Broadening: the Image Schema

Chapter 3 discussed the function of the image schema as a primitive byproduct from the ICM which is applied to analyze the imagistic mappings in our present data. In other words, in contrast to the prototype effect, which connects more precise entities with the target one to capture speakers’ concepts in their idealized modal meanings, the image schema is a broadening of contents which are related to or recollected on the basis of the speakers’

experiences. Mandler (1992: 592) suggested that image schemas consist of dynamic spatial relation and movements in real concrete images and are more abstract than images.

According to Dodge and Lakoff (2005), concepts of motion and spatial relations are the initial shared factors in cross-linguistics analysis which construct the identification of image schemas. Further, these factors reflect everyday experiences through the “informal analysis”

of the phenomenological contours (Johnson, 1987).

A consensus has not yet been reached on a generally accepted image schema list, and numerous subsequent additions to the list have been relatively weak in keeping with the list’s original spirit. Even though image schema lists vary from scholar to scholar, we find that the static characteristics that are shared within imagistic similes allow us to determine some typical kinds of image schemas. These include the CONTAINMENT/CONTAINER schema (Lakoff, 1987: 267; Lakoff and Turner 1989: 97-98) the SURFACE schema (Johnson, 1987: 126), the orientational schemas, the UP-DOWN schema, and the FRONT-BACK schema (Lakoff, 1987;

Clausner and Croft 1999: 15). On the other hand, other kinds of image schemas, namely, the

dynamic kinds, such as the PROCESS schema (Johnson, 1987: 126), the INANIMATE MOTION

schema, and the ANIMATE MOTION schema (Mandler 1992: 593-596), are also included but they usually seem abstract, or appear to “jump out” from the original scale. In particular, they are able to evolve imagined scenarios.

As we taste coffee, we tip the drink into our mouths and sense the gustatory feeling on the tongue. Because taste buds are located “on” the tongue, we have to pour the drink with complex flavors onto the tongue to perceive consequent feelings. As a result, the relation between the tongue and the flavors forms the SURFACE schema, that is, our tongue is the

SURFACE for flavors as CONCRETEENTITIES are placed onto it. For instance, a pungent flavor stinging one’s tongue is analogized to a Brazilian lady dancing on the perceptual surface (see example (6.8)). The spatial relations between our tongue, mouth, and flavor are viewed as the componential elements of the imagistic similes used in flavor expressions.

(6.8)

…然後有一個辛辣的味道，彷彿你的嘴巴…在被一個森巴女郎在那邊 跳舞，在那邊刺你的舌頭。

…. Afterwards, it has a pungent flavor, as if your mouth…as if a Brazilian lady is dancing on it, and stinging your tongue.

Dynamic image schemas such as the PROCESS schema, ANIMATE MOTION schema, and

INANIMATE MOTION schema are also applied in the similes found in the cupping notes. In the

PROCESS schema, the perceiving process (i.e., flavor tasting) is schematically structured by a more straightforwardly physical process (i.e., dancing). However, the motion schemas in the target and source domains are transferred from the schema of INANIMATE MOTION to that of

ANIMATE MOTION. As we see in example (6.8), the chemical stimulation of coffee on the

this regard, by “animating” the motion from inanimate objects such as a chemical stimulus or natural force, speakers can relate the perceptual event to a more vivid point of view. Further, if we take off its simile appearance, the strategy of placing an inanimate entity from the target domain into an animate one, in metaphor, is called personification.

In other imagistic similes utilizing gustatory imagery, the CONTAINMENT relation between the perceiver and the flavors in the target domain can be inferred in the source domain. This inference of a containment relation can be seen in examples (6.9) to (6.11). For instance, in example (6.9), the taster places the coffee into his/her mouth in the beginning, thus creating a CONTAINMENT relationship between the perceiver’s mouth as the CONTAINER

and the flavors as the CONTENTS in the container. Moreover, in the source domain, the perceiver is walking into another environment evolved from the flavor. This example echoes

the original spirit of our bodily experience, which is that “we experience our bodies both as containers and as things in containers (e.g., rooms) constantly” (Lakoff, 1987: 272, cf.

Johnson, 1987).

The CONTAINMENT schema is thus commonly utilized to schematize this certain spatial relationship. Besides CONTAINER and CONTENT, another structural element of the

CONTAINMENT schema is present, that is, BOUNDARY, which is noted in examples (6.10) and (6.11). In the target domain, the boundary of the container is the boundary between the taster’s mouth/nose and the exterior area (i.e., things which are “beyond the taster’s body”).

Consequently, the taster’s body is contained within his imagery of a garden or a forest evoked by the flavor contained in his body. In the source domain, or the imagined scenario aroused by the flavor percept, the garden or the forest becomes the bounded container.

(6.9)

的味道…

And then the flavor of the third cup is like walking into Mother Nature, and smelling the freshness of nature.

(6.10)

喝下去的時候，我們聞到了煎茶的味道，然後有組員形容是走進了一座 花木扶疏的花園的感覺。

When drinking the coffee, we smelt a flavor of sencha tea, and then some members have described the flavor as walking into a flourishing garden.

(6.11)

加奶之後，整體喝起來酸，但是是順的然後還蠻輕盈的，有人覺得有點 像在森林裡面慢跑。

After adding milk, the overall taste is sour, but it is smooth and then it is light as well. Someone has felt that it is like jogging in the forest.

However, if we view these examples based on the logic of the CONTAINMENT schema, then

“everything is either inside a container or out of it” (Lakoff, 1987: 272). Therefore, if the first container (the mouth) is in the second container (the garden, forest, nature), and the flavors are in the first container (the mouth), then the flavors are in the second container (i.e., the imagined scenario). Indeed, this conclusion is illogical because the actual world and the imagined scenario differ in their spatial dimensions. In other words, to say that flavors “give rise to” or “evolve into” a certain scenario implies that there must be a sequential order between the actual tasting and the imagined experience. Certainly, the line between target and source domains in imagistic similes is stricter and clearer than that in metaphors. We thus propose that the actual flavor perception and the associative scenario follow a sequential

order rather than happen simultaneously.

Moreover, inanimate-animate actions can be illustrated by means of the PROCESS

schema, in which the perceiving process (i.e., flavor tasting) is schematically structured by a more straightforwardly physical process (i.e., jogging or walking). Instead, since we consider more the perceptual crossmodality within these evoked motional scenarios, we discuss, in a later section, the potential of MOTION schemas to facilitate crossmodal interactions.