新戰爭趨勢下的空海軍事作戰硏究: 以美中軍事競爭爲例 - 政大學術集成

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(1)International Master’s Program in International Studies National Chengchi University 國立政治大學國際硏究英語碩士學位學程. ‧ 國. 學. A Study on “Air-Sea Battle” Concept by 治政 Changes of War Pattern大in Military 立 Competition between U.S. and China. ‧. 新戰爭趨勢下的空海軍事作戰硏究: y. Nat. sit. n. al. er. io. 以美中軍事競爭爲例 Ch. engchi. i Un. Jingun Lee Advisor: Yeh-chung Lu. June, 2015. v.

(2) Abstract. By announcing ‘pivot to Asia’ policy in 2011, the 2nd Obama Administration is moving U.S. strategic center of gravity to East Asia-western Pacific area. Inter alia, U.S. is intensively deploying its conventional military forces on this area in order to check China emerging regional military power by its sustained economic growth, and ‘Air-Sea Battle’ concept is mentioned as a background of the military disposition. This battle concept is now interpreted as a thing to counter-act Chinese expansionists’ maritime strategy has been constructed since. 政治大. 1980’s for regional extension of influence in military. Received much attention from military. 立. academia, the Air-Sea Battle concept is recognized as a regular operation doctrine derived. ‧ 國. 學. from superiority in military technology has dominated war fighting styles of the U.S. military forces for a long time as well as the military has put stress on it by itself and conservative. ‧. military professionalism.. y. Nat. io. sit. However, war was just a repeated event tackling enemy’s weak points through unthinkable. n. al. er. war patterns in terms of its mean and way, and especially the war patterns served a golden. Ch. i Un. v. opportunity for the weak encountering the strong enemy. Meanwhile, the military cannot. engchi. adapt to changes seasonably signed its own death warrant and recent asymmetric warfare between regular forces and irregular ones in Middle East shows that point suitably. In the respect, this thesis will identify critical but neglected threats on the Air-Sea Battle and will search for its limitations while expecting China’s spectrum of war at the comprehensive and multi-modal level.. i.

(3) Acronyms. A2/AD: Anti-Access and Arial-Denial ADB: Asian Development Bank AFV: Armored Fighting Vehicle AIM: Air Interceptor Missile AIIB: Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank AMS: Academy of Military Science. 政治大. ARPANET: Advanced Research Projects Agency+network. 立. ASAT: Anti-Satellite. ‧ 國. 學. ASB: Air-Sea Battle. ASBM: Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missile. ‧. ASEAN: Association of South East Asian Nations. y. Nat. CONADCOM: Continental Air Defense Command. n. al. Ch. i Un. CSBA: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments CVG: Carrier Air Group. engchi. DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency DCA: Defensive Counter-Air DDG: Guided Missile Destroyer DDos: Distributed Denial of Service DoD: Department of Defense EW: Electronic Warfare ii. er. io. sit. CCJO: Capstone Concept for Joint Operations. v.

(4) FDI: Foreign Direct Investment FEBA: Forward Edge of the Battle Area FFG: Guided missile Frigate FY: Fiscal Year GDP: Gross Domestic Product HMAS: His[Her] Majesty’s Australian Ship IADS: Integrated Air Defense System ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. 政治大 IRBM: Intermediate Range Ballistic 立 Missile IFV: Infantry Fighting Vehicle. ‧ 國. 學. ISR: Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance JDAM: Joint Direct Attack Munition. ‧. JSF: Joint Strike Fighter. y. Nat. sit. LACM: Land Attack Cruise Missile. n. al. er. io. LANTIRN: Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infra-Red for Night LCS: Littoral Combat Ship. Ch. engchi. i Un. MDBS: Mutually denied battle space Strategy. MIRV: Multiple Independently-targeted Reentry Vehicle MLRS: Multiple Launch Rocket System MRBM: Medium Range Ballistic Missile NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCW: Network-Centric Warfare NM: Nautical Mile(s) OCA: Offensive Counter-Air iii. v.

(5) OMG: Operation Maneuver Group PGM: Precision Guided Munition PLA: People’s Liberation Army PLAN: People’s Liberation Army Navy PLAAF: People’s Liberation Army Air Force PMC: Political Military Company PRC: People’s Republic of China RDR: Radar. 政治大. ROC: Required Operational Capability. 立. ROK: Republic of Korea. ‧ 國. 學. RMA: Revolution in Military Affair SALT: Strategic Arms Limitation Talk. ‧. SLBM: Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. SM: Standard Missile. sit. SLOC: Sea Line of Communication. SNS: Social Network Service. SOF: Special operation Force. Ch. engchi. SOP: Standard Operating Procedure SONAR: Sound Navigation And Ranging SOSUS: Sound Surveillance System SS: Submarine SSK: Conventional attack Submarine SSN: Submarine nuclear START: Strategic Arms Reduction Talk iv. i Un. v.

(6) SWOT: Strength, Weakness, Opportunity, and Threat THADD: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense TLAM: Tomahawk Land Attack Missile TPP: Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle UCAV: Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle U.S.: United States USAF: United States Air Force. 政治大. USCENTCOM: US Central Command USFK: US forces in Korea. 立. ‧ 國. 學. USPACOM: US Pacific Command USS: United States Ship. ‧. WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. v. i Un. v.

(7) Table of Contents Chapter 1 Introduction............................................................................................................ 1 1. Motivation of Research.................................................................................................... 1 2. Main Questions............................................................................................................... 10 3. Scope and Methodology of the Study ........................................................................... 11 Chapter 2 Theoretical Frameworks ..................................................................................... 13 1. Origin of Security Dilemma: Offense-Defense Balance Theory .............................. 13 2. Security Dilemma and Military Interaction between U.S. and China ...................... 20 3. Characteristics of Environment in Future War .......................................................... 25. 政治大. 4. New perspectives on war and Hybrid War concept ..................................................... 30. 立. Chapter 3 The Air-Sea Battle Concept as a Conventional Doctrine ................................. 38. ‧ 國. 學. 1. Background .................................................................................................................... 38 2. Basic Concept of the ASB Doctrine .............................................................................. 54. ‧. 3. Expectable Scenarios on the ASB Doctrine ................................................................. 63. y. Nat. 4. Debate and Response ..................................................................................................... 69. io. sit. Chapter 4 China’s Hybrid War and Its Implication .......................................................... 74. n. al. er. 1. War Philosophy of the People’s Liberation Army ...................................................... 74. i Un. v. 2. China’s Hybrid War Patterns....................................................................................... 88. Ch. engchi. 3. Assessment .................................................................................................................... 105 Chapter 5 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 108 References ............................................................................................................................. 115 Appendix A ........................................................................................................................... 123 Appendix B ........................................................................................................................... 125 Appendix C ........................................................................................................................... 127 Appendix D ........................................................................................................................... 128. vi.

(8) Lists of Table. Table 2.1 Conceptual Comparison between Conventional War and Hybrid War ........ 35 Table 3.1 U.S. Regional Shares of global Merchandise Trade ......................................... 43 Table 4.1 Comparison of War Thoughts between Ancient China and Western World 80 Table 4.2 Analysis of China’s Counter-U.S. Military Capabilities (by SWOT) ............. 90. 立. 政治大 Lists of Figure. ‧ 國. 學. Figure 2.1 Jervis’s Four Worlds ........................................................................................... 18. ‧. Figure 2.2 Implied Change in Spectrum of Conflict........................................................... 36 Figure 3.1 Major Shipping Transport Links around the World ....................................... 42. y. Nat. sit. Figure 3.2 The Island Chains and Potential Sources of Conflict with China ................... 52. n. al. er. io. Figure 3.3 Core Concepts of the ASB................................................................................... 58. i Un. v. Figure 3.4. China’s String of Pearls & SLOCs ................................................................... 67. Ch. engchi. Figure 4.1 Flow Chart of the Hybrid Threats ................................................................... 104. vii.

(9) Chapter 1 Introduction. 1. Motivation of Research The Chinese strategist in ancient time, Sun Tzu said “all warfare is based on deception” as an essential characteristic of the war. 1 It means that one can defeat enemy by feinting not to let the enemy know friendly’s intention and behavior or by attacking the enemy’s weakness intensively. Also, said that ‘hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy;. 政治大. masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions,’ 2 he insisted. 立. forming favorable condition by inducing the enemy to attack my particular portion looks like. ‧ 國. 學. a weak point without exposure of real weak points. As know from war history, an army understanding this essence of war and applying it properly could achieve its military goal,. ‧. whereas other army had to suffer a defeat even though its enemy was weaker than it. Whether. y. Nat. io. sit. spectrum of the war is full-scale war or limited war (or regular warfare or irregular warfare),. n. al. er. as the more experience of such war has been accumulated repeatedly, the more the spectrum. Ch. i Un. v. has become complex and diverse at strategic, operational and tactical level. And, accumulated. engchi. lessons from those experiences have been standardized to military doctrine which is adaptation in normative but it must be re-interpreted in accordance with different threats or particular environments. Doctrine can be defined as ‘a fundamental principle by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives.’ It is authoritative but. 1. Tzu Sun, Sun Tzu on the Art of War, trans. Lionel Giles M.A (England: Allandale Online Publishing, 2000),. 2. Ibid., 17.. 3.. 1.

(10) requires judgment in application. 3 Therefore, military organization doesn’t only make a war plan in peace time or executes given operations in war time within doctrinal principle what the military has believed for a long time, but it also re-interprets following results in terms of its doctrinal view and then re-applies the feedback into the military doctrine. In addition, the military organization develops and acquires weapon systems for the doctrine. As a result, various elements composing the military organization and its means are intimately connected to each other within the principle of a certain doctrine. However, a doctrine underpinning war will not be fossilized to an unchanging principle as. 政治大 intricate and sensitive intention立 such as political goals affect on fundamental backgrounds of. each war will not be going along in same pattern and order, because civil policy makers’. ‧ 國. 學. a military organization which design that doctrine and perform all military activities. Although a military force retaining perfectly strike capabilities can win a victory absolutely. ‧. against its enemy under the frame of offensive doctrine, the doctrine can become a limited. y. Nat. sit. and even a defensive thing by a political leader who is afraid of side effects caused by offense.. n. al. er. io. Then, the changing process is again applied to a strategy, an operation, and a weapon system en bloc.. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. In other dimension, a grand strategy a state is pursuing can be materialized in accordance with ultimate political goals, and a military doctrine can also have different objective, range, means and ways in accordance with specified goals of the grand strategy. As mentioned before, all elements on war including military doctrine should be changed to match given situations and furthermore proper military doctrine by a state’s grand strategy can emerge as decisive problem to determine the outcome of war. On the other hand, a military organization. 3. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2015), 71.. 2.

(11) doesn’t grasp the property of doctrine or doesn’t apply it onto real situations cannot be guaranteed a victory when it conflicts with opposing forces applying the doctrine well vice versa. French grand strategy between two world wars derived from concerns about a recurrence of catastrophe of the World War I was mainly concentrated on post-based defensive condition against Germany thereby the grand strategy changed French military doctrine into defensive one. 4 Furthermore, in the mid 1930s military culture of the French troops was “professional army might be more dangerous than one might believe for the security of our nation” 5 as. 政治大 France built the Maginot Line立 at a great cost just before World War II and French army’s. well as civil politicians also preferred to maintain their army for pacific attitude. As a result,. ‧ 國. 學. primary strategy was only planned to defense the German attacks at stalled front lines based on militia and reserved forces by a year conscription. However, the French military doctrine. ‧. did not only follow the old typed doctrine but it was also conservative even though the. y. Nat. sit. environment of war was changed by international relations and advanced military. n. al. er. io. technologies. Moreover, the doctrinal impact made bend national efforts to development of. i Un. v. military operations centered ground forces for interrupting incoming enemies in stalemate.. Ch. engchi. Also, politicians wholeheartedly supported the enforced defensive concepts because they were reluctant to re-generate attrition warfare in the trenches. Meanwhile, French troops could not develop multidimensional war-fighting concepts such as offensive mobile warfare and developing more offensive weapons and its application onto other military affairs could not be realized although the troops already retained fairly good fighter aircrafts and highly-. 4. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (London: Cornell University Press, 1984), 105-121. 5 Requoted in Pierre Hoff, Les programmes d’armenent de 1919 à 1938 (Vincennes: Service hitorique de l’armée de terre, 1982), 157.. 3.

(12) mobile & light-weight tanks. And, the French defensive doctrine in the end went down the drain without handling German sudden attacks in the early of World War II. Compared with France, the Germany was in a disadvantageous situation. Geopolitically, she was isolated from the opposite allied system established by Great Britain and France after the World War I. Moreover, the Germany had to pay enormous war reparations to the Allies with strict arms limitation by the Versailles Treaty. Under these limitations Germany had to make a new breakthrough for overthrowing the isolated situation and the result was emerged as an offensive grand strategy and an aggressive military doctrine. Germany could not play a. 政治大 Therefore, Germany designed立 her own grand strategy intensifying lighting war through protracted war because of her cut-off situation from outside with limited strategic resources.. ‧ 國. 學. ‘ambush’ and ‘circumvention’ which were different scenarios the enemy states had not expected, then German military doctrine could become offensive with avoiding delaying its. ‧. war. 6 Doctrinal key point of the German troops can be represented by the Blitzkrieg breaking. y. Nat. sit. through stalemated front lines while concentrating attacks on a certain sector on the lines and. n. al. er. io. blocking enemy’s rear areas, but this was an unthinkable war fighting style for French army.. i Un. v. More importantly, innovative efforts on the military doctrine by integrating assault tanks,. Ch. engchi. dive-bombers, and radio communication systems for command and control became an asymmetric threat for the opposite troops preferring worn-out defensive battle concepts such as the rinky-dink trench warfare. As know these opposed examples of two states, in spite of different impact development of military doctrine and involved warfare through means and patterns which enemy does not expect can affect as a military threat and it can be also used to achieve goals of war. However,. 6. Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 181-188.. 4.

(13) military organizations tend to overlook this problem due to conservative bureaucracy even though the organization should be the most sensitive about this problem. Besides modern war (or modern warfare) requires more RMAs (Revolution in Military Affairs) on the doctrine while its pattern is becoming multiple simultaneous and irregular by technical advances and globalization of conflicts, but military organization is reluctant to take ‘innovation’ and ‘transition’ in the respect. Organization culture in the military, meanwhile, affects to identify and calculate its threats progressively but carefully from past combat experiences, and in order to counter-act those. 政治大 Again, other innovative elements 立not proved or not be verified are physiologically difficult to. threats the military organization also searches for solutions from the past qualified lessons. 7. ‧ 國. 學. be accepted into military affairs by the organization itself and even military doctrine is not easy to change dramatically in a short period of time although it is not a revolutionary task.. ‧. Because, to lose the war will bring about a negative result damaging ‘survival’ and. y. Nat. sit. ‘justification’ for existence of the military organization. Hence, the military organization. n. al. er. io. regards steady improvement based on successful cases in the past war as a stable choice. i Un. v. rather than development of the innovative doctrine lacks a certainty in actual battles. Plus, to. Ch. engchi. renovate a military organization of a state radically would be a fussy problem to deal with in the dimension of organizational egoism because it can effect on interests of the military organization or even between the military and civil area. Although RMA led by civil policy makers is sometimes emerged, it can do but effect limitedly on subservient sectors because of the closed military culture and its military professionalism and even RMA over long period. 7. Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars,” International Security 19 (1995): 65-93.. 5.

(14) cannot be easily epoch-making in spite of strong political pressure. 8 Thus, innovation in the military doctrine requires much more efforts and time whether it is a positive thing or a negative thing because the doctrine exists as a fundamental principle deciding all elements of a military organization. However and nevertheless, the military doctrine must be adapted appropriately in accordance with its given situations in terms of interpretation and application. In the fall of 2011 and early 2012, the Obama Administration announced that it would be intensifying the U.S. role in the Asia-Pacific region. To do this, with U.S. troops gone from Iraq and poised to be drawn down in Afghanistan, Administration officials say they plan to. 政治大 those represented in the Asia-Pacific 立 region. And ahead of 2011, in September 2009 the U.S. ‘rebalance’ U.S. attention toward planning for future challenges and opportunities, such as 9. ‧ 國. 學. Air Force chief of staff General Norton Schwartz and the U.S. Navy’s chief of naval operations Admiral Gary Roughead signed a classified memorandum to initiate an effort by. ‧. their Services to develop a new operational concept known as “Air-Sea Battle.” 10 But not. y. Nat. sit. clarified detail identification on concept level, intention and its ultimate goal, this new battle. n. al. er. io. concept is mentioning for a military alternative to check China’s armed development. i Un. v. forgotten for a moment as well as counter-act against the China’s People’s Liberation Army in war time. 11. Ch. engchi. For U.S. having exerted influence as a hegemonic power in East Asia, the remarkable development of the Chinese PLA has hindered the status quo of America gradually. Since the early of 1980s, China has tried to expand military influence from the traditional ‘People’s. 8. Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster, “The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces & Society 29 (2002): 35-40. 9 “Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament,” Last modified November 17, 2011, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament. 10 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle? (Washington DC: CSBA, 2010), 2. 11 Michael Billington, “Air-Sea Battle Is a Plan for War on China,” EIR (2013): 29-31.. 6.

(15) War’ based on attrition and long-term war within the Main-land to oversea war including, socalled, ‘the 1st Islands Chain (including southwestern of Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, and western of Philippine)’ and ‘the 2nd Islands Chain (including eastern of Japan, Guam, Mariana islands, and western of Australia)’. 12 With this expansion, the PLA has pursued the ‘A2/AD (Anti-Access and Arial-Denial)’ strategy blocking the potential enemy’s access threatening sovereignty and interests of China at the sea and impeding or neutralizing the enemy’s military operations proceeding in the area by arms modernization especially in navy, air force, and joint operations between military services. Whether it is an intention to defense. 政治大 regional hegemony by hectoring 立neighboring states, the China’s military trend, therefore, has. the enemy’s threats purely within the Chinese coast or an offensive expansionism for holding. ‧ 國. 學. been recognized as a potential but critical threat to impede ‘freedom of space use’ for projecting military forces as well as U.S. SLOCs. 13. ‧. In the respect, the ASB can be one of specified military policies of U.S. in order to. y. Nat. sit. interrupt China’s threats for securing supremacy in the region and to get rid of the threats. n. al. er. io. when military crisis occurs. To overcome geographical limitation surrounded by sea, using air. i Un. v. and naval power would be its alternatives, so the ASB is regarded as a new doctrinal concept. Ch. engchi. which is different from existing conventional styles in the way that it is for exerting physical hit via in the air and on the sea while refraining from intervention of the ground forces.. 12. Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle?, 5. In detail, the 1st Island Chain on the A2/AD covers U.S. forward bases and its deployed forces in South Korea and Japan within its range, and pre-emptive strike capabilities including surveillance and reconnaissance within the chain suggest that it is able to make offensive operations toward U.S. and its allied military forces. In addition, the 2nd Islands Chain is enough to threaten U.S. has traditionally generated national interests by securing maritime chock points because China will contain more expanded area including Guam into the targeted range until 2030. Meanwhile, those China’s military expansion will be more sensitive for U.S. because general operation concept of U.S. military forces has been based on expeditionary military force concepts; deploying aircraft carrier fleets in the near sea of conflict region or dispatching aircrafts, soldiers there for example. 13. 7.

(16) Moreover, this doctrinal concept has an offensive intention because it cannot only defense China’s pre-emptive strikes, but it contains to neutralize the enemy’s military troops dispatched to China’s soil by using U.S. strike forces while breaking through the islands chains. Traditionally and historically, U.S. tends to regard military threats as a conventional one in regular war, and to react those threats U.S. has generally used military technology-centered regular forces for her main means. After WW II, U.S. has taken massive persons killed in action very seriously because it would damage justification of war, so to overcome that. 政治大 supported by advanced military 立technologies in terms of military doctrine. In doing so, the problem U.S. military has concentrated on a precision-guided strike and a short-term war. ‧ 國. 學. high-technology has brought about techno-centrism while U.S. has given undue value on that aspect and related war scenario inclining to conventional war patterns what U.S. thinks. ‧. unilaterally. The perspective of U.S. about China’s military threats could be similarly come. y. Nat. sit. from the unilateral view of U.S., not from China. If then the ASB could be just a military. n. al. er. io. doctrine developed to deal with the intolerantly-accepted threats by U.S. only. More. i Un. v. importantly, the spectrum level about the China’s threats would be narrow-minded while. Ch. engchi. absorbing a part of all things. And, other ignored threats could be critical weaknesses for U.S. when reminding that war can be irregularly proceeded by un-expectable ways. Since the Gulf War in 1991, modern war led by U.S. has shown such doctrinal tendency of U.S. very well and the ASB is also another doctrine connected to the doctrinal tradition. However, U.S. military forces deployed in Middle East after the 9/11 did not work well against asymmetric enemies than expected even though they had consistently developed the cutting-edged weapon systems, equipments, operation concepts, and tactics. Furthermore, their facing opponents were relatively weak terrorist groups retaining poor warriors such as 8.

(17) Al-Qaeda or Taliban. American-styled conventional war executed by the regular armed forces against so-called ‘irregular warfare’ or ‘asymmetric warfare’ did not make an end of the war clearly in spite of a huge of military efforts while unintended casualties by asymmetric means and tactics such as IEDs and suicide bombings became a sensitive political issue for the great power. Hence, the negative result against the irregular threats means that the present military doctrine would be limited to cover all spectrum of war. Viewed in the recent war cases, it is notable that asymmetric and irregular patterns of warfare can/will be a considerable threat on the existing doctrine such as the Air-Sea Battle. 政治大 aiming not only modernization立 but also high-technicalization can understand those kinds of concept, and in the wider dimension it may be asked to what extend the modern armed forces. ‧ 國. 學. threats and how far they can cover those things in military dimension. In this respect, the ASB would lose its role and function as a doctrine due to the unfamiliar situation if China. ‧. also threatens U.S. with confused threats between regular warfare and irregular warfare. y. Nat. sit. because an enemy will shape an unthinkable situation at a point what its adversary does not. n. al. er. io. have in mild, not a point what suit the adversary’s taste. Nevertheless, those unconventional. i Un. v. elements are not up for discussion today yet in studies on the ASB, but rather those are just. Ch. engchi. narrowing down its focus on how to operate conventional military forces in terms of regular war or warfare. With the change of conception, this being so, recognizing more comprehensive threats of the People’s Republic of China and preparing it are a subject eminently worthy of careful study. Besides the military range, a study on the ASB concept considering changes of war pattern is also important for regional security in East Asia. The veiled military threats of China will have sensitive influence on national interest and sovereignty of neighboring states like South Korea, Japan, and U.S. for example, and the balance of the regional security will be also 9.

(18) upset if there is no proper alternative to counter-act the potential threats. More seriously, the alliance system of U.S. in the region will get weak in the event that U.S. falls behind in the armed competition with China. Then, it will bring about negative result laying a burden on isolated military operations of U.S. Therefore, the ASB concept must have enough abilities to be able to cover diverse threats positively and it should be suggested by a direct /indirect policy instrument of ‘reassurance’ for the allied states. Also, the ASB concept must serve as a useful, but realistic milestone determining construction directions for military power of the regional allied states because U.S. military doctrine has effected on not only its own military. 政治大 operations, roadmaps for weapon 立systems, and even training systems on combined operation. but also allied states’ military organizations while having a direct influence on core strategies,. ‧ 國. ‧. 2. Main Questions. 學. among the states as a result.. y. Nat. sit. This thesis will be intensively studied by focusing on following three main questions.. n. al. er. io. Firstly, ‘why should U.S. develop the ASB concept as a military doctrine and which reasons. i Un. v. made the U.S. do that?’ This is an important question to search for background of the ASB. Ch. engchi. because a military doctrine can be developed by two backgrounds. If a state has a certain political goal in its situation, the state has to achieve the goals in every effort whether it is a rhetorical speaking or a physical military action based on a proper doctrine. Then, propensities and characteristics of the doctrine would be influenced by several military perspectives such as doctrinal tendency of war-fighting style, recognition for its threat for example, so this question will offer an answer why the ASB should be developed while regarding China’s threats like that within the range of regular war. Secondly, ‘what is definition of the ASB concept and what is basic concept of the ASB?’ In 10.

(19) detail, based on existing studies about it, which characteristics does the ASB concept have? And, how can it be implicated to an actual war against China? Because, these questions make us understand overall identification of the ASB, it would let to know why the ASB is just a conservative idea remaining within regular war concept, and would let us to expect limitations on the ASB in terms of other threats, not just conventional ones. So, lastly, ‘why does the ASB doctrine have its limitations and which elements can effects on its limitation?’ If a state has to survive in a harsh world, the state must calculate and prepare enemy’s actual military threats while expecting change process of war pattern. In the. 政治大 point. Chinese communists haven’t 立 ever opened their real military intention and other. respect, it is required to observe change of war spectrum objectively without a biased view. ‧ 國. 學. information about it, and the situation is likely to make U.S. miscalculate the Chinese threats in conservative stereotype that U.S. has adhered to for a long time. That’s why this question. ‧. should be accentuated, and it will detect flaws of the ASB doctrine in the end.. n. er. io. al. sit. y. Nat 3. Scope and Methodology of the Study. i Un. v. However, it is unromantically impossible to study all threats what China can generate.. Ch. engchi. Furthermore, it is not a recommendable approach to enumerate a moment of threats simply because spectrum of those threats will be changed at some future day even if it is possible. Instead, this thesis tried to analysis development patterns by confirming ‘style’ and ‘propensity’ inhered in those threats. For methodology on this study, it mainly approached from literature analysis because to acquire officially-confirmed information or other critical data regarding military strategies and its doctrinal intension of the Chinese military organization is actually limited. Thus, it attempted to retain objectivity by acquiring indirect materials such as military academic articles published by the Chinese People’s Liberation 11.

(20) Army or other retired military officers of the Chinese troops, official governmental materials of U.S. and other stakeholders, and related data from some authoritative military channels, although quantitative data substituted for some sectors requiring numerical analysis while including supplementary works of qualitative method by actual case studies. War should be observed by realistic view because it has a fundamental principle which one must neutralize another side in political and in military. The Offense-Defense Balance, one of representative theories of the realism camp, is theoretically explaining the structural principle of war well. With background of armed competition and security dilemma between U.S. and. 政治大 and why China should consider 立irregular warfare (or, hybrid warfare including asymmetric. China, it is enough to suggest a theoretical basis for the reason why the ASB was developed. ‧ 國. 學. warfare) on its war plan. Focusing on the perspective, the power balance theory was thus applied to explain those backgrounds in the first half of chapter 2. Also, to identify ignored. ‧. threats on the ASB concept, it had an opportunity to understand specific war theories. y. Nat. sit. including ‘hybrid warfare’ concept especially in the latter part. In the chapter 3, the. n. al. er. io. background of development on the ASB concept was explained by inter-relation between the. i Un. v. grand strategy and military doctrine of U.S. while clarifying the identification of the doctrinal. Ch. engchi. concept. Moreover, it tried to trace why and how the ASB can be nothing but a conventional typed doctrine, examining detailed characteristics and its campaign scenarios simultaneously. Analyzing china’s military threats centered on the hybrid warfare concept was included in the chapter 4, while studying traditional war philosophy and doctrinal ideas of the Chinese PLA. In so doing, this chapter will intensively explain limitations of the ASB doctrine by analyzing possible threats posed by China such as the irregularly-mixed hybrid warfare.. 12.

(21) Chapter 2 Theoretical Frameworks. As the acute arms race between U.S. and Soviet Union in the era of Cold War, competition between two great powers will make the military balance unstable constantly, proceeding towards the catastrophic destination. Then which factor does shape that phenomenon and how does it continue? Offering a good opportunity to observe the phenomenon, new rivalry between U.S. and China demands a theoretical description for those questions. In this chapter, it will try to understand the phenomenon theoretically and it will also consider the reason. 政治大. why a state has to fight with its rival by all means.. 立. Meanwhile, researchers need to understand characteristics of future war environment when. ‧ 國. 學. assuming that security environments under the phenomenon could decisively change patterns of war. As no effect without a cause, the war patterns cannot be changed blindly and with. ‧. explanation power it requires presentation of causes about the change. Therefore, this chapter. y. Nat. io. sit. will simultaneously explain some theories on change of war pattern and its background in. n. al. er. order to establish a theoretical frame for two purpose; discovery of China’s expectable threats. Ch. and identification of limitations on the ASB doctrine.. engchi. i Un. v. 1. Origin of Security Dilemma: Offense-Defense Balance Theory For a hegemony power, a rival state emerging newly could be recognized as a threat to tear status quo down whereas the existing hegemony state could be regarded as an obstacle of national growth for the rival state trying to establish new inter-state relations by changing structure dynamics. Under this conflicting circumstance, each state must make desperate efforts to maximize national interest in the face of stiff competition alongside preparing a 13.

(22) mean of survival. Also, the efforts would/should be autonomously realized by the each state because international relation is in a state of anarchy and it just requires the state to select a way for survival by the state itself. Military power can be directly used in a political mean for protecting a state’s sovereignty, interest and its survival because individual state can only protect itself by its military force in terms of international relations. 14 John Mearsheimer also argued that ‘the only rational approach for states under anarchy was to assume that those who can do harm, might do harm, and to prepare for this possibility by creating countervailing offensive military potential.’ 15. 政治大 unless it clarifies (political) goal 立and scope of counter-action against its threats, because to However, what a state retains military force and operate it would lose roles and functions. ‧ 國. 學. operate the military organization unlimitedly is in fact impossible due to restrictive resources and limitation of national capabilities.. ‧. Meanwhile, a state’s military force would be operated by the detailed goal and intention. y. Nat. sit. whereas its enemy state alerting the state would recognize the military force as a critical. n. al. er. io. threat since some elements requiring strong security such as a war plan bring ‘uncertainty’ to. i Un. v. the potential enemy while hiding its cleared intention. Although a particular military policy. Ch. engchi. just has defensive intention and goal, policy decision makers of the enemy state would misjudge it by hostile offensive actions unless the decision makers know it perfectly, and then the enemy policy makers would also have a dash at being guaranteed their survival by enforcing their own military force. Those situations under the uncertainty would be continued consistently and the efforts to solute the interactions between the two states repeatedly come. 14. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove: Waveland Press, 2010), 111-123 Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 35. 15. 14.

(23) into action within dilemma, so-called ‘Security Dilemma’ 16 Then, how can the security dilemma concretely be shaped and which conditions can determine level of the dilemma? And, how can the inter-relations between the conditions and the dilemma explain? Evan B. Montgomery referred the definition of security dilemma, saying that ‘the situation where one state’s attempts to increase its security appear threatening to others and provoke an unnecessary conflict.’ 17 Also, Martin Griffiths said that ‘the security dilemma describes a condition in which efforts to improve national security have the effect of appearing to threatening other states thereby provoking military counter-moves. This. 政治大 shaped not only by threatening立 intention of a state but also by a defensive intension of it. The. in turn can lead to a net decrease in security for all states.’ 18 But, the dilemma could be. ‧ 國. 學. reason is that the situation in which one state improves its military capabilities, especially its defenses, and those improvements are seen by other states as threats; each state in an anarchic. ‧. international system tries to increase its own level of protection leading to insecurity in others,. Nat. sit. y. often leading to an arms race. 19. n. al. er. io. If retaining military force by itself is a necessary thing for a state’s survival, military. i Un. v. tension between two states are in competition can be in security dilemma by two levels. Ken Booth noted that;. Ch. engchi. First Level: a dilemma of interpretation is the predicament facing decision-makers when they. 16. The word, ‘dilemma’ means ‘ambiguous proposition’ and it is a ‘situation that requires one to choose between two equally balanced alternatives.’ Ibid., 4. 17 Evan B. Montgomery, “Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty,” International Security 31 (2006): 151. 18 Martin Griffiths and Terry O’Callaghan, International Relations: The Key Concepts (London: Routledge, 2002), 292. 19 Karen A. Mingst, Essentials of International Relations (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 198, 322.. 15.

(24) are confronted, on matters affecting security, with a choice between two significant and usually (but not always) undesirable alternatives about the military policies and political postures of other entities. This dilemma of interpretation is the result of the perceived need to make a decision in the existential conditions of un-resolvable uncertainty about the motives, intensions and capabilities of others… Second Level: a dilemma of response logically begins when the dilemma of interpretation has been settled. Decision-makers then need to determine how to react… If the dilemma of response is based on misplaced suspicion regarding the motives and intentions of other actors, and decisionmakers react in a militarily confrontational manner, then they risk creating a significant level of. 政治大. mutual hostility when none was originally intended by either party… 20. 立. ‧ 國. 學. Therefore, whether it is an exact calculation by correct awareness or a miscalculation by mistake and exaggerated threat, military policies of the both states have possibility of which. ‧. it is construed as an intention threatening the adversary’s security in the end. Plus, arms race. y. Nat. io. sit. between rivals would be mutually repeated until reaching a certain apex in order to resolve. n. al. er. the unstable security problem as well as reduce uncertainty, and the apex means possibility of. Ch. i Un. v. war. However, security dilemma isn’t always shaped even though international status is. engchi. anarchy and, moreover, it isn’t shaped in the same level and similar intensity. For example, U.S. and Soviet Union concluded the SALT in 1970 and the START I in 1991 under the sharp arms race of Cold War period such as catastrophic nuclear strategy, so-called the ‘Mutual Assured Destruction’. After then, those two great powers could reduce the dilemma while deciding to decrease the number of nuclear weapon to 2,000 warheads respectively by the. 20. Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, 4-5.. 16.

(25) successive the START II & III. 21 The ‘Offense-Defense Balance’ theory, one of representative realism theories, explains origin of security dilemma and level difference of it by assuming propensity of military technology between two rival states as a main independence variable. Although K. Waltz didn’t mention the military technology in detail, he appreciated importance of it effecting on a state’s power. 22 Steven Van Evera argued that propensity of the military technology effects on a state’s behavior and stability of international system, distinguishing it concentrically between advantage for offense rather than defense and advantage for defense rather than. 政治大 Robert Jervis and his offense-defense balance theory explain conditions of forming 立. offense. 23. ‧ 國. 學. security dilemma and its intensity through four situations. According the theory, it is possible to distinguish military forces, military technologies, and related military policies of two rivals. ‧. between defense advantage and offense advantage and possibility of war will be weaken if. Nat. sit. y. those elements are within defense advantage. 24 He also suggested four theoretical worlds,. n. al. er. io. insisting that the propensity can determine military policy intention of a state in accordance. i Un. with whether it is an offensive weapon or a defensive weapon.. Ch. engchi. v. The first world assumes that it will become the most dangerous dilemma if it is ambiguous or unclear to distinguish military policies and military enforcement direction of a single state or both states between offense and defense, because a state retaining offense advantage military forces is more easy to attack rather than defense and (if so is one) another state will. 21. Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, New START Nuclear Reductions Treaty Briefing Book (Washington DC: Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, 2010), 7-15. 22 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18 (1993): 50-54. 23 Stephen Van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Cause of War,” International Security 22 (1998): 17-18. 24 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30 (1978): 199-210.. 17.

(26) strive to reduce the security dilemma by military build-up that is based on offense, not defense. 25 Thus, it is likely to escalate military conflictions due to offense-intensified arms race between rivals and it will be close to war in the end.. OFFENSIVE HAS THE ADVANTAGE. OFFENSIVE POSTURE NOT. DEFENSIVE HAS THE ADVANTAGE. 2. 1. DISTINGUISHABLE FROM. Security dilemma, but security. Doubly dangerous. DEFENSIVE ONE. 立. requirements may be compatible. 政治大 3. No security dilemma, but aggression. OFFENSIVE POSTURE. 4. possible.. DEFENSIVE ONE. 學. ‧ 國. DISTINGUISHABLE FROM. Status-quo states can follow different policies than aggressors.. Doubly stable. ‧. sit. io. n. al. er. Nat. Figure 2.1 Jervis’s Four Worlds. y. Source: Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” 211.. i Un. v. In the second world, a state can recognize rival state’s military enforcement as a threat. Ch. engchi. because of the rival’s ambiguous intention and attitude. However, intensity of the security dilemma will be weak if the rival is in defense advantage or in favorable condition for defense because its possibility of attack is relatively low. 26 The third world assumes that security dilemma will not be shaped when intention and goal of two rival states are clarified. Even enforcing offense-centered military forces, an opponent. 25 26. Ibid., 211-212. Ibid., 212-123.. 18.

(27) side can make a military balance because another side also shows clear intention. 27 However, if military power is a core mean for a state’s survival in the view of realism, rival states in Jervis’s world are able to conceal offensive intention on purpose. Then it could turn into ‘the first world’ or ‘the second world.’ Lastly, the fourth world is the most stable and safe among the Jervis’s worlds. In the world military intention between the two states are not only clear but also in the defense advantage 28, so it has relatively low possibility of security dilemma with high certainty. Although those four worlds show diverse intensity of security dilemma, the possibility of. 政治大 information including its core立 intention in the name of ‘secret’. Considering it, sensitive the dilemma still exists (even in the fourth world). One of military tendencies is to close all. ‧ 國. 學. intensions or other information cannot be opened for the enemies and it makes them misunderstand and take an over-action.. ‧. In addition, the balance theory concentrating on military technology is limited in the way. y. Nat. sit. that it dichotomously categorizes propensity of weapon systems including its technical. n. al. er. io. sources by offense and defense. ‘Weapons may be usefully differentiated in a variety of ways,. i Un. v. but the offence/defense distinction is not one of them’ 29 Again, a weapon system should be. Ch. engchi. distinguished by how to use it and how to be applied into operation and tactics in parallel, not simply ‘spears’ and ‘shields’. Furthermore, modern military technology can make integrate those two domains (offensive and defensive) into a single platform. For instance, the F-16 fighter jet is used to not only DCA (Defensive Counter-Air) missions that intercept penetrating enemy aircrafts but also OCA (Offensive Counter-Air) missions infiltrating the. 27 28 29. Ibid., 213-214. Ibid., 214. Sean M Lynn-Jones, “Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics,” Security Studies 4 (1995): 672-674.. 19.

(28) enemy territory and striking them, 30 while concentrating on multi-role functions. With the military technology, the origin of security dilemma suggested by the offense-defense balance theory, therefore, should be considered other important elements and its characteristics such as a doctrine, an operational concept, and a tactic for example.. 2. Security Dilemma and Military Interaction between U.S. and China From the offense-defense balance perspective, how can the security dilemma between U.S. and China explain specifically? Historically and traditionally U.S. has guarded freedom and. 政治大 protect regional nations like 立 South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan from communists while. democracy. With this background, U.S. has wielded strong influence in East Asia in order to. ‧ 國. 學. maximizing national interests. Nevertheless, China’s expansionism and ambitious attitude having emerged since collapse of the Cold War are challenging to U.S. hegemony squarely. ‧. while being a critical threat on U.S. security. Especially, the A2/AD, a Chinese maritime. y. Nat. sit. strategy, has been realized since the early of 1980s and it is also expansionism in terms of. n. al. er. io. military perspective. U.S. is sensitive to the military trend of the People’s Republic of China. i Un. because the U.S. has to hold its power via maritime space too.. Ch. engchi. v. People’s Liberation Army, Navy, and Air Force are now extending scope of the People’s War over all area of East Asian region, leaving main land where Chinese army had preferred to make a protracted war with attrition. The military trend will become a prerequisite condition for protecting China’s sovereignty spreading to the world as well as guaranteeing. 30. F-16 is one of representative multi-role fighter. By its weapon operation capability, it can take a variety of air missions. For example, F-16C Block 50/52 series can employ AIM-9M, AIM-120A/C Air-to-Air missiles for defensive air mission. For Air-to-Ground missions, the aircraft can deliver and release Laser Guided Munitions as well as JDAMs with LANTIRN pod for precision guided strike. Republic of Korea Air Force, Korean Air Force Tactics, Techniques & Procedures (KAFTTP) 3-3 Volume 5: Basic Employment Manual F-16C, Republic of Korea Air Force (__: October, 2005), 4-167, 5-1.. 20.

(29) national development in the future. China’s core security objectives in Asia can be categorized by exerting control over its bear seas, defending and advancing Chinese sovereignty claims, and regional economic integration. 31 To realize the strategic objectives, China has developed and acquired a variety of weapon systems including short and mediumrange ballistic missiles, ground and air-launched cruise missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, advanced fighter jets including stealth jet fighters, long-ranged military capabilities, and other defensive systems. 32 Therefore, U.S. understands the A2/AD strategy that can delay the assembly of U.S. power-projection forces, keep them beyond effective range of Chinese. 政治大 transportation, and support forces 立while dissuading the allied forces from granting U.S. forces. territory, or defeat them once they come within range including attacks on logistics,. ‧ 國. 學. operational access to their bases. 33 Like that, U.S. is now appreciating that China has intention to attack the U.S. forces through preemptive attacks for example, but the China. ‧. government strenuously denies about it, only mentioning that ‘it has only peaceful intentions. y. Nat. sit. and does not believe in launching aggression and that it fights wars only to defend its. n. al. er. io. sovereignty and territorial integrity’ 34. i Un. v. On the other hand, although U.S. insists that ‘ASB is not about war with China or. Ch. engchi. containment of China but rather part of a larger offsetting strategy,’ 35 the ASB is a military doctrine to counter-act the China’s military challenge. Detailed in the chapter 3, the U.S. war. 31. Bonnie S. Glaser, “‘China’s Grand Strategy in Asia’: Statement before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission” (paper presented at the meeting for the CSIS, Washington DC, March 2014). 32 Generally those weapons are categorized to offensive weapons in terms of operational capabilities, purpose of using, and characteristics of targets which the weapons are designating.. 33 Roger Cliff, et al., Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Anti-access Strategies and Their Implications for the United States (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007), 51-71. 34 Gurmeet Kanwal, “China’s New War Concepts for 21st Century Battlefields,” IPCS 48 (2007): 2. 35 Richard A. Bitzinger and Michael Raska, The AirSea Battle Debate and the Future of Conflict in East Asia (Singapore: Nanyang Technological University, 2013), 5.. 21.

(30) fighting concept is a projection operation force that fights out of homeland by expeditionary forces. Therefore, the A2/AD could impede freedom of using space on the sea or in the air and it could also threaten U.S. military assets and facilities located in the oversea forward deployed bases. To overcome these threats, the ASB concept was designed to defense the enemy’s attack including preemptive strikes in initial phase while guaranteeing stereoscopic operations in the operation access phase for securing initiative. More importantly, it has also offensive intention in the flowing phase. With distant blockade, some expectable operations on the ASB doctrine include striking missions targeting strategic nodes in the Chinese. 政治大 concept whether it means neutralization 立 of the Chinese military forces or elimination of the. territory. 36 Moreover, the ASB has ambiguous intention and unclear end status on the. ‧ 國. 學. Chinese Communist Party. It could make the Chinese regime more anxiety with calling military distrust. As a result, continuous military competition between the great powers would. ‧. be kept by the regime with more severe arms race. About this dilemma, Joshua Rovner said. y. Nat. sit. that ‘deep inland strikes could be mistakenly perceived by the Chinese as preemptive. al. n. dilemma.’ 37. er. io. attempts to take out its nuclear weapons, thus concerning them into a terrible use-it-or-lose-it. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. For the offense-defense balance perspective, the propensity of military technology and weapon system is an important element to form security dilemma. In the respect, the present arms race between U.S. and China is also a critical element to their dilemma. Military expenditure of China has increased steadily since the end of Cold War, and the budget in 2013 closed with 191,228 US million dollars (2.02% of GDP). U.S. also had increased military expenditure since the Cold War (although the budget was reduced recently due to the. 36 37. Ibid., 3-4. Billington, “Air-Sea Battle Is a Plan for War on China,” 30.. 22.

(31) financial sequester action). 38 However, while the Chinese government doesn’t open detail expenses of the budget, the U.S. estimates that the military expenditure can be more increased because China omitted sensitive parts of it. 39 Additionally, U.S. appreciates that arms modernization trends of China are mainly focused on offensive capabilities and the capabilities contains long range operation ability within China’s strategic lines the 1st & 2nd Islands Chains while enforcing offensive capabilities in the space and the cyber space. 40 Recently, military technology trends of U.S. tend to pursue multi-purpose mission concept that can exert defensive and offensive roles from a single platform because of highly. 政治大 operates AEGIS system developed 立 for fleet air-defense mission originally has not only SM-3 increased development costs for weapons. For example, USS Arleigh Burke-class DDG that. ‧ 國. 學. missiles for ballistic missile defense but also cruise missiles for offensive missions. Similarly, USAF F-35 JSF fighter was developed to intercept the leaking enemy aircrafts without. ‧. detection thanks to its stealth technology while it strikes ground targets by the Precision. y. Nat. sit. Guided Munitions. In the case of THADD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) missile. n. al. er. io. defense system, it literally sounds like a pure defensive weapon but it can indirectly enhance. i Un. v. offensive mission rate by protecting friendly forces taking offensive missions from the. Ch. engchi. enemy’s massive missile attacks. Eventually, synergy effects generated by the interaction between offensive and defensive technologies should be considered into the security dilemma issue. Thus, the dilemma will be more escalated while China could be suspicious about the. 38. See more detailed data on ‘Appendix A. Military Expenditure Trends of the US and the PRC.’ “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” accessed May 1, 2015, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database. 39 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014 (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2014), 43. 40 See more data on Appendix B. China’s Arms Modernization Trends and Developing Capabilities.’ Ibid., 2739.. 23.

(32) military technology trends too. In this situation the ASB concept is aggressively aiming at China, Chinese communists might think that its regular military forces are not enough to minimize the dilemma because U.S. military capabilities are still superior in the conventional military technology and in the quantitative/qualitative scales of the force including actual experiences of war. Again, they will search for other ‘roundabout’ solutions in order to alleviate the escalation, realizing that the head-on confrontation against U.S. is no meaningful to overcome the ambiguous circumstance. Under the slogan ‘local war under high-technology condition,’ China armed. 政治大 their military ability to overshoot 立U.S. is insufficient yet. For example, the Chinese military. forces, in fact, have propelled arms modernization since the end of Gulf War. Nevertheless. ‧ 國. 學. are still staying in a transition stage although modern warfare strongly requires joint operations based on enforced ability to integrate heterogeneous operations of each military. ‧. service. Especially, their network-centric C4ISR system lags considerately behind U.S. and. y. Nat. sit. retained weapon systems should be linked to the system are not a common concept yet for the. n. al. er. io. Chinese soldiers. Of course, it is true that their weapon systems acquired recently are. i Un. v. outstandingly improved than before but human resource such as operators controlling new. Ch. engchi. weapons lacks experiences to adapt the improvement (even their operation procedures are still developing in the initial stage). Besides these disadvantageous conditions, China regime would encounter other different problems when military confliction or war breaks out actually. Some domestic nationalism movements having a grievance against the coercive CCP would give rise to political chaos, taking advantage of war time. Also, it would cause collapse of the regime in severe cases. Plus, the regime has to encounter a political crisis if Chinese SLOCs are blocked by the enemy’s military actions because China’s economy structure has a high level of dependence 24.

(33) on overseas. Accordingly, China should consider somewhat different alternatives through irregular and asymmetric ways rather than regular war that is expensive but difficult to maintain the military balance when considering the complex problems. Ambiguous intention or goal brings about the dilemma alongside uncertainty. The ambiguous ASB doctrine will make Chinese political regime more nervous so the regime will maintain its survival by all means available including nuclear bombs. However, using nuclear weapons will make the regime worry in politic, economic, diplomatic and military dimensions like nightmare of the Cold War whereas it cannot exclude possibility of nuclear. 政治大. retaliation of U.S. If then, China’s practical option is taking unconventional military actions. 立. based on irregular and unique ways.. ‧ 國. 學. Even though there are certainly offensive intentions among the two rivals, the security dilemma will be highly escalated like Jervis’s the first world by uncertainty derived from. ‧. ambiguous attitudes of the states, blatant ‘demonstration effects’ for retaining offensive. y. Nat. sit. capabilities and its involved military technologies of weapons, and psychological effects. n. al. er. io. worrying about unstable security caused by former two reasons. To solve the situation, the. i Un. v. weak China will exert unthinkable and irregular military alternatives while escaping from the. Ch. engchi. unfavorable status in the regular war. Moreover, U.S. military ignores the irregular warfare because of its conservative norms and culture prefers regular war based on high-technology, but for China it will be a decisive opportunity to maximize their inferior condition. This is essential of war and a real military technology!. 3. Characteristics of Environment in Future War Generally speaking, military policies of a state (as an overall meaning to cover a strategy, an operation, a tactics, a weapon and a doctrine that is fundamental principle) can be 25.

(34) designated to its directions and concrete scales in accordance with threat level analyzed by understanding security situations exactly. By the way, the policies might have shortages not to deal with unthinkable and strange threats as well as it could not cover those threats effectively in the case of building up military forces according to the bureaucratic procedures calculated preliminarily. To supplement the bureaucracy, military academia has attempted to expect war patterns through case studies of the past, but most studies have limited discussing its scales within conventional concept and have largely concentrated on regular fighting styles or technological means. Nonetheless, those stale perspectives cannot explain recent. 政治大 performance of the unusual conflicts, 立 so it needs to take a converted view point by a fresh. asymmetric confrontations between regular war and irregular war and disappointing. ‧ 國. 學. perspective.. ‘Paradigm’ is a concept referring theory, law, knowledge, belief, and habit which a specific. ‧. field or total society of an era have shared, and paradigm revolution breaks out when existing. Nat. sit. y. institutions cannot solve problems derived from it. 41 Like that, paradigm in war patterns. n. al. er. io. means a newly perceived idea from changes of diverse military environment such as ideas. i Un. v. about war or war fighting styles. 42 It is also a turnover process of cognizable ideas while. Ch. engchi. identifying environmental elements differentiated from the war patterns what we are encountering at present. If so, where can we find the causes changing the paradigm and what are the causes? It can be enumerated to five ones largely; military technology, transition of civilization, values change, constrains of war resources, and military doctrine. Firstly, military technology has. 41. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 35-42. 42 Won Ko, “War Paradigm Shift and its Implications for Korea Military Operation,” GukbangJeongchaekYeongu (Defense for Policy Analysis) 26 (2010): 12-13.. 26.

(35) repeated its development, having a question how to attack the enemy without friendly’s fratricide. The technology has also been advanced by complementary cooperation between military and civil domain. For example, the origin of ‘Internet’ was begun by the DARPA, as one of military communication technologies in 1962 and its first name was the ARPANET. 43 After emergence of the internet, it could achieve splendid development today passing through commercialization phase because a variety of application technologies could be devised during the phase while useful technologies for military purpose have re-accepted into the military domain again. Specifically, ‘Network-Centric Warfare’ concept could be realized by. 政治大 portion of cyber warfare gets more 立 large. While the technological phenomenon is currently that interactions and diverse military solutions are more depending on the civil domain as. ‧ 國. 學. spreading out over the world, Won Ko insists that the phenomena can be categorized into two domains; hardware domain such as space warfare system, unmanned weapon systems;. ‧. software domain for operating the hardware such as human resources and supporting. y. Nat. sit. institutions. Moreover, he strongly argued that ‘technical hyper link’ offers a technical source. n. al. er. io. to employ existing conventional forces with future-oriented forces together, integrating those. i Un. v. two domains. 44 However, the technical element is not only for super powers. Its development. Ch. engchi. mixed with civil sector has enabled massive proliferation of various kinds of weapon with reducing production costs. The result brought that weak countries including non-government actors can enjoy the technical benefits. Actually, some poor states such as North Korea and Iran can effectively but inexpensively hack into U.S. military networks (especially their tighten network centric war-fighting systems), and electronic hyper-link nodes which U.S.. 43. Barry M. Leiner, “A Brief History of the Internet,” ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review 39 (2009): 23. 44 Ko, “War Paradigm Shift and its Implications for Korea Military Operation,” 17-18.. 27.

(36) military assets fully rely on could be attacked by those poor actors or even specific privates in the asymmetric way. Transition of civilization can be explained, focusing on ripple effects of information. For instance, ubiquitous communization of information and its unlimited proliferation can deconcentrate a conventional combat style into a shapeless spot style by its non-leaner nature, massive application of information derived from out-of-order configuration, and automation of those things. 45 The transnational operation system of Al-Qaeda emerged around the 9/11 eluded the grasp of the U.S. and its allies through internet network dispersed as a huge. 政治大 in the way that it cannot be removed 立 completely.. number of spots and the unconventional organization sent shockwaves throughout the world. ‧ 國. 學. Today people’s value change is described a phenomena concerning individual safety increasingly rather than unconditional sacrifice for public interest. Representatively, the. ‧. individualism is observed very easily on a number of SNSs and it is also true that diverse. y. Nat. sit. NGOs are expanding their roles gradually with circulation of anti-government movement. In. n. al. er. io. this circumstance, justification of war can be raised seriously when some collateral damages. i Un. v. like recent mistaken bombings on innocent civilians in the Operation Enduring Freedom are. Ch. engchi. opened while spreading out over the world. Thus, people would not support their government any longer as much as in the past and decision processes on war would be more sensitive thanks to those public opinions about anti-government. Within limited military budget condition, arms modernization in peace time and conduct of war have been a touchy issue since the era of the ‘nation-state’ of the Peace of Westphalia. Because war has been only conducted for people’s interests and sovereignty with their lives. 45. Ibid., 22-24.. 28.

(37) since then, the budget has had to be used by the people’s approved range. However, the problem would be more critical than before because not only to manage modern military organization will require enormous amount of financial support but also to cost of war will astronomically increase, so the modern military should complete missions in spite of the restricted budget situation. Reduction of the military organization is one of current issues of RMA and this situation effects on using other war materials including petroleum, munitions as well as the defense budget itself. Thus, modern military troops must manage its organizations economically and must conduct its war and warfare effectively too. Under these. 政治大 regarded as a crippled and useless 立 pain in the neck if it cannot smartly respond disconcerted limitations, the military would lose people’s supports while suffering humiliation that it is. ‧ 國. 學. threats including irregular and asymmetric ones.. Accordingly, military organizations have attempted to renovate their doctrine ‘how to fight’. ‧. in order to adapt those difficult environments because war concept can be improved by basis. y. Nat. sit. on improved doctrine in terms of which the doctrine offers specified principles in war. n. al. er. io. fighting style. For example, to overcome reduction of costs and cut-downed strength, U.S.. i Un. v. has tried to make a doctrinal innovation such as ‘surgical strike’ concept to maximize. Ch. engchi. operation effectiveness by pin-point strikes to selected core nodes of enemy states in late of 1980s. This effort proved its effectiveness in the Gulf War. In detail, U.S. military forces neutralized strategic targets located in rear area of Iraqi soils despite standing face to face with the terrified Iraqi Republican Guard at the front line. This being so, they could reduce casualties and prevent protracted war. In the respect, military doctrine should be modified its mean and application depending on change of environments in order to provide a fundamental method how to conduct war.. 29.

(38) 4. New perspectives on war and Hybrid War concept Considered the changes of war environment, the ‘Fourth Generation War’ (hereafter refers to as ‘4GW’) explains a war concept in aspects of way and actor while it describes war as a social phenomenon that occurs in the evolutionary epistemology. Thomas X. Hammes mentioned that a state, a sole legal actor using force, is already exposing the limitations of its role and function, arguing that methods for conducting war and its actors are able to be different by development of (military) technologies and political/societal changes. 46 Core points of the 4GW is that non-state actors will exert not only physical-destructive power but. 政治大 the strong state, so non-kinetic立 means for social, cultural, and psychological shocks can be also psychological influence conquering enemy’s mind with the purpose of standing against. ‧ 國. 學. utilized broadly. In addition, the 4GW is a ‘developed rebellion action’ and it will progress a pattern to neutralize enemy’s political goals or objectives of war, not to achieve goals by. ‧. attacking the enemy’s military forces straightly because the 4GW is aiming at the enemy’s. y. Nat. sit. psychological effects as well as demonstrating political will by using social networks. About. n. al. er. io. that, William S. Lind said that the 4GW will be occurred by confliction between religions or. i Un. v. cultures, not only military confrontation monopolized by states. 47. Ch. engchi. However, the 4GW concept makes a mistake in respect of which it recognizes the pattern of war as an evolutionary stage. Characteristics of each generation should work within range of the compartmental generation with differentiated concept from other generations, and all of phenomena should be explained consistently within a certain generation. But, the characteristic what 4GW explains are in fact existed in the past and, furthermore, war has not. 46. Thomas X. Hammes, “War Evolves into the Fourth Generation,” Contemporary Security Policy 26 (2005): 190, 196-217 47 William S. Lind, “Understanding Fourth Generation War,” Military Review (2004): 13-14.. 30.

(39) unfolded by a same pattern. For instance, characteristics of war on the People’s War what 4GW insists stresses on guerilla warfare that harasses enemy consistently and destroys the enemy’s weaknesses exists for shaping favorable condition to execute a decisive war, but it doesn’t ignore regular war. And, strategies of terrorists who confronts with a targeted states can work for their political goals, not for overthrowing the states or getting rid of ultimate political goals of the states. Moreover, wars between states are still going, so it is not a right perspective to give prominence to only the non-state actors when observing war and patterns of it. In the respect, the 4GW theory has theoretical errors to accept it, but it is worthy of. 政治大 directions and it also suggests立 irregular threats led by diverse actors including non-state notice in the way that it criticizes technology-based military doctrines and related policy. ‧ 國. 學. actors.. Mary Kaldor observes war with a distinctive view point in her book New & Old Wars. She. ‧. insists that commercialization of war and its globalization are possible because war can be. Nat. sit. y. arisen by lack of political will. 48 As Carl von Clausewitz said, it is an established theory that. n. al. er. io. war cannot be separated from politics, but she is more interested on acts of war by non-state. i Un. v. actors while assuming that war can rise due to lack of the political will. For example,. Ch. engchi. increased civilian casualties maximize hatred and the wrath can make a war. Plus, political pressure of the military-industrial complex or the PMCs (Political Military Companies) can do that too. However, war cannot be separated from the political will when reminding the Clausewitz’s maxim, ‘war is an extension of politics.’ If ultimate objective of the non-state actors is to construct their own utopia, it is just a different-typed state. Also, the PMCs can partake into a war by a political regime employing them while the military-industrial. 48. Mary Kaldor, Old & New Wars (California: Stanford University Press, 2007), 95-116.. 31.