4. Convergence of Slovakia’s and Taiwan’s Interests
4.4 Development of Slovak-Taiwanese relations after the opening of the representative offices
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culture, which is acceptable to the PRC” (MZV a EZ SR, 2004). These statements were further reiterated in the official documents following the opening of the representative offices and more or less persist in all the of the government‟s rhetoric.12 That is to say, Slovakia remains cautious in its relations with China and limits its interactions with Taiwan purely to activities that cannot upset Beijing, such as economy, culture, education and research.
4.4 Development of Slovak-Taiwanese relations after the opening of the representative offices
After the opening of the offices in 2003, the Slovak-Taiwanese relations followed the standard pattern of development typical for relations between Taiwan and other European countries. Slovakia, in line with the EU's common foreign and security policy, maintains relations with Taiwan only through non-governmental bodies, recognizes Taiwan only as an economic and business entity (as it is a full WTO member), and as long as there are benefits for both sides, Slovakia also supports Taiwanese participation in international organizations (SECO Taipei, 2017). Given the unofficial character of the relations, contacts between Slovakia and Taiwan are limited mostly to investments or business missions meetings between government officials and Taiwanese investors operating in Slovakia. The most intensive cooperation between Slovakia and Taiwan is thus in the economic sphere. Taiwan is the second largest non-European investor in Slovakia after South Korea. Total Taiwanese investments in Slovakia reach nearly 445 million Euro13.
A significant influx of investment from Taiwan to Slovakia began in 2006 when Delta Electronics came to Slovakia. Other important investors to follow were Foxconn, AU Optronics, and ESON. However, this relationship had been unilateral for several years, as Slovak companies started to invest and operate in Taiwan only
12 Slovakia‟s consistence to the „one China‟ policy was further shown at the time of the opening of the trade office in Bratislava, that was as expected accompanied by discontent of the PRC to which the Slovak government complied. The Chinese made sure that the offices only represent the capital cities and that the office in Bratislava does not display the official attributes of Taiwan - the flag and the coat of arms.
13 This is almost 10 times more compared to the 49 million of Euro of Chinese investments in last 16 years.
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recently. The main areas of cooperation so far seem to be intelligent transport, cyber security, blockchain technologies and others (Podstavek, Interview 2019).
Taiwan is indeed Slovakia‟s valuable economic partner. As for Slovakia‟s role in this relationship, there is still room for improvement compared to the other countries in the region. In 2019, Slovakia is Taiwan‟s 59th biggest economic partner (while Poland is 39th, the Czech Republic 47th, Hungary 48th) and 19th largest economic partner in the European Union. The data show that the total bilateral trade has been experiencing a negative growth rate of almost 16%. This year the value of bilateral trade with Taiwan was USD 279.71 million (in 2018, USD 348.59 million), which means a drop of about 20% compared to the previous year. In 2018, Slovakia‟s exports to Taiwan were about USD 137.98 million while imports from Taiwan were about USD 210.61 million (Bureau of Trade, 2019). In bilateral trade with Taiwan, Slovakia exhibits a surplus of imports over exports, yet this phenomenon is typical for the trade relations of the whole EU with the countries of Southeast Asia. Chronic deficit results from the parameters of global division of labor and consumer preferences (SECO Taipei, 2017).
Slovak exports to the island consist of machinery, mechanical tools and electronic equipment, cars and vehicles, optical, photographic or cinematographic tools and plastic products. Taiwan‟s exports to Slovakia include machinery, mechanical and electronic equipment, optical and photographic apparatus and metal products. The most common Taiwanese brands importing to Slovakia are HTC, Acer, Acer, D-link, Giant, Merida (SECO Taipei, 2017).
A solid basis for cooperation and interaction between Taiwan and Slovakia in trade and economics, science and technology, as well as culture exists thanks to several significant bilateral agreements and memoranda of understanding. Especially productive were years 2011 and 2012, when the two countries signed various agreements and memoranda of cooperation. Among the most significant are the agreement for avoidance of double taxation; a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for cooperation on standards, metrology, and inspection; an agreement on cooperation in the field of e-government; an MOU between the Bureau of Consular Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the ROC and the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic; and an MOU on mutual recognition of
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driver's licenses. Slovakia and Taiwan also signed an MOU on youth working holidays.
Despite being only a small international actor, Slovakia‟s EU membership gives value to the support expressed for Taiwan in the international arena. Slovakia took action several times to support Taiwan‟s participation in international organizations. For instance, in 2014 Slovakia was the first country in the Eurozone to raise a resolution supporting visa-free travel for Taiwan nationals to the Schengen Area. In 2015, Slovakia also supported a proposal for a Taiwan-EU bilateral investment agreement (BIA) in a new EU trade strategy report proposed by European Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmstrom. Similarly, Slovakia actively engaged into promoting the negotiation and signing of an economic cooperation agreement (ECA) between Taiwan and the EU. In addition, the Slovak National Council's Committee on European Affairs in 2010 passed a resolution supporting Taiwan‟s participation in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. In 2013, Slovak-Taiwanese Parliamentary Friendship Group called on the International Civil Aviation Organization to accept Taiwan's observer status (Office of the President ROC (Taiwan), 2015).
With regard to the significance of the bilateral relations, there are several advantages for Taiwan. By establishing substantial relations with Slovakia, Taiwan gained limited support for its attempts to re-enter intergovernmental organizations, means for arranging visits by high-ranking officials and conducing regular dialogue through government-to-government channels. It also successfully expanded its European market attracted by its processed goods and gained a source of raw materials from Taiwanese industry (Tubilewicz, 2007).
As for Slovakia, the most important gains resulting from its relations with Taiwan concern the economic partnership. As mentioned previously, Taiwan is the second largest non-European investor in Slovakia and its investments reach almost ten time higher figure than the investments coming from the PRC. However, Slovakia believes that it cannot ignore the strategic partnership with China, especially in the context of the current Chinese project One Belt One Road (OBOR). Therefore the country remains excessively cautious in its approach and communication with Taiwan.
This caution, however, may unnecessarily reduce the potential that the Slovak-Taiwanese cooperation offers (Rejtová 2019). This is possible especially given the
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evidence that “non-confrontational foreign policy towards the PRC does not guarantee greater economic benefits than a supportive policy for Taiwan and Tibet issues”
(Furst, Pleschová, 2010). After all, this could be seen on the development of Taiwan‟s relations with Slovakia‟s neighbors in the 1990s, when as mentioned previously, active criticism of the PRC and friendly attitude towards Taiwan and Tibet did not reduce the countries‟ chances to enjoy close economic cooperation with China.
Slovakia has therefore space for improvement in order to make its relations with Taiwan equally convenient and fruitful for both sides.
List of bilateral agreements and memoranda (SECO, Taipei)
Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation and Research between the Slovak Academy of Sciences (Slovenská akadémia vied, SAV) and the National Science Council14 (國家科學委員會), signed in 1996.
Memorandum of Understanding on Customs Cooperation between Taiwan Customs Administration, Ministry of Finance (財政部關務署) and Customs Administration of the SR (Colné riaditeľstvo SR), signed in 1998.
Cooperation Agreement between Slovak Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Slovenská obchodná priemyselná komora, SOPK) and the Chinese National Association of Industry and Commerce (中華民國工 商協進會), signed in 1998.
Agreement on cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan (Republic of China), signed in 2004.
Air Services Cooperation Agreement, signed in 2007.15
14 The National Science Council (NSC) became the Ministry of Science and Technology (科技部) on 3 February 2014.
15 Despite the agreement, there have not been any direct air services between Taiwan and Slovakia. The reason to this, as stated by a Taiwanese diplomat during an interview, seems to be the lack of connecting flights from Bratislava to other countries. It is therefore the international airport in Vienna that is in very close proximity to Bratislava that serves as a hub for China Airlines in the region.
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Memorandum of Cooperation in the Electrotechnical Industry between the Union of Electrical Engineering of the Slovak Republic (Zväz elektrotechnického priemyslu SR, ZEP) and the Taiwan Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers's Association ( 台灣區電機電子工業同業公 會,TEEMA), signed in 2008.
Memorandum of Cooperation between the Slovak University of Technology in Bratislava (Slovenská technická univerzita, STU) and National Science and Technology University of Taipei (國立臺灣科技 大學), National Taipei University of Technology (國立臺北科技大學), and the Taiwan National SunYat-sen University ( 國 立中山大學 ), signed in 2009.
Memorandum of Cooperation between the Prešov University (Prešovská univerzita v Prešove) and Soochow University (東吳大學), signed in 2012.
Memorandum of Cooperation between the Comenius University in Bratislava (Univerzita Komenského v Bratislave) and the National Sun Yat-sen University (國立中山大學), signed in 2010.
Agreement between the Jessenius Medical Faculty in Martin (Jesseniova lekárska fakulta UK) and the Research Center for Biomedical Equipment (生醫器材研發暨產品試製中心) at Taipei Medical University (臺北醫學大學) signed in 2010 for five years.
Agreement on Scientific Cooperation between the Slovak Academy of Sciences (Slovenská akadémia vied, SAV) and National Science Council ( 國家科學委員會, NSC) on the program of exchange of scientific workers working on a joint project, signed in 2010.
Memorandum of Cooperation between the Taipei Medical University (臺北醫學大學) and the Jessenius Medical Faculty, signed in 2014 for five years.
Memorandum of Cooperation of National Associations of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, signed in 2011.
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Memorandum of Cooperation between the Slovak-Taiwan Friendship Group in Slovakia and the Hsinchu Science Park (新竹科學工業園區), signed in 2011.
Agreement on Cooperation between the Metrology and Standardization Offices, signed in 2012.
Agreement to prevent double taxation and tax evasion in the field of incomes between The Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of China (Taiwan) (中華民國 財政部), signed in 2011.
Agreement on Cooperation in the Area of eGovernment between the Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Government of the SR for the Information Society and the Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission, Taipei City Government (臺北市政府研究發展考核委 員會), signed in 2012.
Memorandum of Understanding between the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic and the Bureau of Consular Affairs (BOCA, 外交部領事事務局) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan), signed in 2012.
Agreement on the Mutual Recognition of Driving Licenses, signed in 2012.
Memorandum of Understanding between the Slovak Economic and Cultural Office in Taipei and the Taipei Representation Office, Bratislava on a Working Holiday Program, signed in 2014.
Agreement on Science and Research Cooperation between The Slovak Economic and Cultural Office Taipei and the Taipei Representative Office, Bratislava, signed in 2015.
Memorandum of Cooperation between the Technical University of Košice and Chung Hua University (中華大學) signed in November 2018.
Agreement on Cooperation between the Čiernohronská Historical Railways and the Forestry Bureau of Taiwan (林務局) focusing on
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cooperation in the field of historic railways and the promotion of tourism in Pohronie and Alishan, signed in December 2018.
Memorandum of Cooperation between the University of Ţilina
(UNIZA) and the Institute for Information Industry in Taiwan (財團法 人資訊工業策進會) in the area of cyber security, signed in March 2019.
Memorandum between the Slovak Economic and Cultural Office in Taipei and the Taipei Representative Office, Bratislava (駐斯洛伐克 台北代表處) on economic cooperation signed in April 2019.
Memorandum of Cooperation between Comenius University and Soochow University (東吳大學) signed in July 2019.
Letter of intent between the Slovak Economic and Cultural Office in Taipei and the Forestry Bureau of Taiwan (林務局), signed in May 2020.
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4.5 Summary
Taiwan had made efforts since 1990s to establish relationship with all Central European countries and yet its economic diplomacy with Slovakia did not appear to be effective until the early 2000s. The important shift in the Slovak-Taiwanese relations development was concurrent with the major changes within Slovakia‟s domestic politics. With the change of government in 1998, Slovakia started gradually conforming to the Western European standards as well as gaining on market confidence as a result of the prospects of the EU membership. In other words, the differences previously existing between Slovakia and its Central European neighbors gradually ceased to exist. It was under these circumstances that the accords on the opening of the representative offices with Taiwan were negotiated. The major changes in Slovakia‟s post 1998 development thus suggest a possible correlation with the shift in Slovakia‟s decision making towards Taiwan as well as with Taiwan‟s own interest towards a partnership with this Central European country.
The development after the opening of the representative offices shows that Slovakia‟s relations with Taiwan follow the standard pattern of relations typical between Taiwan and other European countries. That means that Slovakia adhering to the EU's common foreign and security policy maintains de facto relations with Taiwan and engages in bilateral cooperation mainly in economic and cultural areas.
Despite the relations being only of substantial character, they bring meaningful advantages to both sides, which can be seen on several important agreements.
Moreover, Taiwan being Slovakia‟s second largest non-European investor by far overcomes scarce Chinese investments. On the other hand, Slovakia proves to be a valuable partner within the EU, where it speaks up for Taiwan in its fight for international support.
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5. Conclusion
The analytical framework adopted for this thesis provided us with several factors that were supposed to evaluate whether in 1990s Taiwan was able to build an asymmetrical interdependent relationship with Slovakia and provide it thus with an incentive to follow its Central European neighbors and open the representative offices.
The analysis was further meant to answer the thesis‟ research questions: How did Slovakia respond to the Taiwanese economic inducements in Central Europe in the 1990s? What were the specific reasons that led Slovakia to be the last Central-European country to establish the representative office with Taiwan?
Firstly, when we look at the economic cooperation between Taiwan and Slovakia, it becomes evident that an asymmetrical interdependent relationship built on economic partnership between these two countries did not exist in the 1990s. Taiwan, seeking to expand its international support, relied primarily to economic incentives in form of aid, investment and trade when targeting Central European countries. These were responsive to Taiwan‟s offers due to their uneasy economic situation resulting from decades of centrally planned economy. Slovakia shared the same experience, yet neither the loans nor the grants employed by Taipei‟s economic diplomacy in the region seem to have succeeded in stimulating Slovakia‟s foreign policy conformity.
Given scant evidence, the reason behind this cannot be conclusively determined.
However, it is possible to base some assumptions on the region‟s experience with Taiwan‟s humanitarian aid. By the time Slovakia emerged as an independent country (1993), all the other Central European countries have already entered into economic partnership with Taiwan. By then, as Tubilewicz claims, it was clear that Taiwan‟s cash grants or humanitarian relief were small, while aid relied primarily on soft loans with an unknown grant element. The contrast between the actually provided economic assistance and the promised aid projects was particularly obvious in the cases of aid packages of Macedonia and Kosovo. This served to remind the post-communist countries about the limited economic benefits resulting from political support for Taiwan (Tubilewicz, 2007). Moreover, as the author further points out, Taiwan found it difficult to construct an asymmetrical interdependent relationship relying primarily on its aid as its interests in persuading the recipients to become its partners was
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greater than the recipient‟s interest in Taiwanese aid, which could have been substituted by China (Tubilewicz, 2007).
Given the absence of a dependent relationship between Taiwan and Slovakia based on the economic aid, it was necessary for this research to take into consideration other instruments employed by Taiwan‟s economic diplomacy in Central Europe, i.e. trade and investments. While these have convinced the other countries to interact with Taiwan and to open mutual representative offices, it is evident that Slovakia was not among them. While Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic could rely on rather favorable economic conditions, good legal framework and business infrastructure, Slovakia‟s case was rather different. The analysis of the economic situation of Slovakia in the 1990s showed that, unlike its neighbors that after 1989 managed to adopt successful economic reforms to heal the state economy and integrate it to the world market, the Slovak government of Prime Minister Mečiar led by personal interests implemented several measures that led the country to a continuing economy distress. This discouraged the international investors who were looking for a stable and safe business environment (Goldman, 1999). This thesis therefore assumes that the economic policies of Mečiar‟s government could have to a certain extent affected the economic interactions with Taiwan that in the 1990s were minimal if compared to the neighboring countries. As expected, in 1990s Taiwan‟s economic diplomacy was not successful to build an asymmetrical interdependent relationship with Slovakia and as a consequence the mutual representative offices were not open until 2003. The specific reasons leading to this were the focus of this thesis.
What usually to a major extent complicates Taiwan‟s international status and its diplomatic relations is the influence and interference of China. Beijing is particularly sensitive when the Taiwan‟s issue affects its official diplomatic relations.
That is why, as Tubilewicz (2007) argues, China did exert some diplomatic pressure on Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, yet this did not prevent their governments to agree on the conditions for the opening of the unofficial representations. These countries thus despite being engaged in official relations with China could at the same time enjoy the few advantages of the economic relations with Taiwan. As for Slovakia, given its economic backwardness and its minimal international influence, China did not give particular relevance to it and consequently, the bilateral relations were not
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particularly fruitful in the 1990s. However, it seems that for the newly independent and economically distressed Slovakia, the cost of partnership with an economically powerful UN member was way too high to be balanced by the friendship of a small and internationally isolated country in the Pacific Ocean. Therefore, Slovakia in the 1990s deliberately chose to secure China's diplomatic support and access to its vast
particularly fruitful in the 1990s. However, it seems that for the newly independent and economically distressed Slovakia, the cost of partnership with an economically powerful UN member was way too high to be balanced by the friendship of a small and internationally isolated country in the Pacific Ocean. Therefore, Slovakia in the 1990s deliberately chose to secure China's diplomatic support and access to its vast