Chapter 3 The Air-Sea Battle Concept as a Conventional Doctrine
4. Debate and Response
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enemy military forces through predominance of military technology. Thirdly, the ASB doctrine cannot accept other irregular threats or unconventional conflicts due to conservatism and organizational egoism in the military organizations even though receiving a lot of criticism about it. Lastly, the ASB doctrine cannot help narrowing down its range of application into the Asian theater whereas excluding strategic situations of other theater including the continental U.S. because the conservative perspective on a war sticks to the linear order on battle.
4. Debate and Response
Debates on the new ASB doctrine led by Air Force and Navy are arising from a variety of places. Army and Marine Corps relatively alienated from the doctrinal concept claim that it should be employed the relatively inexpensive ground forces in the beginning of campaigns, pointing out that ‘an Air-Sea Battle-focused Navy and Air Force would be preposterously expensive to build in peace time and would result in incalculable human and economic destruction.’96 Also, U.S. Army strongly stresses on balanced jointness among Services, mentioning that they are developing long-range detecting & firing systems corresponded with the ASB concept as well as improved air-defense systems. To satisfy it, the army suggests specific ideas which improved capability of the Field Artillery can support a long-distance firepower for naval operations while the Army Air-Defense Artillery can guarantee freedom of air space for Air Force.97
96 Thomas P. M. Barnett, “AirSea Battle: The Military-Industrial Complex’s Self-Serving Fantasy,” Time, August 8, 2012, accessed May 11, 2015,
More critically, the U.S. Marine Corps argues that the ASB concept should be led by ground forces whereas Navy and Air Force should only maintain
http://nation.time.com/2012/08/08/airsea-battle-the-military-industrial-complexs-self-serving-fantasy/.
97 Philip Neri, Army Fires Integration into Air-Sea Battle (Washington DC: U.S. Army, 2014), 4-7.
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supporting forces because ‘catastrophic loss’ of land warriors is nonsense, saying that “for the past 75 years, 96 percents of all the fighting and dying has been done by the ground forces.”98
Navy also insists that the ASB doctrine would work as a concept to protect projection of power because it could arouse formidable preemptive attacks including nuclear bomb by China due to its offensive propensity, concerning that ‘failing deterrence, the ASB concept assumes that a conflict with China would involve a protracted campaign.’
But, those ground forces just express discontents about loss of operational initiative, not suggesting fundamental alternatives.
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Also, there are skeptical opinions about offensive concept of the ASB. The retired Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. James “Hoss” Cartwright criticized that ‘the Air Force and Navy’s high-profile Air-Sea Battle concept is demonizing China,’ complaining that military conflict caused by ambiguous intentions and goals get United States nowhere.
As mentioned before, that argument corresponds with the MDBS concept tends to limit range of operations on maritime blockade.
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98 Jim Lacey, “Air-Sea Battle: Our defense intellectuals, seeking a new Big Idea, need to seek farther,”
National Review, December 14, 2011, accessed May 12, 2015,
Joshua Rovner mentioned that the opposite feels uneasy and then they will hesitate whether to use nuclear weapons in order to solve security dilemma because a state’s offensive action is used to get rid of a threat is the opposite rather than to change the opposite’s behavior, while he says that debates on the ASB have no discussion about other war patterns such as
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/285685/air-sea-battle-jim-lacey.
99“What’s New about the AirSea Battle Concept?” accessed May 12, 2015,
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2010-08/whats-new-about-airsea-battle-concept.
100 Sidney J. Freedberg Jr., “Navy Lags, Coast Guard Leads, In Building Ties with China,” Breaking Defense, December 3, 2014, accessed May 13, 2015,
http://breakingdefense.com/tag/gen-james-cartwright/.
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While being sensitive about the ASB doctrine, some U.S. allies in the East Asia/western Pacific region voice a variety of opinions. Japan circuitously expressed agreement with the ASB doctrine, making an issue of territorial dispute between Japan and China. According to the Japan’s 2012 National Defense Program Guidelines, a top priority objective is to defense the Nansei Islands including Senkaku Islands where is struggling with China. To protect the islands Japan planned a new concept, ‘Dynamic Defense Force’ concept aiming at making the JSDF lighter, more technological advanced, and with power projection capabilities.
Eventually, those concerns warn indiscriminate responses of China in order to suppress the ASB, while escalating security dilemma.
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101 Joshua Rovner, “‘AirSea Battle and Escalation Risks’: Changing Military Dynamics in East Asia”
(paper presented at the policy brief 12 for the Study of Innovation and Technology in China, California, January, 2012).
It implies Japan might indirectly take a part into the military campaigns of the ASB by supporting operations with acceptance of U.S. forward forces into their territory and it also means to scale up collective self defense right of the Japan Self-Defense Forces abroad. After WW II, Japan has adhered to the exclusively defensive security policy and for it they have the world’s best military readiness posture. Thus, Japan can offer a strong defensive capability to the U.S. from China’s preemptive attacks. Moreover, it is expected that Japan might take an offensive missions or support missions for it against Chinese armed forces when occurring an actual territorial conflict between China and the country, jumping on the doctrinal bandwagon.
In terms of balance of power theory, the ASB doctrine will give Japan a strategic opportunity because Japan also wants to maintain status quo in the region while deterring the Chinese expansionism. However, Japan has taken a cautious attitude in actual ability for suppressing the A2/AD, and the stance could be interpreted as an indirect criticism about the compulsory
102 Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2012), 130-132.
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doctrine leaning too much on regular war whereas China’s real threats still remain unclear.
To prevent the grotesque threats of North Korea, the Republic of Korea has maintained strong combined military forces with the US Forces in Korea (USFK), but Korean government has kept a neutral attitude about the ASB doctrine not to stir up China.
Nevertheless, the doctrine would effect on the Operation Plans and other national defense policies of the ROK103 when assumed that military doctrine of ROK should be adapted with the U.S. doctrine unless the allied force system are broken down. Therefore, that situation would make the ROK apply the ASB into counter-asymmetric warfare, focusing on the North Korea’s asymmetric threats. In the respect, the ROK-US-Japan Military Intelligence Sharing Agreement in December 2014 could be interpreted to partly make an encouraging relation on development of the ASB doctrine.104
Australia also expressed a tacit approval in the ASB doctrine. For U.S. the Australia has a strategic value for rear military bases in the ASB campaigns because the rear bases are located outside of the Chinese islands chains. Australia is probable to accommodate U.S.
military assets with other supporting operations including air defense missions for U.S.
stationing bases deployed in its territory without causing direct conflicts with China,
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Although those responses of the allies showed a careful stance in the offensive intention and through it they will participate in the campaigns.
103 Sang-ho Song, “U.S. Military Applies New Warfighting Concept in Korea,” The Korea Herald, May 13, 2015, accessed May 10, 2015,
http://khnews.kheraldm.com/view.php?ud=20140619001157&md=20140622004021_BL&kr=1.
104 Eun Mi Song, “Hanmijoolil sai nonchiboki weikyo…Banjoongdongmyang duteun pihara (An astute diplomatic relations between Korea, US, and Japan… Avoid the trap of counter-China alliance),” Hankook Ilbo (The Korean Times), April 29, 2015, accessed May 13, 2015,
http://www.hankookilbo.com/v/8ccd5fcdc8db4fdf97c0805dfe00794a.
105 Benjamin Schreer, Planning the Unthinkable War: ‘AirSea Battle’ and Its Implications for Australia (Barton: ASPI, 2013), 31-34.
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that is plainly aiming at China, it also seems that the states regard the doctrine as an unstable factor of regional security. Furthermore, it’s true that those states are not provided definite
‘trust’ and ‘reassurance’ from the ASB in to what extent it can work its effectiveness at actual war. In order to maintain a firm alliance system with clear reassurance, as a result, U.S. must fully prepare to develop a complete military doctrine, while exactly understanding the potential enemy’s threats, because it is a necessary requisite for achieving goals of the American grand strategy.
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