Chapter 4 China’s Hybrid War and Its Implication
1. War Philosophy of the People’s Liberation Army
國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
74
Chapter 4 China’s Hybrid War and Its Implication
A military organization tends to calculate enemy’s threats from conservative perspective, and also to seek a proper doctrine to counter-act the threats in that background. However, the organization can reduce uncertainty of the threats while understanding fundamental elements having influenced on the enemy’s doctrine and involved war-fighting styles, if the enemy makes a complete nonsense of the conservative ideas by causing an unthinkable situation that is hard to deal with. Because adversaries could/should develop a military policy from their own war philosophy that has dominated them for a long time.
This chapter will study why China’s military threats could be different from what the ASB doctrine is considering through China’s ideological foundations including traditional ideas of war, and it will also identify limitations of the ASB by grasping it onto the Hoffman’s ‘hybrid war’ concept.
1. War Philosophy of the People’s Liberation Army
As ‘different countries follow different strategic culture traditions resulting from their history, social traditions, value system, and the philosophical traditions they follow’,106
106 Huiyun Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Confucianism Leadership and War (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), 33.
if war philosophy of a state has accepted traditionally is proved its effectiveness in practice or if it accords with some intangible components such as culture or ideology of the state, war of the state would be conducted by principles reflecting the philosophy. And, that process would suggest basic directions how to fight to military organizations. The organization theory
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
75
Allison insists implies that decision making process, SOPs, and behavioral characteristics of members of a certain organization depend on such background factors and the theory provides an important clue when studying the veiled organizational tendency of Chinese army from external perspective.
In 2006, People’s Liberation Army Daily (jiefangjunbao) reported that ‘PLA adopted Sun Tzu’s Art of War as a training manual for military officers.’ 107
Historically, Confucianism has been accepted into social morals of China. Bottom line of the Confucianism is based on ‘harmony’ between sovereign and people, and in the respect war was able to be only conducted by justified purpose for the people. In detail, the sovereign had to avoid the war if it is possible, but if it is impossible, the war had to move forward in the direction reducing the people’s damage and burden.
Concentrating on armed modernization, it seems to be ironical to adopt the classic book written 2,500 years ago as a manual for the modernized military, but it implies that the war principles is still working on the modern Chinese army. Therefore, it should not interpret Chinese war patterns by Western perspective, rather it must discuss the war patterns by understanding the indigenous war philosophy has traditionally influenced on the Chinese military organization.
108 Huiyun Feng said that Sun Tzu’s thought could also exist as a distinctive principle by that ethical idea, mentioning that the reason why Confucianism could be a ruling idea for a long time is that it helped to run the country with less violent context than any other philosophies in the same age.109
107 Kisung Park, “Joonghaebanggoon, Sonjabyengbup Hoonlyunkyojaero chaetaek (China’s PLA, adopted the Art of War as a training manual),” Yeonhap News, May 3, 2006, accessed May 22, 2015,
Plus, if the
‘harmony’ is a basis of maintaining a country, disturbing the harmony between sovereign and
http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=102&oid=001&aid=0001288130.
108 Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making, 19-21.
109 Ibid., 4.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
76
people would be a critical threat for enemy country, so the enemy should use dissatisfaction and grievance of the people.
In terms of asymmetric warfare,110 Sun Tzu’s though is worthy of note in the way that it pursues a practical way not only avoiding a war if possible but also minimizing expenses even in war in order to prevent the people’s great damages. Sun Tzu said:
If he is secure at all points, he prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him.111 Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.112
What these two maxims mean is that attacking enemy’s weakness rather than avoiding all-out war is wise because the harmony will be broken down by stupendous costs the people have to bear with increase of their grievance when war occurs. It can be also categorized to three situations in accordance with military gap between two states. For instance, when state A has a superior military power than state B, state A can easily neutralize state B by employing strong military power into weak point of state B. Also, state A can minimize costs by using a part of total military forces for attacking the selected weak points while the rest forces prevent the enemy’s attacks in flexible. Next, if the two states have same or similar levels of military power, any of them can achieve its objectives by attacking the enemy’s weak point without a total war. Attacking the weak points can also be a decisive factor even in a total war because serious costs derived from the total war will result in disaster to the
110 ‘Asymmetric warfare is violent action undertaken by the ‘have-nots’ against the ‘haves’ whereby the have-nots, be they state or sub-state actors, seek to generate profound effects… by employing their own specific relative advantages against the vulnerabilities of much stronger opponents.’ Rod Thornton, Asymmetric Warfare:
Threats and Response in the 21st Century (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 1.
111 Tzu Sun, Art of War, 21.
112 Ibid., 4.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
77
states. Lastly, if state A has an inferior power than state B, attacking the state B’s weak points can be an asymmetric weapon for the weak because the asymmetric attack can outflank the strong in some ways exploiting shock or fear.
Vietnam War in the 1960s is a good case to show the asymmetric way. In the war, U.S. had to suffer bitter experiences though it absolutely retained more strong military power than Vietnamese communists, because the protracted war produced protests of anti-war due to the enemy’s asymmetric warfare with massive casualties. To overcome the inferiority, the Vietnamese communists took guerilla warfare and it was intensively executed in where U.S.
military forces were not able to use their firepower easily such as a civilian-inhabited area.
American soldiers had to fight in ambiguous circumstance in which it cannot distinguish the enemy whether it is a combatant or a non-combatant, while being exposed to booby traps, and such unusual battle conditions were certainly a weak point for the U.S. military because American war-fighting style was based on a ‘fair’ game.
As Sun Tzu advised that ‘the good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy,’113
Sun Tzu declared the essence of war is an action by deception, mentioning that ‘all warfare it is, however, a more important problem to ‘when to launch an operation’ so-called ‘timing’, if the asymmetric warfare is to search and attack enemy’s weakness because in the Sun Tzu’s world war is not a linear continuity but it is a repetition of time that flows capriciously as well as simultaneously. Hence, the asymmetric warfare will go down the drain if no patience to wait an opportunity even though acknowledging the enemy’s weakness exactly.
113 Ibid., 12.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
78
is based on deception.’114 In his view, the saying means that objective of the asymmetric warfare is to aim at the point that which enemy doesn’t prepare or is insufficient to counter-act whereas it includes inducement of the enemy into a trap looks like a weak point, but it is in fact strong one. However, can the asymmetric warfare only guarantee a victory? Sun Tzu stressed on harmony between the asymmetric warfare and regular warfare (it means a direct confrontation), saying that ‘in all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory,’115
Eventually, the Sun Tzu’s thought insisted a ‘justified war’ in the way that it attempt to maximum effectiveness by avoiding a direct collision while minimizing the people’s damages.
Accordingly, this ancient Chinese thought has a series of characteristics; a circuitous war-fighting style with asymmetry rather than a direct decisive match; a deceptive combat based on ambiguity rather than a muscular materialism; a maximization of psychological effect rather than a physical destruction; consideration of a political legitimacy rather than a military objective itself; a relative superior rather than an absolute superior; a simultaneous time line with irregularity rather that a linear time line with regularity; and a harmonious combination between these elements.
because the asymmetric warfare can be conducted in any time regardless of in peace time or in war time, but the regular warfare can cover the lacks of asymmetric warfare.
On the other hand, war philosophy in Western world is somewhat inconsistent with the Chinese thought. For example, although the Japan’s sudden attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7 1941 was a ‘well-done’ operation in terms of Sun Tzu’s perspective, but the next day U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt announced that the attack aroused American people’s
114 Ibid., 3.
115 Ibid., 15.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
79
anger and blame while criticizing that it was an action of cowardice with no proclaim of war in his speech day of infamy.116 Going far back in WW I period, conventional war-fighting pattern in the European front mainly employed a face-to-face confrontation between both sides. During that period, the pattern of engagement brought a tiresome protracted war with repetitive sieges despite massive casualties from direct confrontations such as the horrible trench warfare.117
If Western civilization originated from Greek Hellenism, the view of war might also be derived from war-fighting pattern of the Greek period. The Phalanx that was a representative combat formation in that period was designed for a head-on collision by a square formation.
Its basic tactics was to collapse the enemy formations in the face even in unfavorable situation. What’s more interesting is that a long-range attack by archers was disregarded from main forces although it could intensify the confusion to the enemy.
Meanwhile, using a sudden strike was limited within rear area of enemy troops, but it was taboo to threaten the enemy state’s citizens directly. Even though it should achieve goals of war by all means, why did those kinds of asymmetric warfare be evaded in the Western world?
The Chivalry was at the center of military culture in medieval period. It valued honor above everything else, so norms among knights of that era emphasized on a fair play led by head-to-head fights, and, moreover, it was ethically an unpardonable behavior to attack the opposite surreptitiously such as assassination in the military culture.118
116 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Day of Infamy,” United States Senate. Washington: SEN 77A-H1. December 8, 1941, Rpt. National Archives: 1-2.
In addition, war among the absolute monarchies in the medieval time was rather confrontations between noble
117 The Infantry Journal Incorporated, Infantry In Battle (Richmond: Garrett & Massie, 1939), 294-306.
118 Ward Thomas, “Norms and Security: The Case of International Assassination,” International Security 25 (2000): 111-115.
‧
families or aristocrats than between countries, so ‘honor’, ‘formality’, and ‘dignity’ were thoroughly emphasized in the war, by doing so the Western styled war had no choice but to be ineffective and to be consumptive.
Another Western tendency of war-fighting patterns is the popularity in military circles of Carl von Clausewitz. His perspective was differentiated from Sun Tzu’s thought of win all without fighting and avoiding strength and attacking weakness, because Clausewitz strongly emphasized total mobilization of a country for total war. He also believed in the need to seek a decisive battle in which one would annihilate the enemy.119
Table 4.1 Comparison of War Thoughts between Ancient China and Western World
Ancient China Western world
Based on Asymmetric warfare by indirect attack on a weak point
Maximization of psychological effects
Inducement of enemy by deception and stratagem Simultaneous war-fighting pattern
Emphasis on decisive timing in accordance with relative superior forces
Harmonious war between military and non-military realms
Face-to-face confrontation
Emphasis on physical destruction Decisive war based on a total war Linear war-fighting pattern
Emphasis on massive and material offensive in accordance with absolute superior forces
Separated war between military and non-military realms
Source: Compiled by author
119 Clausewitz also insists the decisive war, suggesting that destruction of forces can usually be accomplished only by fighting and only major engagements involving all forces lead to major success. So, the greatest successes are obtained where all engagements coalesce into one great battle. Mark McNeilly, Sun Tzu and the Art of Modern Warfare (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 38.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
81
Until now, that Western thought of war has kept the traditional tendency establishing patterns of modern war based on regular war, and this high context has pursued a physical warfare based on military technologies, so the ASB doctrine could be developed by these reasons. Therefore, war-fighting style of the Western world is firstly to emphasis on decisive war through a head-on attack. Secondly, it is intensifying physical destruction by massive suppression in accordance with enemy’s capabilities and its fundamental principles are based on muscular and material military forces. Next, if its core concept is to take the bull by the horns with a full-scaled war like a total war, asymmetric warfare by deception and ambiguity is less important than regular war. Lastly, it stresses on war led by linear orders and the war can be only conducted within the military realm.
However, Sun Tzu’s principles are still working in modern war because it has been steadily developed by the people’s war although the Western thought has spread all over the world.
While Mao Zedong had had diverse combat experiences over fifty years, he was intense in a combined warfare mixed with regular force and paramilitary force by grasping the Sun Tzu’s thought onto modern war. His ‘people’s war (renminzhanzheng)’ ‘takes advantage of ‘China’s inherent strength (a large population and vast land mass) while employing traditional Chinese fighting skills of speed, surprise, deception, and stratagem.’120
120 Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century (New York:
Routledge, 2012), 119.
Initial concept of the people’s war is to exploit a stratagem which drags the strong enemy forces into Chinese main-land in depth in order to weaken the enemy’s line of communications, thereby isolating the enemy troops from their main body. More importantly, as the Chinese Red Army induced the enemy troops into terrain in depth, the enemy had to suffer insufficient situation awareness more and more due to strange grounds. In that situation, small elements of the red army harassed the
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
82
enemy, not only inducing them into more unfavorable terrains but also attacking them from all sides. Drawing to waste of the enemy’s combat capabilities with a protracted war, Mao’s strategy was to maximize psychological effect exhausting the enemy’s ‘will to fight’ in the end. So-called ‘guerilla warfare (Yu Chi Chan)’ was a central concept of the red army and it was based on ideas of the Chinese asymmetric warfare.
‘Guerilla warfare means comprises combat operations conducted in enemy held territory by predominantly indigenous forces on a military or paramilitary basis to reduce the combat effectiveness, industrial capacity, and morale of the enemy. Guerilla operations are conducted by relatively small groups employing offensive tactics and it also supports other (regular) military operations.’121 Samuel Huntington also defined it as ‘a form of warfare by which the strategically weaker side assumes the tactical offensive in selected forms, times, and places.
Guerilla warfare is the weapon of the weak.’122
Reflecting strategy and tactics of the guerilla warfare, Mao Zedong also developed doctrinal principles on the people’s war. The ultimate concept of people’s war is to lose justification of the opposite regime by instigating naïve farmers who are isolated from society in order to protect the red army in the rural areas. At the same time, the concept had an intention to expand their military operations from the rural areas. To realize it, the people’s
Therefore, the guerilla warfare is an organized revel activity to oppose an existing political regime or a public resistance to counter-act foreign invaders, so it can be executed by a weak side in terms of arms, organizations, and trainings and the weak actor can take an irregular pattern of violence at any time and in any place which are unilaterally selected by the weak side.
121 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 31-21 Department of the Army Field Manual: Guerilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1961), 8.
122 Samuel P. Huntington, introduction to Modern Guerilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerilla Movement, 1941-1961, ed. by Franklin M. Osanka (New York: The Free Press, 1962), xvi.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
83
war progressed by three phases. As a phase to establish political justifications, ‘strategic defensive’ phase mainly used propagandas to resist local governments, violence for political chaos, terrorism, and assassination for example. When the situation turns into favorable direction, it psychologically pressed the government and people by shaping a shadow government. ‘Strategic stalemate’ is a phase to occupy territories by expanding operation scales. In this phase, it was important to capture the enemy’s assets, forming the communist government in the isolated area with inducing attrition against existing government forces.
Thus, the red army and the people had to maximize psychological pressure with meticulous propagandas. Lastly, ‘strategic counter-offensive’ phase focused on enforcement of their operation capabilities for achieving political goals until the last full-scale offensive, so psychological attacks to get rid of the enemy’s will were stressed on in the phase.123
Strategic key points of Mao’s doctrine are, firstly, that the weak enforces its supporters by mass mobilization and then mixing political activities with military operations properly to weaken enemy without exposure. So, primary objective of the red army is to enhance military abilities with securing the rural supporters while doing a land reform. The second point is that the people’s war has no battle field divided by front and rear area because it doesn’t need its main bases in order to form an attrition and protracted war. Next, although it has a characteristic of attrition warfare in strategic level, but it has a tendency of intensive surprise attack in tactical level, and it should allow ‘counter-attack’ and ‘pursuit’ by smashing the enemy’s attacks surprisingly and by withdrawing swiftly. At fourth, Guerilla warfare cannot gain an ultimate victory by using it only, but it can do that by combing with regular forces.
For example, when the guerilla combatants cooperate with regular forces, they have to deter
For example, when the guerilla combatants cooperate with regular forces, they have to deter