The China factor (1993-2003)

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since independence. As Meseţnikov (2001) points out, “the entry of the Slovak Republic to the OECD in December 2000, and its invitation (extended in December 1999) to begin negotiations on full EU membership, were tangible fruit of these endeavors.” Eventually, Slovakia was invited to participate in the first wave of accession in 2004 and gained acceptance of the international community.

In relevance to the Slovak-Taiwanese relations, it appears obvious that Mečiar‟s dubious attitude towards the EU membership failed to create economic and political conditions that would have facilitated negotiations between Taiwan and Slovakia. These were set only after the change of government in 1998, which brought as well the first substantial interactions between Taiwan and Slovakia. It is thus possible to assume, that the endeavors to obtain the EU membership activated the necessary conditions favoring as well the Slovak-Taiwanese relations.

3.3.4 The China factor (1993-2003)

China‟s presence on the international sphere is of significant importance to Taiwan‟s diplomatic relations. Whether a target country is willing to engage in any kind of negotiations with Taiwan usually depends to a major extent on the target state‟s relations with China. The diplomatic pressure that China often exerts on its allies leads them to reconsider their position and the value of a potential relationship with Taiwan. The analytical framework therefore assumes that it is often difficult for Taiwan to create an asymmetrical dependent relationship, as the cost of its own interest depends to a major extent on the target state (Tubilewicz, 2007). In order to evaluate the degree of China‟s influence on the Slovak-Taiwanese relations prior the opening of the representative offices, it is important to have a look first at the relations between Slovakia and China.

Slovakia as part of former Czechoslovakia first established relations with the Kuomintang regime on the mainland after the WW1. However, following the foundation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, an already communist Czechoslovakia was one of the first countries to acknowledge and establish official contact with this new Asian regime. Therefore, 1950s were marked by a relatively active cooperation between Czechoslovakia and China in fields as trade, technical

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sectors and culture. The friendly relations were, however influenced by the split between China and the USSR, and the atmosphere started improving only in the late 1980s with the changes within the USSR itself. Yet the 1989 developments that on one hand saw the Chinese Communist Party suppressing social protests in the country, and on the other hand a systemic transformation in Czechoslovakia cooled the bilateral relations once again. Similarly, the subsequent division of the country in 1993 was not welcomed by the Chinese government, which itself was trying to suppress the domestic separatist tendencies (Fürst, 1989). Nevertheless, the independent Slovakia succeeded in the basic bilateral and multilateral contractual agreements of Czechoslovakia (Duleba, Lukáč, Wlachovský, 1998) and thus maintained diplomatic relations with the PRC.

In the 1990s, China was not the primary focus of the Slovak foreign policy and vice versa. This was mostly given as a result of Slovakia‟s low economic performance and its low international impact (Gregušová, 2005). Therefore, there was no significant cooperation between Slovakia and China during this period. However, the Slovak government opted for a non-confrontational dialogue with China disregarding the sensitive issues such as human rights or the „one China‟ policy in order to maintain good relations with the growing economy. The importance of this partnership is proved by relatively high number of political visits occurring in this period (Gregušová, 2003).

Nonetheless, the economic partnership was not the only factor a young country such as Slovakia took into consideration in its foreign policy. China‟s rising political status and its UN membership to which Slovakia aspired were equally important elements that showed as too high to be balanced by economic gains from the ROC. Taiwan allegedly offered Slovakia 500 million USD in exchange of political or economic communication and it seems that the President Michal Kováč, the political opponent of Mečiar, appealed to the government to initiate economic or political dialogue with Taiwan (Tubilewicz, 2007). However, given Mečiar‟s predominance in the politics of Slovakia in the 1990s, it is not surprising that Taiwan eventually did not find support from the Slovak government.

On the contrary, Slovakia‟s efforts to please China intensified and the Parliamentary Friendship Group with the PRC was established in 1995. An official Slovak delegation to China that same year assured the Chinese government of its clear

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stand towards the „one China‟ policy and emphasized the importance of the partnership for Slovakia (Gregušová, 2005). Finally, President Kováč in 1996 assured the Chinese delegation that even though Bratislava did not exclude economic cooperation, the government did not plan to establish official relations with Taiwan (Tubilewicz, 2007).

According to the information available, it thus seems that despite the lack of substantial cooperation between China and Slovakia, it was the latter to willingly prioritize these relations. This reality would again only prove the assumptions that pragmatic leaders, such as Mečiar, would turn a blind eye on Taiwan and instead prefer to assure smooth relations with China and thus an easy access to its growing market (Tubilewicz, 2007). On the other hand, liberally oriented leaders are more likely to show support to Taiwan as it was seen on the case of the Czech Republic and Poland. Once Slovakia‟s political scene saw the departure of Mečiar, the economic cooperation with Taiwan gradually intensified. The new political atmosphere eventually brought several Slovak diplomats to show support to Taiwan.

3.4 Summary

The framework of this thesis was meant to determine whether there was an asymmetrical dependent relationship between Slovakia and Taiwan prior the opening of the diplomatic missions. The next step was to identify the factors that in the 1990s obstructed Taiwan‟s economic diplomacy‟s goal to establish substantial relations with Slovakia. The country, unlike the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary that opened their diplomatic missions with Taiwan in the early 1990s, followed their example only in 2003 becoming thus the nineteenth European country to do so (Tubilewicz, 2007).

From the above analysis it is obvious that the economic cooperation between Taiwan and Slovakia in the 1990s was almost non-existent. The lack of economic negotiations thus could not lead to an agreement on mutual conveniences that often result in the establishment of representative offices. According to the available data, it also seems that Taiwan did not provide Slovakia with generous economic incentives in form of humanitarian and economic aid needed at the time of the economic distress caused by the legacy of centrally planned economy and subsequently by the government‟s manipulation of the privatization program. These two factors only

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prove the expected absence of an asymmetrical interdependent relationship between Taiwan and Slovakia prior 2003.

The analysis thus lead us back to the research questions of this thesis: How did Slovakia respond to the Taiwanese economic inducements in Central Europe in the 1990s? What were the specific reasons that led Slovakia to be the last Central-European country to establish the representative office with Taiwan?

That is to say, it was necessary to understand where could have Taiwan‟s economic diplomacy‟s efforts failed to build asymmetrical interdependence with Slovakia. The China factor proposed in the analytical framework should give light to the influence of the PRC on the matter of the Slovak-Taiwanese question. Were the relations with China too precious to be sacrificed for a friendly dialogue with Taiwan and thus predetermined the attitude of Slovakia towards Taiwan? Indeed, given the negligible economic relations with Taiwan, the cost of Slovakia‟s political and economic partnership with Taiwan might have appeared as too high compared to the value offered by smooth relations with China. However, as we could see, despite the official diplomatic relations between the independent Slovakia and China, the relations were not as fruitful to be regarded one of the Slovak foreign policy priorities.

Moreover, the other countries in the region that similarly engaged in official relations with the PRC could at the same time enjoy the few advantages of the economic relations with Taiwan. China did exert diplomatic pressure on them (Tubilewicz, 2007), yet this did not prevent the Hungarian, Polish and the former Czechoslovak government to agree on the conditions for the opening of the unofficial representations. Why it did not work in case of Slovakia?

As we could see, the framework assumes that “states with governing parties leaning to the left would be more likely to treasure friendship with communist China than states where the ruling elites are oriented towards the right of center in the ideological spectrum” (Tubilewicz, 2007). Slovakia‟s government during most of the 1990s definitely did give importance to relations with China and from the ideological perspective obviously did not prioritize human rights and democratic values as important principles of its administration. Therefore, the government‟s attitude seems to be supporting the idea and explaining the lack of bilateral communication until 1998, when a new government took the lead of the country and signaled a new era not

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only for Slovakia‟s relations with the West, but also for the Slovak-Taiwanese relations.

The sudden warming in the Slovak-Taiwanese relations obvious from 1998, when the first bilateral trade agreement was signed and resulted in the first wave of mutual trade negotiations suggest an important change in the development of the bilateral relationship. This change is somehow concurrent to the major political transition in Slovakia – the 1998 elections that saw the Mečiar‟s government defeat by a democratically and pro-EU oriented coalition led by Dzurinda. The administration of these two leaders had very different impact on Slovakia‟s development within the Central European region and on its route towards the EU and NATO membership. The acceptance to these international institutions, especially the EU, propelled Slovakia to conform to the Western international standards and catch up with its Central European neighbors. The opening of the representative offices with Taiwan was one of the aspects Slovakia needed to catch up with. So how did these important changes affect Slovakia‟s decision making towards Taiwan and what exactly were the conditions that previously lacked to provide a favorable environment for the opening of the mutual offices? From the above analysis results that the domestic politics and its impact on Slovakia‟s foreign policy seem to have played the major role in delaying the opening of a diplomatic mission between Taiwan and Slovakia. A further analysis is required in order to answer the thesis‟ research questions.

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