To solve the dilemma, U.S. started establishing detailed objectives from the late 19th century, perceiving that those problems would act as decisive variables on achievement of political goals. The goals were the protection of American territory, citizens, constitutional system of government, and economic well-being,54
53 Mark T. Gilderhus, “The Monroe Doctrine: Meanings and Implications,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36 (2006): 8.
and then the U.S. could make a specified grand strategy in accordance with the political goals while suggesting professional military for securing naval supremacy on the seas and for guarding territories in domestic; ‘protection of trade and freedom of navigation on the oceans’; ‘a prohibition against European military
54 R.D. Hooker, Jr., The Grand Strategy of the United States (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2014), 3-4.
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intervention in the Western hemisphere’; ‘a capable navy; a small but professional army, capable of rapid expansion in time of crisis’; and ‘a readiness to provide support to civil authorities when needed.’55
However, the grand strategy meant that the U.S. would intervene in the states’ conflicts in other regions when it needs even through U.S. had persisted in the isolationism as mentioned.
Nevertheless, the reason why U.S. took a part in the WW I and WW II was concerns about possibility to damage its interest and sovereignty critically by the two world wars in terms of the ‘balance of power’ perspective that had dominated American strategists for a long time. In this perspective, the American strategists had regarded bilateral power balance between the Pacific world and the Atlantic world very seriously because U.S. located on the midpoint could develop national power through jump on the bandwagon when one of the two sides relatively get more power superiority.56
The changed attitude of U.S. expanded range of the grand strategy again during the Cold For example, in the early of 20th century European countries caused unbalanced power by dominating Asian countries in the Pacific world and U.S. could foster national capacities by politic, economic, and cultural exchanges with the strong powers whereas it could profit interests on those fields through its more prominent position than Asian countries. However, the rise of Japan in the Pacific was a threat to make negative effects on the U.S. interests as well as changing the balance of power. Moreover, expansionism of Japan and Germany implied emergence of potential threats likely to occupy the American Continent and in the end the unstable international situation made the U.S.
change the foreign policy from ‘close’ mode to ‘open’ mode.
55 Ibid., 4-6.
56 Robert S. Ross, “US Grand Strategy, the Rise of China, and US National Security Strategy for East Asia,”
Strategy Studies Quarterly (2013): 21-23.
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War era although its fundamental goals did not change. The objectives of grand strategy were
‘enforcing a stable international order and economic system that preserved American sovereignty, security, and prosperity, ensuring the security of the homeland through nuclear deterrence, alliances, forward-deployed ground forces, and airpower and sea power, and preventing the rise of peer competitors that might challenge its economic and military superiority,’57
After the Cold War, the U.S. had to search for new policy directions for achieving political goals in diverse security environment as much as the state became super power, but it should not make a conclusion that basic principle of the ‘U.S. Grand Strategy’ was changed despite the changed circumstances. Until now, the strategy is that ‘U.S. vital or core interests remains remarkably consistent: the defense of American territory and that of our allies, protecting American citizens at home and abroad, supporting and defending our constitutional values and forms of government, and promoting and securing the U.S. economy and standard of living,’
but main point of this strategy was to maximize national interests and protection of sovereignty while protecting democracy from communists with strong military alliance system. Especially, the strategy included more broad scope than before such as using a term ‘alliance’ because U.S. had to wield military power from remote range by detaching military forces into allies or by enhancing the military capability with the allied forces.
58
In the respect, the rapid emergence of China has appeared distinctly since 2000s is not only a threat to change regional dynamics but it is also an obstacle to disrupt realization of objectives on U.S. Grand Strategy that has been maintained continuously. While political and
so it cannot expect an innovative change on the strategy because the grand strategy is just a mean of political goals established inherently by the given geopolitical condition.
57 Hooker, The Grand Strategy of the United States, 7-8.
58 Ibid., 14.
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economic influences of the (Western) European countries have stagnated since the post-Cold War era, synergy effect of Asian countries centered on economic power has become a driving force that turns ‘center of gravity’ of U.S. foreign policies toward the Asian region. U.S.
dependency on this region is also a growing trend according to the increased regional capability.
Source: “Transitioning Skyscraper,” accessed May 10, 2015, https://transportcity.wordpress.com/#jpcarousel-122.
Figure 3.1 Major Shipping Transport Links around the World
Geographical condition of East Asia is more important for U.S. grand strategy. For instance,
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the India Ocean and the Strait of Malacca are representative maritime logistic corridors of the region, and those areas are critical SLOCs, reaching 50 percents of world container products and 70 percents of ship-borne oil and petroleum traffic transiting through its water passages.59 Thus, U.S. must secure stable SLOCs in the region in order for safe shipping of strategic resources and U.S. has no choice but to depend on the SLOCs due to the isolated geological factor.
Table 3.1 U.S. Regional Shares of global Merchandise Trade60
Regions
Exports Imports
1980 2010 1980 2010
Africa 6.0% 3.3% 4.7% 3.0%
Asia 15.9% 33.3% 16.9% 31.4%
Central & South America 4.5% 3.8% 4.9% 3.7%
Commonwealth of Independent States 3.8% 3.9% 3.3% 2.7%
Europe 44.1% 37.0% 48.8% 37.4%
Middle East 10.4% 5.9% 4.9% 3.6%
North America 15.3% 12.9% 16.5% 17.4%
Source: Manyin et al., Pivot to the Pacific?, 26.
While center of gravity of the world economy is concentrating on the Asia, U.S.’s trade dependence on the region has been on the rise. The amount of trades has increased two times
59 Robert D. Blackwill and Naresh Chandra, The United States and India: A Shared Strategic Future (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2011), 3.
60 The used word ‘Asia’ includes East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania region, but not includes Central Asia.
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for twenty years whereas the amount of other regions except Asia has been decreased (see Table 3.1). Plus, some Asian holders such as China, Hong Kong, Japan and Taiwan are holding 48.1% (2.5 trillion USDs) of the total U.S. federal debt.61
Accordingly, U.S. government has stressed on the ‘rebalancing strategy’ since 2011 to maximize national interests as well as to protect sovereignty. So-called ‘pivot to Asia’ policy is a foreign policy for achieving political goals depend on the East Asia, appreciating the importance of the region, and the political goals can be enumerated to ‘freedom of navigation, the free flow of commerce, and the promotion of democracy and human.’62
61 Marc Labonte and Jared C. Nagel, Foreign Holdings of Federal Debt (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 2.
Thus, U.S.
government has tried to enforce its influence in the region. For example, the TPP (Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership) led by U.S. was already established in 2005 for enhancing economical interests while the administration has extended multilateral diplomatic activities to strengthen relations with the Asian-Pacific countries. However, China’s efforts to have regional hegemony have progressed too. Expanded influence of China by economic development showed its intentions and objectives indirectly through the ASEAN+3/+6 while inducing economical integration with the traditional allies of U.S, South Korea and Japan.
Furthermore, in 2013 Chinese President Xi Jinping suggested establishment of the AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) in order to check the World Bank and the ADB led by U.S. and Japan. More critically, U.S had to encounter different problems besides those situations. It was how to narrow down military gap between U.S. and China caused by China’s military modernization and how to solve the escalating security dilemma under uncertainty.
62 Mark E. Manyin et al., Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s Rebalancing Toward Asia (Washington DC: Congress Research Service, 2012), 3-4.
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To achieve its political goals, U.S. has traditionally pursued ‘freedom of movement’ with the command of the sea and its impetus was in ‘projection of military power’ based on strong naval force. Therefore, U.S. military has worried about devising proper alternatives to check and deter China’s military power that are penetrating into the area of it while recognizing threats of the A2/AD capabilities. With this background, U.S. Department of Defense started relocating military forces located in Middle East and Western Europe into East Asia. In 2012 200 ~ 250 U.S. Marines were deployed in the Darwin Island where is a part of Australian territories alongside the HMAS Stirling Naval base. In that same year, U.S. concluded a Memorandum of Understanding for allocating four new LCSs (Littoral Combat Ships) with Singapore. In 2014 U.S. also executed component military exercise for the purpose of blocking Chinese naval vessels with Philippine by renewing military agreement while enforcing military cooperation systems with traditional allies. In addition, financial supports for U.S. military forces allocated in the East Asia was not reduced despite constraint of the budget, and it was rather increased with additional enforcement of troops and arms. Because there was the ASB doctrine has developed since 2009 behind those activities of U.S.
Barry R. Posen explains the process how to develop and how to vary a state’s military doctrine by inter-relations between a grand strategy on political motivation and a doctrine that is one of components of the grand strategy, classifying it into three dimensions; ‘offense-defense-deterrence’, ‘integration-disintegration’, and ‘innovation-stagnation.’63
63 According to Posen, the definition of ‘grand strategy’ is ‘a political-military, means-ends chain, a state’s theory about how it can best “cause” security for itself,’ while military doctrine means ‘the subcomponent of the grand strategy that deals explicitly with military means. In addition, ‘integration’ means ‘the knitting together of political ends and military means’, while ‘innovation’ is defined as change in military doctrine in terms of its mean and way. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 7, 25, 29-30.
By applying
‘organizational theory’ and ‘balance of power theory’ into real cases between the two World
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Wars, he also proved his own hypotheses. In terms of organizational theory, military organizations generally prefer an offensive doctrine rather than a defensive or a deterrent one because a SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) of the military organizations requires an offensive doctrine in order to reduce operational uncertainty, thereby maximizing effects to give the uncertainty to enemy. Plus, the military organizations also tend to prefer an offensive doctrine although cleared political intention exists because they want to expand organization size, to enhance wealth, and to maintain independence from civilian oversight. In the dimension of integration, military organizations have a tendency to avoid integration with political field through different doctrine from the political goals, and they will also strive to be recognized their professionalism form civilians while control information in order to avoid control and interference of the civilians. Military organizations don’t support innovation itself because they prefer to reduce operational uncertainty by gradual improvement of a doctrine, not radical innovation. However, the military organizations can accept some innovative elements by themselves when the elements are proved its capabilities by the actual case,64 or when they get bitter lessons from failed doctrines.65
64 Ibid., 222-227.
65 According to Graham T. Allison, the organizational theory explains how to effects on propensity of a policy by three models focusing on decision making process of government organizations; rational actor, organizational process model, and bureaucratic politic model. As a rational actor, a organization generates information in accordance with intention to optimize rational behaviors and it follows rational decision making process through the information. Thus, military organizations can generate a doctrine by internal calculation even though the enemy’s intention is ambiguous or even though it lacks exact information of the enemy.
Organizational process model is consists of a variety of sub-organizations in a government and it assumes the situation in which decision making process works by those organizations. In the respect, the military organization has well-done objectives and SOPs, and the SOPs could limit direction and level of the (innovative) doctrine development. Plus, the military organization selects a favorable doctrine for its own satisfaction because it makes detailed doctrines according to the SOPs. Lastly, military organization can select a doctrine in the favorable direction what the organization can gain interests in the bureaucratic politic model because key decision makers wield important influences on decision of the organization’s behaviors (the each key decision maker does not only have a different perspective and order of priority, but preferred policy direction are varied by the seats which the decision makers are sitting). Graham T. Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban
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On the other hand, balance of power theory seeks for the causes of development and variation of a military doctrine from extraneous motivation factors. Posen insists that both expansionist power and declining states prefer an offensive doctrine. Furthermore, he argues that a state fighting with multiple enemies will select a more offensive one whereas a state has no ally will be also more offensive. In terms of integration and innovation, when a state has an aggressive political leader who has offensive political goal and intention or when possibility of war is escalated in a situation facing threats, military organizations prefer an offensive doctrine and the selected doctrine is integrated with political goals with its innovation. With concentration on more effective ways, in addition, the military organization makes efforts to the innovation and integration when cost of war is increased or when the lessons of failed experience on war are critical.66 67
Development background of the ASB can be also explained by the mentioned hypotheses.
Firstly, to solve the uncertainty, U.S. should calculate threats of a potential enemy by rational decision making process of the military organization unless intention and military capabilities of China are cleared, and this should be converged to objectives on the grand strategy. Thus, the U.S. military organization has no option but to calculate the threats through its own conventional decision making process whether it is a stereotype or not, so it is possible to be regarded as threats based on regular war. According to the Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, U.S. Department of Defense assesses that Chinese military modernization will threaten
Missile Crisis,” The American Political Science Review 63 (1969): 691-715.
66 Ibid., 228-235.
67 However, Posen makes a conclusion that it can understand the integration between military organization and politics and practical innovation of a doctrine by the balance of power theory whereas the organizational theory can explain the tendencies of military organizations prefer an offensive doctrine. Ibid., 239-240.
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regional security as a regular war concept, not an irregular war.68
Rejection of the operational uncertainty induces U.S. military organizations to change their doctrine gradually through lessons from success cases. By which they learned the U.S. should counteract against China. To project their military powers on the restricted maritime environment, the military forces must neutralize the enemy in the air, on/under the sea, and other diverse realms and this requires a tight-knitted joint operation capacity between the services (although it is mainly led by navy and air force). However, a joint operation has to integrate heterogeneous operation concepts of each service should be insisted in spite of many risks, so the U.S. military had to search for role model from successful case of the past doctrines, named ‘Air-Land Battle’.
It suggests that the U.S.
military is observing the Chinese military threats as a ‘normal’ military organization is different from rogue states or terrorists with focusing on conventional military capabilities of the threats. With enforcement in space and cyber space domains, remarkable modernization of the PLA Navy and the PLA Air Force are enough to provoke U.S. not to banish the lingering affection for regular war and conventional warfare when considering battle environment blocked by seas on the A2/AD.
In the Cold War period, the Warsaw Treaty Organization developed ‘OMG (Operation Maneuver Group)’ doctrine that gained conception from the German Blitzkrieg doctrine of the WW II. The development purpose of the doctrine was to reduce tempo in warfare while maximizing ‘jointness’ of operations and weapons. Its main concept was that all combatant echelons rush the enemy’s position at the same time and then make a breakthrough with
In the Cold War period, the Warsaw Treaty Organization developed ‘OMG (Operation Maneuver Group)’ doctrine that gained conception from the German Blitzkrieg doctrine of the WW II. The development purpose of the doctrine was to reduce tempo in warfare while maximizing ‘jointness’ of operations and weapons. Its main concept was that all combatant echelons rush the enemy’s position at the same time and then make a breakthrough with