Imagistic Simile: Prototype Effect and Image Schema

In terms of simile, we aim to understand the cognitive mechanism behind the similes selected from our data of flavor expressions, as well as the crossmodal expressions utilizing gustatory imagery. Thus, we propose the use of imagistic simile, which is parallel to the use of image metaphor (Lakoff, 1987b) and imagistic metaphor (Kövecses, 2011). The reason to use imagistic similes lies in their employment of similes rather than metaphors. Similes concern the categorization of more abstract concepts; image metaphors concern structured metaphorical expressions, and thus the use of image metaphors would not be useful in our examination. For the most part, image metaphors map conventional images on the basis of conceptual metaphors, whereas imagistic similes focus on applying mental images on account of primitive cognitive theories. These theories involve the prototype effect (Lakoff, 1987a; Langacker, 1987) and the image schema (Clausner & Croft, 1999; Lakoff, 1987c).

On the other hand, Kövecses (2011) suggested that the “image” in imagistic metaphor should be regarded as the rich details that “are specific and fully-felt experiences in context”

which we perceive through different senses. Although we consider the images in imagistic similes to be abstract and less of a schematic portrait based on experiences, Kövecses considered the conceptual metaphor as the base of the imagistic metaphor, with the image schema supporting its extension, as shown in his example below.

The 2005 hurricane capsized Domino’s life, though he’s loath to confess any inconvenience or misery outside of missing his social circle...

According to Kövecses, the imagistic metaphorical statement of “the 2005 hurricane capsized Domino’s life” is derived from the general metaphor of LIFE IS A JOURNEY and

imagistic expression, the word capsize is unconventional and non-recurring in the context of

LIFE IS A (SEA) JOURNEY.Thus, it is seen as an extension chosen by the speaker for “visual consequence” and becomes an imagistic metaphor (Kövecses, 2011).

Notwithstanding, in our data, the expressions of similes do not tend to be supported by conceptual metaphors; rather, they are more “imagistic,” activating a conceptualized or analogical mechanism that supports the scenario. Consider the following simile examples from our present data:

(3.3)

…當然它的風味就會有比較多的煙味。可能是瑕疵豆比較多的關係，它 會有是煙灰缸的味道…

… of course its flavor has a much more smoky smell. It may be because it has more defective beans inside. It has the odor of an ashtray.

(3.4)

…然後有一個辛辣的味道，彷彿你的嘴巴…在被一個森巴女郎在那邊跳 舞，在那邊刺你的舌頭。

…. Afterwards, it has a pungent flavor, as if your mouth…as if a Brazilian lady is dancing on it, and stinging your tongue.

We find that the hidden conceptual mechanisms behind these similes in fact echo the second and third dimensions of imagery proposed by Langacker (1990), that is, the “level of specificity” and the “scale” and “scope of prediction.” While the former involves the specification of a certain flavor or quality of gustatory perception, the latter focuses on how an expression can extend from its original region or schema.

On one hand, in terms of the second dimension of imagery (“the level of specificity”),

Langacker (1990) suggested that in the two sentences below, the former sentence can be schematic for the latter one elaborating on the specifications and limiting them to a narrower range. Discussing lexical items in particular, the relationship of schematicity regarding specificity, for example, animal à reptile à snake à rattlesnake à sidewinder (see Langacker, 1991:7), helps us to classify objects in shared categories.

(a) That player is tall.

(b) That defensive player is over 6’ tall. (Langacker, 1991: 7)

Similarly, we find that the concept-to-object analogy (e.g., the smoke flavor of the coffee is like the smoke from an ashtray) is often used to specify a flavor. In turn, when applying a level of specificity to example (4), we consider the prototype effect (Lakoff, 1987a;

Langacker, 1987) for the conceptual labeling of the nominal expression of a similar flavor.

On the other hand, we argue that recurring schematic and analogical knowledge, that is, awareness of the so-called image schema (Kövecses, 2011: 60), is required to understand the perceptual embodiment of flavor experiences. First presented in Lakoff and Johnson (1987: 267), image schemas are constantly recurring patterns of particular bodily experiences, such as CONTAINERS, PATHS, LINKS, FORCES, BALANCE, and in orientations and other relations like UP-DOWN, FRONT-BACK, PART-WHOLE,and CENTER-PERIPHERY.Image schema is, overall, a schematic structure that is constantly operating in our “perception, bodily movement through space, and physical manipulation of objects” (Johnson, 1987: 23). Hence, Hampe (2005) emphasized that “embodied schema” and “image schema” are other terms that can be used interchangeably with “image schema.”

We take the image schema (Lakoff, 1987c) into consideration, as similes are able to construe an associated scenario (e.g., for the dancing scenario, see example (3.4)) from the

experience: “we experience our bodies both as containers and as things in containers constantly.” For instance, in example (3.4), in the CONTAINER schema involving the

CONTAINER and the CONTENT, the gustatory feeling in the mouth is likened to a lady “dancing”

within the container of the mouth. In addition, the PROCESS schema proposed by Grady (2005) is also essential for forming schematic scenarios from the flavor tasting. The PROCESS

schema presumably formulates our understanding of both physical processes (e.g., chewing, walking, washing, etc.) and more “abstract” ones (e.g., thinking, evolving, etc.) (Grady, 2005). Grady (2005) noted that this schema is not restricted to particular perceptual experiences. However, we argue that in the similes utilizing crossmodality in our data, the physical and perceptual processing of coffee tasting and other multi-perceptional physical processing evoked by it share the PROCESS schema, from monomodal perception (i.e., tasting) to multimodal imagination (i.e., sensation from the imagined scenario, such as seeing, listening to, and feeling a Brazilian lady dancing).

Furthermore, similar characteristics are shared between imagistic simile and image/imagistic metaphor. Based on the definition of image metaphor given by Lakoff (1987b), first of all, both image metaphor and imagistic simile include one-shot mappings, that is, they are not conventionalized but highly creative and “are susceptible to triggering different interpretations” (Rodríguez, 2001). Second, they are not commonly used in everyday reasoning. Third, there are also no systematic or idiomatic expressions based on both image metaphor and imagistic simile. Fourth, they are not applied to understand the abstract in terms of the concrete. Finally, there is no basic rule in experiential knowledge that stipulates what should be mapped onto what.

Moreover, imagistic simile also stays in accordance with imagistic metaphor

(Kövecses, 2011). First, both are context-induced or could be construed as the “priming effect of the context.” Next, they require an immediate physical setting to evoke experientially-based image schemas for elaboration. Last but not least, the speakers using both expressions should be aware of the major entities in the discourse, that is, their resultant interpretation could be traced back to its referential rather than fleeting imaginations. In Chapter 6, we will use the analytic mechanism of imagistic similes to discuss the crossmodality of the similes found in the present data.